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Military Aspects of German Unification Cited

AU0204130690 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 30 Mar 90 p 11

[Interview with Sergey Akhromeyev, marshal of the Soviet Union, by NOVOSTI correspondent Vladimir Ostrovskiy; place and date not given: "Looking for New Solutions"]

[Text] At [Bratislava] PRAVDA's request, Sergey Akhromeyev, marshal of the Soviet Union, adviser of the USSR president, granted an interview to Vladimir Ostrovskiy, NOVOSTI parliamentary correspondent, on some military aspects of the unification of Germany.

[Ostrovskiy] From the Western viewpoint, a united Germany must remain in NATO. What could you say about this? How can the GDR, if the idea of unification is implemented, retain its membership in the Warsaw Pact, in your opinion?

[Akhromeyev] I believe that the future united Germany cannot be a member of either military alliance, NATO or the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union is opposed to united Germany joining NATO; it does not advocate the reinforcement of the military alliance of states which, to this day, regard the Soviet Union as their potential enemy. It is necessary to look for new solutions, under which the Germany of the future would not be a member of any alliance. There exist various options. A united Germany could be neutral. The USSR had made this proposal right after the end of World War II. From 1945 up until 1959 the Soviet Union advocated a united, neutral, and democratic Germany.

There also exists the possibility of another solution, whereby the united Germany would be integrated in some other organization, an organization which would be hostile neither to the USSR nor to the United States, Great Britain, France, and other European states. I believe that it is necessary to look for such a solution. This issue will evidently be addressed by representatives of states at the two-plus-four conference.

[Ostrovskiy] Will the Soviet Union be reassured by the FRG's vague promise not to deploy any troops on GDR territory in the event of unification?

[Akhromeyev] A promise by the FRG, or even by the United States and other countries, not to deploy troops on GDR territory in the event of the unification of the two German states cannot satisfy us. First of all, it is only a promise. Second, even if such a statement were to be made by the NATO states as a bloc, we could not possibly get the necessary guarantees.

I have to draw attention to historical experience, which is very instructive. After the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles, the Rhineland (the area between the French and Belgian border and the Rhine) was demilitarized. In 1936, however, Hitlerite Germany violated these commitments and occupied this zone. And we all know what followed....

Likewise, we must not forget the fact that U.S. tactical nuclear systems are deployed on FRG territory, which will not disappear from there automatically in the event of German unification.

[Ostrovskiy] Given the international situation that has come about, do you not think that it would be appropriate if both military alliances—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—renounced their military functions and underwent a transformation into political organizations? According to J. Baker, the U.S. secretary of state, U.S. troops deployed in Europe serve mainly as a guarantee of Western security and a factor of stability in the area. Could we take a unilateral step, dissolve the Warsaw Pact, and thus make the continued presence of U.S. troops in Europe superfluous?

[Akhromeyev] We are advised rather often to eliminate something—i.e. to take unilateral steps. I believe that such a step would benefit neither our nor universal security. It does not take into consideration our justified concern about maintaining the Soviet Union's security at the necessary level.

Such one-sidedness would not be to our benefit. Good intentions tend to be more promising when they are implemented on a bilateral basis, all the more so when the security of states is at stake. On such a basis it is possible to effect a bilateral reduction of armed forces, equipment, and military expenditures. This would also guarantee equal security for both sides.

Also realistic would be the attainment of reliable security by means of reducing the military functions of the two military alliances. For the time being, however, the NATO states do not accept this. I must note that we proposed long ago that the possibility of transforming the two alliances be considered. So far, however, NATO does not want to take any radical decisions, let alone change its military doctrine. As is evident, the Soviet Union has shown sufficient goodwill and taken upon itself a formidable number of unilateral commitments for the problems of actual disarmament to get out of deadlock. Now it is the West's turn at disarmament negotiations. I rely on the Vienna talks in this respect, whose result could become palpably reflected in an enhancement of all-European security.

United Germany's 'Threat' to Europe Assessed

PM2203145090 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 10, 6-12 Mar 90 pp 12-14

[Professor Daniil Proektor article: "A Reunited Germany—a Threat to Europe?"]

[Text] Europe is changing again. Apparently, this continent is destined to be the most dynamic centre of the world. At the political U-turn it is approaching the Europeans must display the maximum skill to stay on the track. That turn starts the road into the 21st century.

On that road, we will have to take the most difficult tests. Perestroyka in this country will be the greatest of all. Its failure of success will greatly determine the further movement into Europe's future. The revolutions in East Europe have dealt a mortal blow to the system of management by command. But won't its ruins block the way?

The bankruptcy of the old system is accompanied by ideological quakes. The ideological vacuum in East European countries has to be filled with new values. Experience has shown that efforts to find them trigger social upheavals whose outcomes is hard to foresee. Yet, Europe's transition to a new quality has a sound basis. We have for far too long tried to see relations with it not the way they are, but the way we wanted them to be. With the passage of time more mature cooperation will be established. It will be normal and friendly, and without too much kissing and back-slapping on airfields!

Here is another test to be encountered on that way - the emergence in the western part of the continent of a united market, a new powerful economic and political centre. What will this mean for the rest of Europe? Will this centre also be a military centre? Will a future common market be Europe's fortress, or keep the doors to the East open, just as those to the West and the South? Lastly, won't it become a wind tunnel which would draw in the East European economies?

The demilitarization of Europe is one more test on that road. We feel most keenly today that the cold war has turned the continent into a military monster. Historians are still to find out whether jthat war was inevitable or a result of the incompetence, ambitions, fears and insane mutual mistrust. Whatever the case, Europe is breaking away from the cold war era, and Soviet policies have played the decisive role in this.

Indeed, Europe has been disarming itself, its good old militarism has been losing its previous authority and the european public does not regret this. And the most daring and independently-minded Europeans have suddenly had the idea that they can do without any blocs pretty well—how horrible! Moreover, the boldest ones suspect that it is much better to have no blocs than to have some.

So what is the problem? Nobody knows how to build that peaceful European home free of any blocs. By sheer instinct everybody finds oneself in the trap of the very same military idea, that of blocs, or rather their improved variant. It seems calmer and more stable that way.

This is probably the worst hurdle of all—militarism in people's minds. I fear that it will take much time to do away with it. In this we find particularly much conservatism and many dogmas. Both are archaic. Both are a sharp contrast to the new european thinking. Europe is being involved in a tremendous technological revolution, which is about to produce an informational community, and the more roadblocks of the outdated militry thinking we remove, the less problems we will have in the future. So far we have been only creating ever new difficulties in order to be able to rejoice in the future when we overcome them....

Let me mention yet another problem. One can hardly call it an obstacle, because its material form has collapsed. Merry crowds that on the night of November 9, 1989, gathered at the Berlin Wall, as formidable as despised just the other day and now fit for being taken apart for souvenirs, attended an event that could only be likened to the fall of the Bastille. That event heralded a new European era, and the very same minute one of the oldest European questions—the German one—acquired a new dimension.

A Question That 'Never Existed'

What is today called the German question has over the past two centuries become part and parcel of Europe's history. This is a fourth reshuffle of European forces in the 20th century connected with the german question. The first one took place at the beginning of the century. Two more occurred after the first and second world wars. The fourth one is happening today after the cold war. Although for a long time we kept saying that there is no German question any longer, it has made a loud knock on Europe's door.

Whereas the German question since the time of Bismark was in this way or another associated with militarism and wars, now the unique opportunity has opened up for achieving a peace settlement.

I'm certain that closer relations between the two German states and their eventual unification is historically natural, as natural as their emergence on German soil following the defeat of Nazism and the cold war. The lack of alternatives, vulgarization in politics, ambitions and the militarization of blocs surpassing any reasonable dimensions—all this insanity of the cold war era made the estrangement of Germans in the East and the West particularly grave. Today the march of events has taken the opposite direction and been picking up pace. The speed of change has puzzled even the most experienced political scientists in Europe and the Americas; everybody knew that something like this was bound to happen, but nobody ever guessed that it would be that quick.

Europe's Interests

Europe's most urgent need in the anticipation of Germany's unification is to guarantee the stability and security of all. True, the world is greatly changed. Both German states and the German people in general have over the past few decades shown their disgust with conflicts and wars. They have denounced, both in their own way and with different degrees of convincingness, their tragic national experience of totalitarianism, Nazism and aggression. Yet, one can understand those Europeans whose minds still carry the scars of two world wars launched from German soil.

Borders are number one question. I believe that all of them must acquire new guarantees. True, the quality of European borders has been changing considerably. In West Europe, they are rather symbolic already and will soon disappear altogether. In East Europe, including this country, they have been ever more penetrable. The military revision of borders becomes absurd as economic, technological and trading activities expand. No borders can stop this process.

Yet, many Europeans still have some sort of subconscious tension rooted in the images of the past. In this, utmost caution, care, and political delicacy are required.

Taste is fraught with many dangers. The GDR is already experiencing its negative effects. Therefore it seems that Hans Modrow's concept of Germany's multistage reunification (incidentally, it has much in common with Chancellor Kohl's ten-point plan) may lay a constructive basis on which to build up. However, bringing closer together and uniting the fundamentally different infrastructures of the two Germanys is a task that will require more than just a year.

Let me remind those who are obsessed with the storm of unification that revolutions are only easy to start. It was very simple to execute Louis XVI, or the Russian Tsar and his family. That is followed by the hard times of reforms, mistakes and sacrifices in efforts to "build a new world."

Taking into account the various political, economic and other interests of all countries and peoples connected with Germany's future is another necessity. There could hardly be any doubt that the surest way to achieve this is through developing the Helsinki process and building a "common European home." When the heads of state gather for Helsinki-2, that question will most probably be the focus of attention.

But can solutions be delayed? Revolutions in East Europe aimed against totalitarian rule and neo-Stalinism and driven by grass-roots pressure have been destroying ossified structures. This is an inevitable stage in building a common European home. It means comprehensive democratization.

Therefore, Germany's unification and an end to the split of Europe coupled with the full harmony of interests of all countries can be achieved only in the context of all European political freedom. Germany's future in today's world can be shaped only through consensus.

The freedom of political thought in that matter is practically unlimited. There is a long-established structure of treaties, commitments and declarations concerning German affairs—from the Potsdam agreement and the treaties concluded by the four Allied powers to Helsinki accords, Moscow treaty and the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin and others.

The general desire to include the German question into the all-European process and the systems of East-West relations has already led to negotiations among the FRG, the GDR, France, Britain, the USSR, and the USA (2 plus 4 formula) on the foreign aspects of German unity—including the security of neighboring countries. This method brings the best results—remove all fears and ensure that Germany should become the genuine centre of Europe's unification.

Germany and Military Blocs

Future Germany's attitude to alliances and organizations is the third aspect of German unification. Current changes in Europe have altered fundamentally the meaning and structure of military-political alliances. The Soviet Union has been unilaterally reducing its armed forces, and at requests from its allies, withdrawing troops from their territories. The Soviet Union and the United States have been negotiating a ceiling for their military presence in central Europe. The Vienna negotiations are in progress. Isn't all this evidence of the diminishing role of military force and military blocs?

It is still to be decided at what stage of that devaluation a united Germany can materialize. This leads to another series of questions. Won't future Germany become a member of NATO for some time? Will its western areas be affiliated to NATO and Eastern ones to the Warsaw Treaty Organization? Will it enter NATO but the military infrastructures of that alliance will not spread to the East where part of the Soviet troops will remain as a guarantee of security? Will the old-time ideas of neutral Germany prevail? Or will some kind of interim, so far unknown, option be found. It is too early to make any forecasts. Any of the suggested models has chances to gain universal recognition, all the more so that blocs are not immune to change, either.

As military and political alliances undergo change, they can gradually lose their role of instruments of confrontation, and to acquire new functions, those of cooperation, disarmament, defence strategy only, prevention of conflicts and negotiations on various European problems.

What Are We Afraid Of?

Our public has been widely debating some controversial issues.

For instance, some say that changes in East Europe mean that we have conceded the socialist camp to the capitalists and well-nigh betrayed the community. My answer is this: Such views stem from a dogmatic attitude to the European history of the past few decades. The administration-by-decree system planted in the East European countries increasingly came into conflict with the interests of a majority of their population. Their traditions, cultures, religions and centuries-old extensive ties with the West were alien to rude totalitarian methods. The prolonged presence of our troops in countries that didn't have to be protected from anybody, and the suppression of the "Prague spring", and the Hungarian revolution

aggravated the situation. "Fear spells respect" policies caused not just estrangement, but hatred.

In that situation the Soviet leadership made the only correct and farsighted move by admitting the East European countries' freedom of choice. The current processes in East Europe are painful, no denying that. They are only natural in eliminating the mistakes of the political strategy of totalitarianism. They are relieving us of the unbearable burden of foisting our friendship on those who do not want it, the only variety of friendship the command-and-administer system is capable of. They also release great resources and increase the chances for establishing normal relations with neighbouring countries.

Some say that we are losing strategic positions in East Europe. I cannot agree with this. For too long in the past we stuck to the archaic opinion that firm strategic positions can be guaranteed by deploying our troops in the territory of neighbouring countries, or moving borders as far away as possible so as to have some kind of a buffer zone. That led us to political failures more than once. The 1939 pact with Hitler, the division of East Europe, the 1939-40 war in Finland, and lastly, the war in Afghanistan were largely a result of such "strategic" imperial considerations.

What are the results? This strategy put us in opposition to our neighbours and the world community, and led to serious political and military setbacks, the loss of human life and increadible expenditures.

The truth is that we are not "losing" strategic positions in Europe, but on the contrary, strengthening them. We are returning our troops home, into a favourable environment and creating new incentives to easing the heavy military burden carried by the country and its people, and to gaining respect of our neighbours and the world community.

As far as "strategic considerations" are concerned, one should have understood long ago that in the era of long-range missiles, super-fast aircraft and comprehensive means of communication and intelligence, the customary ideas of "advantage" and "disadvantage" have been replaced by other categories. Those who still think in terms of World War I situation should update their views with the help of special literature published in this country and abroad.

The Soviet Union and Germany

We are also told that by taking the process of Germany's unification for granted, we are helping to establish a new powerful political, economic and military centre in the very heart of Europe, a centre that would pose a threat to us. How justified are these fears?

There is no doubt that the structure of Europe will change. Many new problems will arise. However, in this case it would be wrong to project the political categories of the past to the future. The quick democratization of Europe, the concept of a common European home, and the gradual transformation of West Europe into a confederation, as well as the tremendous growth of the economic and technological potentials have been changing the old ideas of rivalry and shifting the emphasis from military factors to economic and technological ones. A new Germany incorporated into an all-European system will not need a "Drive to Volga." On the contrary, its progress will hinge on peaceful cooperation, economic included.

I'm certain that we are capable of having a friendly Germany in the near future. The new thinking, perestroyka and reforms in this country are a key to success.

Some argue that we have been too quick to have agreed to the unification of the two German states. But this is just another evidence of how realistic our policy is and the awareness of what is expedient and what is not, what we can and what we cannot do.

The trend towards German unification is fast and does not depend on us. It reflects the will of a majority of the German people and is profoundly democratic. In a situation like this it would be useless to stand in the way.

We must lay the groundwork of good-neighbourly relations with future Germany now. We will need them very much. The Germans are unlikely to forget support granted them at a crucial moment in their history. Our clear-cut position is a prerequisite of constructive policies based on the recognition of the freedom of people's choice.

Lastly, one can hear this: this country lost millions of people in battles for the liberation of East Europe and now we have to leave. Aren't we betraying the memories of the dead? No, we are not. The heroic accomplishment of Europe's liberation has gone down in history. But vulgarization of ideology is unacceptable, particularly when the patriotic feelings of people are involved. Such methods run counter to international law.

The struggle for the liberation of Europe from Nazism and the presence of troops in foreign territory are totally different things. The former by no means implies the latter. If in the changed situation sovereign countries insist on the withdrawal of our troops, the country that must pull out its troops does not sustain any political or moral damage. It is its duty.

It will be soon half a century since the beginning of World War II. New generations have grown up. The memories of those days will live on. But policies cannot forever be built on reminiscences. I'm saying this as an active participant in the war against Nazism, and in the battles for the liberation of East Europe.

We are living in a new era of Europe, that of starting the building of a common European home. Comprehensive democratization and perestroyka can produce the main prerequisites for success. Europe is part of an integral world, and all of its countries are parts of a united,

integral Europe. The end of the cold war makes the unification of the two German states inevitable. This is an objective reality and for that reason we should start laying the groundwork of new friendly relations with our neighbour, great in its authority and history.

Yazov Interviewed on Germany, NATO, Lithuania

PM0304082690 Paris LE FIGARO in French 30 Mar 90 p 3

[Interview with Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov, by Laure Mandeville in Paris on 28 March]

[Text] [Mandeville] Some time ago Georgiy Arbatov, the analyst, expressed the idea that the greatest trick that Gorbachev had played on the West was to have deprived it of its enemy. If we look at things from the opposite angle, can we say that the Soviet Union no longer has any enemy and that it faces no military threat?

[Yazov] None of this happened by chance.... We began by introducing perestroyka into our economic relations, then into our political relations with foreign countries. We announced that we were in favor of disarmament in the conventional and nuclear arms spheres. Everybody was able to see that we were not in favor of war, but against it, and that we had no intention of attacking anybody. The aim was to enter a 21st century free from nuclear weapons. We have set the example.

Are we afraid of anybody? I would say no. First, because the Soviet Union is the Soviet Union—a state which is sufficiently strong. In addition, we realize that the international climate is much less tense and that nobody is preparing to attack us.

[Mandeville] Do you think that all threat has disappeared?

[Yazov] There is a potential threat and it will exist as long as there are different states and as long as private property exists. That is Marx's idea. But, nobody threatens the Soviet Union today. That is why we would like the military pacts to become political unions, and to move from confrontation to accord among nations.

[Mandeville] You therefore do not agree with General Gromov when he criticizes Mikhail Gorbachev's disarmament policy and expresses the view that NATO is still a danger for the Soviet Union?

[Yazov] Gromov writes that it is too soon to disarm. This means that there are still forces which can threaten the USSR. I think that, too. We want reduction, not complete disarmament. It is too soon.

[Mandeville] But do you think the time has come to dismantle the alliances?

[Yazov] I think so. Of course, not at a stroke. We first want to give these alliances a political character, then we will be able to reach accord among nations.

[Mandeville] With what can the military alliances be replaced?

[Yazov] With accord.

[Mandeville] But with what security system?

[Yazov] This system already exists. It is that of the United Nations. The various UN institutions should set up the new system. It is through them that we found agreement on the war in Afghanistan, on the Iran-Iraq conflict, and so forth.

[Mandeville] Can a unified Germany become a threat to the Soviet Union?

[Yazov] I think that the dialogue which we want to conduct at the four-plus-two conference will permit us to receive guarantees that a united Germany will not threaten France, Britain, or the Soviet Union. If it were to threaten somebody, we would have to have ways of acting to remove that threat.

[Mandeville] What is your assessment of the Genscher plan which makes provision for Germany to enter NATO, while envisaging the maintenance of Soviet forces on the territory of the former GDR for a transitional period?

[Yazov] A united Germany, with 80 million inhabitants, could not enter NATO. if it did, it would be against the Soviet Union. Was the NATO bloc not formed to oppose the Warsaw Pact? Or, more precisely, it was the pact which was created in response to NATO.

[Mandeville] How will the Soviets solve the Lithuanian problem? Why are Soviet troops there? Is there no other way of settling this crisis?

[Yazov] The Soviet Union and Lithuania currently still belong to the same state. The Congress of People's Deputies has not recognized Lithuania's declaration of independence. A solution must be found for leaving the Union.

For almost 50 years, Lithuania has developed within a unified economic complex. The whole USSR, all its republics, have constructed many factories in Lithuania—nuclear power stations, and so forth. How can all that be divided? What should Lithuania pay to the other republics? More than 1 million Russians and Poles live there. Have they been asked whether they want to live in a bourgeois republic?

Only 41 percent of people voted in the elections. And only 26 percent voted for Sajudis. Twenty six percent is not 100 percent.... The people of Lithuania do not want to leave the Soviet Union.

[Mandeville] But you said the opposite yesterday....

At this point in the conversation, General Yazov stood up and ended the interview. On Tuesday, he had said: "The Lithuanians can leave the USSR. But they must first pay their debts. They cannot simply slam the door."

United States & Canada

NSA Opposes Trans-USSR Fiber Optic Link

PM2703100790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
27 Mar 90 Second Edition p 6

[Own correspondent V. Gan dispatch: "It Is Hard To Get Out of the Rut. Dissonance Within the U.S. Administration"]

[Text] Washington, 26 Mar—The more rapidly the changes take place in the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe, the more painful the process of revising the dogmas and stereotypes of the "cold war" period becomes for official Washington. That is probably how one can regard the fairly frequent interdepartmental squabbles provoked by disagreements over how ossified political views should be changed, to what extent, and how fast.

The latest example is that presented by the theoretically rare bipartisan action taken by more than 100 members of the U.S. House of Representatives, who signed a letter to Secretary of State J. Baker, Defense Secretary R. Cheney, and Secretary of Commerce R. Mosbacher. In this letter the legislators complain that the U.S. Administration is not displaying due flexibility and effectiveness in reforming trading relations with East European states. Describing the entire procedure for issuing American companies with export licenses as "outmoded," the writers of the letter demanded a fundamental break with the principles and practice of discriminatory restrictions on trade with the East and the revision of the entire system of control within the framework of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls—the organization of leading Western countries which coordinates export policy.

But other voices can also be heard. Among them, America's National Security Agency [NSA] has had its say. Under this department's leadership opposition has taken shape within the Bush administration to the plans to extend across the Soviet Union a fiber optic line of communications which would unite Western Europe with the countries of the Pacific Ocean region, primarily Japan. It is intended that use of this state-of-the-art communications technology would help meet ever increasing demands for telephone and other information links. Moreover, the consortium of companies headed by the firm "U.S. West" envisages that the Soviet Union could also utilize this line to improve its internal telephone communications.

Since businessmen need to obtain the administration's permission to implement the plan, the NSA entered the game; the agency categorically objects to "deliveries of progressive technology" to the USSR. It objects because the Soviet Union's current telephone communications technology, which is considered primitive in comparison with world standards, quite "suits" the NSA, which listens to telephone conversations in our country. The establishment of a fiber optic line of communication, its representatives argue, would jeopardize the "invaluable harvest of information and vast capital investments in NSA satellites."

U.S. Election Body Meets Soviet Counterparts

PM2903143490 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
24 Mar 90 Moscow Evening Edition p 4

[Unidentified TASS correspondent report: "Interest In Our Elections"]

[Text] It seems that in America, unlike ourselves, people are more mistrustful of the promises of would-be parliamentarians. Of course, it is possible to promise the voters mountains of gold during the election campaign and to do precious little later, but politicians of this kind have no future. This was explained in the course of a talk given in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet 23 March by John McGarry, a member of the U.S. Federal Election Commission, which is in Moscow at the invitation of the Central Electoral Commission for Elections of USSR People's Deputies.

The conversation turned on who had secured victory in the present elections to the Russian parliament. Giving explanations, T.G. Ivanova, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, remarked that in some regions it was precisely those candidate deputies who were able to speak beautifully and make big promises who had won. Was the fact that in some places the voters were stunned by a resounding phrase, behind which no serious program for extricating society from its current difficult state can be discerned, the reason that few workers and peasants were elected to the Russian parliament?

Well, the question is to some extent rhetorical. The notorious "quota system" for deputies' seats has ended, but by no means everyone has mastered political ethics. At the same time, as was emphasized in the talk, many new people have entered the Russian parliament as well, with a fresh view and their own vision of reality. Whether the polarized forces can be successfully consolidated and channeled in constructive directions is a question posed by life itself, by perestroyka.

These ideas met with deep understanding from the Americans. It was rightly observed by the delegation members that the Russian Federation has all the potential for moving more actively into the outside world, in particular for developing wider relations with various U.S. states. The strengthening Soviet-American relations were called "a fine lesson in mutual understanding" by the head of the delegation, Lee Elliott, chairman of the U.S. Federal Election Commission.

On the previous day the U.S. Federal Election Commission delegation visited the IZVESTIYA offices. The guests inquired about the progress of perestroyka, the practical implementation of the Soviet electoral system, in particular the procedure for carrying out elections of

deputies to republican and local organs of state power, and who monitors the observance of the electoral legislation of the USSR and the union republics, and how. At the the American side's request, the paper's chief editor, I.D. Laptev, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee, talked about the role of the Soviet mass media in the implementation of political and economic reforms in our country and the contribution of IZVESTIYA staff to the development of the processes of glasnost and democratization.

The chairmen of the USSR and RSFSR Central Electoral Committees, V.P. Orlov and V.I. Kazakov, took part in the discussions.

New York Protest Over Jewish Emigration Viewed

LD0204153190 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] On Sunday a crowd of 100,000 demonstrated in front of the United Nations Headquarters building in New York to demand that Moscow create more favorable conditions for the departure of Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union. As befits any civilized state the Soviet Union has recognized the right of its citizens to live where they want, writes our commentator Oleg Shchedrov. Thousands of people have used the right and have already left the country. There are no problems in this respect, but problems do exist in another area.

One gets the impression that the stream of Jewish emigrants is being channelled to Israel. There might be no problem in this regard either, but the Israeli leaders are planning to settle the new arrivals in the occupied Arab lands. Arabs are naturally gravely concerned, and so are we.

By the way there have appeared frequent calls to Moscow to restrict the outflow of Jews in general. Palestinian extremists have also stepped up their activities, they have threatened terrorist acts against the airlines that take Soviet Jews to Israel, for example the Hungarian Malev airline.

Of course the Soviet Union won't back (up?). Freedom of choosing the place of residence is an inalienable right of every person, but I think the people who are worried about the problems of Jewish emigration should rather direct their questions to the states to create real not fictional obstacles on this path, concludes our commentator Oleg Shchedrov.

Shevardnadze Meets Time Inc. Group

LD0204180890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 2 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Comrade Shevardnadze today received a group of representatives of the American company Time Incorporated, led by McManus, editor-in-chief of the publishers. The conversation touched on general problems of Soviet-U.S. relations and also matters relating to the forthcoming visit by Comrade Shevardnadze to Washington. Petrovskiy, deputy foreign minister of the USSR, took part in the conversation, on the Soviet side. [video shows Shevardnadze, Petrovskiy, and Gerasimov at meeting.]

U.S. Acting Charge Received at Foreign Ministry

PM0204140990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] A.A. Bessmertnykh, USSR first deputy minister of foreign affairs, received J. Joyce, U.S. charge d'affaires ad interim in the USSR, at the latter's request 21 March.

Questions connected with the current talks on strategic offensive weapons and a number of questions pertaining to bilateral Soviet-American relations were discussed.

China

New Taiwanese President, Political Change Viewed

PM2603134990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Own correspondent Yu. Savenkov dispatch: "On the Other Side of the Formosa Strait"]

[Text] Beijing—Li Teng-hui (67) has been elected Taiwanese president for a six-year term, having won an absolute majority of votes in the National Assembly, which meets once every six years exclusively to choose the president.

Li Teng-hui, head of the current Taiwanese administration, is a devout Christian and an economist interested in agriculture.

Now, following the National Assembly's ratification of Vice President Li Yuan-tsu—who was hand-picked by the president and had been chief of his office—a new stage of political transformation is clearly beginning in Taiwan.

This process will not be easy. On the one hand, the opposition—which last December took part for the first time in elections to parliament and local organs of power—and above all the Democratic Progress Party [DPP] are demanding more realistic reforms. The DPP recently stated that it believes it could win power by the year 2000, bearing in mind its real success in the December elections. On the other hand, the Kuomintang old guard does not want to surrender its positions and is agreeing merely to pluralism administered in small doses.

An acute problem is presented by the National Assembly itself. It is a unique anachronism with hardly a counterpart anywhere in the world. "Imagine President Bush

conducting his election campaign in old people's homes, or Margaret Thatcher, in order to bolster her majority in the House of Commons, seeking the support of those who were elected 40 years ago and had supported Winston Churchill," an observer for Hong Kong's SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST asked.

But in order to win his mandate President Li has to win the support of the "old people's homes." The overwhelming majority of the National Assembly are those who were elected in various provinces of China back in the late forties—that is, before the formation of the PRC. Since then they have naturally not been reelected and hold their seats for life. Li Teng-hui's attempts to retire some of them by offering them substantial pensions have not met with success. If a deputy dies, by established tradition his seat is taken by the person who in the 1948 elections came second, or third... Moreover, this time certain octogenarians even attempted to suggest alternative candidates, and one of them was the last surviving son of Chiang Kai-shek! Only the delicate diplomacy of Li Teng-hui and his supporters averted a split.

There have been cases of violence in the streets, smashed windows, and people injured in clashes with the police. For a week 6,000 students took over a park in central Taipei, demanding faster democratization and the release of political prisoners. This major student demonstration ended peacefully after the president told the students that he would accept all their demands which will benefit the nation. The students announced the creation of a coalition which will monitor the implementation of the promised reforms and brief the population. For his part, the president issued a written statement of his adherence to democracy and promised to convene an emergency conference before July with the participation of representatives of all circles in order to discuss Taiwan's future political structure.

Speaking at a session of the Chinese National People's Congress in Beijing, State Council Premier Li Peng reaffirmed yet again his adherence to the policy of peaceful reunification with Taiwan on the basis of the "one country, two systems" concept. Noting the positive trends in the development of relations between the population on both sides of the Formosa Strait, he regretted the fact that the Taiwanese authorities are stubbornly hewing to anticommunist positions and rejecting peace talks. It is particularly galling, the premier said, that certain people on the island have recently launched a "movement for Taiwanese independence and are openly advocating its separation from the motherland. The Chinese Government cannot remain indifferent to this."

PRC Foreign Minister Holds Press Conference

LD3103170690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Correspondent V. Kulikov report; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen has held a press conference for the Chinese and foreign journalists covering the session of the Chinese parliament—the National People's Congress—in Beijing.

The extremely concise international affairs section of the premier's report to the session could not wholly assuage the interest in the PRC's foreign policy. Furthermore, a visit to Moscow by a representative Chinese delegation is scheduled for April. It was with this that the press conference began:

[Begin recording] [Qian Qichen in Chinese with superimposed Russian translation by Kulikov] We would like this visit to promote the continued development of our post-normalization relations. We hope that an important step forward will be made on economic matters and on the question of reducing the level of military confrontation on the border, as well as in other spheres. The prospects for this are good.

Chinese journalists were also interested in various aspects of Sino-Soviet relation, and not least in border issues.

Since our relations were normalized, talks have begun on cutting the armed forces on the Sino-Soviet border. The aim of these has been to reduce the armed forces to a level that is in keeping with normal relations between two countries. At the present time, guiding principles for reducing the armed forces and for strengthening confidence in the military sphere are being worked out. The border situation is stable. [end recording]

The PRC minister was less optimistic when, replying to a correspondent from the United States, he touched on Sino-U.S. relations, which, according to Chinese Premier Li Peng, are currently marked by difficulties and zig-zags. This, the PRC foreign minister replied, is a consequence of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing granting political asylum to Fang Lizhi, a Chinese citizen, who, in the opinion of the Chinese side, has broken PRC law, and also of the discriminatory measures taken by the U.S. Congress in the sphere of Sino-U.S. economic and trade relations.

Minister Describes Growing USSR-PRC Trade

90UI0452A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 15 Mar 90 p 3

[Report on interview with K.F. Katushev, USSR minister of foreign economic relations and head of a Soviet Government delegation to the PRC, by TASS correspondent V. Kashirov: "...But Could Be More Fruitful"]

[Text] Beijing—"During our visit to the PRC we saw for ourselves once again that Soviet-Chinese cooperation is developing on a firm foundation of mutual interest, including in the sphere of trade and economic relations. This is largely connected with the results of M.S. Gorbachev's visit to China last May."

Having made a positive assessment of the results of the visit to China of a delegation he led and the results of the Soviet-Chinese negotiations in Beijing, K.F. Katushev said that the meeting of ministers of the two countries in charge of foreign economic relations and foreign trade, held after a 30-year break, was very fruitful.

"We summed up," the minister observed, "the great amount of preparatory work which had been performed by both parties and determined the structure and volume of commodity turnover for 1990, which will be 36 percent greater than the level of supplies actually achieved according to the 1989 protocol.

"Machinery and equipment," K.F. Katushev continued, "will account for 55 percent of the supplies of Soviet commodities to China. Power engineering and aviation equipment will constitute a sizable proportion of this group of goods. China's need for mechanical engineering products is determined by the rapid development of the PRC's electric power engineering and air transport. We will continue to supply China with considerable quantities of such commodities as ferrous metal rolled products, pig iron, aluminum, lumber, and carbamide.

"As far as PRC commodities which will be exported this year to the Soviet Union are concerned, industrial consumer goods and foodstuffs of which our domestic consumer market is experiencing a shortage will, at the suggestion of the Chinese side, constitute 80 percent of their total. We will also purchase in China consumer durables and raw material commodities sorely needed by our economy.

"The structure of Soviet-Chinese commodity turnover," the minister went on to observe, "graphically testifies that our trade reflects the mutually complementary nature of the two countries' industrial and agricultural production. This is a factor of the continued expansion of trade, border trade included, the establishment of diverse mutually profitable forms of economic cooperation and the development of economic relations between individual regions of the USSR and the PRC. Unfortunately, we are unable as yet to engage this factor at full strength.

"During our time in China we negotiated on a broad range of issues of the present state and further development of bilateral trade with Zheng Tuobin, PRC minister of foreign economic relations and foreign trade, and looked at the future of our economic interaction in a comprehensive discussion with Gan Ziyou, deputy chairman of the PRC State Planning Committee. We shared the opinion that Soviet-Chinese trade and economic relations have sound prospects and that it is essential to make fuller use of their potential for the good of the peoples of our countries. In this connection we agreed on the joint implementation of a number of important measures pertaining to the development of cooperation in the investment sphere.

Northeast Asia

PRAVDA Cited on Arms Reduction in Asia

SK0304114790 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 1 Apr 90

[Text] Is it possible that the experience obtained in the USSR-U.S. arms reduction talks for achieving mutually acceptable agreement can be applied to the Asian-Pacific region? Ovchinnikov, PRAVDA political commentator, answered this question in a recently carried article as follows.

As has been known, the Soviet Union has given a positive answer to this question. Moscow's call for a collective discussion of the issue of security, trust, and cooperation constitutes the purport of the Soviet initiatives it put forward at (?Vladivostok) in 1986 and Krasnoyarsk in 1988.

The prevailing view in Washington is that the position of promoting trust and security that has been brought forth in Europe is not yet applicable to Asia and that the Soviet military threat in the Asian-Pacific region has not diminished.

Washington is avoiding dialogue with Moscow for two reasons. First, the position of [word indistinct] the United States holds in the Asian-Pacific region at present is appropriate for Washington. Second, maintaining the superiority it holds on the sea, the United States [words indistinct] balance with the Soviet Union on land.

The Asian-Pacific region is a clear [words indistinct] for the prospective U.S. world strategy. Taking into consideration the U.S. military bases in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, and (?adding) the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to the U.S. forces in the Pacific region, the United States and Japan enjoy superiority over the Soviet Union in this region, with a troop size more than double that of the Soviet Union, with (?almost four times) as many large warships, and with more than double the number of strategic and naval assault fighter aircraft. Here it should be taken into account that reform in the Soviet military policy on the principle of a (?balanced) defense is under way both westward and eastward.

The Soviet Union proposed a comprehensive program aimed at promoting peace, security, and cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region (?4) years ago, and all the problems contained in this program still maintain their rationale today.

As for [words indistinct] and the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, positive developments have been made. The Soviet Union has faithfully carried out the Geneva agreement on Afghanistan. The Vietnamese forces have left Cambodia. In these countries, political coordination based on national reconciliation is continuously explored.

The way to reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula has also come forth. The Soviet Union and China joined the [word indistinct] agreement without delay. The Soviet Union deals positively with the idea of the ASEAN countries on declaring Southeast Asia a nuclear-free zone.

For the future of the Asian-Pacific region, the countries in this region should find a proper balance in their interests, and when necessary, should subordinate their interests to the overall interests.

MVD Troops Chief Comments on New Law

LD0204133890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1245 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 2 April (TASS)—By decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR law "on the duties and rights of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] internal troops while protecting public order" has come into force. Its adoption, Yuriy Shatalin, chief of the USSR MVD internal troops, considers, was caused by the need to give a legislative basis to the procedure for employing internal troops and to the use by their personnel of weapons and special means.

Previously, he noted in an interview to a TASS correspondent, the introduction of internal troops was implemented by decision of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and only in particular cases—with the agreement of the USSR Council of Ministers. Now, in accordance with the new law, the decision to employ internal troops is taken by the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs at the request of the Council of Ministers of the appropriate union or autonomous republic, or with the agreement of the USSR Council of Ministers with compulsory examination of the given issue with the Council of Ministers of the appropriate union or autonomous republic, or in implementation of a decree by the USSR president.

During discussion of the law, USSR people's deputies inter alia raised the question of manning units deployed on the territory of the republics on an ethnic basis. This is already being done, the general disclosed. Individual military collectives already comprise 15 percent or more representatives of native ethnicity. However, in a number of republics, in his opinion, given the situation which has arisen, such an order of manning is impossible. It will create serious difficulties in employing troops.

General Shatalin also considers the people's deputies' formulation of the question of manning the internal troops on a voluntary basis to be correct and apposite. At the present time, he said, at the order of the USSR minister of internal affairs the necessary calculations for manning the posts of soldiers and sergeants on a voluntary basis are being carried out. Foreign experience is being studied. Despite the fact that the cost of maintaining the internal troops when they transfer to a professional basis, according to specialists' calculations, will increase five-fold, people's deputies are insisting on the allocation of the necessary means. Therefore already in the course of 1990-1991 an experimental transfer to a professional basis of the personnel of a company and five units will be made. The mixed principle of manning will also be applied.

Progress Seen in Easing Tension in Asia

SK3003020690 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 27 Mar 90

[Text] The process of active reform taking place in Europe is crushing the structure of military confrontation and is shaking the strategic idea on this continent which seemed to be resolute and firm even yesterday. However, such reform appears to be far away in Asia.

Concerning this, a commentator of KRASNYA ZVEZDA writes as follows: The Soviet Union is making as much effort in Europe as in Asia to crush the deadlock in solving problems. However, the course of relaxing tensions in Asia is remarkably slower than in Europe.

A number of proposals made by the Soviet Union to the United States and Japan to lower the level of military confrontation in the Asian region failed to meet with understanding.

However, it appears that progress is being made in this matter. In a congressional committee, Solarz, a U.S. congressman, stated that it is now time to take steps to manage the armed forces in the Asian-Pacific region and stressed that the Soviet Union, not the United States, is striving to attain such a goal. He also called for holding talks on naval forces. The U.S. congressmen handed down a directive to the Pentagon to prepare a report on the military and political situation in the Asia-Pacific region by early April. Thus, they suggested that the issue of reducing military expenditure for this region is a matter for their interest.

There is also an indication of a new attitude in Tokyo. For example, in a speech at the parliament, Prime Minister Kaifu said that Japan is ready to welcome an international conference on the issue of security in the Asia-Pacific region. His appeal may cause a certain degree of expectation. However, his appeal failed to evoke any (?response). Assertions were put forward during a hearing in the U.S. Congress which stressed that because U.S. troops in Asia are contributing to maintaining security in this area, Washington need not reduce its active naval forces.

The Japanese prime minister also hastily put forward a conditional assertion that the United States and Japan should continue their defense efforts because the situation in Asia is still strained.

As for Japan, its military expenditure is increasing each year by 6 percent on an average. In terms of this index, Japan ranks third in the world. A French magazine also wrote that the Japanese Navy is again gradually growing

into an oceanic fleet and its Army has also surpassed the range of defense a long time ago.

For example, the "Team Spirit," an annual military mobilization exercise between the United States and South Korea which began 14 March, shows that the Pentagon has no intention of reducing its active armed forces in Asia. The Pentagon has again completed a scenario for another large-scale (?event) in Asia.

Furthermore, Rimpacex, a multinational mobilization exercise, will be conducted on the broad seas of the Pacific from 2 April to 21 May with the participation of the United States, Japan, South Korea, Canada and Australia.

The negative factors taking place in the politics of some nations hinder the relaxation of tension in Asia. Nevertheless, an indication that confrontation will be removed from this area has begun to appear.

CPSU Greets Japanese Socialist Party Congress

LD0204123590 Moscow TASS in English 1135 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 2 TASS—The Soviet Communist Party Central Committee has sent a message of greetings to the delegates to the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) 55th congress and wished the congress every success.

"The ties of comradeship between our two parties serve mutual understanding and good-neighbourly relations between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Japan, the establishment of a safe and stable world order, and constructive processes in the Asia-Pacific region," the message said.

The JSP congress opens on Tuesday.

Radio Moscow Interviews Japanese Businessmen

OW2303064090 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 20 Mar 90

[From the "Friendship and Good-Neighborly Relations" program; interview in Moscow with Tsunekazu Ishihara and Ryo Kagawa, respectively chief audio-visual producer of Tidic Co. Ltd., and deputy chief editor of Ascii Co. Ltd., by Moscow Radio reporter (Didro); date not given]

[Excerpts] Radio Moscow reporter (Didro) recently interviewed Tsunekazu Ishihara, chief producer at the Audio-Visual [AV] Department of the AV Project Division of Tidic Co. Ltd., and Ryo Kagawa, deputy chief editor of the Editorial Department and [words indistinct] at the No. 3 Editorial Control Department of the Publication Division of Ascii Co. Ltd., at the International Trade Center on a new type of Soviet-Japanese trade cooperation. First the interview with Mr. Tsunekazu Ishihara of Tidic Co. Ltd.

[Begin recording] [Ishihara] Our company is in the business of computer software, particularly [words indistinct] in computer games. I returned today after concluding a contract on [words indistinct] in computer games.

[(Didro)] What was the contract worth? Could you tell us if it is not a secret?

[Ishihara] I cannot discuss it since the contract states that the content of the contract is confidential. What I can say, however, is that I have returned after concluding a contract on the acquisition of computer game software from an enterprise called [words indistinct] which is under the Science and Technology Corporation.

[(Didro)] Does this mean that computer games in Japan will become enriched as a result of the contract?

[Ishihara] Well, there are so many kinds of computer games offered in Japan. I think the software acquired will augment the group.

[(Didro)] Do you think Soviet computer games are interesting?

[Ishihara] Well, the games are very good in basic concepts. I think the software I got this time is also very interesting.

[(Didro)] How long have you been here in Moscow this time?

[Ishihara] I have been here for eight days.

[(Didro)] Have you been able to see outside corporations like [words indistinct]?

[Ishihara] They were first rate.

[(Didro)] As I recall—I think it was last year or the year before that—a new computer game for young people was imported into Japan from the Soviet Union and became very popular in Japan. Right?

[Ishihara] Yes, it was a game called Tetris. The Tetris game became very popular. It was something. For the first time in the history of computer games, a computer game became available on all machines of the world, including those in penny arcades, personal computers, and word processors. Such a popularization of a computer game was the first such experience. Since the game was designed by people of the USSR Academy of Sciences Computer Center, the whole world looks forward to the Soviet Union coming up with a new game to follow Tetris. Consequently many people from other countries such as the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Hungary have come to the Soviet Union to look for new software to follow Tetris. [passage omitted] [end recording]

[Announcer] You have the remarks of Mr. Tsunekazu Ishihara of Tidic Company, Ltd. I would like you to hear from Ryo Kagawa of Ascii Company, Ltd.

[Begin recording] [(Didro)] Mr Kagawa, how many times have you been here before?

[Kagawa] This is my first trip.

[(Didro)] What kind of company is Ascii?

[Kagawa] It is a Japanese company devoted to developing software, publishing books and journals on computers, and designing semiconductors. In other words, it is a computer business.

[(Didro)] What kind of business are you doing with the Soviet Union?

[Kagawa] This time I am accompanying Mr Ishihara. I was able to see in many places what is being done in software development. I think the potential here is great. Even in Japan six, seven, or eight years ago, computers were not used much. The degree of computer use growth in the Soviet Union is greater than that seen in Japan several years ago. There are so many people who are so good with computers and computer programs in the Soviet Union. My impression is that the Soviets will become major rivals as well as good companions for us. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Press Conference on New ROK Air Route

LD0204222790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1607 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 2 Apr (TASS)—"The opening of a new air route will help to expand and deepen the ties between the peoples of our countries," Khen-Sek, general director of the main civil aviation administration of the South Korean Ministry of Transportation said at a press conference held here today devoted to the start of direct air communications between the USSR and South Korea.

The air bridge linking the two capitals operates on the basis of an agreement signed by Korean Air and Aeroflot in February. Flights on the 8,000-km route will be made once a week. The agreement also ultimately envisages cargo flights on the new route.

Spokesmen for the South Korean airline told journalists that they hope to establish direct routes to Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia.

North Korean Economy, Politics Profiled

90UF0028A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 13, 31 Mar-6 Apr 90 pp 4, 5

[Article by A. Mashin: "North Korea: Legend and Reality"]

[Text] The rapid development of events in East Europe, which has affected even Albania, has stirred readers' interest in our Asiatic neighbors also, specifically the DPRK. It is difficult piecing together an integral picture of the situation in the DPRK from the fragmentary press reports because detailed economic statistics are not published there and most important political decisions are adopted by the country's leadership in an atmosphere of secrecy, and events of the past are frequently interpreted in isolation from the general historical context. It is difficult separating the authentic facts from the politicized legend and purging them of the veneer of propaganda.

History Without Myths

From 1910 through 1945 Korea was in the position of a Japanese colony. Its liberation occurred at the end of World War II in the course of concerted military operations against the Japanese forces conducted by the Soviet and American commands north and south, respectively, of the temporary line of demarcation in the area of the 38th parallel. The "cold war" and the confrontation of the United States and the USSR thwarted the allies' understanding concerning the restoration of Korea's independence and territorial integrity. The line of demarcation became in 1948 the border between the separate states of the Republic of Korea in the south and the DPRK in the north of the Korean peninsula. The country's division was the first cause of the 1950-1953 military conflict in Korea and the military-political tension which persists there to this day.

The decisive role in Korea's liberation in August 1945 was performed by the Soviet Army. Several Korean guerrilla formations entered the country and began operations together with it. It is said that one such detachment was commanded in the rank of captain of the Soviet Army by Kim Il-song, the present president of the DPRK and general secretary of the Korean Worker's Party Central Committee.

"The great leader of the Korean people, brilliant strategist, and legendary commander of steel," Kim Il-song was born in the hamlet of Mangyongdae not far from Pyongyang on 15 April 1912 (the date is celebrated as a national holiday). According to official biographical material, even in 1926—that is, at the age of 14—he was head of "a real communist revolutionary organization, the Union for the Overthrow of Imperialism." In the 1930's he succeeded on the basis of a small armed detachment in creating an entire guerrilla army. In August 1945, North Korean historians maintain, this army under the command of Kim Il-song "established ties to units of the Soviet Army" and in several lightning assaults liberated North Korea from Japanese imperialism.

Subsequently, having come to head (with the blessing of J. Stalin) the country and the party, Kim Il-song, as the official press writes, "was victorious over American imperialism in the 1950-1953 war and then undertook the successful building of socialism in the DPRK." The Soviet reader is less familiar, evidently, with the scientific-theoretical and philosophical aspect of Kim Il-song's activity and his contribution to the development of Marxism-Leninism. Let us therefore quote from a book published in Pyongyang "Kim Il-songism—Theory and Practice." A hundred years ago, it says, "thinking

people went to Germany, the birthplace of Marx, the leader of the international workers movement of that time, and at the start of the 20th century they made for Russia, where Lenin led history's first socialist revolution. So today thinking people of the world visit with hope Korea, where the great leader President Kim Il-song, national hero, genius of the revolution and building, brilliant thinker and theoretician, leader of the world revolution of the present day, shining light and standard-bearer of the struggle, is to be found."

Triumph of Ideas and the Prosaic Side of Life

The DPRK may be called a Kim Il-song museum. Portraits and bronze and gilt sculptures of him are everywhere. There is an imposing monument personifying the ideas of Kim Il-song (chuche).

Unquestioning devotion to the leader is the principal criterion of the merits of the country's citizens. His instructions are carefully studied. Everyone, young and old, wears on his chest a badge with Kim Il-song's portrait. The shape of the badge determines affiliation to this public organization or the other and even social status. All Koreans know from the mass media and many are convinced that it is only thanks to the leader that they are living best of all and in the happiest country in the world. Maintaining this image within the country and overseas does not come cheap: Approximately $4.5 billion was spent in Pyongyang over four years on the construction of prestigious buildings and sports grounds for the 1989 World Festival of Youth and Students.

However, not that good a life of the ordinary people is discerned behind the outward prosperity. There is a shortage of food, clothing, medicines, and other most elementary things. Uncertainty, concern, and weariness are perceived increasingly in the mood of the population. The adult's day is loaded with work, and in the evening political classes or hours-long rehearsals for a gala procession are in prospect. Calls for people to volunteer their labor for state building are carried by loudspeakers to the sound of marches and in the light of searchlights.

Our esteemed V. Kabaidze was right when he said at the 19th party conference that North Korea was building rapidly. But it is evidently necessary to reflect on the kind of price. Of course, labor is "cheap" if much is done in all-hands-to-the-pump fashion, by hand and with the minimum of construction equipment. However, construction is only a particular instance of the general economic situation. The DPRK economy is based on methods with which we are well acquainted from the experience of the 1930's and 1940's.

The Korean press is constantly carrying reports on victories on the economic front, but avoids corroboration thereof with detailed figures for the plans are frequently unfulfilled. Thus it was only in 1986 that the country managed to achieve the indicators which had been planned for 1984 and produce 4.5 million tons of steel, 47 million tons of coal, 8.5 million tons of pig iron, 9 million tons of cement, 550 million square meters of cloth, and 5.5 million tons of rice. The indicators envisaged for 1990 have now been carried over to the final year of the Third Seven-Year Plan (1987-1993).

Western specialists do not take the economic achievements announced by the DPRK as fact and evaluate skeptically the prospects for fulfillment of the next plan also. Noting the decline in production in the basic sectors of industry, they believe that the economic growth rate in 1987-1988 was not more than two percent per annum. The reasons for the crisis state of the economy are the chronic shortage of energy and raw material, the inefficient management system, and the high military spending (up to 30 percent of the annual budget). The inadequate development of exports is reflected in the DPRK's incapacity for paying off its foreign debt to Western countries, which, it is variously estimated, constitutes from $3 billion to $4.5 billion (the debt to the Soviet Union as of 1 November 1989 was R2.2 billion).

Perestroyka North Korean-Style

Analyzing the DPRK's situation, Western experts believe that factors of an internal and external order should be prompting the North Korean leadership to a restructuring of its policy. In their opinion, events in East Europe, in Romania particularly (which are barely covered in the DPRK press), point to the consequences to which the accumulation of domestic political malaise could lead unless ways to overcome the economic stagnation are found.

Also fraught with negative consequences for the DPRK is the weakening of its positions in the economic competition with South Korea. Given a population (1988) of 21.9 million in the north and 42.6 million in the south, the gross domestic product of the two countries in 1987 amounted to $20.5 and $121.3 billion, respectively. The rate of growth of South Korea's economy here amounted in 1987-1988 to 11 percent. South Korea's positions in the international arena are strengthening, and policy in respect of the socialist countries is being stimulated. Diplomatic relations were established in 1988-1989 with Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia.

Nor, objectively, is the DPRK interested in military-political confrontation with South Korea, which provokes dangerous tension in the Far East. There is a growing understanding in the USSR, the United States, the PRC, and Japan of the need for a joint search for paths of a peaceful settlement on the Korean peninsula based on a balance of the interests of all parties, the DPRK and South Korea included, which are called on to play their positive part in this process.

The solution of economic and political problems of the DPRK is a subject of particular concern to the Korean leadership. For this reason Pyongyang, observing events in East Europe, is proceeding from the fact that lasting political stability as they understand it may be secured only by way of the gradual transfer of power by inheritance within the framework of the evolved structures.

Currently President Kim Il-song exercises leadership of the main directions of state activity, whereas responsibility for the day-to-day operation of the party and state machinery is entrusted to his son Kim Chong-il, who is a member of the Presidium of the Politburo of the Korean Workers Party Central Committee and secretary of the Central Committee and member of the Military Committee of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party. It is possible that in the near future even Kim Chong-il will officially hold higher state office. Happiness and prosperity, the book "Kim Chong-il—Leader of the People" says, are guaranteed the Korean people "as long as dear Comrade Kim Chong-il, the great thinker and theoretician, outstanding genius of leadership, infinitely bounteous teacher of the people, and great man of the century, is at the head of the Korean Worker's Party and the revolution."

Near East & South Asia

Middle East Escalation Blamed on Arab Extremists

TA0204172990 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Hebrew 1500 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Commentary by Dmitriy Prokofyev]

[Text] Two terror organizations, the Lebanese Opposition Front and the Islamic Struggle Front [names as heard], have threatened to attack the interests of the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, Britain, and the United States because they have been helping Soviet Jews immigrate to Israel. The Lebanese Opposition Front has already struck: Its terrorists attacked Polish diplomat Zbigniew (Bogdan) and his wife. Both of them were seriously injured and are currently in the hospital. Here is what our commentator Dmitriy Prokofyev has to say on the subject:

In its public relations, the Soviet Union tends to blame the Israeli Government or the Israeli-U.S. strategic alliance for every deterioration and escalation in the Middle East. In certain cases this is definitely justified, but this time nobody has any doubt that responsibility for the escalation lies entirely with the Arab extremists. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries categorically reject the terrorists' threats and will not capitulate to their blackmail. Of course, they also reserve themselves the right to take all required measures to safeguard the welfare of their citizens.

I personally believe that the Arab circles which in principle object to the Soviet policy of opening the gates to Jewish emigration are committing a very serious mistake due to at least two reasons. The first is that the Soviet Union will under no circumstances whatsoever forgo its policy of free emigration, both because the Soviet people, who want to live in a state based on law, will not tolerate it, and because free emigration is a consequence of our international commitments and international law.

The second reason is that the Arab position against immigration to Israel arouses in Israeli society fears that the Arabs have actually not come to terms with the existence of the Jewish state in the Middle East and are conspiring to annihilate it.

I have no doubt that in such a climate of fear it will be hard to promote the political process in the region. What I want to say is that threats and attempted coercion to arrest the immigration of Jews to Israel do not serve anybody's interests, neither those of Israel nor of the Arabs—hence, the urgent need to attain the cooperation of all the moderate forces in the Middle East against the terrorists. Terror as a means to promote political objectives is a phenomenon which the enlightened world cannot tolerate. In fighting terror, all means are permissible to prevent the threat of attacks.

The Soviet Union, too, is prepared to cooperate with all forces in the Middle East that are fighting extremism and terror.

USSR's Near East Role Seen as 'Mediator'

90UF0018A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 13, 28 Mar 90 p 9

[Igor Belyayev commentary: "The Near East Phenomenon"]

[Text] The complex and serious situation in the Near East is once again at the center of attention. It is being discussed and disputed, and attempts are being made to propose some far-reaching solutions in all world capitals. An extraordinarily important press conference, it seems to me, by Yu.M. Vorontsov, first deputy USSR foreign minister, was held last week in Moscow. I consider it an adequate response to what is happening both in the Arab countries and Israel, and in the Soviet Union also. In respect of some of the very serious problems of the Near East.

The first is the emigration of Soviet Jews. According to new legislation which is being discussed, Moscow cannot halt the departure of Soviet citizens for anywhere, Israel included. For this reason any demands on the Soviet Union that it stop the emigration of Jews are groundless, although such demands have been heard recently in many capitals of Arab states, as well as on the part of the PLO leadership. It has been pointed out here that the Israeli Government headed by Shamir intends settling virtually 300,000 Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union on Arab land occupied since 1967. Moscow is treating such plans negatively. And it has now become known that we have agreed with the United States on a condemnation of these intentions since they are destructive.

The idea concerning the establishment of supervision of newly created Israeli settlements is constructive. This is not, after all, a new problem. Now, however, when attempts are being made in Tel Aviv to reanimate it, there is a real opportunity to prevent violations of the

Fourth Geneva Convention excluding the repatriation to or the resettlement of the population of an occupying power on temporarily captured land. If, on the other hand, an attempt is made to answer the question of to whom the major Arab politicians should be complaining in connection with the recent events, they should be addressed to the party which is adopting such decisions; that is, Israel.

Much has been said in recent days about the incident involving the Hungarian Malev Air Line. It had undertaken to fly Soviet Jewish immigrants from Budapest to Tel Aviv, and suddenly went back on its intention. The point being that a terrorist organization, Islamic Jihad, had given the Hungarian airline a kind of ultimatum, threatening to destroy its aircraft in the event the flights continued. Involved in questions of the fight against international terrorism, I consider it my duty to emphatically condemn such an action. I am convinced that my Soviet and American colleagues will agree with me that overlooking so provocative an action would be to connive in international terrorism. But we have outlawed it. I realize that putting the lives of passengers, totally innocent people, mothers and children, at risk would, of course, be inhumane. But tolerating the Islamic Jihad move would mean displaying indecisiveness in the fight against international terrorism.

One and the same question has arisen increasingly often of late—will there be a normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and Israel? I have already expressed myself on this score, believing that the restoration of diplomatic relations between our countries would help the Soviet Union sharply increase its positive role in the peace process in the Near East. Moscow's official position, however, is currently formulated as follows: Yes, the Soviet Union's relations with Israel will be normalized in the context of an all-embracing Near East settlement. We now insist upon this.

Recently, as pointed out at a press conference, the Soviet Union has been intensifying its dialogue with Saudi Arabia. This, it seems to me, is an extraordinary event. And the most remarkable thing is that not only problems of a Near East settlement, but also the German question were discussed in the course of recent talks of a high-ranking representative of our foreign policy deparment in Riyadh. Saudi Arabia has evidently not forgotten 1939 and everything connected with Hitler Germany's policy in the Near East.

In conclusion I would emphasize that I see two essential active components of a impending Near East settlement which have already emerged. The first is the Soviet Union acting the part of a conscientious mediator in the achievement of the long-awaited accords. The second is the PLO implementing its new program. Israel, on the other hand, has yet to choose. And possible positive solutions in the future should ultimately lead to a general and just settlement in the Near East.

Iraqis' Nuclear 'Smuggling' Effort Reported

PM0204143390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Unidentified own correspondent dispatch: "Nuclear Smugglers Caught"]

[Excerpts] London—London's Heathrow Airport was the scene of the final episode of a detective story which had been developing for over a month.

UK customs officials and police have announced that they have seized a consignment of triggers allegedly intended for nuclear weapons. An attempt had been made to secretly ship them to Baghdad on board an Iraqi Airlines plane. Five people have been arrested on a charge of conducting an illegal operation. One Iraqi citizen has been deported and it is expected that criminal proceedings will be instituted against the rest. [passage omitted]

The British press has kicked up a great fuss over this. The mass media's "anti-Iraqi" ire is due not just to the triggers. This incident adds to the recent execution in Baghdad of a journalist from London's OBSERVER newspaper, which caused widespread indignation among the British.

But the Iraqis' smuggling of the nuclear devices through London is being examined primarily from the viewpoint of their purely military purpose. A host of claims have appeared in the press that Iraq is continuing work on creating a nuclear weapon. It is believed here that this episode will undoubtedly have a new, adverse effect on relations between London and Baghdad. In any event, the Iraqi ambassador to Britain was summoned to the Foreign Office and official representations were made to him.

Soviet-Algerian Political Consultations Held

PM0204152190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general headline: "Official Reports"]

[Text] Soviet-Algerian political consultations were held in Moscow 28-29 March in which Yu.M. Vorontsov, USSR first deputy foreign minister, took part for the Soviet side and N. Khaffed [name as transliterated], secretary general of the Algerian Foreign Ministry, took part for the Algerian side.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Commentary Says ANC 'Softening' Attitudes

MB0204163490 Moscow in Zulu to Southern Africa 1930 GMT 29 Mar 90

[Mikhail Tsirilov commentary—read by announcer]

[Text] The African National Congress [ANC] and the South African Government on 11 April will begin talks on this country's future.

The return of some of the ANC leadership in exile to South Africa follows the country's reform changes.

High-ranking ANC officer Jacob Zuma has been sent as part of an advance party to prepare for the talks. Chris Hani, Steve Chwete, Henry Makoti, Joe Nhlanhla, Reggie September, and Aziz Bahad are among those making up the delegation. The fact that these people can return home shows the extent to which things are changing for the better in South Africa.

The fact these talks will take place at all shows a softening of ANC attitudes.

Chris Hani's statements attest to this. About two years ago, Chris Hani advocated attacks on white suburbs, but his thinking changed after President Frederik de Klerk on 2 February announced the unbanning of the ANC and other antiapartheid organizations, followed by the release of Nelson Mandela from prison.

The British newspaper THE INDEPENDENT published a statement by Chris Hani in which he says the whole nation favors resolving peacefully issues within the country that have caused conflict in many areas and said we all need to contribute to the effort. He says he has been in the military wing for over 20 years, and if an opportunity arose to resolve the South African situation peacefully, he would embrace it because too much blood has been spilt and countless lives of the sons and daughters of the land have been lost on both sides of the conflict.

Besides, things have changed in South Africa. Whereas in the past many whites did not envisage the fall of the apartheid system, the white minority government has seen the light and acknowledged the desirability of talks. It is important that the ensuing talks resolve the issue of laying down arms on both sides. So far, the ANC has not seen the need to do so and has voiced its intention to continue the struggle until all political prisoners are freed, the state of emergency is revoked, and government troop are withdrawn from black townships.

The South African situation is worsened by the continuing violence in Natal. The police obviously will have to put more effort into getting Natal's situation under control.

The return of Chris Hani, a hero of the youth in the struggle, is seen within ANC ranks as a move that might help end the carnage.

It is also necessary that Inkatha leader Gatsha Buthelezi should help reduce tension in Natal and further the struggle against apartheid. So far, he has not been seen to do this, hence the necessity of talks with him. He has a place in the struggle and not on the side of the enemy.

Very little time remains before these April talks, and the future of the country rests on them.

Moscow Comments on Resumption of Ethiopian Talks

EA2303213590 Moscow International Service in Somali 1600 GMT 22 Mar 90

[From "World Events Today"]

[Text] On 20 March in Rome, peace talks were resumed between Ethiopia and the Tigray People's Liberation Front [TPLF]. Yevgeney Maksimov comments on the talks.

He starts by saying that this is the third round of talks between Addis Ababa and the Tigray movement. The first two rounds of talks took place in the Italian capital last November and December. However, according to Ethiopian sources, these two meetings ended in failure due to the destructive behaviour displayed by the opposition.

The agenda before the current talks is unchanged, and calls for agreement on issues which will serve as a basis for later practical talks. The present agenda covers agreement on the composition and size of delegations who will represent the two sides at later talks, the issues to be discussed, and when the talks should start.

The outcome of this third round of talks is as yet difficult to predict, accordinging to the head of the Ethiopian delegation, Ashagre Yigletu. It is hoped that many issues will be raised since major differences exist between the two sides. Addis Ababa is ready to discuss the Tigray region and other areas where the rebels are conducting their activities. However, the movement TPLF wants all Ethiopian problems to be discussed. The movement wants the holding of independent elections and the formation of an interim government involving all political parties and politicians. The TPLF wants to be given a share in the government of Ethiopia.

However, our commentator wonders whether it is necessary at this juncture to raise these issues as the regime in Addis Ababa has recently invited all sections of the opposition to take part in the new Ethiopian Democratic Unity Party. It is also important to [words indistinct] whether the Rome talks can bring a cease-fire to the war in northern Ethiopia.

The whole issue is complex. The leaders of the TPLF say they are ready for peace talks, and this third round of peace talks in Rome is a clear demonstration of their serious intent. On the other hand, this movement is fueling the war, through their sister movement Eritrean People's Liberation Front [EPLF], against the Ethiopian people for their own ends [words indistinct].

The catastrophe being caused by this war in terms of life and property is beyond imagination— a catastrophe that cannot be afforded by people already afflicted by severe drought and hunger. The ongoing war is hampering the

transport of food aid and medical supplies to the starving people, says our commentator.

Is the opposition using the Rome talks to put more pressure on the Ethiopian Government? I would not think so, says our commentator. This kind of attitude would show how uncommitted these opposition groups are in the ongoing peace talks. The only way to achieve genuine peace is serious commitment by both parties. This will save the blood which is being spilled needlessly.

The Soviet Union, the United States, international aid agencies, church leaders and international opinion are calling for an immediate end to the war. Jimmy Carter and Julius Nyerere, who have been mediating in the peace talks, recently called on both sides to continue their talks with the [word indistinct] reaching a solution to the Eritrean problem. Last September the peace talks were started in Atlanta. Addis Ababa agreed to attend. The EPLF is now waiting for a reply. Our commentator concludes with the hope that parties to the conflict will strive hard to end their differences and refrain from [word indistinct] and show maturity to avoid further spilling of blood.

Commentator Views Ethiopian Reform Plans

EA2803160090 Moscow International Service in Amharic 1530 GMT 23 Mar 90

[Vladimir Borisov commentary]

[Text] The participants in the recent 11th regular session of the Workers Party of Ethiopia [WPE] Central Committee have devised a new political and economic system for the country. It has been established that the WPE will be (?suspended) and replaced by the Ethiopian Democratic Unity Party [EDUP] and will be an (?all-around) democratic organization embracing all sections of society. From now on, the economic structure of Ethiopia will be established at the government, cooperative, and private levels. We now present a commentary by Vladimir Borisov on this topic.

Some news media have predicted that the decisions mentioned and the plans to [words indistinct] will open up a new chapter in the history of Ethiopia. However, it seems it will be (?difficult) to make such assessments. To put such assessments beyond doubt, it is now necessary to answer two questions. These questions are—one: Can the country be rescued from the present political crisis and the civil war through these plans? Also, the most important question is: To what extent will the plans for the political structure of Ethiopian society be implemented in this situation?

It is hard to answer these questions now, as is clear to everyone. However, it is possible to look at some problems related to these plans and at other possible situations which may arise in the future.

In the economic sphere, it is planned to implement concrete reforms. For example, government control of businesses and enterprises will be reduced, restrictions on capital investment in any economic sphere lifted, central planning methods suspended. These proposals, put forward by Ethiopian President Mengistu Haile Mariam, have been accepted by the members of the WPE Central Committee. The peasants will be given the right to own land and to harvest and sell their farm produce as they wish. These steps will unquestionably strengthen the agricultural sector of the economy in areas which are presently affected by severe drought.

The central government believes that by moving away from the strict Stalinist economic model, by implementing agricultural reforms, it will improve its standing in society in the immediate future and strengthen its political position further. In addition, it believes that through the economic reforms it is undertaking it will to some extent weaken one of the opposition groups in the country, which has a strong position, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front [EPLF]. It should be recalled that the EPLF issued a statement recently saying that when Eritrea won its independence from Ethiopia, private ownership of property would be declared within its territory. On the other hand, the Tigray People's Liberation Front [TPLF] says that even if the central government introduces changes, it should be crushed. Therefore, the situation as regards political changes is not so (?uncertain).

So far, the residents of Addis Ababa have been keenly following the swift removal of the monuments of Marxism and Leninism. All the warring and political organizations struggling against the government have rejected the appeal that they participate in the newly-established (?system). It is not hard to see that the position adopted by the forces opposed to the government stems from the victories they have scored on the war fronts. Some take the view that the reason why the Ethiopian Government has not yet proposed the establishment of a multiparty system in the country is that it does not want to involve all the opposition groups in setting up new political structures in society.

In such a situation, one may predict that the civil war will continue. However, if the authorities in the country wish to promote reforms, allow the establishment of a multisystem, and agree to change the existing political organizations into (?parliamentary) parties, what position will the opposition forces adopt? In order to answer this question, we should remember the example of [word indistinct] Somalia. The Somali president, Mohamed Siad Barre, proposed a similar idea very late. The armed Somali opposition forces ignored the proposal and have continued their struggle to crush the Siad Barre regime, Vladimir Borisov concluded.

Radio Comments on Ethiopian, Somali Reforms

EA2003151390 Moscow International Service in Somali 1600 GMT 19 Mar 90

[Text] A recent session of the Workers Party of Ethiopia [WPE] Central Committee resolved to introduce new

economic and political changes in the country. The WPE has been renamed the Democratic Unity Party. It will be a democratic one open to all members of society. The Ethiopian economy will follow a policy of state, cooperative, and private ownership.

Commenting, our correspondent, Vladimir Borisov, said the media had described these changes in Ethiopia as historic. We would not hesitate to endorse such a view if we could answer two questions, which are: Can these new proposals serve to end the civil war and the prolonged internal conflict in the country? Secondly, and more importantly, how relevant are these proposals by Addis Ababa to introducing changes in the political structure of society? These questions are very hard to answer.

The most important aspect of these changes which President Mengistu Haile Mariam has proposed and which the Central Committee of the ruling party has approved is the one affecting the economy. These changes provide for tax reductions from businessmen and industry and the restriction of central decision-making and economic planning. Farmers will now have the right to cultivate their own land and sell their produce to whomever they wish. There is no doubt that these steps will serve greatly to step up (agricultural) production of the country, which has suffered from (?recurren)t droughts. Such a (?withdrawal) from the Stalinist economic system, particularly in the agricultural sector, will soon bring about an expansion of the central government's social base and also stability which is not connected with the political position of the government.

While the government is introducing economic reforms, the best card in the hands of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front is the recent announcement by its leadership that if Eritrea secedes from Ethiopia, nationalized property in the region will be returned to [word indistinct]; but the reforms are also a blow to the Tigray People's Liberation Front, which unceasingly calls for the overthrow of the Addis Ababa regime at whatever cost. However, the political reforms are not as (?clear-cut) as the economic ones. The vigor with which the slogans of scientific socialism and Marxism are being removed from the streets of Addis Ababa can only make spectators laugh, but they cannot say enything.

The call to the opposition groups to join the new party has been instantly and unhesitatingly rejected by all the opposition groups. Inasmuch as the opposition's recent victories on the battlefield have opened new gates, this immediate rejection can be understood. Addis Ababa has not yet proposed the introduction of a multiparty system, nor has it given up its monopoly of power. That is why Addis Ababa has not yet considered the need to allow the existence of opposition for the sake of political reform. This indicates that the civil war will continue. Even if the idea of the political reform proceeds to the introduction of a multiparty system in the country, how will the existing political organizations turn themselves into parliamentary political parties? And even if they do, how will the opposition respond?

It is very difficult to predict what will happen. The situation is similar to that prevailing in Somalia, which is a neighbor of Ethiopia. Mohamed Siad Barre, the president of Somalia, has, as already known, announced, rather lately, such proposals, while the opposition turned a deaf ear and continues the fight to topple the government.

East Europe

GDR Camp Excavation Reveals Human Remains

LD3103094190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0812 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Vadim Chudov]

[Text] Berlin, Mar 31 TASS—As a result of excavations carried out by servicemen of the GDR National People's Army in the Shmachtenhagen Forest in the area of former Soviet special camp N7 for German internees in Sachsenhausen, human remains and rusted identification tags have been discovered at a depth of one meter. Experts were unable to identify them so the bodies were reburied.

Old residents told journalists that one or two nights a week in 1945-1947 they heard engines of trucks entering the forest. During the day they would see fresh graves. According to experts, including in the FRG, there were no mass murders or killings by shooting in what was then a Soviet camp for German internees. This was stated by Wolfgang Titz, a scientific worker in the Salchsenhausen National Memorial. The inmates died of starvation and tuberculosis by the thousands.

The area and district procurators are creating a special inquiry commission. It will have to contact the Soviet appropriate authorities to obtain materials from Soviet archives.

As transpired last week, in the village of Fuenfeichen on the outskirts of Neubrandenburg, a burial ground has been discovered in which about 2000 inmates are buried. Fuenfeichen was one of 11 such camps in the territory of what was then the Soviet zone of occupied Germany. In those camps, according to the Cologne association of victims of Stalinism, about 90,000 people perished. In the period from 1945 to 1950, 200,000 Germans in all were interned. Out of 55,000 internees, about 21,000 died. [as received]

Mass Grave Discovery Examined

LD0204153990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1425 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Signed article by V. Alekseyev: "On the Question of Excavations on the Territory of the GDR There Must Be Clarity"]

[Text] [no dateline as received]—Reports have appeared in the GDR press about the discovery of mass graves in a wooded locality near Neubrandenburg and Sachsenhausen. Although there are as yet no incontrovertible documentary facts showing the origin of these graves, it is being asserted, with references to Western sources and eyewitness testimonies, that the matter is one of prisoners who died of cold and disease in camps for Nazis and war criminals that existed in the Soviet zone of occupation after the war. The sites and buildings of former Hitlerite concentration camps were in partial use for these camps.

Judging by the character of these reports, which have been widely picked up by the press in the Western countries and are being used to inflame passions, it is a question not so much of throwing light on the essence of the matter, as of creating a certain atmosphere in keeping with somebody's far-reaching plans. It is quite obvious that somebody would like to cast a shadow right at this moment on the Soviet Armed Forces which liberated the German people from fascism, to cast doubt on the whole of the activities of the Soviet authorities in the period of occupation, and to create the impression that all the democratic reforms carried out on the territory of the present-day GDR in 1945-1949, and the measures to eradicate Nazism and militarism, were contrary to German interests and should now be struck out and discarded. This is evidently being done in order to evoke a negative attitude toward the events of the past, and then transfer it to today's Soviet Union and damage its legitimate rights.

Following the war, there were indeed places of detention for persons suspected of having committed Nazi crimes, and also for those who resisted the occupation powers, in all four of Germany's zones of occupation, that is, the American, British, French and Soviet zones. These camps were set up in accordance with the declaration of the USSR, United States, and Great Britain adopted at the Moscow conference on 30 October 1943 on the responsibility of the Hitlerites for the atrocities committed, and on the basis of Directive Number 38 of the Allied Control Council in Germany of 12 October 1946 "Arrest and Punishment of War Criminals, Nazis, and Militarists; Internment, Control and Supervision of Potentially Dangerous Germans."

Former Nazis, SS men, fanatics with "panzer-faust" weapons, and subversives from the secret fascist "Werewolf" organization were shooting at our soldiers from ambushes. These people could not count on kindness, and so putting them in the very same camps in which they had before maltreated Soviet prisoners of war and German antifascists was a fully justified and suitable punishment. However, no mass executions were arranged in these camps.

Nobody is going to try to assert that there was no one who suffered innocently among the prisoners in the Soviet camps for Nazis. Both honest adherents of democracy and simple citizens who were arrested by mistake could have ended up among them. Apart from this, one must distinguish between the excesses committed in the heated wake of the war, and the subsequent refinements of Beriya's henchmen which cost us all very dearly.

Thus, the reports which have emerged in the GDR about graves are grounds for examining all the information that exists on this question, including that in Soviet archives, and bringing complete clarity to it. The past, no matter how difficult it may be, must not act as a brake on the development of friendly relations between the Soviet and German peoples.

Experts Cite Starvation, Disease

LD0204191490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 2 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Servicemen of the GDR National People's Army, while carrying out excavations in the Schmachtenhagen Forest on the territory of a former Soviet camp for interned Germans, have discovered human remains. It has been impossible to identify them.

In the words of experts, including from the FRG, mass murders and executions were not carried out in the camps for interned Germans: The prisoners died in their thousands from starvation and turberculosis. There were similar camps for Germans suspected of aiding and abetting fascists in all occupied zones.

A special investigation commission is to establish contact with the competent Soviet authorities in order to obtain materials from Soviet archives.

CPSU Official Meets Bulgaria's Lilov

LD0204220890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1428 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] A. Lilov, chairman of the Bulgarian Communist Party supreme council, has received R.P. Fedorov, first deputy head of the international department of the CPSU Central Committee, who is in the People's Republic of Bulgaria [PRB] on a working visit. An exchange of views took place on the content and direction of inter-party cooperation in modern conditions.

V.V. Sharapov, USSR ambassador to the PRB, took part in the conversation.

Bulgarian CP, Opposition Differ on Presidency

PM3003132390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Mar 90 Second Edition p 1

[Own correspondent L. Zhmyrev dispatch: "Different Positions"]

[Text] Sofia, 29 Mar—The national "round table," at which the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] is conducting a direct dialogue with the opposition (the Union of Democratic Forces), is continuing.

A. Lilov, chairman of the Supreme Party Council Presidium, came up with the initiative of instituting a presidency in Bulgaria. The ensuing discussion produced a difference of positions. The BCP advocates that the president be elected at direct general elections, the opposition's opinion is that the president should be elected by parliament.

A. Lilov proposed holding a nationwide referendum on the question of electing the president. "We cannot 'deputize' for the people, we cannot resolve on their behalf or in their place questions which are their sovereign right, and we cannot create a democratic system by undemocratic means," the Bulgarian leader stated.

Bulgarian 'Clarification' on OTR-23 Missiles

PM0204154390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Bulgarian Foreign Ministry Clarification"]

[Text] Sofia, 31 Mar—The U.S. Embassy in the Bulgarian People's Republic has inquired at the republic's Foreign Ministry about the presence of OTR-23 operational-tactical missiles on the country's territory. A spokesman for the Bulgarian foreign policy department provided the following clarification.

The Bulgarian People's Army has 72 operational-tactical missiles, including eight OTR-23 missiles, with a range of up to 500 km. They were delivered to Bulgaria from the USSR in 1986, are the property of the Bulgarian People's Republic, and are exclusively under Bulgarian control.

There are no missiles which are subject to notification and elimination under the Soviet-U.S. intermediate- and shorter-range missiles treaty, nor have there ever been any such missiles. The provisions of that treaty which refer to third countries apply only to states on whose territories are deployed missiles or launch installations which are the property of, or are under the control of, the United States or the USSR.

Nishanov Meets Hungarian Ambassador

LD0204213290 Budapest MTI in English 1818 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 2 (MTI)—The Soviet Union is invariably interested in maintaining good-neighbourly and close relations with Hungary, Rafik Nishanov, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the Soviet Parliament, told Sandor Gyorke, ambassador of the Republic of Hungary to the USSR, on Monday. The Moscow office of MTI was informed about the meeting by the diplomat.

Mr Nishanov said the Hungarian parliamentary elections were followed with keen attention in the Soviet Union. Since emphasis is expected to shift to inter-state relations, ties between the two parliaments can play an important role in bilateral relations.

Mr Nishanov emphasized that both houses and the committees of the Soviet Parliament were prepared to develop these relations.

Nishanov Receives Romanian Delegation

LD2903193890 Moscow TASS in English 1656 GMT 29 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 29 TASS—"Soviet people feel sincere sympathy for the people of Romania and the young Romanian revolution and fully support the democratic processes in that state," Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Council of Nationalities Rafik Nishanov said today. He met a group of members of Romania's Provisional National Unity Council. The group is led by Chairman of the Romanian Socialist Democratic Party Marius Kircumaru.

The Romanian delegation was invited to the Soviet Union by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Nishanov familiarised the guests about the political and socio-economic perestroika of Soviet society, and the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet's session.

He briefed them on the election of the Soviet president, the elaboration of new Soviet laws and inter-ethnic relations.

"The Romanian revolution holds a special place among recent developments in eastern Europe," Kircumaru said. "As opposed to developments in the German Democratic Republic or Czechoslovakia, it was a grassroots movement, truly national in character. The revolution was accomplished due to the broad support of the masses and explosion of popular wrath against the tyranny of the Ceausescu regime."

Touching upon the current state of affairs in Romania, the head of the delegation noted the exclusive significance of forthcoming elections and expressed hope that they would help strengthen the country's political and socio-economic stability."

A meeting was held at the USSR Supreme Soviet's international affairs committee today. Committee Chairman Aleksandr Dzasokhov and a group of Soviet people's deputies discussed with the Romanian representatives the development of Romania's socio-political situation and the alignment of the main political forces on the eve of elections.

The Romanian guests also met members of the Council of Nationalities' commission for nationalities' policy and inter-ethnic relations.

West Europe

Adamishin Receives West German Envoy

LD2903194490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1745 GMT 29 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 29 Mar (TASS)—Anatoliy Adamishin, USSR deputy foreign minister, today received Klaus Blech, FRG ambassador to the USSR, at the latter's request. The ambassador conveyed a message from FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher addressed to Eduard Shevardnadze.

German Question Prompts Neighbors' Concern

90UI0457A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondents V. Shutkevich (Poland), Ye. Chernykh (Czechoslovakia), N. Dolgopolov (France), and Ye. Savishchev (FRG): "The German Question—Where and How It Is Posed"]

[Excerpts] **Poland**

"This was going to happen sooner or later," noted my friend, a Pole, as he watched a television presentation of Berliners overcome with enthusiasm breaking down the famous wall. "I am afraid of just one thing—what if, instead of this wall, we have to urgently build another—at the border along the Neisse and Oder..."

I will confess that his fears seemed exaggerated to me. As public opinion polls have continued to confirm, however, a majority of Poles share them. The prospect of the emergence of a united Germany is viewed in Poland with far greater concern than in other countries. Only 35 percent of those polled were in favor of unification here (the figure was 80 percent in the FRG, 68 percent in France, 61 percent in Great Britain, and 51 percent in the USSR no less). Realizing the inevitability of such a development, many Polish citizens would prefer all the same to maintain the existing European order.

What has caused their fears? For a better understanding of this, let us take a look at the pre-war map of Poland. Even a person not well versed in history can readily see how striking the difference is when compared with today's map. You will not see the Piasty lands which belonged to Poland since time immemorial, but were seized as a result of German expansion and subject to violent Germanization over the course of several centuries—Upper Silesia, Warmia, and Mazury, territories adjoining the mouth of the Vistula... Also outside the pre-war borders is Gdansk, which obtained the status of free city by virtue of the Treaty of Versailles. Although Gdansk formally came under the oversight of the League of Nations, Poland controlled the city communications network, had its own postal system there, and was responsible for representing the city's interests in the international arena.

Confusion and uncertainty regarding the question of borders played into Hitler's hands. Coming to power, he required by ultimatum that Gdansk be given back to Germany and that the so-called "corridor" be paved across Polish territory, an extraterritorial motor highway which would join it with East Prussia. Failure of the Polish Government to comply with these demands became one of the pretexts used by Germany to attack Poland. Following the crushing defeat of Fascism, according to decisions made at the Yalta Conference, Gdansk, like other original Polish lands, was returned to its lawful proprietor—the Polish people. "Well, what about the 'corridor' now?" asks the newspaper SZTANDAR MLODYCH. "Won't someone get the desire to take another look at borders when Germany becomes a single, powerful state?" And a certain justification rightly underlies this alarm on the part of Poles. As Polish Prime Minister T. Mazowiecki noted in his statement at a recent press conference, the inviolability of the Polish-German border is an integral component of the European security system. People in Poland know this, of course. The new generation which has grown up on Polish soil realizes it. But Poles cannot close their eyes to the fact that, under cover of the slogan of "a united Germany," revanchist sentiments are again being revived. This is why, in the view of the Polish prime minister, "there cannot be any kind of ambiguity regarding our western border when entering 'a new phase' of German-Polish relations."

But what kind of ambiguities are we talking about? Could it be there is ambiguous language in the treaty concluded between Poland and the FRG in 1970 concerning the fact that neither side has territorial claims against the other? No, it is not ambiguous. But this treaty remains valid only as long as the FRG exists as an independent state. Who can guarantee that, following unification of the two Germanies, they will not want to brush the agreement aside? Poland insists that the inviolability of its western border be confirmed unambiguously by the leading politicians in Bonn. T. Mazowiecki has proposed that the leaders of both German states conclude a new peace agreement which would then be signed by the leaders of the united Germany.

Czechoslovakia

Not a week had passed following election of the new president in Czechoslovakia when he made his first trip abroad and elicited a mass of questions from international observers. Why specifically to the GDR and the FRG? What was this—a demonstration of independence before the Kremlin? A duty out of politeness to the Bonn leadership which had supported Havel, the human rights advocate, during hard times? It is felt that V. Havel wanted to get detailed, first hand information on what was going on in the neighboring German states. Perhaps Prague realized before others that no force would be able to block unification of the two countries.

What position did the new Czechoslovak leadership take in this situation? They chose a path of peace and close

cooperation in building a common home on the European continent. And whereas Poland, fearing for its borders, is placing its hopes on Soviet troops, the Czechoslovaks began insisting soon after the visit on a very swift pull-out of our divisions. Yet it cannot be ruled out that the question of borders may arise here as well at some time in the future—regarding that same Sudeten Mountain region from which the Germans were evicted after World War II.

Recently in Paris, Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs J. Dienstbier expressed fears regarding a revival of German expansionism. He stated that he saw the most reliable guarantee of a united Germany not presenting a threat to its neighbors in a deepening of political, economic, and social integration within the framework of a common European development.

On 15 March, FRG President Richard von Weizsacker visited Prague in order, in his words, to dispel neighbors' fears. V. Havel emphasized the deep symbolic meaning of the date of the visit. Exactly 51 years prior, Hitler arrived in Prague as an emissary of war. The president will be an emissary of peace and, in his "counter-visit," "he will abrogate what took place at that time." But will this be a guarantee that the past will not be repeated in the future? This is the issue.

France

Historically it has come to pass that the main opponent of France has been her powerful neighbor—Germany.

So now they are allies. And what allies! The French dream to convert the European Economic Community into a flourishing Europe of 12 by the year 1993 would be unthinkable without FRG support. It is President Kohl, and not the capricious British, who provided the support for French economic concepts. And it is the indestructible West German mark, according to the French view, which should become the bulwark of the West European currency.

And now we see suddenly bursting forth like a tempest for the French—but entirely realistic—designs for a unification of the two Germanies. Even as recently as a month and a half ago, one would have refused to believe it. According to data of the SOFRES [name as published] Public Opinion Institute, 74 percent of the country's residents thought that if this were to come to pass it would be in about 10 or 20 years. What of the Europe of 12 then? In which France relegated for herself a role as a kind of coordinator, inspiration, and leader? Will the FRG be at all interested in a common Europe and in the creation of a unified monetary system? And won't the burden of economic assistance to that territory which is still called the GDR fall on the shoulders of all EEC members? The question as to whether the unified Germany will be powerful in an economic sense is not even being posed. It is feared today like the flame. It is clearly realized that no one will come close to matching a united Germany in Western Europe. It will be practically impossible to compete with it.

Legitimate anxiety was awakened instantaneously in elements of the left and the right—could territorial claims again arise? Suspicions grew stronger when Chancellor Kohl, in Paris recently for a meeting, was not forthcoming in providing a guarantee on the need to preserve today's European borders. So—not just the post-war division along the Oder-Neisse may be subject to reconsideration? What about Alsace and Lorraine? And the conclusion reached during talks does not provide satisfaction either: "Unification of the two Germanies should take place parallel to the unification of Europe."

It was therefore just about the first time over the period of electing the new parliament that National Assembly deputies of the left and right voted in harmony for the proposal of communist A. Lazhuani. The parliamentarians must seriously discuss the prospects of German unification and its particulars. Anxious Polish leaders Jaruzelski and Mazowiecki were received in the Elysee Palace as if they were relatives. They were reassured that France was against a reexamination of borders and territorial claims. However, French President F. Mitterand made it clear that he was not in favor of the neutral Germany being proposed by the GDR. NATO membership must be maintained.

FRG

In Bonn, the question of the need to reunite Germany is considered a matter which is already decided in principle, at least with respect to the main aspect—the future is seen within the framework of a unified state. The ruling parties and opposition are engaged in dispute only regarding the methods and rate at which the united Germany will be established. The plan proposed by the Chancellor is more to the liking of conservatives—one which envisages a so-called half-voluntary, half-coerced unification of the GDR and the FRG. The Christian Democrats believe this can be accomplished in a relatively short period of time.

Recalling that an idea is worth something only if it is supported by the broad popular masses, Kohl's team is displaying enviable stubbornness in propagating its version of reunification. Manipulation of West Germans and GDR citizens using the press is proceeding at full speed.

The opposition believes, however, that a well thought-out, well-analyzed approach is necessary to solve the entire complex of problems which have arisen. Unification should take place in stages, taking into account the interests of all segments of the population on both sides of the border—"cavalry" attacks will not lead to a constructive solution. Additionally, a unified Germany will be called upon to guarantee peace and stability in Europe, and not be the potential source of a new war. The "Greens" therefore have supported the plan of H. Modrow, which envisages a phased demilitarization of Germany. But such ideas are being brushed away in the federal chancellor's office like a pesky fly.

The idea of swift unification seems today to be becoming less and less popular among the FRG population. The flow of emigres from the East is not letting up and is bringing a mass of problems along with it. Specialists estimate the Federal Republic will accept about half a million new citizens this year alone. And prior to elections the government will find itself in a position of either sharply increasing allocations in the social sphere or significantly increasing taxes. Understandably, each course of action runs up against sharp dissatisfaction on the part of West German citizens.

And so we see a contradictory situation developing: On the one hand, there is the growing concern among FRG citizens over their future, the question being raised ever more frequently as to what the standard of living in the country will be like tomorrow; and on the other, there are intensified appeals for reunification. Meanwhile, all the attention in the Federal Republic is riveted to the coming 18 March elections in the GDR, results of which without any doubt will influence how the German question will be resolved. [passage omitted]

Gorbachev Talks With UK Businessman

LD0204183190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 2 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] According to TASS, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev today received Maxwell Communications, who has arrived in Moscow to discuss issues of economic and scientific and technical cooperation with a number of Soviet departments. A constructive, detailed conversation took place on the prospects for perestroyka in the Soviet Union and its influence on the development of Europe and the whole world, in particular on the creation of the common European home and on the opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation between Soviet organizations and foreign firms in the course of implementing radical economic reform in the Soviet Union. Taking part in the conversation was Comrade Yakovlev, member of the USSR Presidential Council.

Gremitskikh Says Cyprus Situation 'Tense'

NC3003211590 Moscow in Greek to Greece 1630 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] We begin with Yuriy Gremitskikh's statement in a briefing at the Foreign Ministry. The situation in Cyprus remains tense due to the failure of the meeting between the representatives of the two communities in New York from the end of February to the beginning of March. A current opportunity to make the situation worse in both communities has been the Turkish Cypriot authorities' arrest of five Greek Cypriot youths. In the foreground of gatherings and demonstrations in Nicosia demanding the release of those arrested, extremist elements have become active as well. Their terrorist-like actions have made the complex situation on the island even more tense. In relation to this a special and current statement was made in UN Security Council Resolution 649 on 12 March in an appeal to the involved parties in Cyprus to avoid any activity that would make the situation worse.

We believe, said the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman, that it is very important for all Cypriots, both Greeks and Turks, to demonstrate calmness, political prudence, and increased self-restraint. It is necessary that a good atmosphere be maintained on the island for talks to resume in order to find a just and viable solution to the Cyprus issue as soon as possible. There is no other logical solution apart from this. Extensive international experience shows, added Gremitskikh, that the best way to find a solution to even the most burning issues is to try to obtain a gradual restoration of contacts and cooperation between the communities and to carry out dialogue with goodwill and patience instead of confrontation.

Seminar on European Changes Opens in Moscow

LD0204132390 Moscow TASS in English 1255 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Mikhail Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow April 2 TASS—The present German eastern border along the Oder-Neisse should remain unchanged as the preservation of borders is the warrant of European stability, believes West German Public figure and leader of the "Society For Service Peace" Ulrich Frey.

Frey is now attending the international "Europe At A Time of Change" seminar, which opened here today. Public and religious figures from the Soviet Union, West and East Germanies are discussing various aspects of European development, including German reunification.

In a TASS interview, Frey opposed the idea of a united Germany being a member of NATO, advocated by West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and some other leaders of the Bonn ruling coalition. He thinks that it would run counter to European interests.

Frey sais that many West German peace campaigners hold similar views. They are calling for disbanding military blocs in Europe and the creation of a collective security system in the interests of all Europeans.

Finnish Communist Party Statement on Lithuania

LD0204093490 Moscow TASS in English 0914 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] Helsinki April 2 TASS—The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Finland released a statement here saying that issues related to Lithuania's independence can be solved on the basis of new legislation on secession from the Soviet Union, which is currently being drafted by that country's parliament, a national referendum, talks and agreements. Forming defence units, making unilateral statements, ignoring economic

factors, curbing civil and political rights, and outside interference in other people's affairs will not help to solve this problem, the statement points out.

One of the principle goals of socialism is to grant freedom to peoples and the right to decide on their own their affairs. This is exemplifed by the Leninist nationalities policy. However, Stalinism and the command and administrative system distorted these fundamental principles. The economic crisis and the situation where citizens did not have the right to decide their own destiny have aggravated these problems.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Finland supports perestroika and the course of self-determination for nations pursued by the Soviet Communist Party leaders, the statement stresses.

A radical economic renewal of the Soviet Union, democratisation and the building of a law-governed federative state are of immense importance to the USSR as well as to the whole of the international community.

The new legislation, which is being elaborated in the USSR, is based on peoples' right to decide their own affairs. This also applies to the right to secede from the Soviet Union, taking account of the interests of all parties.

At the same time, the legislation will convey a new image to the federative state itself, in which the republics' independence is expanded and inter-ethnic relations are freed of the negative manifestation of the past.

The Finnish Communist Party does not approve of actions to kindle enmity and tension, which are taken against a backdrop of difficulties through which the Soviet Union is going. The Soviet leadership has repeatedly stated its commitment to international law and the quest for a peaceful solution to political and ethnic problems, relying on the principles of the conference on security and cooperation in Europe.

Finland, too, stands to gain from the success of perestroika. It creates additional preconditions for the harmonious development of all peoples in the North and the Baltic region, the statement says.

Cooperation Pact Signed With Finland Radio, TV

LD0204222190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1505 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] Helsinki 2 Apr (TASS)—A cooperation protocol was signed here today between USSR Gosteleradio and Finnish Radio and Television, "Yleisradio". It was signed by M.F. Nenashev, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio, and Reino Paasilinna, general director of "Yleisradio". A series of broadcasts is being prepared on how the Finns work, and how they achieved great successes in economic and social life. A second important aspect of cooperation is coverage of activity in the field of protecting the environment. Here too the Finns are providing a good example.

Communications With Norway, Finland, Sweden

LD2703123290 Moscow TASS in English 0951 GMT 27 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondnet Vasiliy Belousov]

[Text] Murmansk March 27 TASS—Representatives of the Soviet Union, Norway, Finland and Sweden have signed an agreement to set up joint telephone and information networks. The negotiations were held on the initiative of the Murmansk authorities.

"The agreement is a step forward in the development of border cooperation between our countries," head of the Murmansk Production and Technical Communications Department Eduard Meshcheryakov told TASS. "For the first time ever, we discussed not separate contacts but a range of joint measures aimed at the development of communications systems and transportation. We have agreed to mutually develop international communication lines between Murmansk and Kirkenes, Murmansk and Rovaniemi and via one of these towns with Lulea.

"Businessmen and all citizens of our countries' northern regions will have direct telephone communication with their friends and partners."

The negotiators discussed also the establishment of air routes between these regions' administrative centres. They agreed to open a new international route between Murmansk and the Norwegian Kirkenes.

In order to ensure security, the existing air route between Murmansk and Rovaniemi will be extended to Bodoe where an air traffic control office functions.

CPSU Greeting to Norwegian Party Congress

PM3003154590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Mar 90 Second Edition p 4

[Undated CPSU Central Committee greetings message: "To the 20th Norwegian Communist Party Congress"]

[Text] We send ardent greetings to the delegates to the 20th Norwegian Communist Party [NKP] Congress.

We wish your party successes in the struggle for Norwegian working people's interests and for peace, democracy, and socialism.

We are sure that the friendly relations between the CPSU and the NKP, and the good-neighborliness and cooperation between our countries' peoples will grow stronger.

[Signed] The CPSU Central Committee

Supreme Soviet Session

Moscow TV Carries Soviet of the Union Session

Infringement of National Rights Viewed

LD0204200590

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1800 GMT on 2 April begins carrying a recording of the 2 April session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Union at the Kremlin in Moscow.

Lukyanov is shown addressing the Soviet of the Union; today's business is discussion of the law on infringement of national rights. Deputies have copies of the amendments. The floor is given to Golik to report. (video shows Mokanu chairing for the rest of the session)

At 1801 GMT Golik says that the deputies have had time to look at the proposals. It has been decided to keep a preamble, but in reworded form. He says that Burlatskiy had suggested looking at a French law of 1972; Golik reads out some points from it concerning the kinds of acts that are illegal. The draft Soviet law concerns incitement of citizens by any organizations. There have been debates about defining "chauvinism" in the suggestions. The Law and Order Committee considers that the law can now be passed.

At 1806 GMT Burlatskiy says that not only organizations, but also individuals should be covered by the law. Golik says that criminal liability for individuals is already covered by existing criminal law.

At 1809 GMT Deputy Tsyplyayev suggests that the law should include time limits within which the Supreme Court should act on violations of it; Golik says that this is covered by the court's procedural regulations.

At 1810 GMT Deputy Yusupov questions the lack of differentiation between "nationalism" and "chauvinism" in the draft. Golik says chauvinism is seen as extreme nationalism. Yusupov also questions the use of the word "contempt" in the law, as it is too open to interpretation.

At 1814 GMT Deputy Yefimov asks which proposals were discussed; all of them, says Golik. Yefimov wants to know about the punishments allowed for in the law; many deputies felt they were not harsh enough. Golik says some limits on punishment are set by other laws.

At 1815 GMT Deputy Ryabchenko asks how acts of organization will be differentiated from acts by individuals. Golik tells him the question is of activities, not actions. Ryabchenko thinks the distinction should be part of the law. Golik says that this has to be established during an investigation. An organization would be liable if, for instance, its program were illegal.

At 1819 GMT Deputy Glazkov has a proposal whereby an organization might declare itself illegal. Golik rejects it.

At 1820 GMT Deputy (?Zhuravlev) brings up a point about republics claiming territory off each other.

At 1821 GMT Deputy Kalashnikov for the VLKSM (All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League) speaks on points covering people being forced to leave their homes.

At 1822 GMT Deputy Sobchak asks what the committee thinks about organizations such as Pamyat and the fact that the way the law is to operate, making only the big officials liable, could fail to keep nationalist organizations down. Golik feels that there is a parallel with the legislative initiatives that come from organizations.

Voting Begins Article by Article

LD0204200990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1825 GMT on 2 April continues its recording of the 2 April USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Union session in the Kremlin in Moscow.

Mokanu asks if the deputies wish to debate the draft further, as two notes have been received. Deputies agree to give two deputies five minutes; the law will then be voted on article by article.

At 1827 GMT Deputy Rakhimov speaks. Interethnic strife has been caused by organizations that provoke young people, he says. But all the same, the law enforcement bodies have not done enough under the existing laws. The 1958 law on state crimes should be better applied. Application of some residence laws could be made stricter. Young people must be educated to oppose the demagogues.

At 1832 GMT Deputy Golyakov comes to microphone, but changes his mind. Mokanu asks for comments on the preamble.

At 1833 GMT Golik comes to the rostrum, and explains the rejection of one word in the preamble. Mokanu puts the preamble to the vote: 173 for, and eight against. Yusupov still wants "chauvinism" included; Mokanu offers a vote on this. It is rejected.

At 1837 GMT Mokanu asks for comments on Article 1. An unidentified deputy wants to add a clause making individuals liable. Golik says liability of individuals is covered by existing legislation, and that the addition would confuse law enforcers. An earlier speaker still wants an explanation of what an individual's liability is, and what an organization's is. Golik suggests that the committee might produce a separate resolution on this. The deputy is agreeable.

At 1840 GMT Deputy Burlatskiy offers an extra article on responsibility of individuals. The existing law is not adequately enforced, so a new law might work better. Golik insists that responsibility of individuals must be

left to the existing laws, which may well need revision. Any changes of this type would require a great deal of further work.

At 1846 GMT a deputy supports Burlatskiy's proposal for an extra article in the law. Mokanu offers to put Burlatskiy's proposal to the vote. Golik suggests that his committee examine the question as it relates to the law on state crimes. He reads out the draft's wording. An unidentified deputy speaks in support of the committee's view.

At 1849 GMT Deputy Reshetnikov comes to the rostrum. This law is the first Soviet law to regulate the activities of an organization. He feels that the draft law is adequate as it stands, without mention of individuals. He criticizes Burlatskiy's proposal, which tries to detail the acts that can be judged to be offensive. Making a new law will not mean it is better enforced than the existing one. The vote for article one as it stands is 178 for and 12 against, with five abstentions.

At 1854 GMT Burlatskiy reads out his proposal again; he wants to have this voted on as a separate article on the law. Mokanu says that proposals should be submitted to the commission, and suggests doing this with Burlatskiy's. An unidentified deputy contributes to the semantic debate. Deputies want to vote on Burlatskiy's amendment: 41 for and 133 against, with 20 abstentions; proposal rejected.

Law Adopted

LD0204204590

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1857 GMT on 2 April continues its recording of the 2 April USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Union session in the Kremlin in Moscow.

Mokanu asks for comments on Article 2. Deputy Golyakov wants some changes, which Golik says cannot be made because they would go against the existing Constitutions of republics. The Suggestion is withdrawn.

At 1859 GMT an unidentified deputy questions the president's right to suspend the activities of an organization in the interest of public safety, referring to precise wording in front of him. Golik says that this is something the president can only do temporarily, and the courts have to review the decision. The deputy wants a decision to be submitted to the court immediately.

At 1903 GMT Deputy Yusupov says that presidents of republics have been neglected, and suggests adding the chairman of the republican Presidium of Supreme Soviets to the list of people who may ban organizations.

At 1905 GMT Article 2 is voted on: 176 for and two against, with 10 abstentions; the article is adopted. The Tseplyayev amendment is voted on: 22 for and 137 against, with 20 abstentions; the amendment is rejected. The Yusupov amendment is voted on: 17 for and 146 against with 13 abstentions; the amendment is rejected. The Glazkov amendment is voted on: four for and 163 against with 12 abstentions; it is rejected.

At 1910 GMT Article 3 is now to be voted on. A Textual question concerning actions by individuals is tendered by Golyakov. An amendment is proposed by Fominykh on exclusion of a passage on administrative arrest for 15 days; Golik replies. A vote is taken on Article 3 in the commission's edition: 170 for and 10 against, with nine abstentions; the article is adopted. The Fominykh amendment is voted on: 30 for and 143 against, with 10 abstentions; it is rejected. The article is adopted as recommended by the commission.

At 1914 GMT Article 4 is now to be voted on: 172 for and two against, with 10 abstentions; Article 4 is adopted.

At 1915 GMT a proposal is made to vote on Articles 5, 6, 7, and 8, all together: 181 are in favor, one is against, and eight abstain; all articles are adopted. Prior to voting on the law as a whole, Burlatskiy proposes an amendment to the title concerning "associations," as opposed to individuals; Golik replies. Burlatskiy does not insist on his amendment. Voting on the law as a whole: 189 for and one against, with four abstentions; the Soviet of the Union adopts the law as a whole.

At 1918 GMT Mokanu goes on to the draft resolution on the law coming into force. Ryabchenko proposes an amendment; Golik replies. The voting on the draft resolution: 187 for and two against, with three abstentions; the resolution is adopted.

At 1920 GMT the announcer says the matter of the election of the chairman of the Soviet of the Union was raised, but will be continued.

At 1921 GMT the recording of the Soviet of the Union session ends.

Moscow TV Carries Soviet of Nationalities Session

National Rights Law Passed

LD0204210190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1922 GMT on 2 April continues its recording of the 2 April USSR Supreme Soviet with the Soviet of Nationalities session in the Kremlin in Moscow.

Nishanov is in the chair of the Soviet of Nationalities. There is a quorum. They are going to examine at the second reading the same law just adopted by the other chamber of the Supreme Soviet.

At 1923 GMT Golik takes the floor to report, and notes that the law was adopted by the other chamber. He notes changes to the preamble. The introduction of the presidency has also been taken into account in the draft law, as well as the amendment to Article 1 on associations of people. He also goes on to discuss proposed changes

regarding use of the term "chauvinism," as set out at the session of the Soviet of the Union. He proposes adoption of the law.

At 1926 GMT Nishanov says there are no written questions. Deputy Ismailov takes the floor and speaks of the crucial role of the media in this question. He proposes criminal liability for media disseminating material likely to whip up interethnic strife.

At 1929 GMT Nishanov says on this issue that a draft law on the press is being prepared, and that all such matters will be covered there, and that such proposals should be passed to the committees on this law. Ismailov agrees. A vote is taken on Article 1: 175 for and zero against, with one abstention—Article 1 is adopted.

At 1931 GMT Article 2 is to be voted on, following a brief proposal from Deputy Ignatovich. Deputy Kogan proposes the introduction of appeal procedures to this article, noting that the commissions do not appear to have taken account of his proposal. Golik says other laws cover this point.

At 1935 GMT Deputy Bisher on the platform offers clarification on this point to Deputy Kogan. Voting on Article 2: 171 for and six against with 10 abstentions; Article 2 is adopted. The amendment by Kogan is put to the vote; no, it isn't: Someone thinks it will infringe upon the rights of the union republics. The Kogan amendment is put to the vote: 66 for and 78 against, with 41 abstentions; the amendment is rejected.

At 1941 GMT a deputy from the floor makes a proposed amendment to the text of one of the sub-paragraphs of the article, concerning the definition of the organizations covered.

At 1943 GMT an unidentified deputy offers an editorial amendment concerning "officials" in Article 3, and the distinction between judges and courts in another paragraph. Golik explains the legal niceties.

At 1945 GMT Deputy Namazova feels that some of the penalties are too small. This is up to the courts, says Golik. Article 3 is put to the vote: 176 for and six against with six abstentions; the article is passed.

At 1947 GMT Nishanov says that all comments received on Articles 4 through 8 have been included. The vote on all of them together is: 178 for, two against and six abstentions.

At 1948 GMT the law as a whole is put to the vote: 183 for zero against and four abstentions. Thus the law is passed by the Soviet of Nationalities.

At 1949 GMT Nishanov says we will now move on to the draft law on the state of emergency. This draft has been worked on in committees. Golik is to report.

At 1950 GMT Golik says that the deputies in the Soviet of Nationalities discussed the first draft quite recently. Proposals received show the different approaches of the two chambers to the law. Previous discussion focused very much on the rights of autonomous formations, and comments on this have been taken into account. Article 6 has been worked on, as promised. He dwells on the point on labor relations during a state of emergency.

At 1953 GMT Nishanov praises the committee for taking into account concerns expressed during the first reading. An unidentified deputy questions the banning of entertainments and sports during a state of emergency. Golik says it depends on the circumstances.

State of Emergency Law Adopted

LD0204213590

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1956 GMT on 2 April continues its recording of the 2 April USSR Supreme Soviet of Nationalities session in the Kremlin in Moscow.

An unidentified deputy offers more specific wording for circumstances under which a state of emergency may be introduced. Golik says that this would duplicate refinements earlier in the law.

At 1957 GMT an unidentified deputy offers wording making a state of emergency an "exceptional forced measure." Golik thinks such wording might intimidate people.

At 1958 GMT Deputy Prokushev raises a point on when the law on the state of emergency becomes effective; he suggests "from the time it is promulgated" rather than the time it is decided on. Golik explains that this may have a connection with republican laws, and also with natural disasters there may be no time for promulgations.

At 2001 GMT an unidientified deputy suggests excluding part of one article, concerning the rsponsibilities of the minister of defense, and recalling events in Azerbaijan. Golik thinks he has picked a bad example.

At 2002 GMT Deputy (?Tsekhayev) wants riots or the threat of them arising to be added to circumstances under which there can be a state of emergency. This is too general, says Golik.

At 2003 GMT an unidentified deputy speaks about Article 4, and the possibility of citizens being moved away from home areas. It may be used to force people from their homes during interethnic strife. Golik would not want to restrict reasons for evacuations to natural disasters.

At 2004 GMT the deputy continues on this topic, saying that we have enough refugees in the country already.

At 2006 GMT Nishanov says: That's the end of the questions. He asks whether to vote article by article. Article 1 is put to the vote: 184 for, two against, and four abstentions.

At 2007 GMT Nishanov asks for any comments on Article 2 and 3. There are none, so they are put to the vote: 182 for and one against with six abstentions.

At 2009 GMT there is a vote on Article 4: 171 for, three against, with nine abstentions. A vote called on an amendment by Deputy Ignatovich. Ignatovich reads it out. It concerns ensuring the health of workers clearing up after emergencies. Golik says that existing labor legislation covers hazardous work conditions.

At 2011 GMT Deputy Britvin and other deputies make brief suggestions. An unidentified deputy says some proposals have not been taken into consideration. She wants the wording to include ensuring the safety of working conditions.

At 2014 GMT there is voting on the amendment to Point 11 of Article 4: 158 for and nine against, the amendment is adopted.

At 2015 GMT a vote is taken on Article 5-9: 176 for and two against, with three abstentions; the articles are adopted. An amendment is proposed to the punctuation of one of the articles. Golik clarifies his position. on the voting on this amendment, 30 are for and 124 against, with 25 abstentions; the amendment is rejected.

At 2019 GMT a further amendment is proposed on the wording of Article 9. The vote is: 18 for 150 against, and 15 abstentions; the amendment is rejected.

At 2020 GMT Articles 10-13 are to be voted on: 174 for, two against, and eight abstentions, the articles are adopted. An amendment is proposed for Article 13 to be removed. Britvin says the article should remain as it is. The Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs takes the floor to give his views on this point. Deputy Tarazevich gives his views on the text and its meaning.

At 2024 GMT Articles 14 and 15 are voted on: 164 for and five against, with 10 abstentions; it is adopted. An amendment is proposed to Article 15, last paragraph. Deputy Pupkevich proposes a textual amendment on cases dealing with accidents. Golik gives the commissions views on these proposed amendments. The Magomedov amendment is voted on: 101 for, 48 against, and 31 abstentions; the amendment is rejected. Bisher proposes an amendment to the text. Pupkevich again speaks in favor of his amendment. Golik, giving the views of the commission, rejects Bisher's views. Deputy Romanenko gives his views in support of Pupkevich. Pupkevich asked to submit a formulation of his amendment to Golik.

At 2033 GMT Articles 16 and 17 are voted on: 179 for, zero against and six abstentions; it is adopted. Now a vote is made on the law as a whole: 175 for, one against, and 11 abstentions; the law is adopted by the Soviet of Nationalities by a majority vote. Now a vote is made on the draft resolution on the law coming into force: 176 for, zero against, and six abstentions, the resolution is adopted for the law to come into force from the moment of publication. Nishanov declares the session closed for today, to resume at 1000 tomorrow [0600 GMT]

The recording of the Supreme Soviet 2 April sessions ends at 2035 GMT.

Supreme Soviet Views Territorial Integrity Bill

LD0204132190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] At the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Over to the all-Union radio correspondents' post at the Kremlin. Olga Vasilenko is on the line:

[Vasilenko] The Council of Nationalities is beginning work at this moment. This Chamber, too, has now to adopt the USSR law on increasing responsibility for encroachment on citizens' equality of nationality and for violation by force of the integrity of the territory of the USSR. The Council of the Union has adopted the law by a majority vote and, I repeat since we talked about this in the morning news, that the main aim of the law is to strengthen protection of citizens' rights and freedoms and to put a decisive stop to the activities of various nationalist and separatist associations, whose activities may be aimed at discriminating against citizens because they belong to a specific nationality or because of their language or faith. The law is closely linked to the law on criminal accountablity for crimes against the state. Hence one of the articles of this bill has been brought into line with the new law. It relates to the form of penalty for calls to overthrow or alter the Soviet state and social system by force or to violate the integrity of the territory of the USSR by force. Actions of this kind are to be punished either by deprivation of liberty for a period of up to three years or by a fine of up to R10,000. As you can see, then, our parliament's legislative activity today is not only connected to adopting new bills, but also to improving previous laws. Let me add that in addition to the law, a resolution has been adopted on the procedure for putting it into effect. The law comes into force the moment of publication.

In addition, the USSR Supreme Soviet recommends that the Supreme Soviets of the union republics bring their own legislation into line with the new law. This work will now be carried out at the Council of Nationalities. A few minutes ago I asked Yuriy Khamzatovich Kalmykov, chairman of the Committee for Legislation, Legality and Law and Order, whether there would be any fundamental differences in the course of the debate and adoption of this bill in this chamber, the Council of Nationalities. No, the work will be the same. The deputies will examine the amendments introduced to the draft and will vote on it.

As for the election of a chairman of the Council of the Union, which went on until 0200 in that chamber, none of the candidates gained the number of votes needed, which means that the deputies will come back to this issue again.

Law Adopted

LD0204150190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1405 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Report by TASS Parliamentary Correspondent from the Kremlin]

[Excerpt] Moscow, 2 Apr (TASS)—Both chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet—the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities—today adopted at separate sittings the law on strengthening responsibility for infringement of the national equality of rights of citizens and the violent violation of the unity of USSR territory. It will come into force immediately upon publication.

Unlike legal acts presently in force which envisage the responsibility of individual citizens, the new law will introduce the responsibility of associations. The activities of any associations aimed at provoking national or racial enmity, dissension or contempt, the use of force on a national, racial or religious basis, and also the violent violation of the unity of the territory of the USSR, union and autonomous oblasts and okrugs, are to be declared illegal. Decisions on prohibiting such activities are to be made by the courts, after which these organizations are to be dissolved and their property confiscated.

The Soviet of Nationalities today also adopted the law on the legal conditions in a state of emergency. In accordance with it a state of emergency is declared in the interests of ensuring the security of USSR citizens during elemental disasters, major accidents or castastrophes, epidemics, and also during mass disorders. It is introduced on the territory of union, autonomous republics, or in individual localities by the Supreme Soviet of the appropriate republic or the USSR president. A state of emergency on the whole territory of the country is declared by the USSR Supreme Soviet. The second chamber is to adopt this law tomorrow. [passage omitted]

Soviet of Union Fails To Elect Chairman

LD0204112490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1039 GMT 2 Apr 90

[TASS parliamentary correspondent reports from the Kremlin]

[Text] Moscow, 2 Apr (TASS)—The Soviet of the Union (one of the USSR Supreme Soviet chambers) is once again unable today to elect its chairman. Yevgeniy Primakov, who held this post previously, asked to be released from his parliamentary duties in connection with his election as a member of the Presidential Council.

The candidates proposed on Wednesday, 28 Mar—Ivan Laptev, chief editor of the newspaper IZVESTIYA, and Konstantin Lubenchenko, deputy chairman of the parliamentary Committee for Legislation—did not receive the simple majority of votes of the roll of the chamber's members (136 votes) required by law. Ivan Laptev lacked only seven votes to be selected. In view of the fact that at that time many of the chamber's members were absent from the session, this morning a second vote was held. However again there was no result.

Then a further seven candidates were proposed: Aleksandr Kokan, deputy chairman of the chamber and the chairman of various parliamentary committees: Nikolay Pivovarov (for the work of soviets), Nikolay Gritsenko (for social protection, labor and prices), Yuriy Kalmykov (for legislation), Yuriy Ryzhkov (for science and culture), Anatoliy Sobchak, the Leningrad lawyer, and also from Leningrad, Professor Anatoliy Denisov.

Nikolay Pivovarov, Nikolay Gritsenko, and Yuriy Kalmykov agreed to be candidates; the others withdrew their candidacies.

Voting for these three candidates again produced no victor. Then there was voting for Ivan Laptev and Yuriy Kamlykov, who gained the most votes in comparison with the other candidates. However again no decision was adopted. (130 deputies voted for Ivan Laptev and 82 for his rival.)

The Soviet of the Union will return to the election of its chairman tomorrow.

Lukyanov Addresses Parliamentary Journalists

LD0204184890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Aleksandr Ruvinskiy report]

[Text] An important event for journalists took place at today's Soviet of Nationalities session. After the session had ended, they were invited to a meeting by Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. He noted that the parliamentary correspondents have now been at work for a year. A certain amount of experience has been acquired, and it made sense to analyze it.

[Begin Lukyanov recording] In the five years since we started perestroyka—it must be said plainly that when it was just beginning, we did not imagine what colossal additional difficulties we would run into—but even then it was clear that glasnost, freedom of the press, and the influence of the press on society, on revealing all the sore points, everything bad that was going on in society, would have to be supported very fundamentally, and for that reason it seems to me that in these five years, and particularly in the last two years, very much has been done in this respect, and it is primarily positive. This positive work must not be discounted. Yes, there have been mistakes; there have been shortcomings, but what the press and the media as a whole have done is a colossal advance in the life of society. Anyone who is not giving us more should retreat: In connection with this way of putting things, very much, I would say, is begining to depend upon the self-programming of the press and the media, how they are going to program themselves for

this work, how they will attune themselves to it, how they will charge themselves with responsibility in this work.

Here, in my view, there is still much to come, and for that reason the work will be made up firstly of the trust that our state, our country, and our people will show in the press, and secondly, of the freedom that is now being given to you. Nobody can refute the fact that a colossal step has been taken in this direction. Thirdly, the responsibility, the ability, of seizing on the main thing and organizing society as necessary. In my view, this is coming to the fore, and when I was reading over the materials I returned to this question every time. Although the newspapers are quite different, parliament cannot complain that it is now poorly covered, its parliamentary activity. There have been times when we complained about this, but now we cannot complain. It is broadly covered, in the political sense. Every newspaper sees it in a different light, and this is good.

Of course, when covering the discussion in the Supreme Soviet, a correspondent attempts to select, let us say, the really hot, interesting things. That is understandable. But evidently, if you distance yourself from this or that view or standpoint, one should think, nevertheless, much more often about the constructive principle, and feel for the platform of cooperation between different groups, and not set them off against each other.

All my work when chairing the sessions—you can see this for yourselves—is mainly an attempt to find the equilibrium, to make people with different standpoints, often with different views, work together, work for perestroyka, for our common cause, as far as their positive inclinations, so to speak, allow them. They must make use of these.

Does our media always achieve this? From my point of view, no matter how hard I look, I have to draw a negative conclusion; it is far from always, far from always. Why not return—having cooled off, reflected, and compared the facts—to some or other problems. Go off, think, and see how it should be covered in order that society gets the greatest returns? This would be a great help for parliament itelf, for the deputies.

The greatest shortage in society—apart from all the deficits that exist—is in my view a shortage of agreement and accord. There is no greater value at the moment than achieving accord in society, one which would provide the opportunity to move ahead. I am speaking not of consensus, but of accord, accord about the main thing. [end recording]

Supreme Soviet Chambers To Consider Secession

LD0304072890 Moscow TASS in English 0712 GMT 3 Apr 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow April 3 TASS—The two chambers of the Soviet parliament—the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities—are today expected to consider at separate meetings a bill on the procedure for resolving matters connected with the secession of a union republic from the USSR. The bill will be examined in the second reading.

According to the bill, the question of secession from the Soviet Union shall be decided through a referendum involving all Soviet citizens permanently residing on the territory of a republic.

Not less than two-thirds of their votes are necessary to secede. Following that, a transitional period of not more than five years shall be established.

The Council of the Union will also consider a bill, already passed by the other chamber on Monday, on the legal status of a state of emergency.

The deputies will also return to the question of electing a chairman of the Council of the Union in place of Yevgeniy Primakov who was appointed a member of the Presidential Council.

The council considered candidacies for the post twice already. However, none of the candidates managed to poll the necessary majority of votes of all deputies on the council list.

Report on Secession Debate

LD0304094690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0800 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Report by correspondent Marina Novitskaya at the USSR Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin]

[Excerpts] Good afternoon. Today, the chambers of the Supreme Soviet are holding separate sittings. The draft law on the order for resolving issues related to the secession of a union republic from the USSR are on the agenda of both the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. The draft has already been adopted by both chambers after a first reading, and today it has a second reading. It started by a report given by Deputy Tarazevich, chairman of the Commission for Nationalities Policy and Interethnic Relations. He spoke only of the changes the draft has had since discussion. And there have been quite a few changes. [passage omitted]

Briefly, about the changes that have been introduced in the draft law. They all are the result of debates, as I have already said, and I will mention only those which have a fundamental nature. For example, new articles and provisions have appeared in the law. During the transitional period, the USSR Constitution and union laws are in force on the territory of the seceding republic. And another point: In a case if, following the results of the referendum, a decision on the secession of the union republic from the USSR is not adopted, a new referendum on this issue can be held not earlier than 10 years after the previous referendum. The USSR citizens residing on the territory of the seceding republic are

granted the right to choose citizenship, place of residence, and job. The seceding republic undertakes to cover the expenses related to the migration of citizens beyond its boundaries. There is yet another new article: If possible, a repeat referendum could be held during the transitional period in case people change their minds. During preparations for, the holding of the referendum and the determining of its results the USSR Supreme Soviet can invite UN representatives to the republic to observe.

Discussion started after the report, too. One could describe it as conceptual. Deputy Buachidze from Georgia had a categorical opinion: he thinks that the proposed law is not about a union republic's seceding from the USSR but, instead, about its non-seceding. Deputies did not argue with him directly but, in essence, nearly all spoke for adopting the law. True, many said—and Deputy Igityan was the first to voice this idea—that a law on a renewed federation should have been adopted first and only after the one on a possibility for a union republic to secede from it. In his view, today's conflicts have not a national but a social nature. Deputy Shevchenko mentioned this, too; Kogan, Isayev, and Kostishin, members of the chamber, also spoke. Then article-by-article voting has started. It will continue after the break that has just been announced.

Supreme Soviet Session To Continue Until 25 May

LD0304064490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] The session of the USSR Supreme Soviet is now resuming. I remind you that people are assembling from this morning for the Soviet of Nationalities. But the main thing is that in accordance with the deputies' decision, the session will continue until 25 May.

Political & Social

Lukyanov Meets Journalists in Moscow

Comments on Lithuania

LD0204220590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, met today with the journalists accredited at the parliamentary session. Among the questions put to him was a request to give his view on the events in Lithuania. Please listen to this recording.

[Begin Lukyanov recording] I think that our current position has been more than clearly presented in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's letter addressed to the Lithuanian parliament and to the people, to all the citizens of the Lithuanian Republic. In my opinion, this is a precise, clear, calm, and sufficiently well-intended position. We will follow this path. Within the legal forms, within the framework of our constitution, nobody puts in doubt the right of the nations, the peoples, for self-determination. But, if the people want this, it should be done within the legal forms, the forms that would not bring harm either to the very nation which has decided on self-determination or to the other nations and ethnic groups of the Soviet Union. Some are often confused. How is it being said here: The relations of the republic with Moscow, with the USSR. I would like to ask you: What is the USSR? The USSR is all the republics taken together, and only then is there Moscow. Only then is there the union. And so, it is very important that each republic should feel that these are not the relations of Moscow or of the USSR, with the republic, but relations with the other 14 republics. It is precisely this that we feel to be lacking in the rash decision by the Lithuanian leadership. All the rest, all that remains beyond the limits of what I have said—all this has been said in detail already in all our statements. Step by step, in the president's statements, in government statements, in statements of the Congress of the People's Deputies—all this has been said. I often meet with the Lithuanian deputies, with different ones. I met the Sajudis [Lithuanian movement for restructuring] delegation, and not once. I met with the internationalist movements over there. I can tell you—we approach with restraint, calmly, and put much hope in the common sense of every Lithuanian citizen. [end recording]

Presidential Council Changes 'Possible'

LD0304082190 Moscow TASS International Service in Rusian 0558 GMT 3 Apr 90

[TASS parliamentary correspondent Andrey Orlov report from the Kremlin]

[Excerpts] Moscow, 3 Apr (TASS)—Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Lukyanov has met with journalists. [passage omitted]

Answering a question on the composition of the recently founded Presidential Council, Anatoliy Lukyanov said that "adding to it or changes in it are possible."

Touching on his forthcoming visit to India, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet noted that this was the first high level Soviet visit to the new leadership of that country.

The meeting with Soviet parliamentary journalists was to a significant degree devoted to the role of the press in throwing light on the work of the Soviet parliament. Anatoliy Lukyanov called the Supreme Soviet "a collective portrait of Soviet society with all its failings, concerns, and hopes" and called upon Soviet journalist to devote more attention to the work of the committees and commissions.

Dismissal of Health, Aviation Ministers

LD0204213190 Moscow World Service in English 2010 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] Soviet Vice President Anatoliy Lukyanov has faced a shower of questions from the press at a news conference in Moscow on Monday. Asked what he

thought about the current coverage of the parliamentary proceedings, Mr Lukyanov said the frequently-used description of the mass media being the fourth power had much substance in it. He said much was dependent on ways of media reporting and its impact on and reflection of the public mood.

He said the five years of Soviet reform had shown that glasnost and freedom of the press must be given substantial support. He said much had already been done to this end during the period. Asked if the parliament's rating and potential were down following the withdrawal of President Gorbachev and the resignation of Speaker of the House of the Union Yevgeniy Primakov, the vice president explained the parliament's prestige in the way it works should now change following the introduction of executive presidency, which he said must be enhanced. He said he favored a powerful presidency, although Mr. Gorbachev's presence in parliament helped rally much support and curb impatient MP's [members of parliament]. But he said the parliament would work in the way it should.

Before their appointment, all the ministers had to go through a purgatory in parliament. Thus two of them are reported to have been dismissed from their jobs: the health and civil aviation ministers. Mr. Lukyanov said from now on the dismissal of ministers was the president's prerogative unless it is for mismanagement. The two ministers stepped down because of ill-health. He said the health minister, Yevgeniy Chazov, was involved in a car accident, while Mr. Volkov was seriously ill, but their replacements, he said, will have to face parliament before they are appointed to the post.

Mr. Lukyanov was asked about the turn of events in Lithuania. He said the central parliament's position was outlined clearly in President Gorbachev's appeal to Lithuania's parliament and all its citizens. He described it as one of goodwill, which puts through [as heard] no doubt the right to self-determination, but in legal forms and under the country's constitution. If people wanted, he said they must have it, but in a form which would not be damaging to a seceding nation or other member nations or ethnic groups within the union. He said that the emphasis is often made on relationships between the center and the republic, while in essence one should speak in terms of its relationships with other constituent republics and the union as a whole. He said these interests must also be taken into account and protected. They cannot be dismissed, he said.

The vice president also answered a string of other questions.

First Moves by Gorbachev as President Viewed

PM0204134190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[Anatoliy Karpychev article under the rubric "Politics": "President's First Steps"]

[Text] Today much is being said about the scarcity of power. This question occurs to people unversed in political niceties: Where has power disappeared to? Indeed, where? For it is stupid to think that perestroyka has created an absence of power.... You cannot reproach the party for this.... It is renouncing its monopoly on power and handing it over to its legitimate possessor—the soviets. A time of transition. We should evidently "proceed" from here when we speak of a scarcity, particularly as the soviets have not accumulated solid experience in five years of perestroyka nor have they cultivated cadres, and at times they do not always display sufficient desire to possess power.

Nevertheless, the political reform is moving ahead, despite the difficulties it is encountering. Here is new evidence of this—we have been living under presidential power for two weeks now. We have never had such a thing before.

So, the president is taking his first steps.

They merit attention. First, this is history. Second, they concern every one of us. The feeling of freshness and novelty that we expected right after the introduction of presidential power will evidently come later, when its mechanism begins working at full power. We also do not have this feeling partly because we know the president very well.

People both in our country and abroad note the tremendous power with which the president is endowed. Many people are asking: How will he wield it? I believe that his first speech contains the answer. Here it is:

"I cannot conceive of everything connected with the execution of presidential power without reliance on our people, on their will, morality, wisdom, and intellect, their common sense."

I regret the fact that these words were not a constituent part of the text of the presidential oath, but there is nothing you can do about it now. The train has already moved off, as the saying goes. The chief thing is that the words have been pronounced and heard.

In time to come, when analyzing the events of our days, historians will state that the president's first steps came at an extremely complex time for the country. It is a crisis situation. On the eve of the extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies I heard a quite categorical opinion from sources close to the government, as it is customary to say: "Either we create presidential power or chaos triumphs. This is our choice."

The choice has been made.

But, if we speak frankly, we essentially have no idea of what chaos means. Just as we do not have a full understanding of what a power struggle is like. It generally seems to some people that we do not have and cannot have any struggle, but there are bad leaders—chiefly "up there"—whom they criticize.

People who argue along these lines are naive and credulous. There is a struggle—and how.... There are both "left-wingers" and "right-wingers," "new" politicians and "old" politicians. There are already examples of ups and downs. Today we are already speaking of a demarcation of political forces. In certain newspapers the question is posed openly: What is bad about someone struggling for power? Power, they say, will only benefit from this....

Suppose it loses out.

I do not maintain that talented, competent helmsmen have everywhere been posted at the state's helm both at the center and in the provinces during the five years of perestroyka. But I am far from indifferent to precisely who wants power and to whom I personally give my trust and, if you like, my destiny. I am not indifferent to where these people have come from—from the future or the past—what convictions they hold, whether they have any convictions at all, and where they stem from: from within, from a protest of conscience, from the impossibility of keeping quiet even when people have been cruelly punished for this; or with permission from above, when it has become safe to criticize and to be thoughtlessly bold. That is, I am interested in concepts—civic courage, boldness, honesty, wisdom. And much besides, including the test of power.

The "Lithuanian question" was at once the president's first test. People in the West have already nicknamed it a "war of nerves." What will President Gorbachev undertake? This question gives politicians and diplomats no rest. The president sends telegrams—Landsbergis ostentatiously rejects them, saying that the president of a foreign state does not have the right to give orders on Lithuanian soil.

The knot is tightening with every passing day. People in the West are trying to guess: Will force be used? The "Lithuanian question" was even discussed in distant Africa, where the paths of our foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state crossed.

Presidents are having a hard time today. Certain congressmen are pressuring Bush to recognize the so-called "Lithuanian state." Someone has begun on the sly to intimidate our president—otherwise, they say, we will erect a barrier in the way of peacemaking processes, and we will quarrel again. True, the West is, on the whole, being very cautious—too much is at stake. This would, in fact, mean a rolling back to the positions of the "cold war."

One day President Bush could not contain himself on hearing this question: What if the Soviet Union still uses force against the Lithuanians? He replied: "...Stop. I will not answer a hypothetical question of such a nature. What good will it do if the U.S. President, who is half a world away from there, makes assumptions about events which he does not wish to see? In this way I could bring about some misfortune without wishing it myself."

Lithuanian deputies pretend that the USSR president is not an authority as far as they are concerned.

About authority, incidentally. We must learn to protect the president's authority, for otherwise people in the world will cease to respect us. To protect it not against criticism, no—against slander. This is sometimes brought into the world not by foreign malignants but by our dear compatriots, who are called in the West "Gorbachev's critics."

Another of the president's steps that has attracted the attention of both our public and the world public is the formation of the Presidential Council. We are acquainted to varying degrees with the people whose names have been announced: We know some better, others less well. But in this situation we trust the president and his choice. Let us not be in a hurry to draw conclusions. Let the council work for a bit, and then we will make fair assessments. In my view the problem of the president's team is an acute one. I get the impression that there is still not a very great choice of candidacies.

We know that the council has had its first session. The president shared his impressions on television. He was content with the like-mindedness, the desire to move perestroyka on, and the council's intellectual potential. All this is good, but it is only the beginning. The "team" will need time to achieve "teamwork" and to feel its way. I do not rule out the possibility that it may not work out for everyone. The council will probably have to seek both its own personality and its own forms of work so as not to duplicate or repeat what the Supreme Soviet and the government, let us say, have done.

Today many able people have rushed into politics. A laudable desire! Naturally, these people want to please the public. This, too, is laudable. But what arouses an inner protest within me when I listen to the "new" politicians? Some of them have begun their "career" with a frenzied (it is hard to choose a different word) attack on the party to which they belong, on Lenin, and also, at the same time, on the party's central organ—PRAVDA. Some individuals decided to speculate with the people's name. Although they have not had contact with the people for ages, if ever.

I look through the editors' mail—the people do not want their name to be speculated with. To proceed from common sense, the people want to lead a worthy, quiet life under the protection of their state and their president. The people are not interested in how deputies quarreled at the congress. The people await changes. Including from the president. We can ask for the people's patience as much as we like, but it is not infinite.

The country needs unity today more than ever. Not the "monolithic unity" that disintegrated beneath blows from the April wind, no. Demarcation also means unity today.

The world is looking at us. Maybe it is looking with bated breath (we liked to say this before). The world needs a

stable, calm Soviet Union, not a country torn by contradictions, clashes, and enmity. Without a calm Soviet Union there cannot be a calm Europe. For, if something were to happen, the process that was started—born in travails—in Geneva in the fall of 1985 would go into reverse.

Let us ponder. Maybe someone should think better of it. Let us stop castigating each other. This is no longer civilized criticism but something pathological. Let us stop flooding the country with fears and rumors.

Time will judge who is right. Whoever does more for the people will be right. This is probably the only reason for the president to assume the very heavy burden of power. Everything else is political playthings or unsatisfied ambition. Everything else is unworthy of our great people.

Leningrad Official Has 'Doubts' About Presidency

PM1503095090 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 13 Mar 90 p 5

[Sergio Sergi dispatch on CPSU Leningrad First Secretary Boris Gidaspov 12 March remarks in Moscow: "Boris Gidaspov: 'Who Will Lead the Country? Let's Pass the Law First, Then Discuss It'"]

[Text] Moscow—Smiling and charming as always, Boris Venyaminovich Gidaspov, Leningrad first secretary twice over—once for the oblast and once for the city—is buried amid a throng of journalists, photographers, and cameramen. Rightly or wrongly, he is identified as the man who is pursuing a right-wing policy cleverly camouflaged behind support for perestroyka. What does he think about the presidential republic?

"I came here full of doubts...."

[L'UNITA] Why?

[Gidaspov] Because the idea of the president has its pros but also its cons. And I have not yet reached any final conclusion. I have not yet formed my opinion. I want to listen to the delegates and hear all their viewpoints before deciding. But to tell the truth, in our country's present situation I tend to accept the presidency as one of the instruments permitting a calm transition to a completely democratic state.

[L'UNITA] Are you in favor of the so-called "strong hand?"

[Gidaspov] No, it is not just a "strong hand" that is needed. The country needs a balance of forces. There needs to be a man, an organization to balance these forces, to lead and coordinate their activity. And this is a very different idea from that of a "strong hand."

[L'UNITA] But it is being said that the presidential blueprint lacks a legal foundation. And a danger is perceived in this....

[Gidaspov] The danger does exist, and this is why I came here to the "Congress" full of doubts. I want to consult legal experts. However, we certainly cannot separate ourselves from the actual situation and from the conditions affecting the USSR at this stage of its difficult course. This all weighs on and influences our discussions, our thinking, and our actions.

[L'UNITA] In your opinion, is there a real alternative to Mikhail Gorbachev?

[Gidaspov] In my opinion we should discuss this only after passing the law on the presidency. Such discussions would be pointless now. In our country, within society and in the Soviets, there are numerous able and intelligent people. And that is a fact.

[L'UNITA] Historian Yuriy Afanasyev has said that the CPSU has lost the people's confidence, while others say that the party is lagging behind because it has lost its strength. What do you think?

[Gidaspov] The real cause of the Communist Party's laboring lies in neither of these two factors. I believe it is necessary to create a balance among all the thrusts to which the party is subjected during its period of renewal.

Akhromeyev, Plekhanov Cited on Lithuania

PM0204140690

[Editorial Report] London ITV Television Network in English at 1800 GMT on 30 March carries interviews with Marshall Sergey Akhromeyev, Gorbachev's military adviser, in Russian with superimposed English translation; Nikolay Neyland, USSR Supreme Soviet delegate from Latvia; and Sergey Plekhanov, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' United States of America and Canada Institute, by David Smith during a video report on the crisis in Lithuania.

Neyland tells Smith: "Opinion in the rest of the Soviet Union—I mean rest because I myself am Baltic—and the opinion in the Soviet Union is not very positive towards Lithuania, and he, as president of the Soviet Union, he can't ignore this opinion." Smith asks: "What are your doubts about what the Lithuanians have done?" Neyland answers: "Well, about tactics, you know, about some decisions. But as I said...." Smith interrupts: "Do you think they went too fast, too far?" Neylands says, "Yes, too fast...." The interview ends abruptly there.

While discussing the role of the military in Lithuania, Smith asks Marshall Akhromeyev: "How much pressure is Gorbachev under from the military?" Akhromeyev tells him: "The president has the power, he has the brain: He's doing the right thing in Lithuania. Look what happened with you over in the Falklands. What did Britain do when it lost the islands? It used force because they were part of Great Britain. I really don't want to use force here; I really don't want to use the Army. I think we should use the Constitution—not force—in Lithuania and other republics of the Soviet Union."

Smith reports on Gorbachev's meeting with the new Council of the Federation and asks Sergey Plekhanov what the new law on secession will mean for Lithuania and the republics. Plekhanov says: "The law on the new federation will stipulate the rights, the autonomy of the republics, and they are going to be very wide rights. According to the draft, which I have seen, each republic will have to... will be able to conduct... will be entitled to its own diplomacy, its own foreign relations; will have embassies abroad; and it would... of course, it will have economic autonomy; and virtually it will be a federation which would be very much like a confederation." Smith asks: "Will it be necessary for republics like Lithuania to hold a referendum?" Plekhanov answers: "The draft legislation which is now being discussed stipulates that, first, the parliament of a republic takes a decision, and this has to be a two-thirds majority advocating separation from the Soviet Union; then there will have to be a referendum; then there will be a process of actual separation for several years; then another referendum; and then the republic is independent." Smith ends the report by describing this as a "legal obstacle course" for the Lithuanians.

TASS Chief Predicts Party Split

OW3003135790 Tokyo KYODO in English 1327 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Tokyo, March 30 KYODO—The president of TASS, the official Soviet news agency, predicted Friday that the Soviet Communist Party will inevitably split and that radicals in the party will form a new political group after its congress in July.

In an interview with KYODO NEWS SERVICE, Leonid Kravchenko also indicated that Yegor Ligachev, the most prominent conservative in the Politburo, will be removed from his post at the congress, saying his political life is nearing its final stage.

Kravchenko said the power dynamics in the party are much more complicated than reported, adding that there are three groups in both the conservative and the radical camps. He predicted a severe confrontation among them.

The 28th party congress will open on July 2 and elect members of the party's policy-making Central Committee for the first time in four years.

The radical reformists are expected to break away from the party and set up a new entity after the power structure in the committee is determined.

If the radicals in each Soviet republic can be persuaded to join the new party, its membership will swell, Kravchenko said.

The news agency chief said it will be difficult for Ligachev to be among the deputies at the scheduled party congress because they are named through direct elections by party members.

Kravchenko arrived in Tokyo at the invitation of the Japanese Foreign Ministry and will leave for Moscow on Saturday.

CPSU's Yakovlev Comments on Freedom of Choice

AU0204112090 Sofia ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME in Bulgarian 30 Mar p 6

[Interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev, "member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo," by Vitaliy Melik-Karamov, NOVOSTI reporter—date and place not given: "Free Choice—Guarantee of Correct Road"]

[Text] Aleksandr Yakovlev seldom grants interviews and he does not often appear on television. His influence over the new thinking policy is, however, felt by all. At the request of ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME Vitaliy Melik-Karamov, NOVOSTI reporter, talked with Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.

[Karamov] How do you assess the birth of the presidential system in the USSR?

[Yakovlev] I would describe this as a civilized step, not only in the sphere of the state structure. The change of form of government is of great importance. Nevertheless it is not the decisive factor.

What is more important is that for the first time in our country's history that we are advancing toward a constitutional government. With the presidential system we are strengthening the constitutional principles. I hope that this step will have a real influence on the public's awareness.

[Karamov] A large part of the Soviet people still remember the time when our propaganda claimed that our country was a lonely peak surrounded by enemies. Now that the East European countries are relinquishing communist ideology, is there not a danger that this syndrome will reappear. Could not we again start to rearm ourselves and prepare for resistance?

[Yakovlev] I do not think so. Those countries are seeking their own roads. At this stage we must not allow any mistakes to occur and we must refrain from underestimating the choice made by the East European countries. The fact that their decision was a matter of free choice is a positive one. This fact does not guarantee that there will not be any mistakes, but it does guarantee that in the final analysis the correct road will be found.

This does not mean at all that a hostile encirclement is being formed around our country. The East European countries honestly want to preserve their friendly relations with us. There are no symptoms of deterioration. However, the processes are developing and we must keep this in mind. If we ourselves have adopted the ideology of free choice then we must be consistent in this respect toward other countries.

Kryuchkov Meets People's Deputies 23 Mar

LD0204204190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 0600 GMT on 1 April carries a 55-minute program entitled "Meeting Between V.A. Kryuchkov, Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, and USSR People's Deputies." The meeting takes place in the Committee for State Security (KGB) building in Moscow on 23 March. Deputies are shown filing into a room, where they are greeted by Kryuchkov. Kryuchkov says: "Esteemed comrades and guests of ours. We are glad to welcome you to the KGB building. This is no doubt the first time many of you have been here! [laughter] I once read an item in a Western newspaper that people entering the KGB building should examine the door handles. They are worn on the side from which people come in, but quite clean on the side from which they go out. You may have noticed that this is not the case! You know, there is a kind of aura of mystery and secrecy surrounding the KGB, and some even say there is a certain fascination in that. What, you can't hear me properly? I'll try and speak up. As you will know, taking advantage of democracy and glasnost we have of late been attempting somehow to dispel this secrecy and this aura of mystery, because we we also need the people to know more about us. And if people know more about us, they will naturally help us more. Aside from that, without an understanding of the importance of our work, without people's support, and without consideration of the opinion that is formed about the security organs in our society, we naturally cannot successfully accomplish the tasks that we face. I remember when I was being confirmed by the Supreme Soviet, I was not, as you can imagine, in an easy position. It was difficult to handle the large number of questions that had come in. When Iren Aleksandrovna asked an innocuous question about whether we would agree to meet representatives of the "Memorial" society, I replied without thinking: Yes, I agree. And now we must keep our promise! So we welcome you especially. [passage indistinct] So which of you will speak first, comrades? Who will set out the main points of the interests and questions you have?"

Iren Aleksandrovna Andreyeva explains the idea of converting "the building in which we find ourselves, in particular, and perhaps other buildings belonging to the KGB" into "commemorative museums and research organizations which will enable us at this stage of restructuring and in the future to entrench and consolidate guarantees against arbitrary rule and lawlessness." The building is associated with the "horrifying years of repression," she says. Andreyeva describes how her mother had "quite simply almost cried" when she had seen her putting questions to Kryuchkov on television, and had said: "I beg you: don't get too close." The project would be a symbol of the irreversibility of reform for people at home and abroad, she tells Kryuchkov.

Aleksandr Petrovich Kudryavtsev from the Union of Architects asks what the prospects are that the KGB complex will remain on its present site. Sergey Adamovich Kovalev points to the fact that there are wider issues than just the transfer of the building.

Aleksandr Isaakovich Gelman says that, difficult though it will be, the transfer ought to be effected because the building is a "symbol of, and monument to, Stalin and Stalinism, and only when it is transferred to "memorial" and there is a museum here will it all pass into history, and the whole of the NKVD's past will also pass into history together with it."

Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Adamovich says the buildings underline the KGB's continuity and it is in the Committee's interests to "part with the buildings and leave them in the past, together with all the good things and bad things that happened."

Yegor Vladimirovich Yakovlev says that for all the recent openness fostered by Kryuchkov, in his view no breakthrough in public perceptions of the KGB has occurred.

Yevgeniy Ivanovich Bystrov, first deputy chairman of Moscow city Executive Committee, says the mains and services (kommunikatsii) installed on the Dzerzhinskiy Square site and "renovated recently" cost "tens of millions of rubles", and anyway it will take a long time to move them to an alternative site. There is an alternative proposal for a museum to be built where the Ivan Fedorov monument currently stands.

Boris Vladimirovich Paluy, chief of an architect's office at "Mosproyekt-2," talks about what the KGB has done to renovate buildings in Dzerzhinskiy Square.

Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Savin, described by caption as "directorate chief," says he saw "no practical possibility" of transferring the KGB's headquarters, but there are two buildings at the end of "Ulitsa 25-ogo Oktyabrya" associated with "all sorts of actions" in the 1930's, and the possibility of housing the museum there should be examined.

Kryuchkov then says "I'd like to clear up one point. Everyone says that the KGB builds things quickly and to tight schedules, and any Moscow organization can envy it in this respect and can't compare with it. That is the way it was. But, let me reveal a secret to you. When these buildings were being erected on the square [Dzerzhinskiy Square], all the resources the committee had were channeled here, and all the other sections [podrazdeleniye] suffered as a result for years. I was then chief of intelligence, and I plaintively asked (Mikhail Ivanovich Yermakov), who was deputy chairman of the KGB—this did not of course affect our relations!—why he had stripped bare even the intelligence service. We needed many things as it was, things we were in extreme need of to increase the effectiveness of the operations of the intelligence service. But, everything was chaneled here. All the resources were concentrated here, comrades. But I must say they were right to do this, because this is a central square, and promises that had been given to the

Moscow authorities had to be fulfilled as quickly as possible. And we wanted at least one square to be put into proper shape. That is the explanation of the rapid rate of construction. Please don't imagine that we possess some kind of boundless and mighty construction organization that has the possibility of meeting all the requirements of Muscovites. So, when we now recieve proposals that we could build something or help somewhere, we have to weigh it because, to be honest, in the past year or two, our possibilities in this respect have been curtailed.

"As far as this whole ensemble of buildings that you see here [video shows photographs and diagrams on the wall] is concerned and why it is in this location, that is the way we ended up building it. I'll say more about that later. If we broke up this complex of buildings and moved even one of the buildings to another location, we would simply be faced by an insoluble problems. I must tell you—but, if it's alright, I won't explain in too much detail—the KGB does not just carry out its own tasks. It also performs tasks on a statewide scale and level, and we also have matters related to our mobilization readiness for periods of emergency [osobyy period] and communications matters. This is very important because for such a large country as ours communications are of course of great significance. And there are other matters, in particular of a technical nature, without which the committee cannot function at the proper level. I refer to the building on the right, which house the main computer center." "It is fitted with modern equipment. I have to say that it houses our Soviet-made equipment, which isn't bad. It also houses non-Soviet-made equipment. We do not work alone. We work with the relevant Academy of Sciences institutes. In terms of the performance of operational tasks, this building is also integrated into the complex of tasks which all these buildings perform.

"We were awaiting this meeting so that we could hear your opinion and think about the question once again. We can say this: If we were now to come to the conclusion that it would be a good thing after all to leave this building which surrounds us and move to another, then I must say bluntly that it is technically impossible to do this at present; economically, no one would undertake it. And, we are evidently now approaching a different aspect of this problem. I don't wish to say that we reject the proposal as it has been submitted from the outset. I think it requires attention and discussion and I am grateful that none of those who spoke touched upon the Dzerzhinskiy memorial. I shall say that Dzerzhinskiy's name is sacred for security officers. Many people write that Dzerzhinskiy made mistakes, too. Yes, he made mistakes in his time, too. many people made mistakes. But, nevertheless, Dzerzhinskiy is a person who was clean and honest. That was his main characteristic. And I beleive that the fact that the memorial is here and, I believe, that it hasn't given rise to any remarks from you also confirms your constructive and positive attitude to it. I think that if, say, the issue of the Dzerzhinskiy memorial had been raised, then it would probably have been very painful for security officers to hear about it and I am grateful to you for your full understanding on this.

"Now about the historical-political aspect of this question. Well, what can I say? You know, we have of course lived through a very grave period and we are doing so now. As for history, you know, whatever kind of history it may have been it is all our history, both the grave and the happy times, both the glorious and inglorious times. We shall never escape from this. Of course, we have had very grave periods and I think that we have not yet made an objective assessment of many stages of our Soviet history. I shall speak quite openly with you. First, you know, if we take the Stalin era—we are all now discussing that terrible page in the history of our state. At one time many of us, unaware and ignorant, said a great deal of kind things about Stalin. Now that we have found doubt we are, of course, drawing different conclusions. You know, that history cannot be justified for all that. How can one justify Stalin and all his misdeeds? It's impossible. But, we must obviously think seriously about somehow explaining everything that took place, both for ourselves and, the most important thing, for our future generations. I understand that to justify this and to explain it are different categories. I am saying that it is impossible to justify it, but we must somehow seek to explain what happened. The situation now is a different one. We are no longer the same and the times are not the same. But I think that even today it is necessary for us that the overall level of development of our society and state should be considerably higher than that which exists today. I believe that the Supreme Soviet, the Congress of People's Deputies and our public are doing a great deal in this regard."

"Now about our attitude to the security officers of that time. More than 20,000, of our people perished during the period of the Stalinist personality cult. This is a large number, and I shall tell you that a uniform assessment mustn't be made here either, you know. People perished who had not committed any misdeeds or carried out any illegal acts; and people perished who during the first stage had carried out illegal acts, but then they, too, fell under the grindstones. So make an evaluation, if you please! Rehabilitation is now taking place, and here too there are people who also put their hands to illegal acts and then they, too, suffered. We are now rehabilitating them because they were unfortunate in their own way. Probably there were security officers, unfortunate in their own way, who at certain stages carried out illegal acts, but then fell victim to this themselves. They paid for this with their lives. Security officers are now doing a great deal so that truth should triumph.

"Of course, you know, different attitudes can be taken toward these buildings, but I believe that all these questions are not so simple and we should adopt the most difficult decisions. They should be politically well considered and psychologically justified. Of course, you know, we could flog this building, punish it; we could dismantle it. There have been such examples in history.

One can, of course, act in a civilized way or an uncivilized way. That's another matter. But this is not the 16th Century, after all, it's the end of the 20th Century. But, dear comrades, I think that the important thing is something else. It is important that only truth and justice, legality should emanate from this building; that people should sit in this building who have followed strictly the path of that legality.

"We thought for a long time about how to increase our contribution, our might, to rehabilitating the good names of those who have suffered. You are in that part of our building, an old building, where the headquarters of our leadership was located not long ago at all. This was the building of the collegium of the Security Committee. Not far away is the study where Yuriy Vladimirovich worked for 15 years, and we could establish a museum, you know, a branch, a kind of memorial which would be devoted to one problem, the problem of those who suffered and their rehabilitation. We are indeed opening this up now, and we have now shown thousands of case histories to relatives of those who suffered who have made such a request. We are not showing material in which, under the effect of torture and inhuman treatment of people, someone, you know, has slandered himself and slandered others—the main thing is other people—because if we show this to near ones we shall traumatize them even more. And, to conclude this topic comrades, I should like to say the following: I understand the emotions which are overwhelming you, overcoming you, but, after all comrades, in any matter there are two principles. The first principle is emotional and the second principle is rational. The rational aspect always comes into play after the emotional aspect. But I think that you will take a serious attitude to our idea about arranging some kind of memorial here, displaying material, displaying it clearly, that you will think about it, and I believe that none of you expects any instantaneous solutions. So we shall think about it.

"If you have no questions on this section, I should now like to pass on to a critical issue. May I pass on? I may. Should we have some hot tea to set us up? Shall we have an interval? Yes, you may smoke, of course you may. Comrades, so as you please, and then we shall say: We had guests who did everything they wanted to; they even smoked."

Kryuchkov then says: "How is the activity of the KGB to be regulated now and in the future? Whose question is this? It's also yours, it is?" "Well, the activity of the KGB is currently regulated by a provision which was adopted in 1959. Then, after that, a number of legislative acts were adopted concerning various aspects of the activity of the KGB. We are guided by these, too, and, of course, by the Constitution. A law on the KGB is now being prepared. There have already been two readings—I spoke twice—and we have now sent this law to be considered by the Committee for Issues of Defense and State Security and we hope that it will be considered."

An unidentified deputy asks if it will be published. Kryuchkov responds: "Without fail. We would like this to be not a provision but a law, so that it will be adopted by the Supreme Soviet and published, so that our activity will be legalized. I believe that if this law is adopted—there will probably be modifications, of course—it will probably be interesting for the members of the Supreme Soviet to adopt it. It will be the first open law, public law on the KGB and then a great deal will become clear. We would also like to concentrate certain aspects of our activity which would enable us to use equipment and other possibilities because we simply cannot do without this now. If we wish to wage a serious campaign against crime then we must do this. Incidentally, comrade legislators, I think you must equip the law enforcement organs more completely with legalization which would enable us, first, to operate at the prevention stage. Second, we probably must somehow also underpin the concept of the order of (?revolutionary props) with the action of our criminal norms, which would enable us to see clearly. Tell me, please, who says that I am acting in the interests, with the aim of undermining Soviet power?"

Continuing, Kryuchkov says: "Look, they have stopped railway transport in Azerbaijan. Communications between Azerbaijan and Armenia have been cut. Immense damage has been done. Factories have been brought to a halt. There is an article of the law which allows us to prosecute people for these actions if they were carried out with the intention of undermining Soviet power. But the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis say that they support Soviet power. So, how can they act in this way when huge damage of this kind, running into a thousand million already, is being inflicted? Clearly, the legislator must [words indistinct]. We are now encountering, in the conditions of democracy and glasnost, questions that we simply did not envisage a year ago. Therefore, we should probably decide a few things quite differently.

"Take, for example, the relations which certain organizations have with foreign states, with organizations and societies in other countries. I think the questions of obtaining financial and material aid must be regulated in some way. At any rate such things are regulated in the legislation of the FRG, France, Britain, and the United States. But they are not regulated at all in our country. In other words, there are questions which should, I think, be given some thought.

"As far as mail interception is concerned, I have to say that at the present time we are not checking correspondence, except where this is needed in order to prevent crime. In doing so, we are guided by the established norms. These norms are strictly adhered to. There is one other thing I must say. It is often said that telephone conversations are frequently tapped. How they exaggerate our very modest capabilities! I am taken aback by how fearful, afraid, and apprehensive people sometimes are. I understand these feelings, of course. Yegor Vladimirovich [Yakovlev] just smiled. I suppose he was

thinking that nobody knows whether their conversation is being listened to or not. That is, of course, true. But, at all events, dear comrades...." Kruychkov is interrupted at this point by an unidentified deputy who talks indistinctly about telephone tappings.

Kryuchkov then continues: "As regards the archives: We believe there should be a law on the archives. But I don't know when these questions will be decided. In all civilized states there is a law. Such a law must be adopted and applied. Some people advocate a period of 50-100 years for certain questions. I consider that we have materials which cannot be declassified for 70 years. Do understand, we are working in other countries. We are not working in a vacuum. We receive assistance. I also think there are ethical questions which we should not overlook. Therefore, I consider that when a law on the archives is adopted, it will make provision for everything. It will regulate our activities very well. To be honest with you, we are looking forward to this law. We want it ourselves.

"At the same time, there is, of course, no point in keeping things which are of absolutely no use to anybody. The main thing is that, after a certain time, our scholars and researchers should be able to get at these archive materials in order to draw conclusions and, in doing so, provide a very useful service to our people and public.

"As regards abandoning the role of political police...." An unidentified deputy, interrupting says: "The fifth directorate." Kryuchkov responds: "The fifth directorate. I understand, yes. Well, I can say that the fifth directorate was responsible for both intelligence and counterintelligence. These were the areas it was responsible for. But we have not simply changed the functions of this directorate. We have abolished it. This is because, as you know, much has changed. But there is one example I can give you. Take anti-Soviet propaganda. This used to be considered a criminal offense. Is that not so? But it is not any longer. Now it is possible to speak out against Soviet power and to advocate capitalism. But it is still a crime to use violence to overthrow, to make violent attempts to overthrow Soviet power. That's another matter.

"Therefore, the question of the attitude to so-called ideological sabotage has taken on a completely different ring. We don't need this fifth directorate. Therefore we have created what we call a directorate for the defence of constitutional rights, against actions directed at the violent overthrow of our constitutional system."

An unidentified deputy asks: "How does the KGB see its work now that Article 6 of the Constitution has been revoked? What will be the relationship between the party and the KGB?"

A second unidentified deputy asks: "Is the KGB becoming the party's sword?"

Kryuchkov responds: "Well, in the first place, Articles 6 and 7 entered the Constitution in 1977. I think that this article pampered us, I mean the communists. It was as though we were behind a stone wall. Our party decisions [words indistinct]. A lot can be said about what was neglected during the time this article was in force. But, at any rate, the article deprived us of an opportunity to learn about how to wage a real political struggle. I have the communists in mind here.

"But this also had an impact on society. As regards state security bodies, depending on what the situation was, control over them was exercised by the party Central Committee [words indistinct] situation. But, of course, we also received instructions from the Council of Ministers. Financial directives came from the Ministry of Finance. There was control by the Procuratorate. So, the control was fairly strict. Under Andropov this control was significantly increased; that has to be clearly stated.

"But now the norm of our activities is Soviet legislation. The main body for us is the Supreme Soviet. It will determine our activities and principles, legislation, I mean. We are (?monitored) by the Committee on Defense and State Security. Incidentally, the KGB initiated the establishment of the Committee on Defense and State Security. At the same time, we also asked that there should be a sub-committee on state security attached to this committee on questions of defense, and this was agreed to. This is because there are questions which we do not want to be aired completely openly. The Council of Ministers will also guide us more than it has done up to now.

"But the revocation of Article 6 presents us with a new situation, a situation in which there will be more than one party. It also confronts us with the problem of depoliticization. We cannot evade this, whether we are directly concerned or not. For the time being we have only one official party in our country. But new parties of this kind are emerging. I think there will be quite a few of them. Incidentally, we are not opposed to a multiparty system. We advocated [words indistinct] Article 6.

"But forces have already emerged in our country which are opposed to a multiparty system. They are not communists. There is the Tsereteli party in Georgia. Today—no, I'm sorry, yesterday—they held a big demonstration against a multiparty system in Georgia, because they consider that Georgia should have only one party, i.e. their nationalist party. So, as you see, there is this interesting problem which has arisen.

"Speaking for myself, I can say that I shall never go over to any other party. It is being said that there are people who are registering with 48 parties in the belief that at least one of them will win. But I have profound confidence in the party, although I favor its reinvigoration. I will support reform of the party. If our party makes real, constructive contact with the population, with all sections of society, if it pursues proper contacts and links

with all the organizations which are currently being formed, that is another matter.

"However, there are certain organisations which I simply cannot comprehend, so to speak, for example, the monarchist organizations surfacing in our country. I really think that in this country the monarchist train has already made its final departure. I don't what you think about this?

"There is understanding for the work of the KGB. We receive letters of support. There is also material of a negative character. At all events, not a single day passes without us reading one or the other. However, slightly more of the letters are positive than negative. But quality is more important than quantity. [words indistinct] what the future will bring.

"I would like to say something about the latest article in the journal OGONEK. I get on quite well with Vitaliy Alekseyevich [Korotich, editor-in-chief of OGONEK]. It's a pity that he is not here now. I do not often get a chance to talk to him. It would be good to have a chat with him. But they have published this story about Rostov. Well, dear comrades, I can tell you something. They shot a bribe-taker there. When was it, 1980 or 1982? Yes, 1982. He was a bribe-taker who accepted 142,000 in bribes. Everything was properly proved. Even if he had taken only 2,000, he would still have been shot because he was a Chekist.

"Comrades, I must tell you the following. In the state security bodies we have comrades endowed with great intellectual qualities, who are well informed and educated, people who are dedicated to their work and to the law, people who protect our security day in, day out, whether it be abroad or here at home. But they are still people. They are your children. They are your relatives or acquaintances. There is a black sheep in every family. Things have happened inside our organization for which we put some people in prison. Not so long ago some people were even shot for treachery. That actually happened. We have it in mind to (?announce) such things without delay and [word indistinct]."

Kryuchkov continues: "But the negative features, so to speak, of our organization are not as extensive as in some others, and the staff of the committee are very proud of this. I consider that it has retained its purity. We also maintain this purity by trying to immediately dismiss or severely punish those who commit misdemeanours or crimes of any kind. If somebody somewhere commits a misdemeanour or crime of this kind, he is punished just once. But for a Chekist the punishment has to be twice as heavy.

Deputy "Yuriy Alekseyevich Ryzhkov," identified by caption, asks: "What is your prognosis, so to speak, for the development of events in the country over the next 12-18 months?"

Kryuchkov replies: "I'm an optimist, you know, even though it's better to be a pessimist, for one simple reason. If I make a pessimistic prediction, I do not have to take responsibility for it. I can merely say that I was being cautious. But an optimist has to answer for his predictions. Nevertheless, I am an optimist. I think that the processes of glasnost and democracy, the development of democracy and perestroyka in our country, will eventually emerge into a constructive channel, to a significant extent. There are, indeed, unconstructive features about life in our country at the moment, but many things are normalizing themselves.

"But I think we need two things: First, we must seriously think about what we are going to do with the economy. I think we have to proceed along one path. As far as possible, each of our citizens must be able to work to the best of his ability, effectively, productively. But at the same time his material interest should not be infringed upon. I am a supporter of profound and cardinal reforms.

"But there is one question I want to put to you. We talk about new thinking. Can we mold new thinking during the lifetime of one generation? Let us be frank. This is a (?difficult) and serious process. [word indistinct] was right when he said that we should increase output of metal. [words indistinct] It is a complex problem. Therefore, we must, clearly, gear ourselves to a longer time scale, so to speak. We must, of course, give scope to the processes of perestroyka, democracy, and glasnost. But it goes without saying that law and order must be maintained in the country. Otherwise, criminality, crimes of varous kinds, could seriously weaken all our work and do great harm to it.

"As regards the next year or two, there is one task which must be resolved at all costs. I have in mind the problem of interethnic relations. I think we have to do some serious work on this. There are some arguments which seemed very strange to me. I spoke about this at the Supreme Soviet. I would like to say this again now. Some people say it might be a good idea if, for example, the Russians were all to go home and settle in the Russian Federation. Comrades, this is a horrifying idea. As KGB chairman, I would like to declare to you that this is a horrifying idea. In the first place, it does not stand up to any logical argument at all. Second, what about human rights? We must try to ensure that every human being in every place feels himself to be a human being and that his rights are respected.

"I would now like to reveal another figure which has not been published. The most terrible years were 1937 and 1938. During those two years 1,152,319 people were repressed. Over 600,000 were shot. In other words, all that happened during those two years. Naturally, such a thing cannot be justified. But even to explain what happened at that time is very difficult. I consider that to be quite a big number, but it was certainly not tens of millions.

"Now, what about the 1920's. At the moment we do not have precise figures for the 1920's, because the archive

materials have not survived. Some archives were stored locally and disappeared somewhere there. Work of this kind is now underway. After all this has been taken account of, we will definitely publish the figures."

Asked by unidentified deputies about the Pamyat organization, Kryuchkov replies that "the organization is diverse. In the provinces there are organizations which engage in good and decent work. They restore monuments and tourist sites, guard them, and work constructively. But there are elements that do put one on one's guard."

An unidentified deputy says: "Representatives of Pamyat are like parasites, capitalizing on the claims that the Committee for State Security and the Central Committee are on their side [words indistinct], on the subject of Pamyat a leading official of the committee has stated clearly that the committee has nothing in common with Pamyat. That was [words indistinct] and useful. And you know, the more the committee manages to put across its thoughts on Pamyat, the better and more useful it will be."

Kryuchkov replies: "Well, in the first place, I shall issue just such a statement now. That's the first thing. In the second place, you know, there is a lot said about the Committee for State Security! And so, I believe that must be regarded with...[changes thought] In the Soviet Union we have somewhere between 70,000 and 80,000 various organizations active in society. We believe that 98 percent of these organizations are essentially constructive. These must be utilised. Some 1.5 or two percent of the organizations are organizations which, I believe, if they continue to develop on the basis of the principles which they have adopted, are unlikely to develop into organizations that will benefit society."

Asked by an unidentified deputy about the case of the House of Letters, Kryuchkov replies that "there is a criminal case there, an investigation is going on on that." He adds that "there is no intention of dropping the case."

An unidentified deputy then asks: "Another question if I may. Or even two. The first question has to do with what, of course, troubles us—what is happening in Lithuania. If you could somehow comment, and if you could say what you anticipate, what your forecasts are on this score."

Kryuchkov replies; "Right, Lithuania. Just imagine Lithuania instituting divorce proceedings against us. Presumably, then, there must be certain canons which should provide a framework for this process. You will know, and probably there is no point in telling you, that we have hundreds of union-designated enterprises there. These enterprises have cost us several tens of thousands of millions of dollars. Another very important problem is that of communications with Klaipeda and Kaliningrad Oblast. The Ignalina nuclear electric power station supplies both Lithuania and Belorussia, and was constructed out of the union budget. Furthermore, we have a military structure there that costs a great deal. The population there is diverse, with Russians, Poles, Jews and Lithuanians. Around 20 percent of the population speak another language. Just over 80 percent are Lithuanians.

"At the present time the system in place there is socialist; tomorrow a capitalist system will be announced. Then, 41 percent of the populace cast their votes. Of those 41 percent, only 28 percent voted for deputies from Sajudis. Thus, clearly not everything is in order. We are not against self-determination for nations. Not even secession. Those are our intentions. Serious ones. And as I understand it, the Supreme Soviet has the same intentions. But at the same time, there must presumably be some sort of mechanism. If, for instance, we end up with alienation, a rupture, then that is one scenario. Clearly, this is a process that needs both time and the appropriate approaches. But it should be said straight out that what we had not anticipated in Lithuania was the surfacing of a movement against such ways of resolving the question of Lithuania's secession from the Soviet Union. Lithuanians, Russians, and Poles all rose up. Incidentally, the Jewish section of the population has been very active in this. By our reckoning, there were at least 200,000 people at the rally (on the 18th). It went off without a hitch. And now we are working hard to keep the union-designated enterprises from striking. Because we do not believe that this is the way, this is not a step that should be resorted to. And all the actions of the present Lithuanian leadership, they do not accord with our legislation. As a former lawyer, I can tell you that that is the case. For that reason, the relevant statements were issued. Our position on this issue is quite firm, and should anyone in Vilnius think that this was let off as a blank round, for the sheer sound of it, then they are much mistaken. This is a position of principle. We support a political solution to this problem, and would be very much against strong-arm methods taking the place of political methods."

Kryuchkov continues: "But, what have we observed? First, though isolated and personal, nevertheless a bad attitude toward the section of the populace that speaks a different language. There has been unpleasantness. Then, the baiting of units of the Soviet Army and servicemen. Then, there have been threats, and we know that lists are being drawn up of communists and people who played an active part in restoring order in the first years after the war. Falin's speech to the congress was based on documents, and therefore may be believed, and indeed it was basically factual. Therefore, we believe that given the basis—legal, so-called—on which the present Lithuanian leadership has begun tackling the question of secession, we will not maintain normal relations with them. We are against any talks. Because it is impossible to hold talks with a union republic, and we consider it a union republic. Talks can only be held with a foreign state. But we are in favor of discussion, and in favour of resolving these issues. I believe that the present Lithuanian leadership is acting improvidently and rashly, at the very least. It cannot bring anything but misfortune upon our relations with Lithuania and the Lithuanian people.

"I think we must pursue a policy of principle, because only a principled policy can be correct. And the congress, which passed a decision on Lithuania—I do not know whether those comrades present voted for it or not—acting correctly, in my view. I support the decision you took."

An unidentified deputy asks: "Specifically, how do you think events will develop?"

Kryuchkov replies: "Well, take, for instance, the Ministry of Internal Affairs. They have decided to declare this ministry a republican ministry. Under the Constitution, it is union-republican, so nothing will come of it. The Committee for Television: That is a union republican organ. They decided to make it republican. Nothing will come to it. If they try to do something using force, then we will have no option but to ensure the normal functioning of the television. The Committee for State Security; they also decided to disband it. But nothing can come to that, for it is a union-republican committee. On the subject of the border, they decided to place the border totally under their jurisdiction, and to change the posts marking out the border. We deployed a frontier detachment. Large enough for the purpose. It took control of the border. Customs—we likewise took charge of the customs service. If they decide to take any steps, then our steps will be adequate to match them."

He concludes: "I have spoken to you so much today! I would rather like to ask you a few questions, but we don't have too much time."

The deputies thank Kryuchkov, and the program ends.

USSR Foreign Intelligence Work Viewed

90UN1222A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 1 Mar 90 p 4

[Report on interview with L.V. Shebarshin, deputy chairman of the USSR KGB and chief of the 1st Main Directorate, by M. Makhlin: "Whom 'the Hand of Moscow' Serves;" date and occasion not specified]

[Text]**"...And the Lord God spoke unto Moses saying: Send people that they may search the land of Canaan...."**

And Moses sent them to spy out the land of Canaan, and he said to them: "Get you up this way southward and go up into the mountain and see the land, what kind it is, and the people that dwell therein, and whether they are strong or weak, few or many? And what the cities are like in which they dwell, whether in tents or in strongholds?

L.V. Shebarshin, deputy chief of the USSR KGB and chief of the 1st Main Directorate, prefaced his speech to the machine building plant "Banner of Labor" with this quote from the Bible, indicating not without humor the ancient sources of his profession. Taking part with the chief of Soviet foreign intelligence in this meeting with the enterprise's work collective were his deputy, Doctor of Historical Sciences L. [as published], and other managers of the analytical and scientific and technical subdivisions of the main directorate.

Soviet intelligence is considerably younger than its main "opponents" who fostered secret services for centuries. In September 1920, the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b) [Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)] approved a decision to establish intelligence beyond the cordon, as it was expressed at the time. "Only serious and properly established intelligence will save us from accidental blind moves," it was noted in this document. On 20 December 1920, F.E. Dzerzhinskiy signed an order concerning the creation of a Foreign Department of the VChK [All-Russian Special Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage]. In a word, the approximate date of the seventieth anniversary is not far off, but the conversation in the work auditorium was far from festive.

It was not only idle curiosity that dictated the questions of the Chekists [members of the VChK]. A profound and sincere concern was felt by those who were assembled over the seeming inactivity of the organs of state security against a background, as it became acceptable to say, of ambiguous events in our country and in the world. The familiar expression "the Cheka is not asleep," you will agree, has recently taken on an especially ironic sound. One can judge by the nature of the answers that the Chekists are no less interested in exposing the truth about their own department.

[Makhlin] What are the role and tasks of Soviet intelligence under current conditions, in a period when radical changes are taking place in the international situation?

[Shebarshin] Not everyone in the West interprets the changes in the Soviet Union soberly and with understanding. Some figures are tempted to interpret what is occurring in the world as "a victory of capitalism" in the "cold war," and they are attempting to exploit the situation and to reduce the Soviet Union to the status of a regional power.

"We are in a state of war that is called peace. It is a conflict that has not ended and which apparently will last more than one generation," writes former U.S. President Richard Nixon in his book "The Year 2000: Victory without War or Apocalypse." Not only former vice presidents talk this way, but also current U.S. Vice President Quayle and Secretary of Defense Cheney, who dubbed Washingtonians who sympathize with perestroyka "people who take off their coat on the first sunny day of January." The main task of intelligence is to have an objective picture of the processes taking place in the world, and to know and understand them. Intelligence is charged with the task of providing the Soviet leadership with reliable information about the actual plans of the leading Western countries with respect to our country and about the most important international problems. It is necessary for proper decisionmaking.

Intelligence tries to reveal everything that is positive in world politics and all of the resources for improving international relations and achieving mutually acceptable decisions. But its specific character consists of the fact that it must pay particular attention to those moments that create a threat to the security of the Soviet Union, its positions and interests. Of course, this does not mean that intelligence sees everything in a dark light. No, it is specifically a question of insuring our country against unpleasant surprises.

In a number of cases it is impossible to clarify the real picture in any other way apart from intelligence. Secrets in the area of policy, economics, and military strategy are kept under lock and key.

Plans for achieving decisive military superiority over the Soviet Union have not been turned over to the archives yet. Of course, we cannot look at this serenely. Therefore, one of the tasks of Soviet intelligence is to keep an eye on the development of armaments, in order not to overlook a possible breakthrough by the West in the military-technical sphere and in the creation of fundamentally new types of weapons.

The economic reform that is being conducted in our country, new forms of foreign economic relations, and the policy of integrating the Soviet economy into the world economy require from us a significant expansion of work on economic problems. The vital need to overcome crisis phenomena in the USSR's national economy confronts intelligence with the priority task of rendering assistance to the country through a more effective use of foreign economic relations and by providing information on certain aspects of complicated and contradictory processes occurring in the world economy, and on behind-the-scenes plans and actions in this sphere. Typical in this regard is the statement by CIA Director Webster, made on 20 September 1989 at a meeting of the Los Angeles department of the Council on International Relations, that the CIA will henceforth stress attention to the results of economic reform in the socialist countries. In his words, "economic power is a guarantee of authority in the world. Intelligence information concerning economic events has never before had such great significance."

Thus, the sphere of economics will remain not only an area of international cooperation, but also a sphere of opposition in which the special services play an appreciable role.

[Makhlin] Are the events in the Transcaucasus and in Central Asia incited from a single center abroad or in our country?

[Shebarshin] According to our information, there is no such single center either in the USSR or abroad. At the same time, we know of cases of furnishing extremists weapons, money, propaganda literature, and duplicating equipment from various foreign sources.

Recently, by the way, we analyzed material from the radio intercept of the broadcasting of "Free Europe" in national languages. The very same events and facts are interpreted, for example, in Armenian and Azeri, in a diametrically opposed sense. Similarly, life in the country is elucidated in other languages of the people of the USSR. National dissension is skillfully stirred up.

[Makhlin] How many spies and anti-Soviets are held in special camps?

[Shebarshin] There are no special camps. As far as I know, about a dozen spies are being held in places of imprisonment that are part of the system of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. All told, in recent years about 30 agents of Western special services have been exposed. In 1987, when the ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on amnesty was adopted, a number in the order of 250 persons had been convicted of anti-Soviet activity. At that time, it was proposed that as a condition for their release they give a written commitment henceforth to abstain from subversive activity. An overwhelming majority immediately accepted this. There is no one in camps now convicted under articles 190(1) and 70, and indeed these articles themselves have been repealed.

[Makhlin] Does not the "game of spies" look ridiculous against a background of modern techniques with satellites and electronics?

[Shebarshin] Technical systems are rather widely employed, but they are not multipurpose, are limited in their capabilities, and are very expensive.

The Americans are trying to create the impression that they are relying on the use of technical systems in the collection of information. This is a smoke screen. We know precisely that their main system is "human intelligence," that is, agent intelligence. Large appropriations are being allocated to strengthening this direction of intelligence activity.

More than 250,000 of our fellow citizens are working abroad on long-term temporary duty assignments. Contacts by Soviet people with foreign countries are expanding, and a huge number of people go abroad. Under these conditions, there is a greater danger of attempts by Western special services to acquire long-term sources who would work for them in the Soviet Union under any circumstances on a permanent basis. While the special services previously did not shun pursuing any Soviet citizen, they are now working selectively. The major subjects of their interest are Soviet diplomats, the military, scientists, managerial or prospective workers of state establishments, and, of course, intelligence personnel. Western intelligence officers display a great interest in what is being done in the scientific-technical field. And everything in our country is not that bad, and there are developments and ideas of a world standard.

The aggressive activity of the "Russian" departments of the Western countries' special services is indicated by the fact that in 1988 they made three times as many attempts as in 1985 to incite Soviet citizens to secret cooperation or not to return to the Motherland.

Soviet intelligence is placing stress on penetrating those special services that are conducting operations against our country.

[Makhlin] Did "our people" take part in the events that took place in Eastern Europe, in particular in Romania?

[Shebarshin] To observe—they observed, but they did not participate.

[Makhlin] Corruption did not touch the KGB? How do you contend with your traitors?

[Shebarshin] You cannot get away without defects. But we have reduced them to a minimum. Unfortunately, there are people who get hooked on the "easy life" and who use their service position and their foreign travel assignments for various kinds of profiteering. We part with them mercilessly. And I am not just talking about discharge. I assure you that, without worrying about the honor of the uniform or about the publicity of affiliation with the KGB, any employee found to be dishonest will be tried in court without special preferences.

[Makhlin] Who works in intelligence? How do you select personnel?

[Shebarshin] We have a special educational institution into which people with higher education are accepted. As a rule, we find them ourselves. What is desired, of course, is good health and an ability for learning foreign languages. Every employee of our chief directorate knows two languages, and many, three and more. There are also those who wish on their own initiative to enroll in intelligence work. We also study these candidacies carefully.

To run into a person who possesses all of the qualities necessary for our work is practically unrealistic. Indeed, we do not even try for this kind of "superman" figure. On the contrary, a person ideally suitable for our requirements would raise doubts.

One of the most important conditions is sociability, an ability to make contact with people easily. But the most important requirement for all without exception is absolute reliability, dedication to the job, and ideological steadfastness. We must be confident that our comrade will not let us down in a difficult moment.

A typical detail. We transport each new intake of students to a military camp, and on the very next day they perform a parachute jump. Not because they will have to land this way in the future. In our time, there are a lot of other means of penetrating "beyond the cordon." It is simply that after such an experience, some will submit a report on elimination, and we ourselves will drop others. Boldness and readiness at any moment to execute an order are also irreplaceable specific features of an intelligence agent.

Any kind of forced enrollment and pressure in the selection of personnel is totally excluded from our practice. We adhere strictly to the principle of voluntariness. We also profess the same principle in our work with foreign assistants.

[Makhlin] How do you account for the appearance of new KGB buildings at Lubyanka? Is your administrative apparatus being reduced?

[Shebarshin] At our rates of construction, financing, and planning, called long-range construction, projects are being implemented on Dzerzhinskiy Square that were approved more than 10 years ago. As for administrative apparatus, we almost do not have any as such. There is an operational staff, which is permanently "in the field," at work, and on the front line.

[Makhlin] Does the KGB participate in the work of informal organizations?

[Shebarshin] The organs of state security follow the activity of groups oriented toward violent methods of political struggle.

[Makhlin] People continue to work in the organs of state security who persecuted Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn, and dissidents who are now rehabilitated. Is there a guarantee that if the cry rings out "Down with perestroyka," they again will not desert to the banner of stagnation?

[Shebarshin] Important reforms have taken place in the USSR KGB, including personnel reforms. In particular, the 5th directorate, which concerned itself with dissidents, has been eliminated.

It must be said that the initiative for persecuting Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn, and others who were differently minded did not belong to state security.

The history of the organs of state security, of course, is ambiguous, but it is inseparable from the history of the entire Soviet state and society. It has a lot that is glorious and heroic. Unfortunately, there are also tragic pages. Tens of thousands of our employees themselves went though the dreadful meat grinder of repression.

Now, some people are trying to measure the activity of the organs of the KGB on past cases under modern conditions. It is necessary to add to this that Western propaganda very strongly, persistently, and purposefully defames the organs of state security. Manipulating the theme "the KGB and perestroyka," the Western press, first and foremost the American press, is attempting to depict the organs of the KGB and its employees as a "reactionary force" and "enemies of perestroyka," and attempts are being made to provoke dissension between foreign policy departments and state security organs. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, for example, asserts that "the KGB, together with other Soviet bureaucratic

departments, is delaying the efforts of Gorbachev to improve Soviet relations with Western countries, in particular to expand trade with them and to simplify procedures for Soviet citizens to go abroad." All of this is fabrication.

The legal bases for the USSR KGB's activities are being perfected. Of course, this does not mean that we have been working outside legal limits until now. The legal basis for the KGB's activity are the USSR Constitution, Soviet legislation and decrees, and instructions of the USSR Council of Ministers. The Directorate of Public Prosecutions is also functioning and undergoing further development. We are strictly monitored by the USSR Ministry of Finance. The establishment of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Questions of Defense and State Security is a new and, from our standpoint, very positive step.

At the present time, work is being done on the draft Law on State Security. We did not have this kind of a law previously, but it is very necessary. It provides a definition of the concept of state security, consolidates the principles and system of national measures for ensuring state security, and clearly establishes the tasks, functions, rights, and duties of various state organs.

The draft Law on the USSR Committee for State Security is being completed. That is a law and not secret Instructions Concerning the KGB, as it was previously. Removal of the needless curtain of secrecy from the KGB will undoubtedly be perceived positively by the public. The basic principles of activity of the organs of state security do not constitute any kind of a secret. Only specific professional technologies constitute secrets.

It will not be an exaggeration to say that special attention is being given in our country and abroad to the intelligence activity of the organs of state security. This subject has always been treated in our country very prudently and, indeed, it should be noted the matter is dealt with in a similar way in other countries. Perhaps the Americans write about their intelligence most of all. I recently looked through a number of their open publications on this question, and I was once again convinced, unfortunately, that there is very little in them that is practically useful for our work. They write much more in the West about us, about Soviet intelligence, than about themselves. Here facts are mixed with cock-and-bull stories, things are attributed to us of which we are in no way guilty, and a sinister impression of the Soviet secret service and its employees is created that is distorted and completely remote from reality. Now, I hope, you have become convinced that this is not so.

Party Chief Prokofyev Urges Bridging Party Gap

LD2203141390 Moscow TASS in English 1333 GMT 22 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Lev Aksenov]

[Text] Moscow March 22 TASS—"The gap in the communist party should be bridged between the leadership and rank-and-file members," Moscow Communist Party chief Yuriy Prokofyev told a news conference here on the results of elections of people's deputies and the situation in the Soviet Communist Party.

"The city party organization is going to work in the Moscow City Council to consolidate practical forces that really care about Muscovites' interests," Prokofyev said.

He admitted that it is impossible to have unanimity. People elected to the city council have various opinions. "It will be harder to work, but results that we achieve will be the more meaningful," Prokofyev said.

Prokofyev stressed that views expressed by the Democratic Russia block and the Democratic Platform in the CPSU, formed during the election campaign, coincide with current party aims 70 to 80 per cent of the time. "I am sure that after the draft new party rules are published it will be hard to find differing positions," he said.

Speaking about the Democratic Platform in the CPSU, Prokofyev pointed out that its authors have worked out a number of rather interesting ideas. "I suport their desire to democratize the party, but I oppose their intention to split the CPSU," he said.

Dwelling on the program of activites of the new Moscow City Council, Prokofyev, who became deputy only after the second round of elections, censured the practice of working "for the sake of the future and forgetting today's demands."

"Unfortuantely, mass housing construction in some Moscow districts was conducted in this way, the authorities were not thinking of the interests of their residents. This practice should be done away with. City authorities' activities should be aimed at meeting people's interests," Prokofyev said.

Miners Reject Congress of 'Apparatchiks, Employers'

PM0204123990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Why They Left the Congress"]

[Text] When the 15th Extraordinary Mining Industry Workers Trade Union Congress ended in the House of the Unions' Hall of Columns Friday 30 March, three miners representatives visited the the IZVESTIYA editorial office and made a statement.

Aleksandr Dubovik, chief of the Gorlovka Trade Union Territorial Committee's Organizational Department, member of the Gorlovka City Strike Committee Presidium, and member of the Donbass Regional Union of Strike Committees' Executive Committee; Aleksandr Kolomiytsev, face worker and cochairman of the Donetsk City Strike Committee; and Oleg Butrov, a mine rescue worker from Inta, represent 50 members of the commission to monitor the implementation of USSR

Council of Ministers Resolution 608 (adopted by the government as a result of the miners' strikes). They explained why strike committee representatives in the country's coalfields and more than 70 underground workers had left the congress without waiting for it to finish.

Here is the essence of their statement.

First, it was not the congress which the miners demanded be convened during the strikes. They wanted it to set up a trade union for miners and miners alone. And workers in other professions employed in the sector could join their own trade unions as they saw fit to protect their own rights and interests.

Instead, the congress assembled representatives of workers in the entire sector. Moreover, the delegates included 319 released trade union personnel (of which only 52 had been elected after the miners' strikes), 56 general directors of associations and mine directors, 19 party or soviet workers, 50 engineering and technical workers (by no means all of them miners), and 50 workers from the most varied specialisms in the sector—construction workers, machine builders, sales assistants, tractor drivers, and so forth. And only 123 miners.

Admittedly, the congress invited another 92 miners, including the 50 on the commission to monitor the implementation of the government resolution. Nonetheless, it was a congress of apparatchiks and employers, as was clear from the very first moment it opened.

We thought that the congress should carry out the striking miners' will and, above all, announce the resignation of the former trade union Central Committee. It would then discuss the state of affairs and the situation in the mines, analyze the progress in implementing the government decisions on the miners, and work out an overall course to be followed in the future. It would elect a new leadership to implement this course.

Instead, in the spirit of old traditions, we heard a report on the Central Committee's work (as if we were not wholly familiar with that work over the past year) and debates were held on the report.

The congress set one of its main tasks as adopting statutes for the Mining Industry Workers Trade Union. We believed that this highly important document should not be adopted without a prior discussion by miners' collectives. The statutes should be approved by a majority of miners, because only then could they be a prestigious document.

Without the right to vote at the congress, the representatives of the commission to monitor the implementation of USSR Council of Ministers Resolution 608 (and these are people representing the strike committees at the country's largest coal enterprises), nonetheless tried to call on delegates to take a sober view of things. If the congress and its decisions are not authoritative for miners' collectives, a new strike wave is not ruled out at the slightest deterioration of the situation. But after a vote our proposals were rejected.

Meanwhile, the mines had already started receiving telegrams demanding that the miners leave this congress, which does not represent their interests.

On returning to our collectives, we will say that there is still a need to set up a miners' union and we will set one up. Only then will there be unity in miners' ranks and only then will the country not be threatened by wildcat strikes which disrupt the economy and produce virtually nothing for the workers themselves. And it will be possible to conduct an open and constructive dialogue with the government, without forcing it to make hasty and unrealistic decisions, and to improve working conditions and wages on a planned basis.

Lysenko Views CPSU Democratic Platform

AU0204133290 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 24-25 Mar 90 p 8

[Djuro Bilbija report on "exclusive" interview with Vladimir Lysenko, leader of the Democratic Platform of the CPSU; place and date not given: "Vanguard—'Rearguard'"]

[Text] Moscow—The longest and loudest applause at the "March Plenum" of the Central Committee of the CPSU was received by a speaker who had demanded "a final settling of accounts with schismatics in the party." Not even a week passed before the "schismatics" announced that they would leave "Lenin's party" at the 28th CPSU Congress or immediately afterwards and that no one would have to expel them. Or put more precisely: that they would form together with the theoretical-action core of the intra-regional deputies group, a new parliamentary party which would be either purely social-democratic or half way between socialdemocracy and reforming communism.

Schism became unavoidable the moment when the conservative majority in the CPSU Central Committee did not want to allow Vladimir Lysenko, the invited leader of the "Democratic Platform," to go onto the rostrum. It did not even make any difference that he had been invited by Mihail Gorbachev himself because Gorbachev had actually "forgotten" this in the meantime. It was also to no avail that Lysenko himself asked to speak three times. Therefore, BORBA asked Lysenko: What actually happened at the "March Plenum" and why were the doors of dialogue, which seemed to be more than possible, nevertheless irrevocably shut?

Feast for the Conservatives

We asked as far back as January to present our stands at one of the sessions of the CPSU Central Committee. I also discussed this with Yuriy Prokofyev, first secretary of the Moscow party, and Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. But to no avail. Nikolay Travkin, member of the Coordination

Council of the "Democratic Platform," finally reached agreement on this with Gorbachev himself at an extraordinary session of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. It seemed that things were finally moving, even though the leadership refused to invite our "negotiator," Travkin, to the session. I applied to speak and patiently waited my turn. In the beginning, I did not doubt anything despite the fact that the "March Plenum" had quickly turned into a real feast for the conservatives. For example, tumultuous applause followed Ligachev's proposal that a purge (a "check of the party membership") be carried out in the party and real ovations followed the speech by Galina Sivets, party secretary of the Izhevsk metallurgical institute, who demanded "a showdown with schismatics and a crushing of rally democracy." I began to suspect something only when several speakers began one after another to accuse the "Democratic Platform" and when the first secretary of the Tuva oblast proposed that Yuriy Afanasyev be expelled from the CPSU. As soon as there was an interval, I therefore went up to Gorbachev to again apply to speak. He at that time said to me: "You are Comrade Lysenko.... I have heard of you. Do not worry, everything will be all right."

So what happened then? Why did this "everything will be all right" burst like a bubble? This is what we asked next.

I Permitted Myself To Speak

The crucial moment came at 1530. At that time, Gorbachev announced that there were another 50 delegates who wanted to speak and that there had also been demands for the discussion to be shortened. He himself proposed that only another two people be allowed to speak, I was not included. While the first of the two was speaking, I went up to the table where the Politburo was sitting and asked to speak for a third time. I was categorical. Even though Gorbachev was ready to avoid this, as soon as the second speaker finished I got up from my place and spoke clearly and sufficiently loudly saying who I was and what I wanted. There was uproar in the hall. Some people said "let him speak," and others "do not let him speak...." Gorbachev intervened and proposed that a vote be taken. When hands were raised "for" and "against," he roughly estimated that the "votes" were divided half and half. He asked that the vote be repeated. He failed to again count the votes even though the plenum was divided in a similar way to the first time. However, he "thought" for 30 to 40 seconds and announced that in his estimation the second time around, "there were 10-20 votes more for Comrade Lysenko not to speak." This was a real farce, at the end of which Gorbachev suggested that I submitted the text of my speech to the Presidium. What I could do I did but I did not give the text of the speech to Vadim Medvedev who had put out his hand, but to Aleksandr Yakovlev and I sarcastically said: "Here, this is for you and the comrades in the party."

Did Yakovlev, Medvedev, and Gorbachev react to this? No, it seemed nothing could shake their "Olympian calm." Without protesting, they agreed to the conservatives' demand that democratic centralism be restored to the statute of the CPSU and that its introduction include that "the ultimate aim of the CPSU is to be the construction of communism." I really wanted to scream: What are you doing here; all research shows that only 2.6 percent of citizens and 4.8 percent of communists believe in communism. I wanted to warn them that they were finally burying the party and they did not know what they were doing. Now that I have quieted down, I am even more convinced that the CPSU leadership does not know what it is doing. Instead of being concerned with how to adapt the party structure to the federal principle on which the USSR will soon be based and to solve the question of whether the party should be a vanguard or parliamentary party, the Central Committee is only concerned with trifles, like the level of party membership fees and the dilemma over whether to stick to the old names (Politburo and general secretary) or move onto new ones (Presidium and president). I was confused and then quite unexpectedly and against Gorbachev's will received the opportunity to "permit myself" to speak.

The avalanche began when the issue of setting up a Russian Communist Party was put on the agenda. Gorbachev first of all proposed that there not be a congress of the Russian Communist Party but an all-Russian conference and that it be held on 19 June. Then a woman went onto the rostrum and said that they should not wait until 19 June because by then events would have gotten out of the control of the CPSU Central Committee. After her, Boris Gidaspov, first secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Committee spoke and said that a founding congress of the Russian Communist Party had been scheduled for 23 April in Leningrad. He added that he and the Oblast Party Committee had unsuccessfully been trying to halt the process because the "people were demanding that the Russian Communist Party be set up quickly." He commented: "Two currents actually exist—one supports the creation of a Russian Communist Party as part of the CPSU and the second wants to create it in the framework of the 'Democratic Platform.'" I could no longer control myself after this lie. I literally pushed towards the microphone and announced that the "Democratic Platform" was not thinking of setting up any Communist Party of the Russian federation but that this was an ambition of the national-patriotic forces in Leningrad which needed the Russian Communist Party as protection against perestroyka."

Empire of Shadows

Are these the reasons why only several days after the "March Plenum" the "Democratic Platform" announced its intention to secede and develop into a new party?

I did not realize until the March Plenum why the party leadership so persistently refused to have its session relayed live on television. It understood that only one "live relay" would completely destroy the remains of the

false myth about it. I realized that even in its leaderships the CPSU is the "rear guard" and that most members of the Central Committee of the CPSU do not represent anyone or anyone's interests, apart from those of the nomenklatura. I realized that the CPSU Central Committee is an empire of shadows, an empire of political mummies which we have inherited from the past and that these people will never on any account vote for a truly democratic party congress and a deep-rooted reform of the CPSU. Then it became clear to me: "The dead" are overtaking the living—schism is necessary and inevitable....

What do you see as the main differences between the "Democratic Platform" and the proposed congress platform which the CPSU Central Committee has announced?

I think that the party is in deep crisis together with communist ideology, but the CPSU leadership believes that the party has "proven its ability to play the vanguard role" and that the only problem in this is to rid communist ideology of dogmatism and the distortions of Marxism-Leninism. We support general democratic principles and the right for factions to exist and Gorbachev and Ligachev support "renovated democratic centralism." We are for a left-wing people's party which will reduce its role to formulating programmatic stands whose adoption will be fought for in a national referendum and in parliament, and "hard-line communists" are for the concept of the "vanguard of society" which sees itself as a party of people who think the same. The "Democratic Platform" thinks that the sacred principle of a multiparty system should also apply to the CPSU, so that whoever loses at the elections must become the opposition, while the CPSU leadership secretly hopes that it will be able to preserve the proclaimed type of multiparty system that Poland and some other East European countries have had for the whole of the postwar period. We are against any totalitarianism but the CPSU elite would want reformed totalitarianism. Therefore, unless something magically happens in the CPSU at the last moment, schism really is necessary and inevitable....

Value of Rallies, Meetings Questioned

90UN1171A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 10 Mar 90 p 1

[Article by TASS columnist B. Petrunya, specially for RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA: "A Sickness Cannot Be Cured by Shouting"]

[Text] We are starting to get used to everything. It seems that we have been sucked into rampant shortages, and rallies with strikes have become a way of life. Here, however, there is a cause and effect connection—a direct one. Protests and large-scale demands do not emerge from thin air: The impoverishment and devaluation of material and moral values are their nourishing environment.

But this is what is astounding: The cry "We the people! Political strikes, rallies, and demonstrations are our way!," which could be heard two weeks ago in Leningrad, did not, it seems, put anyone seriously on guard. Everything is in the order of things. We are getting conditioned. Let us, however, think about the sense of that rally cry: The instrument of democratic transformations is turning into an end in itself? Wreck, make noise, pull things down, and that's it. Is that the way?

It seems that for some people this is a program of action. A way to power. But what is the meaning here of "we the people," and "our way?" To bring people out onto the street is a simple matter today. And the old, ossified organs of authority—party, soviet, or economic—which often taint themselves with assumed "special privileges" in society, provide more than enough reasons and grounds for this. However, the reason frequently clouds the idea of just protest. And so the motley crowd chants the foolhardy "Down with!" in front of the obkoms [oblast party committee] and gorkoms [city party committee]. The absurdity of such rally "democracy" at times ends up with the fact that the call "down with!" is also directed against hastily re-elected leaders who did not succeed in either showing their worth or sullying themselves.

What can be said here? Perhaps it is worthwhile turning to the words of a rather well-known person, USSR People's Deputy Yu. Ryzhkov, which rang out from the rostrum of the mass rally in Moscow on 25 February: "Villains and scoundrels with the support of a lack of spirituality and a militant lack of culture are playing on the ignorance of people.... With their demagogy and provocations, they are ready to plunge the country into chaos and blood." Of course, the esteemed deputy knows better than anyone else the level of "lack of spirituality and militant lack of culture" and the "ignorance" of his own constituents. As for demagogy and provocations, then he, of course, is right: This is a subject for discussion.

In a civilized society, the rally is a civilized action. Even when it pursues ambitious pre-election objectives. Even when they are not liked by the authorities. That Moscow rally, I dare to assume, could hardly have been liked by the authorities even initially: Because it was planned as an action... against the existing authority. No, of course one could hear perestroyka slogans, and pre-election instructions on whom to vote for and whom to cross off the lists. But what is amazing: There was not one calm, reasonable speech. Why do we yell? The time, of course, does not allow for unhurried philosophical reflections. But it can hardly justify the insulting attacks which—not for the first time—T. Koryagina allowed herself to make against the highest leader of the country and party. In this connection, there is this strange pattern of behavior. At work, in the metro, and on the street, we usually avoid crude attacks against each other. But at a rally, we can do whatever we like. When and why did the rally become "a zone outside the law?" How does all of this conform with declared aspirations to build a rule-of-law state?

I do not think that it would be possible to build it without respect for order. But, my god, so much rage and anger was vented, including from street rostrums, over the fact that the highest legislative organ directed the authorities to ensure appropriate order during mass people's actions. The highest wave carried accusations in connection with all kinds of rumors, fabrications, and arousal of fear. This is interesting: Rumors also began to sow fear... up until the authorities undertook measures inherent in a civilized society to prevent possible disorders wherever a lot of people gather. So, you begin to wonder: Who spread them, and for what purpose. One should be happy. Alas....

Indeed, it is hard to grasp: The Supreme Soviet calls for observing legal norms, but the people's deputy from the rally rostrum... angrily stigmatizes it for this. This rostrum affects a person in a strange way. The usually reasonable G. Popov on that Sunday also hurled challenges at the masses: "Demand that the State Committee for Radio and Television ensure a full transmission of this rally on the first program for the whole country. Who is for this proposal? I ask for a vote. We warn the chairman of the committee, Comrade Nenashev, that he will reply personally for the nonfulfillment of this resolution."

Really, it is awkward to hear such threats from the mouth of a scientist-economist who justly comes out for the quickest possible introduction of market relations, but who is strangely silent about what sources he intends to use to finance payment for the transmission.

It is possible, of course, to kid around about what strikes, rallies, or other stormy forms of willfulness will cost society, a city, or a collective. But is it not time to think seriously: And what are the specific consequences of such mass actions? I in no way want to cast doubt on the validity, even, perhaps, the desperation of those who are forced to choose an extreme measure of resolving a labor conflict—the stoppage of work. Now, you see, practically every collective can find such reasons. But when the persistence of the strikers brings plants in other cities to a stop and leaves people who are not part of this without heat in an apartment—this is indeed something to think about. And first of all: What does this "instrument" have more of—

At least the history of the attempt by representatives of the Donetsk strike committee to topple the obkom [oblast party committee] and gorkom [city party committee] by means of the rally method prompts one to raise the question. Even a hunger strike was declared. Foreign journalists were invited beforehand. They threatened to strike. But there was a misfire: The workers had the common sense not to take a destructive path to resolve questions that were coming to a head. This should be said: From the standpoint of ethics, it is probably more appropriate for communists themselves to decide the fate of their own party committee. It is of interest: When we come to a multiparty system (I do not doubt that we will) will non party people or members of other parties (and even of one's own) march in a rally assault on the "headquarters" of social organizations?

We have more than enough dilapidated structures in this country. Unfortunately, there are enough of them in the party as well. It would not be superfluous to verify their ostentatious "stability" through the collective mind of the masses. Only with the mind, and not with the emotional outbursts of a crowd on which, unfortunately, many are setting their hopes of late. It is difficult not to agree with USSR People's Deputy N. Travkin, who at the last Moscow rally expressed his concern about the fate of our children and grandchildren with these words: "We must determine what we will choose for them: a society with a stall and a miserable ration for some and a special trough for others, or a society that is based on humane values, and where the main criterion is work?" It seems that the already half-forgotten word "work" could be heard for the first time in the flood of rallies. Is it not an alternative to the endless rallies?

We are very sick today. We are ready to cry from pain. But you can numb suffering with cries only for a time. It seems, however, that we exhaust ourselves more from this. And those who are calling for an uninterrupted cry know very well that they are not trying to cleanse the organ as much as they are trying to impair it. For invocations with loud reassuring words are still not medicine.

Internal Troops Public Order Law Enacted

PM0204120390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 2

["USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution on Law on USSR Internal Ministry Troops"]

[Text] USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution on Enactment of USSR Law "On the Duties and Rights of USSR Internal Affairs Ministry Internal Troops in the Protection of Public Order"

The USSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To enact the USSR Law "On the Duties and Rights of USSR Internal Affairs Ministry Internal Troops in the Protection of Public Order" from the moment of its publication.

Union republic supreme soviets are to bring union republics' legislation into conformity with the aforesaid law.

2. To recognize as having lapsed the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree of 28 July 1988 "On the Duties and Rights of USSR Internal Affairs Ministry Internal Troops in the Protection of Public Order" (USSR Supreme Soviet Gazette, 1988, no. 31, p 505) and the USSR Law of 28 October 1988 "On the Ratification of USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decrees on Amendments and Additions to Certain USSR Legislative Acts" with regard to the ratification of the aforesaid decree (USSR Supreme Soviet Gazette, 1988, no. 44, p 684)

from the moment of the enactment of USSR Law "On the Duties and Rights of USSR Internal Affairs Ministry Internal Troops in the Protection of Public Order."

[Signed] A. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.
Moscow, The Kremlin, 26 March 1990.

Government Decides To Set Up Legal Academy

LD3103113190 Moscow World Service in Russian 0930 GMT 31 Mar 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of "Soviet Union Day by Day" program]

[Text] By government decision a law academy is to be set up in our country. Those studying there will be not just be jurists, but also heads of departments, concerns, and enterprises and [people's] deputies. The importance of legal knowledge is growing with the adoption by the Supreme Soviet of new laws directed at radical transformations in the economic and social spheres and the democratization and humanization of society. The acedemy is also conceived as a research center which will analyze the problems connected with the formation in the Soviet Union of a law-governed state.

KOMMUNIST Celebrates Lenin, Cites Opponents

PM3003092790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Mar 90 Second Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "Journal's Latest Issue"]

[Text] The fifth issue of the journal KOMMUNIST is out. It is an unusual issue. Unusual in its outward appearance and format. The facsimile reproduction on the cover of the word "Communist" in Lenin's handwriting somehow restores the human, living meaning to this word, which has become fairly fossilized in everyday perception. It is also unusual because, being devoted to the Lenin theme from the first page to the last, it is a discussion issue from the first page to the last. The journal has none of its traditional rubrics—their role is fulfilled by the sayings of Lenin. Otherwise all the contents would have had to be under the same rubric: "Debates and Discussions."

All of history is here, and all of today's life. All of tradition and all of the present. So, reminiscences about Lenin are published in accordance with tradition (they are previously unpublished in the USSR). But they are reminiscences not of comrades in arms, but of political opponents: A. Potresov and N. Valentinov. They are simply entitled "Opponents' Testimonies." But the surprising thing is that, because of these sometimes unusual and harsh testimonies from people who, unlike many present-day revolutionaries, had a moral right to give them, a powerful and complete image of an outstanding political figure and thinker emerges.

Z. Mlynar, the well-known politician and political scientist and one of the architects of the "Prague Spring," examines the problem of new attitudes to socialism in the context of Lenin's attempt to overcome dogmas in his article "The Concept of Socialism and Historical Experience."

"It Won't Be Straight" is the title of O. Latsis' reflections on Lenin's economic views. The author comes to the conclusion that, in contrast to many left- and right-wing "simplifiers" of reality, V.I. Lenin clearly understood that the road to socialism "will never be straight, it will be incredibly complicated."

An open letter from the Georgian writer K. Gamsakhurdia to V.I. Ulyanov-Lenin, and the thoughts in response to it of the historian and philosopher M. Gefter, are published under the title "A Dialogue That Never Was." Why did the "absolute genius of the great revolution" (the words of K. Gamsakhurdia) and the writer pass each other by on the historical road?

"But was Lenin a 'Marxist-Leninist'?" is the question G. Lisichkin, the well-known economist and USSR people's deputy, asks himself in his article "The Great Sham." His answer: There is nothing of Marx' or Lenin's living, creative ideas capable of development in the dogmatized, Stalinist Marxism-Leninism . The Stalinist revision of Lenin's legacy turned into the greatest tragedy for the party and society.

The issue also carries the articles "New Elements of the Social Structure" by E. Starikov; "Lenin and Philosophy: Should This Problem Be Put Anew?" by A. Volodin; "Personality, Doctrine, Power" by G. Bordyugov, V.Kozlov, and V. Loginov; a selection of letters to the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Central Committee on the eve of the "great turning point;" and other material.

'Seven Days' Program To Return in Different Format

LD0104104790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1755 GMT on 31 March carries the 20-minute "Telescope" program, peresented by Dmitriy Krylov.

Krylov interviews Eduard Mikhaylovich Sagalayev, identified by a screen caption as chief editor of Central Television's main news section and responsible for the introduction of such programs as "12th Floor," "View" and "Seven Days."

Krylov says that the subject of what is called "alternative television" has become very fashionable and asks for Sagalayev's view.

Sagalayev replies: "You know, I think this is extremely topical, because my forecast is that in the near future many new television stations, studios and channels will appear. And I take a very favorable view of this. I believe there should be many different televisions—if I can put it like that—good, varied, and independent ones. For instance, Russian Television, Moscow Television. These should be bound only by the law, by the Constitution,

and by the viewers, but not by any kind of subjective or nonexpert opinion, as unfortunately is often the case now. But in this connection I should like to say that I am very much perturbed by the fate of state television, because I fear that with the coming of such "alternative" independent channels it might become a vehicle for bureaucracy and officialdom. Regrettably, there are some grounds for such concern. There are those who see the future of state television—of Central Television First program—in just those terms. I would not like to see it become like that. I would like to see it as a pluralist channel, also dependent on the viewers, on the people. But of course if the people are to control such a television service they have to do so through some institution of authority, through the Supreme Soviet, for instance."

Krylov asks what is meant by viewers' control. Sagalayev says this can operate through the ratings (reyting), and through views expressed in letters and in polls. In addition there are financial levers: This could take the form of subscription, but Sagalayev says he is against this in the short term. As for state television, he thinks an appropriate Supreme Soviet commission could call its top officials to report once a year and exercise control over appointment to those posts.

Krylov goes on: "As for ratings, let us take the program "Seven Days," which is now off the air. I know that it was extremely popular, that quite a lot of viewers are writing in and asking for the return of the program. Just what is its fate?"

Sagalayev replies: "You know, talking of this makes me both sad and happy at the same time. In times gone by there used to be a forumla which ran: In accordance with numerous wishes expressed by working people... and then came whatever suited the moment. Well, now, in accordance with numerous wishes expressed by working people—and I say this in all seriousness—the 'Seven Days' program will be back. But, [chuckles] despite numerous wishes expressed by working people, it looks as though it will be going out late in the evening. That is a decision by the television authorities unfortunately."

Krylov says: "Late evening?"

Sagalayev answer:" "Yes, late on Sunday evenings. And the editorial team is now working on a new format for the program. But not all the questions connected with this new format have been resolved yet, so I can tell you that I am really keen that the program should continue, because over a very short period we received some 3,000 telegrams and 2,000 letters, of which 99 percent are unanimous in backing the program, and only one percent are against. That is something which gives great joy, and I am grateful to all our viewers for those letters and telegrams, regardless of how things might turn out with the 'Seven Days' program."

Foreign Ministry Journal Launched in U.S.

LD3103205890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 31 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

["Excerpts] [Announcer Yevgeniy Kiselev] The first issue of a new English-language publication on foreign policy has been launched at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. The new publication is entitled VESTNIK MID SSSR [Bulletin of the USSR Foreign Ministry]. The journal is prepared in the Soviet Union but published and distributed in Maine. It is targeted at politicians, state officials, diplomats, journalists, businessmen and people who make a profound study of East-West problems. [passage omitted] [video shows a close-up of the journal, which has the word Vestnik in large letters on its front cover. Ambassador Yuriy Dubinin is seen addressing an indoor gathering.]

More Republic Election Results Published

PM2103110390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Mar 90 Second Edition p 4

[Roundup of reports by PRAVDA correspondents and TASS: "First Election Results"]

[Excerpts] **RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]** [passage omitted]

The 64 RSFSR people's deputies newly elected by the capital include N.N. Vorontsov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Environmental Protection, and A.I. Gurov, chief of the USSR MVD [Internal Affairs Ministry] Organized Crime and Corruption Administration. [passage omitted]

Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] [passage omitted]

In Kiev okrugs the following have become Ukrainian SSR people's deputies: I. Saliy, first secretary of Podolskiy Rayon Party Committee; L. Skorik, docent at Kiev State Art Institute; Yu. Kostenko, scientific associate at the Ye.O. Paton Arc Welding Institute of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences; the poet P. Movchan; Ya. Kondratyev, chief of the republic MVD Criminal Investigation Department; B. Dukhov, chief of the Marshal Vasilevskiy Air Defense Academy; and others. The formation of the body of deputies has not been completed, however.

Belorussian SSR

Not even the runoff has made the composition of the new Belorussian parliament clearer. One seat in every four is vacant.

Public organizations have strengthened their positions: the republic ecological union and the Frantsisk Skorina Belorussian Language Society. The elected deputies include Academician Ye. Konoplya of the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences, the writer N. Gilevich, the

journalist O. Golubovich, the teacher Ye. Tsumarov, and others. Many deputies' seats have also gone to party workers. However, V. Pechennikov, secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee, conceded to the journalist I. Gerasyuk; and M. Misuno, leader of Minsk City party organization, to the serviceman V. Gribanov. For the first time priests have gained seats in the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.

Latvian SSR

G. Blum, chairman of the republic Central Electoral Commission, has told a TASS correspondent that 170 out of 201 deputies were elected in the first round of the elections to the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet. A second ballot [peregolosovaniye] will take place in 14 electoral okrugs, and repeat elections in 17. Some 80 percent of the republic's electorate participated in the voting.

The deputies include A. Gorbunovs, present chairman of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; members of the Latvian People's Front Duma; and A. Alekseyev, chairman of the Latvian SSR Working People's International Front Presidium.

None of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee secretaries ran in these elections.

Commission on Problem of Crimean Tatars Meets

LD1203225190 Moscow TASS in English 2053 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 12 TASS—A meeting of the state commission on problems of Crimean Tatars was held here. The commission was formed by the USSR Council of Ministers in accordance with a decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet "on conclusions and proposals of the commission on problems of Soviet Germans and Crimean Tatars."

The commission emphasised the need to adopt balanced decisions on questions of resettlement of Crimean Tatars, taking into account the interests of families returning to the Crimea and of the population now residing in the Crimean district so as to prevent ethnic conflicts.

A comprehensive programme for voluntary return of Crimean Tatars to the Crimean region should be prepared in June. The scope of the programme, the timeframe and the needed material and financial resources should be substantiated.

Members of the commission noted that encouraging sporadic resettlement without creating normal conditions for new arrivals does not promote a fair solution to the problem of Crimean Tatars.

The commission heard information about the work done by the government of the Ukrainian Republic and by the Crimean Regional Executive Committee to create conditions for the resettlement of Crimean Tatars and for working out the draft comprehensive programme. The programme should envisage creation of new jobs, allotment of land, housing construction, the construction of production facilities and the social infrastructure, of educational and health facilities and the development of national culture.

The commission formed a working group which will shortly leave for Kiev and the Crimean region to work out proposals for the drafting of a comprehensive programme.

The meeting called attention to establishing interaction between the work of the state commission and the Commission of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet for nationalities policy and inter-ethnic relations and for providing objective information about the solution of the problems of Crimean Tatars.

Economic

Abalkin Denies Planned Economic 'Shock Therapy'

LD0304085290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0800 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] You will probably agree with me that, despite glasnost, rumors continue to occupy a significant place in our lives. And people are now saying that the USSR Council of Ministers has adopted a secret decision on a transition over a very short period to the Polish model of introducing a market economy. These rumors have been rejected by Academician Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, who was being addressed directly by a TASS correspondent. Leonid Ivanovich Abalkin said that the experience of many countries—including Poland—in transferring to a market economy is presently being studied, but no single model could be transferred to the Soviet economy in its pure form. Furthermore, Academician Abalkin said, the situation which has come about in Poland is totally different from ours. The conditions there are far more favorable to this kind of shock therapy, and they were preparing for it for about 10 years.

The rumors are most likely to do with the fact that the government is drawing up proposals for a considerable radicalization of economic reform. They concern a wide range of issues including the development of market relations, restructuring of fiscal and credit policy, reform in price formation and—the main thing, of course—measures for the population's social protection. These proposals are far from secret and in the near future they will be presented for consideration by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Sergeyev Reviews Soviet Foreign Debt, Aid

90UF0005A Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN in Russian No 12, Mar 90 p 6

[Article by B. Sergeyev, candidate of economic sciences: "The Giving Hand Is Generous"]

[Text] **How much, to whom, and on what terms does the Soviet Union give aid? Is it not time to bring our aid to other states in line with our capabilities?**

The debts of any country and the indebtedness to it on the part of other states are the two sides of the coin. Their correlation indicates a given country's position in the sphere of international financial payments and in general in the system of the international division of labor. If a country owes more than it is owed, it is time to sound the alarm; if the reverse is true, use its advantages as a solid creditor more intensively....

The article "Our Debts in Light of Glasnost," published in the weekly issue No 50 for 1989, touched upon one aspect of this problem. This is an opportunity now to talk about the other aspect.

The USSR appropriations for "state credits and rendering free aid to foreign states" were identified for the first time in the draft state budget for 1990 by Minister of Finance V. Pavlov. They amount to R9.7 billion. This is a substantial decrease compared to the R12.5 billion for last year. The difference in and of itself is appreciable and capable of evoking a sigh of relief from those who believe our country is overburdened with concern for others. But for an objective perception of such important indicators, I always want to know more.

In international practice, for example, the generalized word "aid" means all types of aid, including credits and free gifts. In any civilized state, it is known what portion of aid is in credits and what portion is in gifts. In our country, for the general public all this is still in the same pot. And if clarifications appear, clarity is not added. Thus, in the newspaper TRUD for 21 January of this year, the sum of R9.7 billion cited by V. Pavlov as credits and free aid was defined in the international style as "foreign aid." A breakdown by gifts and credits is nowhere to be found.

The same can also be said about the report of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, according to which the volume of Soviet aid for 1989 was 1.4 percent of our GNP. If you take into account that last year's GNP is estimated at approximately R900 billion, 1.4 percent corresponds to the sum of R12.5 billion cited above. But here is the catch: the GNP is expressed in domestic prices, while aid is expressed in world prices. Consequently, these two indicators cannot be correlated, since they are incomparable, all the more so since one cannot interpose the sum of aid in world prices into the expenditure portion of the state budget, as the minister of finance did. It is a puzzle.

It is impossible to solve this puzzle independently. But it must be solved for the sake of being aware of our place among creditors and making thoroughly intelligent and sound decisions.

The lack of complete official data makes it impossible to analyze thoroughly the effectiveness of the USSR's foreign ties and is one of the reasons for our not always successful orientation in the system of the international division of labor. Secrecy has become the culture medium for the flourishing of flagrant mismanagement, the result of a departmental approach to solving national problems, including providing aid to foreign countries. After all, all types of aid are scattered over various departments and financing sources without proper coordination. Even removal of the stamp of secrecy here is perhaps not enough to obtain a complete picture of the volumes and directions of our aid to other states. It is not only direct credits and gifts.

A considerable portion of aid involves inflating the prices we pay for imported goods and lowering the cost of our own exports, preferential interest rates on credits, tariffs on services, and other similar corn-bins, understood by those departments according to whose policy such philanthropy is accomplished. There are facts that have already been made public: we pay 7-9 times more for Cuban sugar than we do to other foreign suppliers, thus transferring to the Republic of Cuba more than R2 billion of hidden aid each year under this item alone. A ton of cement shipped by us to Vietnam costs the Vietnamese less than a ton of sand mined in their own quarry....

Of course, we also need Cuban sugar, which accounts for approximately one-third of all the USSR's sugar needs, and Cuban nickel, and Vietnamese coffee, and other goods which we purchase using the profits from the same cement. But at what price and on what terms?

For the Soviet Union, the ages of stagnation and various "preferential prices" were a sort of payment for a show of solidarity of the CEMA countries, "spread out on three continents of the Western and Eastern hemispheres." But in light of the new political thinking, the former payment only for a show of values is clearly excessive.

Of course, we cannot immediately break off such a practice in international ties without detriment to our CEMA partners and our prestige as a great power with its inter-state commitments. However, we must look for a mutually acceptable way out of reckless philanthropy. Both we and our partners must. But for the time being this is exactly what is not being felt.

On the contrary, some of our fellow countrymen, it seems, consider the present situation unshakable. Thus, in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI (No. 52, 1989) S. Tarasenko, chief of an administration of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, clearly idealized, in my opinion, our business relations with Cuba. And the arguments are convincing at first glance. One of them goes like this: it is better to overpay some 2 billion rubles than to pay several hundred million dollars for the same amount of sugar on the world market. But, you see, each year we supply Cuba with 6 million tons of petroleum and petroleum products and a mass of other goods, the currency price of which on the world market far exceeds our dollar savings in sugar.

The Midas list of other advantages which, for example, our Aeroflot, Maritime Fleet, and military and intelligence services receive on the faraway island are also not very convincing. What is it worth just to have about 300 Soviet vessels engaged in servicing Cuba, while the Cuban fleet earns currency for itself for shipping cargo of other countries?

What about our partners? It seems that instead of searching for acceptable solutions and increasing the effectiveness of cooperation, they prefer for the time being rhetoric aimed against us, and the first time we call for equality in barter, they regard it as a restriction and discrimination. Thus, the Spanish newspaper INDEPENDENTE on 22 January of this year carried the following words of Fidel Castro: "If the USSR is going to practice an unequal trade exchange in its relations with Cuba, selling its goods at a higher price with each day and buying our agricultural products at cheaper prices, this will mean the same thing the United States is practicing with respect to developing countries." Is he contradicting the truth? But on the other hand, it was clearly inspired by the arguments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative.

Here we cannot help but recall the information contained in IZVESTIYA on 1 March from V. Panskov, USSR deputy minister of finance, that for 1990 the amount of our free aid to other states is planned in the sum of R1.6 billion. Is that all? Perhaps this amount is just direct gifts? After all, if you remember the subsidies, this sum does not cover the subsidies even for purchasing Cuban sugar.

Of course, the desire of a number of our CEMA country debtors to pay off their debts first not to the Soviet Union but to capitalist countries does not pass the test of true internationalism. And most of their currency exports, acceptable to us as payment for debt, are being sent to the West. Instances of, if not complete refusal, deliberate delays in setting up in their countries production facilities, in which we are interested in as being able to make it easier to pay off indebtedness to the Soviet side, are becoming more frequent. The patient "older brother" somehow will wait....

Back in June of last year, at the First Congress of People's Deputies, the former deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, V.M. Kamentsev, reported that the repayment of approximately half of the R90-billion debt to the Soviet Union from foreign borrowers is open to question. This is a minimum of 40 billion rubles. How much is this in "Chernobyls"—five or six? I would not be mistaken if I say that this is the worst indicator among all creditor-countries. It is twice as high as for the United States.

It would be extremely unobjective to blame just our debtors for this. The command-administrative system which could sacrifice the interests of the country at home and abroad for the sake of a high-sounding slogan is largely to blame. In such conditions, departments did not have to bear responsibility for what they sold or built in other countries. It was at times immaterial to them what the return from their facilities would be for the giving and receiving countries.

The practice in which the supplier operates according to the principle of "don't look a gift horse in the mouth," and the receiving side follows the rule of "say thank you and ask for more," unfortunately, is deeply rooted in our relations with developing countries, particularly within the framework of CEMA. For example, the Soviet side planned and the Mongolian side agreed to have a poultry farm with a cost-recovery period of 200 years.

USSR Foreign Debt (as of the beginning of 1989)

	Billions of Rubles
Total	33.6
Including:	
in freely convertible currency	28.1
in closed currencies (clearing)	1.9
including:	
Finland	0.6
Yugoslavia	1.0
in transfer rubles	3.6
including:	
Czechoslovakia	1.5
Romania	0.6
Bulgaria	0.5
Hungary	0.4
GDR	0.4
Poland	0.2

Indebtedness of Other Countries to the Soviet Union (in millions of rubles)

Country	Indebtedness as of 1 Nov 89	Including Basic Debt	Written off as of 1 Nov 89	Deferred in 1986-1989
			Including Interest	
Total	85846	83090	545	17398
Including:				
Socialist Countries	43806	42502	483	9586
including:				
Cuba	15491	15092	-	2360
Mongolia	9543	8981	57	2031
Vietnam	9131	8856	406	1569
Poland	4955	4952	-	3158
DPRK	2234	2234	-	418
Laos	758	758	-	50
Hungary	622	622	-	-

Bulgaria	434	434	-	-
Developing Countries	42040	40588	62	7812
including:				
India	8907	8907	-	-
Syria	6743	6515	1.7	993
Iraq	3796	3514	-	1415
Afghanistan	3055	2899	-	624
Ethiopia	2860	2850	52	855
Algeria	2519	2448	-	560

Sources: PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK, No 19, 1989; IZVESTIYA, 1 Mar 90; and others

The return from foreign investments continues to fall. But the departments demand more and more new expenditures, justifying them with commitments made. Yes, it goes without saying, we must remember our commitments: "Lie once, and who will believe you." But in remembering the past, we also must not forget the future. We must not take it away from future generations, cutting the budget for education, science, and space.

What constructive can be proposed here? The main thing is to separate aid from commerce and trade from politics. We must apply complete glasnost to this sphere. Here it is especially noticeable that the less glasnost, the less responsibility.

Lobozenko Urges 'Market Mechanisms' in CEMA

PM2203162690 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 11, 18 Mar 90 p 15

[Aleksandr Lobozenko article: "CMEA—Something Missing"]

[Text] The changeover within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance [CMEA] to clearing accounts in freely convertible currency at world prices is a dire necessity which all the Council members recognized. But both these measures could prove to be useless if one thing is ignored.

The reasons for the crisis in the CMEA are rooted in the system of cooperation. Trade within the CMEA is based on bilateral intergovernmental accords on the goods needed—enterprises are given directives about what to produce, in what quantities, and at what prices they are to trade with each country. And if some of the partners earn more than they spend then we see the same thing we see daily in our own country—there is nothing to buy with the extra money (in this case, transferable rubles), because everything has been planned and distributed beforehand. That's why no country is interested in selling more than it buys.

In such trade a buyer cannot say to the seller: "The price is too high, I'll buy the goods somewhere else," and the seller like our co-ops can jack up the price, as he knows the buyer has no choice. Moreover, the possibilities for the exporter to raise the price grow depending on the sophistication of the good. Prices for raw materials are easily determined—oil in Western Siberia and in Saudi Arabia is the same good, but it is hard and sometimes even impossible to find similar machines and equipment. Since our exports are mainly raw materials, and imports are mainly machinery ad equipment, the raising of prices, above all, affects the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union pays about one billion rubles more in trade with Hungary alone every year due to these factors. We pay more in our trade with other countries—Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that the transferable ruble has been chosen as the unit of accounting. It is an artificial unit, and makes it hard to use world prices, to put it mildly.

The shortcomings of this system weren't so obvious in the past. Trade turnover grew quickly, and the East European countries were supplied as much of our oil as they wanted. Meanwhile, in Soviet shops it was possible to find Bulgarian tomatoes, Hungarian apples, Polish cosmetics and other material clues of the successes of socialist integration. But they were lavishly paid for by Soviet raw materials delivered at discount prices and on a mass scale.

However, as soon as world prices on raw materials fell and the situation for our economy became worser, European CMEA countries developed surpluses in trade with the USSR. And they didn't hurry to show economic charity, preferring to cut back on trade with the USSR. These trends became manifest most of all in the reduction of food and consumer goods, and the authorities in some CMEA countries declared a real customs and currency war on "aggressive" Soviet tourists, "protecting" their internal markets from them.

Life, apparently, demands a depolitization of our cooperation, of transferring it to normal commercial principles. But, even though the transfer to a convertible currency is a correct measure, the simple substitution of dollars for transferable rubles will change little. Why?

The advantages of a convertible currency stem from the fact that it services normal market relations which presuppose a freedom of choice in with whom to trade, in what goods and at what price.

If we preserve the planning-directive forms of the "coordination of national economic plans", then the monopoly of the seller will be preserved, too. The Soviet enterprise will not get the freedom of choice of partners, and our country will continue to purchase consumer goods and machines in CMEA countries at higher prices, because intergovernmental obligations must be fulfilled.

Therefore, the most important element in restructuring in the CMEA is not just to transfer to convertible currency, but to dismantle completely the system of cooperation. Halfway measures and the guarantee of markets for concompetitive CMEA goods and deliveries

of Soviet raw materials, for political ends, will make it impossible to transfer to world prices even when using convertible currency.

For this reason the decision, adopted at the 45th CMEA session, to transfer to the new system of accounting gradually, over 3 years, is unreasonable. Of course, the transfer must be in stages as a compromise with some member countries. But, at the same time, in the relations with Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR, this is tantamount to the USSR financing the losses incurred during the reorientation of the economies of these countries to Western markets. We do not have the basis to do this, and in the new conditions of trade and accounting, it would be expedient to switch over jointly at least in these countries as fast as possible—as of 1991.

The transfer of CMEA to market mechanisms of cooperation does not mean a complete abandoning of existing trade and economic relations. But the forms of regulation must change—the directive principle must be replaced by economic methods—agreement upon the general conditions of financing of international trade, support of exporters by insuring them, offering credits, guaranteeing payments by the importers, and other methods used in industrialized countries.

We can impart fresh stimuli for development of the CMEA community only by accepting such an approach. We mustn't fear that consistent application of market principles would lead to a considerable reduction of trade—only the noncompetitive goods, sold at high prices, will suffer. Therefore, let there be less, but better.

Nikitin Discusses March Economic Data

LD0204212090

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1741 GMT on 2 April carries a 20-minute interview granted by Vladilen Valentinovich Nikitin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers with program presenter Lev Aleksandrovich Voznesenskiy. Voznesenskiy opens the program by saying: "Hello comrades. Vladilen Valentinovich Nikitin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, chairman of the Council of Ministers' State Commission for Food and Purchases, today describes what has taken place in our national economy in March, and how it has taken place and what the government has been doing in that time. So, the first question is this: What has March brought for our national economy?"

Nikitin responds: "The conditions of working in March were more complex than had been the case during the first two months of the year. Stoppages at enterprises, due to interethnic conflicts, have made themselves felt here. The shortfall in the deliveries of output to other enterprises has made itself felt here. That is why one cannot call the results satisfactory."

Nikitin gives the example of the Berdyansk synthetic and fatty acids works, whch had to stop production due to ecological considerations. This resulted in hundreds of enterprises which make soap having to stop production, Nikitin notes. The government had to give emergency aid and it was, of course, "expensive," Nikitin says.

Nikitin continues by saying that during the first two months production was lagging behind the level of last year by one percent: this goes for average output per 24 hours and for average output of the two months. The situation in March was that the average output per 24 hours was 0.7 percent higher than in the same period last year, but that this year March had less working days, so the total volume of output is approximately between 1.5-1.7 percent less than last year, he explains.

Nikitin states: "Comrades are concerned that extraction of oil has declined, that extraction of coal and generation of electric power have declined. These are the main indicators which determine the work of the national economy. Well, in all, there will be a shortfall of R3 billion worth of output over the three months."

Voznesenskiy asks: "This is overall output. What is happening to consumer goods? Have there been any changes for the better in March?"

Nikitin replies: "More consumer goods were produced in March than February—R3 billion worth. It is a conversion that has made its mark here. Defense enterprises are successfuly developing production of consumer goods. In my view, their production will have increased by more than 20 percent over the quarter. These are, in the main, complex household machinery, power units for agriculture, washing machines, refrigerators, video recorders, and other equipment. I am unable to say that the light industry has had good results. Production of textiles has declined by 73 million square meters; footwear by 4 million pairs—this is approximately five percent. Nevertheless, March shows that the light industry's pace is progressive, and that the lagging behind of production levels of past years will be eliminated in the next few months."

Asked about food production, Nikitin says that "production has increased in March to the tune of R1 billion." Production of tinned fruit and tinned vegetables had declined—last autumn's fruit harvest was insufficient, he notes. However, he notes, production and purchases of milk have increased over the three months with purchases increasing by 500,000 tonnes—including the 200,000-tonne increase achieved in March. He points out that meat purchases declined by 60,000 tonnes in March. Livestock production complexes which use state fodder produced less and this has made itself felt here: We buy this fodder abroad and we are working toward buying less, Nikitin says.

After commenting on the shortage of medical, shopping, sewage, water, heating and other facilities in thousands of villages throughout the USSR, he goes on to discuss the shortages facing peasants with regard to spares for agricultural equipment and to insecticides. Nikitin then calls for a speedier transition to market relations, with an

improved banking and financial system. He notes that the appropriate documents are being prepared.

Asked about the most urgent and topical problems the government may have dealt with in March, Nikitin says that "it is the first time that we came to face a situation involving so great a number of refugees—more than 600,000 people have fled the places where they have lived for a long time, and where they have felt at home. We had to see to their needs. Their status must be determined. Compensation for the losses sustained in their previous places of abode must be determined. They must be clothed, provided with footwear, fed. It is not as if all this went smoothly—but these issues have been resolved.

"The government is also worried by the slow work of those who have to execute the decision to rectify the situation around the Aral Sea, by the Aral tragedy. Jointly with the councils of ministers of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], the Ukraine, Belorussia, measures are being worked out to stabilize the situation in the area affected by the Chernobyl explosion. The situation there is not what it had at first appeared to be, and additional and serious measures are needed. The government—in particular, the Commission on Emergency Situations—is examining a major state program for nature protection and utilization of natural resources up to the year 2005. Subsequently the Supreme Soviet will debate it. It is a very serious document.

"At the start I said that the government is worried by what is already at this stage a steady downward trend in oil extraction. Literally a few days ago, oil workers, those in charge of drilling and oil and gas extraction associations, assembled for a meeting with Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, chairman of the Council of Ministers. They did so to determine the measures to get out of this most complex situation. The meeting passed...[pauses] there were many proposals. There was a shortfall in the deliveries of equipment from machine builders to oilmen—of food from the Russian Council of Ministers. Builders lagged behind in commissioning housing and welfare amenities. Constant and unabating attention is needed to power engineering—this industry is now crucial to the development of the national economy. Additional investments will be made. Additional measures will be taken to stabilize life, especially in Tyumen Oblast, this complex region of the country." Summing up, Nikitin says that the government is now more resolved to speed up the transition toward market relations.

Bank Chairman Sees No Need for Money Reform

LD0204165790 Moscow World Service in English 1500 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] The chairman of the board of the Soviet State Bank, Viktor (Girashenko), believes that there is no need for a money reform in the country. This is a last resort of a country with a devastated economy and finances, he said, while the situation is not that bad. Though the consumer goods market still suffers from acute shortages, government steps to normalize it are beginning to produce results.

According to estimates last month, the growth of spending on purchases could finally exceed the growth of incomes.

(Girashenko) believes such steps as the sales of housing and building materials could remove extra money from turnover. The State Bank is planning to issue new bonds at terms advantageous for the population.

Economist Rejects Dogmatic View of Marx

PM0204144790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Mar 90 Second Edition p 2

[Doctor of Economic Sciences Professor Ye. Mayminas "Debate Platform" article under the "Questions of Theory" rubric: "Economists' Duties—What Are They?"]

[Text] Moscow—"Are you followers of Marxism?"—a venerable professor once asked me and my colleagues, teachers of economico-mathematical methods at Moscow State University, in menacing tones. It probably never occurred to such high priests that no scientific theory can be followed like a religion. In fact, it has to logically and rigorously explain and correctly predict the development of real processes.

A change of criteria is always disastrous for the social sciences. And it is no wonder the claim that "economists have a duty to the people," to each working person and creator of all things of value has become the talk of the town. Nowadays, at rallies, one often hears economists blamed for all the mess, for "pushing the country onto a dangerous path."

Of course, the current interest in economic science and the mounting wave of criticism of it are understandable. After all, it deals with an important sphere of human activity and affects people's vital interests. In recent years scientists have come into the forefront of political life. They often appear in the press and on television and many have been elected people's deputies and have taken up prominent posts in the state management apparatus.

Meanwhile, the national economic situation is getting worse and it has not yet been possible to break the negative trends. It is no longer enough to put it down to the accumulated and indeed heavy burden of the stagnant past. It would follow from this that the analysis is invalid and the recommendations of the reformist economists are erroneous. The advocates of the administrative system, throwing in the cooperative workers, organized crime, and the "intrigues of the West" for good measure, are trying to push a people irritated by all the problems, towards this conclusion. But maybe the crux of the matter is that the scientists' proposals are not

being implemented in full or are being distorted in practice? Even when they are reflected in legislative and other normative acts.

So we decided it was necessary to look at the problems of economic science from two related standpoints: the inner logic of its development (the quality of scientific results) and the external "social imperative", the links with politics and the sentiments of different social groups.

The stumbling block in the development of Soviet economic science was the monopolization of Marxism—its theoretical basis. By any standards Marx was a great scholar. The socioeconomic theory he created gave a general explanation of the replacement of the social formations and foundations of classical capitalism. The theory became part of the "system of coordinates" of world economic science. In the fullest edition of "Palgrave's New Economic Dictionary" there are separate entries on 723 scholars—from classical times to the present day. Marx could have known approximately 300 of them. In the four volumes of "Das Kapital" and in the letters there are references to 187 writers in Palgrave's dictionary. On the other hand, since Marx no serious economist has been able to get by without comparing his own scientific results with him.

Remember that Lenin never confined his study of economic literature to Marxist works. In his work there are references to 121 writers out of the 400-410 scholars whose works Lenin could have known. After October, when the Bolsheviks were faced with the task of "governing Russia," many members of the brilliant galaxy of Russian economists became involved in this work.

But, at the same time, there developed an idealization and then a dogmatization of Marxism, the transformation of it into a kind of religious dogma. This began when Marx was still alive, and he became increasingly alarmed. The First International called "Das Kapital" the "Bible of the working class." There appeared, as Mehring aptly put it, "Marxist parish priests." They sowed sectarian intolerance of any deviation from their narrow interpretation of the dogmas, calling all other currents in Marxism revisionist.

Many normative, including socialist, teachings suffered from similar ailments. But the real problem occurred when the dogmatists were able to wield the full might of the party and state apparatus. One saw the start of repression and ideological persecution of any real or fanciful heterodoxy. As a result the Stalinist treatment of Marxism-Leninism acquired a monopoly, which led to total self-isolation from the world mainstream of economic science.

The break has still not been repaired. Since 1969, when the Nobel prize for economics was first awarded, 27 economists have received it. Not counting the sole Soviet winner, Kantorovich, just isolated articles by only 11 of his colleagues have been published in Russian. And only three or four Nobel prize winners have had their main works translated. Indeed, there is no particular demand for the best world economic literature at the moment.

In books, dissertations, and articles by Soviet economists on contemporary economics one will find barely a dozen of the names in Palgrave's dictionary. I am talking about the names and works of non-Marxist theorists. For many years they have been depicted as apologists, capable only of embellishing capitalism. The "enemy image," this time in the scientific sphere, is gradually becoming part of the past. But the assimilation, let alone development of the theoretical riches accumulated by world science and the Soviet economists' return to the world scientific community lie in the future.

It must be borne in mind that Marx and Lenin created an economic theory that is geared primarily to the tasks of the class struggle. The theory's isolation prevented its development in a different plane—a more concrete, but integral analysis of the development of the real processes and mechanisms of the capitalist and socialist economies.

The following dichotomy was proclaimed as a dogmatic theory: Private ownership, market and crises, competition, and exploitation "over there"; socialist, effectively statized ownership, plan and steady development of the national economy, equality and the smoothing out of differences "over here." Theoretical arguments would be arranged in accordance with this extremely simplistic scheme, although the practical results were different. For example, all planned products and all projected expenditure on their production were declared socially necessary and the market mechanism was bypassed. In practice this led to the squandering of resources and the "input principle" of management. Theoretically, labor in the "nonproduction" sphere was considered nonproductive, although essential to society. Practice regarded this labor as second-grade and financed the social sphere in accordance with the "residual principle."

The failure to make a genuinely scientific analysis of the problem of usefulness and its link with value resulted in actual contempt for the study of consumer needs and for product quality. Chronic shortages and the shadow economy do not fit into the dogmatic, antimarket scheme. Only now is Hungarian economist Kornai's seminal work "Economics of Shortage," which analyzes these phenomena as intrinsic elements of the prevailing economic system in the socialist countries, being prepared for publication in our country.

The political economy of socialism, so divorced from the realities of life that it has not even recognized the altered view of socialism in Lenin's latter works, can only serve as an ideological buttress for a bureaucratic-command reality. The main duty of economic theory is to get back on a scientific footing. A "new reading" of the classics is not enough (albeit useful). Why? Many decades have passed. The world has undergone fundamental changes. With these changes world economic science has marched on.

Soviet scholars have also been investigating the real economic processes, despite fierce resistance from dogmatists. I would single out the economico-mathematical works of Kantorovich, Nemchinov, Novozhilov, and Lurye. But only now is an integral conception of the functioning of our economy beginning to take shape. In the West it has been developing since the late 19th century within the framework of the science of "economics." The complex market mechanism and the economic behavior of firms and working people and their families are studied together. The movement of income and supply and demand, competition and the influence of monopolies, employment and inflation are studied in depth. There is particular interest in the many forms and tasks of state regulation of the economy and problems of economic growth—contradiction and integration in the world economy. Subtle methods have been created for the quantitative analysis and forecasting of many other processes.

It is essentially a matter of the formation of major new areas that will radically change both the content and structure of our economic science and will require a different, deideologized assessment of results. Not dedication to dogma, but loyalty to and thorough analysis of objective economic reality, full explanation of it, reliable forecasts, and valid scientific recommendations.

In accordance with these criteria, the exponents of the new methods, geared to economic reform, are by no means working to the highest world standards in all things as yet. Apart from the aforementioned causes, there are the factors of a dire shortage of information, inadequate scientific groundwork, and the need to make "running" recommendations in a rapidly changing situation. And the direct borrowing of foreign experience, including the experience of contiguous countries, is unrealistic in view of our specific conditions—raw material exports, regional differences and interethnic contradictions, and management traditions and stereotypes.

The latter factor performs a special role, uniting dissimilar currents of criticism of economic reform: dogmatists—the custodians of "principles"; populists—protectors of "the people's interests"; conservatives—guardians of the "imperial orb." Behind them are certain groups who feel threatened by the proposed changes. These public forces are exercising a very significant influence on the adoption of decisions connected with the reform and particularly on the process of their implementation.

But the technocratic-command method of thinking and action, which has taken shape over the decades at all levels of management, is an even stronger factor. The methods of economic and legal regulation and market forms of management simply do not fit in.

As a result of their upbringing and work experience the majority of leaders still regard the economy as a directive, hierarchically controlled machine, whereas the market is a kind of bazaar.

When state enterprises and cooperatives started to increase the prices of their scarce products entirely in accordance with the laws of the market, the majority of economic and political leaders preferred administrative to economic methods. At important forums there was angry condemnation of the "group egoism" of these producers. After all, back in 1776 Adam Smith wrote: "We expect to get our dinner not as a result of the benevolence of the butcher, brewer or baker, but as a result of their observance of their own interests. We appeal not to their humanity, but to their egoism."

The complex mechanism of state (and even interstate) regulation of the modern market presupposes a combination of economic and administrative and legal levers. But only a combination in which market stimuli and, if you like, egotistical motives benefiting production development and refinement are not suppressed.

What one must do above all is consider the interests of the managers. Science has now gotten well away from the one-dimensional notion of the "economic human being," who reacts only to material income or loss. An integrated mathematic model has been devised that describes the behavior and interaction of those involved in the labor, capital, natural resources, and information markets and the influence of trade, taxation, credit and finance, social, foreign economic, and other forms of state policy.

There has to be an organization that is "responsible to the country for meeting known demand."

While ridding ourselves of dogmatism and numerous taboos in the theoretical sphere, we must launch a study of the mechanisms whereby the economy actually functions. On this basis recommendations will be made and ways devised of implementing the reform and contributing to a general improvement in economic standards in the country.

These, in my view, are our urgent professional and civic duties.

Cost-Conscious Taxation Model Developed

LD0304103390 Moscow TASS in English 0959 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 3 TASS—By TASS correspondent Veronika Romanenkova:

A cost-conscious taxation model, which was developed at the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Management Problems, is designed to curb inflation, which is inevitable given the present crisis in the Soviet economy.

This model, can, in the opinion of its authors, be applied in all areas of the economy, and has already been introduced at several enterprises of the communications ministry and proved its efficiency.

Under the new plan, a tax is not levied on additional profits received by an enterprise in excess of the fixed

minimum. The taxation rate is sharply increased in case of excessively high or monopoly profits.

"In these conditions, an enterprise is motivated to bring down the price of part of its output so that overall revenue does not exceed the level above which taxation begins rapidly to rise. This will force prices down which will benefit the consumer. Simultaneously, it ensures a rise in an enterprise's profits and, accordingly, in revenue to the state budget," Professor Vladimir Burkov, the author of the plan, told TASS.

The model of the Institute of Management Problems is one of many projects which have been developed lately. The finance ministry, parliamentary commissions, scientific institutions and some people's deputies have been engaged in the quest for various variants of an effective taxation system.

Last week, the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted the first reading of a bill on income tax. A bill on the taxation of enterprises is currently being drafted and will then be put to debate.

Agruicultural

Ligachev Participates in Agricultural Roundtable

LD0204095590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1215 GMT 1 Apr 90

[From the "Rural Hour" studio roundtable discussion program on agriculture, moderated by political observer Anatoliy Ivashchenko; with by Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Ligachev] In general, we understand very well how important and how complex is the resolution of the problem of providing our people with food products. And I'll tell you that we have an increase in food supplies, but it is so small, so insignificant, that, in general, matters connected with providing our people with high quality products, and moreover, of sufficient (?range), the acuteness of the problem is not only not subsiding, I would say it is growing. And we all find ourselves, of course, in a state of seeking out a way for our people to perceive more quickly at least some alleviation of these difficulties connected with food supplies. I think that we all agree that such a form of holding as the private subsidiary holding, or as we sometimes call it, even a family holding, is a path that could, to a certain degree, provide us with an increase in food supplies.

Regarding this, we have the precise directions of the March plenum of the party Central Committee last year, which once again stresses diversity of forms of socialist ownership and various types of socialist economic management—including, alongside kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms], peasants' and farmers' holdings, various kinds of associations, agrocombines, agrofirms, a substantial place in the life of the peasantry and in resolving the matter of food supplies is occupied by the private subsidiary holding.

I would, all the same, like to remind you, so as to emphasize once again the significance of this problem, that nevertheless a quarter of all agricultural production is provided by private subsidiary holdings. That's the first point.

Second, they provide a very substantial increment in incomes. Thus, according to academic figures, about 20 to 40 percent—on average throughout the country 20 to 25 percent, and there are regions where privae subsidiary holdings provide peasants with supplementary incomes of up to 40 percent. [as heard]. I think that our main task, both at the center and in the localities—and I would end my introductory remarks on this for the moment—is the creation of favorable conditions for this form of economic management. What conditions? Economic, organizational-economic, and legal conditions. Such processes are under way, and we are removing or have already removed all unjustified restrictions on the development of private subsidiary holdings. And I'll tell you that last year, for the first time, comrades, there finally began a growth in production of agricultural output on private subsidiary holdings after, I think, a period of at least 10 to 15 years. For the first time, I would say, we have broken the decline of these forms of economic management, and we are beginning to ascend. This is, I think, a gratifying occurence. In any case it is possible to speak of a tendency, the tendency of a rise in the role of the private subsidiary holding in providing our country with food. That's what I would like to say to you, Anatoliy Zakharevich, at the beginning of our conversation. [passage omitted]

[Ivashchenko] I would like, with your help, let's get together and suggest the following idea to Yegor Kuzmich. In the light of what has been said here, and what people write to us, in the light of your story, tell me, please: Wouldn't it be worth our while to review the land quotas, so that it shouldn't be 15 hundredths, but dependent upon a person having a large family, all of them working on the kolkhoz and the sovkhoz, the more so as crop rotation (?is being introduced) in the fields, as in the Brest Oblast, where everything is mechanized. So there is sense in reviewing the quotas in keeping cattle on the holding. What do you think, Yegor Kuzmich, tell us, what is your point of view on this?

[Ligachev] I absolutely support this, in the first place, because we have in effect already granted such a right to all local organizations. You have raised a very important question, Anatoliy Zakharevich. We need to remove all these restrictions, and in this regard we have all the relevant directive documents, and the local organs—I am again using the fact that our listeners include both rural and urban people—I would like to say once again that absolutely all unjustified restrictions have to be removed for the utmost development of private holdings, as was rightly said here by [name indistinct], they are subsidiary, and we need to put this into the past, and

this is indeed commodity production, this is a family holding, it is a private holding, and grant as much as can be assimilated, half a hectare, a hectare, two hectares, three hectares, and so on. By the way, this is even being done at the present time not only in the European part, which is quite broadly represented here, but is also very actively underway in Central Asia. Over the last approximately six months, just in Uzbekistan, hundreds of thousands of families, I repeat, hundreds of thousands of families, have received supplementary plots of irrigation land in order actively to run their private holdings. There are ample labor resources, and the hunger for land is great. For this reason they are currently trying to take on people on their domestic holdings. And so I think that this is extremely important.

[Ivaschenko] And another thing, the leisure zones around the large industrial towns—take even Moscow region. This is a rubbish tip, not a leisure zone, it's desolate land, why not hand it over to gardening societies? Oblige...[changes thought] after all, such resolutions have been adopted, primarily so that enterprises should build roads here, lay gas pipelines, organize water supplies. Why are we not making any progress here?

[Ligachev] So what we're dealing with here are our garden allotments?

[Ivashchenko] Yes, yes.

[Ligachev] Yes, by the way, we have no fewer than 18 million of them, and I think that this is [words indistinct], this is also an extremely fine support, both for leisure and for food production. You have touched on one of the, I would say, vexed matters. Nearly every day I am, to one degree or another, occupied with these matters, because many comrades write, including from the Moscow region. You see, all the land that lies around the large towns has to some extent already been distributed, you have to go further. This requires time and effort to assimilate it.

But our public is at present so active [laughs] that, you know, you are saying that this is a leisure zone and that gardening ought to be introduced there—it's not so simple. Because they watch literally every tree—should it be felled or not? Although of course, those engaged in gardening can make a whole garden in place of this tree.

[Ivaschenko] Of course.

[Ligachev] And so, I am constantly even receiving applications from deputies, people's deputies from Moscow region, for the solution of one matter or another to be speeded up. We have stirred up such a passion, every year now, comrades, every year up to 3 million new garden allotments. For three or four years the maximum was 200,000 to 300,000. And there are, of course, difficulties with this, you have to go and resolve them and get things moving. [passage omitted]

[Ligachev] I would like to say, Anatoliy Zakharevich, in the end, firstly, to voice great satisfaction. I don't know about you, comrades, but I have once again felt how important it is to work on this matter. We currently have a passionate debate underway in society, I don't see anything bad in this, although besides debates you also need action. We have many platforms—debates, meetings and gatherings, we have no deficit here, we have the hypnotism of the word, hypnotism of the phrase, but we could do with a few more good old actions. Arguments are underway concerning the forms of socialist ownership, forms of socialist economic management, and so on. I wouldn't want to go into this subject, but I would like to say, here it is: a form of economic management has taken shape, it has taken shape historically. And moreover, a specific form of economic management, combining the collective sector and the individual sector. There are 38 million such holdings. So I think we need to take this seam and work it, and run it on a major scale as it is done in Stavropol, in Brest, and many other regions. That's the first thing.

Secondly, I fully agree that this sector is one that is rightly integrated with the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Along this path we can advance both the kolkhoz and sovkhoz sector, and also the individual sector, when they are integrated, when they are united. Quite sufficient examples of this have been given, to endorse my thought. Furthermore, I think that it ought to be stressed once again, that our private holdings, family holdings, form an organic part of socialist agriculture. That's also important.

The idea is obviously catching on. There is also a tendency, as I would like to stress as well, for this to turn more and more into commercial production in a number of places. The degree of commercial production is increasing, and that is positively as well. And finally, I would like to express tow or three wishes about how we sould go about development of personal subsidiary farms in every way, as well as the development of peasant farms, what they call farms in the West, and kolkhozes, sovkhozes, agro-combines, and whole range of other agricultural and agro-industrial associations. The primary thing is that we must develop the prestige of this matter in every way. The comrade engaged in this business must be the most respected person in the countryside or the city. It simply has to be a state matter, not some personal or purely individual one, although here we are, of course, satisfying both a personal need and a public need. That is of great importance. Unfortunately, it is not everywhere that this is so, although the comrades were saying here, and it was pleasant to hear them, that there are leaders who understand the significance of this matter. Because it is extremely important. Further, it must be integrated even more with the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. The question has been raised here quite correctly. We have to not only run the farms, but run them on a scientific level, so that we have the best cattle, the best seeds, you understand, the highest yields, we can arrange competitions and oblast exhibitions, give certificates to these farms. [passage indistinct] I know they could even be put up for an order, like that

chap, (?Yurov)—I remember him from when I was in Rostov Oblast—who also provides meat and milk for 200-300 people. Unfortunately, we invited him, but he fell ill. He is doing very interesting work. This is extremely important.

The next thing I would to note is the aktiv. I would like to support the idea of (?Ivan Grigoryevich), in particular, that where the aktiv is involved, not with words but with deeds in personal farms, things go well. What I think is, if there is a collective farm chairman, or chairman of the village soviet, a communist deputy, living in the village, they should give a good example, because in the village they do not put up with mere words, and they especially respect an example. For that reason, I would like to call upon all our comrades who are in the party, in the rural aktiv, in the corps of deputies, all our economic and party workers, to give an example in how to run a personal farm.

And finally, two or three questions. Of course, we have to create the conditions. What conditions? The point is that we absolutely must make sure the buying in of all the food, so that it does not become a burden, but so that it is done in organized fashion, and we must provide for processing, of course. What Mikhail Nikolayevich was talking about here is right, and I have seen it in other oblasts and regions, how the peasant can hand this produce over for processing and get it back as gammon, sausage, or whatever he wants. That is something that provides a stimulus, and people are more drawn to it. The next thing is the creation of cooperatives in kolkhozes and sovkhozes to give help in this matter. This is a form which is already widespread, it has become widespread and is the most effective form. This helps to move things forward. And finally, of course, I agree with the remarks, we expect a lot of you here. Apollon Sergeyevich [Systsov, minister of aviation industry also participating in roundtable], we have to make people's workload lighter. In fact there is a lot of manual labor in kolkhozes and sovkhozes, a person gets home from work and then he has more manual labor. What is more, the young people are drawn to this technology. I recall, in Omsk, we were on a farm when we were holding a seminar on these issues. It had a German population, they were very good people and hospitable. So, we finished our inspection of personal subsidiary farms, then they said: Yegor Kuzmich, come along, we will show you an exhibition of technology. We looked at this exhibition of technology. The craftsmen, the rationalizers, had made a mini-tractor, motor units and other things. They were very inventive. I had ambiguous feelings. On the one hand, I was full of respect for the intelligence and handiness of these people, while on the other hand, I looked and what was it made of? From scrap metal. It is an absolute disgrace for us, you understand, Apollon Sergeyevich, we should be providing millions for this, but so far we don't even provide tens of thousands. And so I am very gald that we have put the pressure on the minister here, that's very good, we need more and better, better and more. Without that, it is very difficult for us to move things along. In brief, this matter has to be moved along, and it is a matter which is not so much personal as a public one. [passage omitted]

Scientific

Cosmonauts Continue Testing On-Board Computer

LD0304110590 Moscow TASS in English 0930 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 3 TASS—By TASS special correspondent from the Mission Control Centre:

Soviet cosmonauts Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin today continue to test the new on-board computer in the general motion control contour of the Mir orbiting station.

According to the medical research plan, they will check their health, including during physical exercises, in order to estimate the efficiency of various training regimes after being exposed to weightlessness for a long time.

On Monday the cosmonauts used ultra-sonic equipment to test the functioning of their hearts.

They also conducted a series of astro-physical experiments with the use of the "Maria" magnetic spectrometer to reveal the possible relationship between the intensity of flows of fundamental charged high energy particles and the Earth's seismic activity.

The cosmonauts are feeling well.

Mir Station Marks 1,500 Days in Space

LD3003184190 Moscow TASS in English 1036 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Mission Control Center March 30 TASS—The Soviet Mir orbiting station has spent 1,500 days in space.

Cosmonauts Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin have been recently testing motion control systems in the major unit and orbital modules in the general Mir Contour.

According to plan, the cosmonauts underwent medical check-ups to estimate the reaction of their cardiovascular systems to physical strain.

Alongside re-equipping the station, the crew continues to fulfil its scientific program. Today they will carry out a series of experiments to estimate the influence of outer space on physical and mechanical characteristics of various materials, samples of which are installed on the outer part of the Kvant-2 module.

They will also study the ionosphere and the upper atmospheric layers.

According to the medical check-up, the cosmonauts are feeling well.

Glavkosmos Official Outlines 1990 Space Program

LD3003205890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1410 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] The launch of the "Kristall" technology module which is to become a component part of the Soviet long-term orbital complex, "Mir" has been postponed from 9 to 18 April. This was reported today at a briefing at the Main Administration for the Development and Use of Space Technology for the National Economy and Scientific Research [Glavkosmos], by the head of that body, Aleksandr Dunayev.

According to Dunayev, two more manned flights to the "Mir" station are planned this year. Five "Progress" freight craft are also to be launched. Aleksandr Dunayev reported that around 200 million rubles, that is, 80 million less than last year, have been allocated this year to carrying out the national Soviet manned flight space program. According to Dunayev, this put Glavkosmos in an extremely awkward situation in which it is forced to look for the money it lacks.

It was reported at the briefing that in the middle of this year there are plans to launch the "Almaz" artificial earth satellite to study the planet's natural resources. It is proposed to launch the artificial earth satellites "Resurs F" and "Okean O" and other automatic space equipment in the interests of various sectors of the USSR's national economy.

The "Gamma" astrophysical observatory will also be launched this year. This event has been delayed for the last few years, the head of Glavkosmos said.

According to Aleksandr Dunayev, the "Gals" satellite will be put into geostationary orbit at the end of 1991-beginning of 1992. It will be the first of a series of space apparatus to provide transmission of the first and second all-union programs of Central Television throughout the entire territory of the USSR in continuous broadcasting mode.

Military

USSR Resolution on Spring Draft Released

PM0204104790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Mar 90 Second Edition p 1

["USSR Council of Ministers Resolution No. 305 of 29 March 1990; Moscow, the Kremlin"]

[Text] On the discharge into the reserve from the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces and of Border Guard Troops, Internal Forces, and Railroad Troops of servicemen who have served the prescribed term of active military service, and on the next draft of citizens for active military service in April-June 1990

In execution of the USSR Law "On Universal Military Service" the USSR Council of Ministers resolves:

1. To discharge into the reserve in April-June 1990 from the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces and of Border Guard Troops, Internal Forces, and Railroad Troops draftees who have served the prescribed term of active military service.

2. In connection with the discharge into the reserve of the servicemen mentioned in point 1 of this resolution, to draft for compulsory active military service in the USSR Armed Forces and the Border Guard Troops, Internal Forces, and Railroad Troops in April-June 1990 male citizens who will be 18 years of age by the date of the draft and who are not entitled to deferment of the active military service draft, and also citizens above draft age who have lost the right to draft deferment.

3. To publish the resolution in the mass media.

[Signed] N. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers
M. Shkabardnya, administrator of affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers

Geneva Conventions Appeal Rebutted

PM0204215390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[Report signed "USSR Defense Ministry Press Center": "The Spring Draft"]

[Text] The next draft into the USSR Armed Forces is beginning. This is an event that directly concerns millions of Soviet people. Above all those young men who are to take up the standards. And of course the parents who are sending their sons off to military service. Labor collectives and educational establishments bidding their envoys farewell as they enter the Army ranks are naturally not neutral. According to age-old tradition the next draft into the Soviet Armed Forces is always an important, exciting, festive occasion.

The published USSR Council of Ministers resolution, which discharges servicemen who have completed the prescribed period of active military service into the reserve and announces the next draft in April-June 1990, figuratively speaking launches the spring draft.

But there are, regrettably, grounds for concern and alarm. The point is that a campaign designed to disrupt the draft has been under way for quite some time now in some areas, particularly in the Baltic republics. Legislative acts have even been adopted in contravention of all-union constitutional and other legal norms determining draft and service procedure. Various informal organizations whose activity is intended to disrupt the draft have joined in the anti-Army campaign. They have considerably stepped up their activity of late.

Thus, during the rally on Riga's Cathedral Square on 29 March organized by the Latvian People's Front, the "Geneva-49" society, and other groupings, there were calls for military service cards and draft registration certificates to be handed over. There were similar

inflammatory actions in other population centers. Unfortunately, under their influence some draftees took the course of violating the law and evading military service.

In a speech on republic television 29 March Major General A. Visotskis, military commissar of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], rightly pointed out that military commissariats have been rendered incapable of performing their functions. He urged the republic's Supreme Soviet and government to repeal their hasty decisions, which are inciting young people to violate the USSR Constitution, and take steps to guarantee the draft. And to heed this voice of reason. Especially since the republic's inhabitants, including Supreme Soviet deputies, can be heard speaking with increasing frequency about the totally unjustified haste employed in adopting these decisions.

Cases are being encountered in the Baltic republics of people trying to justify attempts to evade the Army draft by citing the Geneva Convention of 1949, which allegedly gives people the right not to serve in the Soviet Army of "occupation." In this connection I must stress that here we have a familiar tactic used by provocateurs and disinformation specialists—where references are made to some document, while its essential points are hushed up.

Geneva conventions concerning protection for victims of war were indeed adopted in 1949. One of them—the Convention "On Defense of the Civilian Population in Time of War" (let us stress—in time of war)—contains Article 51, which prohibits occupying powers from forcing the population of an occupied territory to serve in their armed or auxiliary forces, while Article 2 stipulates that the convention "will be applied in the event of a declaration of war or any other armed conflict."

Thus, these conventions have no bearing on the legal regulation of the draft of USSR citizens for service in the USSR Armed Forces. References to these conventions are just an attempt to play on people's lack of information. Which is all the more dangerous in that it may incite a confused person to break the law. It is high time that we called those people engaged in such inflammatory activity strictly to account.

We must not allow the spring draft to be disrupted, even in a single village or city. Everyone must do his duty to the homeland.

Internal Troops Chief Views New Regulations

PM0304095790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Apr 90 First Edition p 4

["Topical Interview" with Colonel General Yu. Shatalin, commander of the MVD Internal Troops, by correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Semenyaka; date and place of interview not specified; first paragraph is editorial introduction: "Internal Troops: Rights and Duties"]

[Text] USSR President M.S. Gorbachev has signed the USSR Law "On the Duties and Rights of USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] Internal Troops While Protecting Public Order." Our correspondent asked Colonel General Yu. Shatalin, commander of the MVD Internal Troops, to answer some questions about this document.

[Semenyaka] We are aware that the internal troops were guided for a long time by all manner of intradepartmental directives, recommendations, and orders. Did not this approach affect the development of the internal troops? Is not that why they have frequently found themselves in a difficult position?

[Shatalin] Well, first, let me say a word about directives and orders... There was a legislative act—the only one pertaining to questions of the life and activity of the internal troops. This was the statute adopted by the republic's Labor and Defense Council on the internal security troops of 21 April 1920. Later, as you have pointed out, there were departmental documents regulating the life of the troops. They played a definite role in developing the organizational structure and resolving problems relating to cadres, rear services, etc. That is why we should not reject the things that they helped to establish.

[Semenyaka] You will agree, however, that departmental documents did not provide an adequate legal foundation for the troops' activity.

[Shatalin] That is true. We were especially acutely conscious of shortcomings in legal regulation over the last two years and—to be more precise—since February 1988 when the Sumgait events occurred.

[Semenyaka] And exactly six months after these events a decree was issued whose title resembled that of the law which has now been adopted.

[Shatalin] The publication of this document was brought about by acute ethnic conflicts and the use of troop personnel to suppress illegal actions by individual people and groups. The decree played a positive role in regulating the troops' activity under difficult conditions in the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, Moldavia, and other republics. The troops often proved to be the sole guarantor that Soviet citizens' constitutional rights, lives, and safety would be ensured. However, actual practice showed up the decree's weak points. In particular, the decree defined with insufficient clarity the procedure for employing troops to fulfill their duties of maintaining public order and to some extent touched on the sovereignty of the union republics. It did not determine the reasons for the use of special means. That is why the decree was justifiably criticized by people's deputies at the First Congress.

[Semenyaka] Yuriy Vasilyevich, could you please comment on some of the provisions of the law which you consider to be substantially different from or amplify those of the decree.

[Shatalin] The law has changed the internal troops' legal status since they are no longer part of the Armed Forces. A clear mechanism has been determined for using the troops to safeguard public order with the direct involvement of the union republics. A new article has been introduced which defines the procedure for the use of the special means within the troops' arsenal. The procedure for the use of weapons as a last resort [kraynaya mera] has also been more precisely defined. Internal troop personnel have been given the right to use weapons in certain situations without giving a warning. The circumstances when use of weapons against certain categories of citizens is prohibited have been clarified.

This law accords with the norms of international law and the treaties to which the USSR is a signatory. It encompasses the experience of many states.

[Semenyaka] Are you referring to actions by forces similar to our militia's operational motorized units?

[Shatalin] Most foreign countries have special militarized police units. The FRG, for instance, has the so-called Bereitschaftspolizei. France has the Compagnies Republicaines de Securite, which are mobile police subunits under the jurisdiction of this country's minister of internal affairs. In Italy the Ministry of the Interior's mobile public security forces are made up of motorized special-purpose subunits, which carry out patrol duty in addition to their basic functions. Special-purpose detachments have been set up within police bodies in major U.S. cities.

[Semenyaka] As I understand it, these are all professional formations. Obviously, that is why you yourself are in favor of putting the internal troops on this footing?

[Shatalin] It is not what I want, it is the behest of the times. The 10 servicemen of the internal troops who died and the four who went missing this year while eliminating the mass disturbances in Azerbaijan remind us of the need for better training for operations in such conditions. That is why I consider it a logical and justified step for the posts of enlisted men and sergeants to be filled on a voluntary basis on contract.

An experiment is currently being planned. Our future decision will depend on its results.

[Semenyaka] What is your opinion of the new law on the whole? Will it help establish public order in the country and enhance the troops' prestige?

[Shatalin] Of course. The law is nevertheless an interim measure. We have set to work in earnest on a more extensive, basic draft Law on the USSR MVD Internal Troops. It will include the provisions of the current law, along with questions relating to the complete transfer of the troops to a new manning principles and other provisions pertaining to the problems of the internal troops' organization, their professional activity, and social, legal, and material and technical security.

The future draft law should include norms for which the general military regulations make no provision but which are employed, in particular, during service on patrol or at their stations by the relevant internal troop units and subunits. It will, in all probability, reflect provisions regarding the responsibility of officials and the rank and file for wrongful actions and, of course, questions of legal and social protection for servicemen and their families.

We have embarked on developing a new form of dress, which differs from all previous versions. We plan to present the first examples of this new uniform to our servicemen for their verdict by this fall.

I believe that the substantive side of our activity, legal protection, and the other steps taken in the troops' interests will enable them to successfully fulfill their duties as stipulated by law.

Possible Resiting of Test Ground Discussed

LD0204151690 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] [Announcer] Last week we repeatedly discussed the possibility of resiting the Soviet nuclear test ground from Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan to the Novaya Zemlya island in the Arctic Ocean. Views on the score vary. There are supporters and critics of the idea. To continue the polemics we give the floor to military experts again. First, Colonel Vadim Solovyev.

[Solovyev in Russian with superimposed English translation] The Soviet Union has not initiated the development of nuclear weapons nor has it ever set the pace to their perfection. This country has always tried to catch up with the United States and has applied incredible efforts to maintain strategic parity. To prove the point, we may recall that when the United States dropped atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki the Soviet Union didn't even have such weapons at the time. To advance nuclear forces the United States has staged 1,070 nuclear explosions, while the Soviet Union's total is one-third of the number, or 710 nuclear blasts [as heard]. This is one of the few fields where the Soviet Union has not sought to outdo the United States, but for obvious reasons it could not allow to be left behind. The Soviet Government has repeatedly urged doing away with nuclear weapons once and for all and it even unilaterally declared an 18 months' moratorium on nuclear testing. However, the United States didn't reciprocate. Explosions at Semipalatinsk resumed. But for a brief spell there have been no nuclear tests at Semipalatinsk since last November, nor will there be any this month and possibly in the months to come. The local public has been protesting. But how long such a situation will last without a damage for strategic parity? [end recording]

[Announcer] Does this mean that functions of a test site at Semipalatinsk, where up to 80 per cent of nuclear weapons tests have been conducted until recently, will be

taken over by a new site on Novaya Zemlya? we put this question to General Vartolomey Koroboshin, a senior official at the General Headquarters of the Soviet Armed Forces.

[Koroboshin in Russian with superimposed English translation] The government has passed no decision to resite the test ground. If the question on dismantling the test facilities at Semipalatinsk arises and the United States by then declines to sign a treaty to ban underground nuclear tests, the Soviet Union will have to test nuclear weapons elsewhere, otherwise we may fall behind. One of such sites may be a test ground on Novaya Zemlya, a deserted island without natural wealth and seismically inactive. It is profitable for us economy-wise to transfer tests there since we won't be required to construct a new test site. But this is to be expected, of course, only if the United States continues with its tests, General Vartolomey Koroboshin said in conclusion. [end recording]

Historian Voices Concern Over German Threat

PM0204152990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[Letter from historian N. Ivanov under the "Opinions" rubric: "Let's Be Objective"]

[Text] Voroshilovgrad—We are concerned about who will take over the leadership of Germany (in the event of its unification) tomorrow or in five-10 years' time, because we know from history that revanchist forces have repeatedly come along and imposed small wars and two world wars.

The rapid development of events in East European countries does not yet make it possible to predict what will happen in each of them in a year or two. But we can already see today a cooling, to put it mildly, toward us on their part, voices are increasingly heard to speak of withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, and there are elements of anti-Sovietism.

...We must strive to preserve the adequate strength of the Army and the Navy and to improve them technically so that they are able to defend our country if necessary.

I appeal to the mass media—Stop! Show more positive material on the Army and help to strengthen our motherland's defense might so that we do not have to recall the words of a worker in the movie "The Living and the Dead": "...How come the Germans are already suddenly outside Moscow?"

Baltic Republics

Message Says Council Ready To Start Dialogue

LD0304114190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1900 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis sent a telegram to USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev on behalf of the Lithuanian Supreme Council. The telegram says in part:

The Presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Council has received and discussed your appeal with regard to the present status of Lithuania, and especially your conviction that the de jure restoration of Lithuanian independence would have grave consequences for the Lithuanian people, and the Soviet Union and its perestroyka policy.

The leadership of the Lithuanian Supreme Council would like to assure you that Lithuania has no intentions whatsoever to harm the Soviet Union and your policy of perestroyka.

The Presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Council has noted the readiness on the part of the USSR Government to start debates concerning the legality of acts and decisions adopted by the Lithuanian government.

General discussion of your appeal will start today if you chose to send a representative. He could give a broader presentation of the position of the Soviet Government.

We assure you that Lithuanian representatives are also ready to start a dialogue, negotiations, and discussions at any level with the USSR Government or its representatives on the legal status of Lithuania in view of the USSR Constitution and international law at the nearest and most convenient time for you.

We sincerely believe that the USSR Government will agree to start negotiations with the government of the republic of Lithuania, concludes the telegram. The text of the telegram will be published in the press.

More on Message

LD0304110990 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] The struggle for independence is going on in Lithuania. Unarmed and dignified, the nation is reaffirming its resolve in thousands of telegrams addressed to Mikhail Gorbachev since yesterday evening.

Meanwhile, the printing occupation is being escalated. All the Soviet mass media are subordinated to one purpose—to stir up panic and to dispose the public against Lithuania. The truth, however, cannot be concealed, even by driving out foreign journalists and by blocking telephone and radio communications.

In the message by the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Republic, Vytautas Landsbergis sent a reply to Mikhail Gorbachev assuring the Soviet president that Lithuania's representatives are ready to start a dialogue. Lithuania is ready for negotiations and discussions at any level with the Soviet Government or its representatives at the nearest time convenient for Mikhail Gorbachev as well as to discuss Lithuania's legal status from the point of view of the Soviet Constitution and international law.

The reply ends with the words: We sincerely believe that the Soviet Government will consent to start talks with the government of the Lithuanian Republic.

Vilnius Radio Carries 3 Apr Council Session

Army Call-up Problem Discussed

LD0304095490

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0700 GMT on 3 April begins carrying a live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius, chaired by Deputy Ceslovas Stankevicius.

He opens the session by stating that the problem of Lithuania's young people serving in the Soviet Army is to be debated.

At 0703 GMT a draft resolution appealing for help to the Red Cross is read. The resolution is adopted by a majority of votes.

At 0715 GMT Deputy Andrius Rudys opens the debate on the attitude of the Supreme Council to the callup of young people into the Army and to alternative service. Various opinions are expressed and legal aspects of the service are discussed—those who decide to respond to the callup are acting contrary to the laws of the Lithuanian Republic. Anxiety about the protection of those who refuse to serve in the Army is expressed. Hope is expressed that the delegation, which has left for Moscow, will be able to come to some arrangement with the Soviet Union on this question. Deputy Sejunas proposes that young people should renounce their Soviet citizenship and thus have grounds to refuse to serve in the occupation Army. Deputy Sabutis proposes that everything should be solved by way of negotiations. Deputy Saltenis states that the Supreme Council is responsible for creating the whole problem of refusing to serve in the Army and should bear full responsibility for it.

At 0800 GMT Prime Minister Prunskiene states that contacts should be established at any price with Soviet corresponding institutions on this problem. No decision should be taken today. It is essential to wait for the results of our delegates talks in Moscow.

At 0802 GMT the debate continues. Deputies stress the responsibility of the Supreme Council; the commission for the restoration of the state should be instructed to draw up a corresponding document which will emphasize the necessity to postpone the callup. A draft resolution is proposed that the aforementioned commission

will coordinate all aspects and also consult Latvian and Estonian bodies on their decisions on alternative service.

At 0814 GMT the deputies accept this proposal.

At 0816 GMT an agenda is proposed for today and tomorrow [4 April].

1. Appointment of administration members of Lithuanian Radio and television.
2. Draft law on enterprises of the republic of Lithuania.
3. Status and working conditions of deputies of the republic of the Lithuanian Supreme Council.

Concerning the 4 April agenda it is announced: "Tomorrow we plan to have only one morning plenary session to discuss the draft law on setting up independent state organs and the law on political parties, as well as a draft decision on rehabilitating persons who have been sentenced for resistance against the occupation regime."

At 0819 GMT Deputy Sepetys makes a statement on the press situation:

"Yesterday, Juozas Kuolelis, representative of the CPSU organization in Lithuania, declared at the Spauda Lithuanian Printing Enterprise, that printing the newspapers RESPUBLIKA, ATGIMIMAS, SOGLASIYE, GIMTASIS KRASTAS, LIETUVOS RYTAS has been cancelled. At the same time it is proposed that the editorial board of ECHO LITVY and KURIER WILENSKI vacate the premises of the Press Palace.

"Such actions of a party which has no right to control the mass media of the republic of Lithuania cannot be assessed in any other way than trampling over the principles of democracy and absolute violation of laws of this republic.

"On behalf of a group of deputies I propose that the Supreme Council entrusts the Internal Affairs Ministry, which is obliged to control the implementation of the Law on Press, and the republican Procurator's Office, which has to ensure law and order in this country, take measures to ensure that Lithuanian readers can read without impediment the newspapers: RESPUBLIKA, SOGLASIYE, ATGIMIMAS, GIMTASIS KRASTAS, LIETUVOS RYTAS, ECHO LITVY and KURIER WILENSKI, as well as other newspapers, tomorrow and in future; newspapers are part of our culture."

At 0820 GMT the session adjourns until 0900 GMT.

Deputy Procurators Nominated

LD0304105690

[Editorial Report] vVilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0900 GMT on 3 April resumes its live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council.

At 0906 GMT the chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Court is proposing candidatures for his deputies.

At 0911 GMT the chairman of the commissions supports the candidatures. The candidates [names indistinct] present their views on their future posts. Questions are put to them.

At 0932 GMT the deputies vote to elect the following deputy chairmen of the Supreme Court: (Aristidas) Pestininkas and Algirdas Valiulis.

At 0935 GMT a proposal is made to publish the names of candidates in the press and the deputies' views about them.

At 0936 GMT the republican procurator proposes candidatures for his deputies—Petras Babraitis and Gedgaudas Norkunas. He also proposes candidates to the Procuracy Collegium.

At 0945 GMT deputies put questions to the procurator about his candidates and about the work of the Procuracy.

At 0951 GMT Norkunas and Babraitis are appointed to the posts of deputy procurators of the republic of Lithuania. Members of the Collegium were appointed, too.

At 0956 GMT Landsbergis proposes the candidature of the chief state arbitrator of the republic of Lithuania. He is Aloyzas Jonas Marciulionis.

At 0959 GMT Marciulionis answers questions put to him by deputies.

At 1006 GMT he is elected the republican arbitrator.

At 1009 GMT Landsbergis makes a statement on the political situation.

At 1024 GMT Deputy Petrovas reads an appeal to the Russian population in Lithuania from the Russian National Front.

At 1028 GMT Landsbergis proposes that a message to Estonia should be dispatched. The proposal is accepted. The message will be prepared.

At 1030 GMT the session is adjourned until 1200 GMT.

Council of Ministers Formed

LD0304141290

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1200 GMT on 3 April resumes its live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius.

At 1200 GMT the session resumes work. Kazimiera Prunskiene gives a short report on the current economic situation of the republic. She does not think that at present the economic blocade by the Soviet Union has been imposed on Lithuania. She thinks that the disruption of the supply of raw materials is the result of the chaos which currently reigns in the USSR economy. However, she says that many suppliers have now demanded that hard currency should be paid for raw materials as, they said, Lithuania is no longer a Union

republic. Prunskiene states that food supplies are not reaching the shops and the situation has worsened. However, this cannot be said about other commodities, such as cars and equipment.

At 1220 GMT Prunskiene reads a letter to the USSR Government which informs the USSR Government that the law on compulsory military service has been cancelled and that rayon and city executive committees of the people's deputies have been instructed to withdraw their support from the Soviet Army Military Commissariats in recruiting young men to the Armed Forces. The text of Prunskiene's letter, addressed to USSR Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, reads: "Greatly esteemed Nikolay Ivanovich. Since a resolution was adopted on 14 March on the call-up of young people to military service, the republic's Supreme Council has instructed town and rayon executive committees to suspend their work concerning the call-up and also [words indistinct] of the commissariats.

"In order to eliminate complications between the authorities of Lithuania and the Soviet Union we propose that a complex of documents be prepared to solve these problems. [signed] Prunskiene."

At 1224 GMT questions are put to Prunskiene.

At 1226 GMT a candidate for the post of trade minister is nominated by Prunskiene. He is Albertas Ambraziejus Sinevicius; born in 1943; Lithuanian; a graduate of Kaunas Polytechnical Institute; and he is an engineer. This is the last minister to be appointed and the cabinet of ministers will be completed.

At 1233 GMT the nominee takes the floor to present his ideas on the present state of trade and its future. He also answers deputies' questions.

At 1251 GMT questions are being put to the nominee.

At 1312 GMT a debate on the appointment of the trade minister, and trade in general, is in progress. Deputy Paulauskas says that currently trade is even of political importance and constitutes a guarantee of stability in the republic, because many people are concerned about thriving speculation supported by people working in trade organizations.

At 1326 GMT a vote is taken on the candidacy. Albertas Sinevicius is elected trade minister by a majority of votes. Thus, the cabinet of ministers is now formed.

At 1328 GMT Deputy Sinevicius takes the floor and says that an assessment of the republic's present situation, in the conditions of occupation should be made, that is, he says that a document which assesses the present situation from a legal point of view should be prepared by the Commission on Legal Matters.

The session then adjourns until 1400 GMT.

Russian People's Front Issues Appeal at Council

LD0304114290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1024 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Appeal from the Russian People's Front to Russian speakers in Lithuania; issued at the Lithuanian Supreme Council Session in Vilnius; read by Deputy Petrovas speaking in Russian—live]

[Text] Appeal to the Russian-speaking population of Lithuania:

Brothers and sisters! Friends!

What is at stake today is not only the freedom of the Lithuanian people; what is at stake today is freedom as a whole. Today's USSR is a prison for all peoples, and that includes the Russians. But it is not possible for all to get out of this prison at once. Someone has to lead the way so others can follow. Russian people! Unite with the Lithuanians and people of other nationalities in support of the idea of a free and independent Lithuania. In a free state, persons of any nationality can live as human beings, not as slaves. A free Lithuania today will mean a free Russia tomorrow. The Soviet people's real enemy is not people of other nationalities, but rather the unbending and inhuman communist system. Long live a free Baltic region! Long live a free Russia!
[Signed] The Russian People's Front, the Moscow Coordinating Center of the Democratic Union

Vilnius Radio Carries 2 Apr Council Session

Agenda Adopted

LD0204144590

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian at 1200 GMT on 2 April begins to carry a live simultaneous translation of the Lithuanian Supreme Council plenary session in Vilnius.

The agenda is confirmed as follows:

1. A report on the political situation by Vytautas Landsbergis.
2. Appointing a minister of economy.
3. Elections for chairman of the republic of Lithuania Supreme Court.
4. The appeal of the USSR president to the Lithuanian Supreme Council and a response to this.
5. Discussion on the issue of military service by Lithuanian citizens in the Soviet Armed Forces.

At 1212 GMT Vytautas Landsbergis takes the floor to report on the political situation in the republic.

At 1243 GMT Landsbergis concludes his report. Kazimiera Prunskiene, chairman of the Council of Ministers, then nominates a candidate for the post of minister of economy: Vytas Navickas, born in 1952, Lithuanian, a graduate of Vilnius University, candidate of economics, nonparty member. Until now he has held the post of

scientific co-worker at the Institute of Economics at the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences.

At 1250 GMT Vytas Navickas takes the floor and introduces himself and his opinions.

At 1316 deputies ask Navikcas questions

At 1323 GMT Vytas navickas is appointed minister of economy, by a majority of votes, of the Republic of Lithuania.

At 1325 GMT various announcements are made which also include a statement by Vanda Kassauskiene, director of the Institute of the History of the Party. She says that paratroopers dressed in militia officers' uniforms occupied the builidng and the archives are at risk. She believes that documents which are of great importance will be taken out of the republic. Staff members and the procurators of the republic express statement of loyalty to Arturas Paulauskas, procurator general.

At 1335 GMT the session adjourns until 1405 GMT.

Supreme Court Chairman Elected

LD0204165190

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1405 GMT on 2 April resumes its live broadcst of the Lithuanian Supreme Council plenary session in Vilnius. Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian carries a live simultaneous translation of the Supreme Council Session.

At 1406 GMT Vytautas Landsbergis says that regardless of all the obstacles, organs of jurisdiction and law would be set up. Landsbergis proposes Mindaugas Luisys as candidate for the post of chairman of the Supreme Court of the republic of Lithuania.

At 1410 GMT the nominee takes the floor to present his views on the future of courts of law of the republic of Lithuania.

At 1422 GMT questions to the nominee are in progress. A vote is taken. By a majority of votes (102 in favor), Mindaugas Luisys is elected chairman of the Supreme Court of the republic of Lithuania.

At 1429 GMT discussion begins on the fourth question of the agenda "concerning the appeal of the USSR president to the Supreme Council of Lithuanian and to the people of Lithuania."

At 1430 GMT Deputy Kazimieras Motieka takes the floor. His remarks are monitored from the simultaneous Russian translation broadcast by Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian.

Deputy Moticka says: "I propose, esteemed deputies, that the contents of the response must be discussed at our session in great detail and with great attention." Moticka continues: "We must not forget that it will be not only a response to the message sent by Mikhail Gorbachev, but at the same time it will be a message also to our inhabitants of Lithuania." "We must discuss very urgently and set out the basic, fundamental viewpoints on the issues that are to be discussed. The basic position of this document must be a repeat of what we have already several times declared in many documents, in many statements, in documents of the Supreme Council, in documents of the chairman of the Supreme Council. We have already stated this in addressing the USSR Supreme Council and the president of the USSR. We also stated this when we addressed the peoples of the world and the states of the world. I propose that all of this must be reflected in our document. I also consider that there is no more important question at present than the preservation of the young men of Lithuania, i.e., persons who are due to be called up to the ranks of the Soviet Army according to the recently published order of the USSR Armed Forces Ministry on the call-up of young men to the ranks of the Armed Forces. With the adoption of the act of independence of Lithuania, and the recreation of the independent Lithuanian state, we all understand that it would be simply absurd to assert that the Lithuanian state will willingly send its young men to serve in the Army of another state."

Motieka concludes: "Let us try to discuss things constructively, in a cool and considered manner, in order to draw some conclusions from the speeches, to generalize these conclusions in order for us to come to a well-grounded, thought out, weighed document which we will be ready to publish, acquaint the people of Lithuanian with it, and formulate it as a response to Moscow. Thank you for listening."

At 1433 GMT Deputy Motieka concludes his report.

Gorbachev Appeal Debated

LD0204171690

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1433 GMT on 2 April continues its live broadcast of the Lithuanian Supreme Council plenary session in Vilnius. Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian continues to carry a live simultaneous translation of the Supreme Council session.

At 1433 GMT Deputy Pleckaitis takes the floor to present a report on the appeal of the USSR president to the Lithuanian Supreme Council.

At 1433 GMT Deputy Beriozovas takes the floor. He defends the legality of the laws and decrees adopted by the Supreme Council. At the same time, he calls for flexibility, having defined first of all how far back the concessions made by this government should go.

At 1448 GMT Deputy Varanauskas takes the floor. He says that now unity is the most important thing.

At 1452 GMT Deputy Vaitiekunas takes the floor. He says that in response to two appeals from Gorbachev, Lithuanians also should respond in the same way. He calls upon all the people of Lithuania to help hide

Lithuanian young men who refuse to join the Soviet Armed Forces. He says that there is no other solution because independent Lithuania currently has no means of protecting them against illegal arrests.

At 1459 GMT Deputy Stakvilevicius takes the floor. He also says that the government should look for compromises and constructive solutions. Stakvilevicius says that the Law on Referendum adopted by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet demanded that issues of such great importance should be solved by way of referendum, therefore, he suggests that the republic should hold a referendum now, to confirm the decision adopted on 11 March of this year.

At 1506 GMT Deputy Audrius Butkevicius says that people should not expect that the parliament alone make and implement all the decisions. People should decide themselves which side they are on and take an active part in everything that is going on. He agrees that meek obedience to soldiers' orders is hardly acceptable.

At 1510 GMT Abisalas takes the floor. He says our people should be assured that we will not turn back. Abisalas says that the response to Gorbachev should not be made hastily. It should first be opened for public discussion. Concerning the referendum, he says that the idea of having a referendum in conditions of occupation is impossible.

At 1516 GMT Juczas Dringelis takes the floor. He says that Gorbachev should be told that the Soviet mass media is disseminating distorted information about events in Lithuania.

At 1521 GMT Deputy Petrovas takes the floor. He says that revanchist forces should be prevented from emerging in the republic. Eugenijus Petrovas says that Estonians should be given all support possible because their aims are identical.

At 1528 GMT Deputy Saulius Razma says that the conditions that Gorbachev mentions and wants Lithuania to fulfill were not specified and therefore are unknown to Lithuania. Saulius Razma voices his concern about the recruitment to Soviet Armed Forces.

At 1537 GMT Vytautas Landsbergis takes the floor. He speaks about various proposals voiced by deputies concerning the fate of the young recruits. However, he says that no concrete decision was adopted.

At 1540 GMT the session is adjourned until 1600 GMT.

Possibility of Referendum Debated

LD0204180690

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1600 GMT on 2 April resumes its live broadcast of the Lithuanian Supreme Council plenary session in Vilnius. An uidentified deputy is making proposals concerning a reply to Gorbachev.

At 1607 GMT a deputy, name indistinct, states that, in his opinion, there are hints at negotiations in Gorbachev's letter. He thinks that the Soviet Constitution should have an article indicating how an occupied country may leave the empire. As far a referendum is concerned, it is, in his opinion, impossible at present when tanks are in Vilnius and when tension is being increased. Therefore Moscow and Lithuania should sit down at the same table and discuss how to organize a referendum in a way acceptable to both parties. Young people should be advised not to take an oath in the Army. All possible contacts should be maintained between Lithuania and the Soviet Union.

At 1615 GMT Deputy Kropas states that the Council of Ministers should appoint a delegation to go to Moscow, explain that many enterprises in the Soviet Union do not adhere to agreements with Lithuania and that this harms both parties in their economic relations.

At 1618 GMT Deputy Cepaitis voices the opinion that if Lithuania survives the present intimidations and tension, negotiations with Moscow will start eventually. In his opinion, negotiations with Moscow according to the requirements of the Soviet Constitution should not take place. The deputies should calmly continue their work, attention should not be paid to soldiers outside.

At 1624 GMT Deputy Sadreika states that there cannot be any concessions as far as the declaration of independence is concerned. From the legal point of view, the word "negotiations" should not be used, there should be a dialogue. Since Lithuania's independence is not recognized by Moscow it thinks that it cannot conduct negotiations with the republic says Sadreika.

At 1630 GMT Landsbergis takes the floor expressing his anxiety that the time may come when it will not be possible to print newspapers in Lithuania.

At 1633 GMT a proposal is made that the final editing of the reply to Gorbachev should be transferred to the commissions. An appeal to the USSR peoples also should be drawn up. Another deputy voices his opinion that an appeal to soldiers and officers of the Soviet Army on Lithuania's territory should be prepared. A proposal is also made to send a goodwill mission to Moscow to explain Lithuania's position.

At 1640 GMT Deputy Vaisvila states that all deputies should feel a very great responsibility in making various statements. In his opinion, the only way at present is that of disobedience to the occupying power. Unfortunately, many rayons still obey orders from the Military Commissariat and other bodies. This also applies to some officials.

At 1653 GMT Zigmas Vaisvila delivers his report. He says that a delegation is to leave for Moscow headed by R. Ozolas to look for a solution to the problem of military service.

At 1654 GMT Zigmas Vaisvila concludes his report. Some deputies propose to change the call for "general public disobedience" into "general public obedience to Lithuanian law."

At 1657 GMT Vidmante Jasukaityte criticizes the work of the commissions for not adopting maximum and minimum programs concerning service in the Soviet Armed Forces. V. Jasukaityte says that a great number of letters written by soldiers who died while doing their military service and many facts about the inhuman treatment of Lithuanian soldiers in the Soviet Armed Forces have been collected by author Zilinskaite. She proposes to publish a book, translate it into various languages, and to send it to various world organizations. Because of existing "dedovschina" in the Soviet Armed forces, Lithuanian young men are serving under constant conditions of threat, she says.

At 1708 GMT Z. Vaisvila says that Yazov said some time ago, during one of the numerous meetings, that political solutions are required so that the Army can find solutions without any hindrance.

At 1710 GMT discussions are held concerning some draft documents, placed before the deputies for familiarization. The chairman announces that the session will resume work at 0700 GMT on 3 April, tomorrow. An appeal to the Red Cross will be adopted tomorrow.

Landsbergis Addresses 2 Apr Council Session

LD0204151890 Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian 1212 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Speech by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, at the Lithuanian Supreme Council Plenary session in Vilnius; Landsbergis speaks in Lithuanian with superimposed Russian translation—live]

[Excerpts] Esteemed colleague deputies: The last few days have been no less full of events than previously. We have assembled to continue our constructive work on the restoration of the state in a situation when the affairs of Lithuania are at the center of attention, at the center of discussions, and these discussions are important to us, to our future. Therefore, as before, I will try at the beginning to make a brief review of the situation in Lithuania. [passage omitted]

Another important factor in our life is the attitude of the Soviet Union's leadership to the problems in Lithuania and to its own problems. It seems, and we can understand this, that the leadership of the Soviet Union has its own political difficulties, its own obligations in adopting some categorical statements. Therefore, it is essential to look for ways to help them and ourselves. The appeal of the USSR president to the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Council is known, as well as his appeal to the people of the Lithuanian SSR. [passage omitted]

Since Mikhail Gorbachev directly addressed the people of the Lithuanian SSR, the procedure of politeness obliges the people to reply to his appeal. The same applies to us. We, in fulfilling our duties with our votes, express our attitude. This must not be delayed because Saturday and Sunday were days off at the session, and on Friday the deputies met the electors. We have prepared a reply on behalf of the Supreme Council Presidium. You have it and I am not going to read it. It is a very detailed answer. It contains all the basic argumentation we think should be reiterated. It contains the expression of good relations we have stated from the very beginning so that it will be possible to solve problems through a dialogue, and not two monologues.

As the Norwegian foreign minister mentioned so aptly, the USSR must understand that dialogue means a conversation with an opponent and not only talking to him. We would also like to have talks between the two parties, and therefore we see positive moments in these appeals. One of them is Mikhail Gorbachev's desire to discuss the problems of Lithuania's status within the framework of the USSR Constitution. [passage omitted]

We proposed that President Gorbachev should send an authorized person. He could explain the situation in detail and how this problem is being regarded from that side. This proposal was sent out this morning.

As far as the procedure itself and the method are concerned, to consider the president's proposal seriously and attentively, we should not start a prolonged discussion and a spontaneous debate. The main commissions should meet and submit their ideas, their attitude. Maybe they can provisionally prepare and exchange opinions. Then I propose that a time limit be introduced because we have very important questions today, the questions of internal life. [passage omitted] Tomorrow we can examine this proposal, discuss it, and maybe set up an editorial commission to prepare a reply to the USSR president on behalf of the Supreme Council. [passage omitted]

The legal act we proclaimed grants us independence. It is possible that some people may see our acts as such sudden demands that power should not be handed over to us immediately, the next day. We did not expect this and we did not count on this. We said in our statements what stages we had in mind and how, through agreements and a gradual takeover of certain functions, we would consolidate independence. [passage omitted]

There have been rumors in the foreign press that we are preparing to revoke the declaration on independence, and so on. One can give a simple reply to this, and this has been mentioned before. When they asked us why we do not agree and do not want a referendum, I said the problem of a referendum could be discussed, but not if it concerns independence. Now if someone imagines that 124 people elected for this purpose said yes, and three weeks later they said no, then I do not know how these people understand the dignity of man [words indistinct].

The second matter, and I already mentioned it, is that the Soviet Union has its own problems, legal, internal policy problems. It is possible to help and to examine this problem in the light desired by the Soviet Union. I do not want to comment on these letters. They contain benevolent words, and angry words, but this is not new to us and there is no need to go into detail about it.

Speaking about our situation and about relations with the other states, one should look into symptoms of these relations and how to regard them. We can expect further demonstrations by a crude military machine. People who give orders to armored vehicles to move on caterpillars at night do not think, naturally, of those who are asleep or are ill. They do not think what kind of statistics of nervous diseases and heart attacks, and other similar cases, if this psychological warfare continues for a longer period of time. Maybe international humanitarian organizations should think about this. You have the appeals. They are an appeal to the Red Cross and to the Organization for the Defense of Human Rights. We ask you to get acquainted with these documents and today or tomorrow discuss a version of these appeals.

I think that the Vilnius City Executive Committee and the city council, which will assemble after the elections, should submit an account to the Armed Forces for damaged streets, because even tractors are forbidden to travel in the city center and damage asphalt. They should at least pay for this. Of course, this is a drop in the bucket, but this will go into the same account if we discuss it sometime in the future when we sit at the same table.

I think there are some better signs. Demands have stopped to hand over hunting guns, at least, they do not compel people to do this. But young people who have refused to serve in the Soviet Army are being returned to the service. This is a difficult problem for the Lithuanian Government. One can understand this, the question of prestige or strength to the Armed Forces, if they think that without Lithuania's young people the Armed Forces will become weaker. But this is also lowering the prestige of the Lithuanian Republic. This is being done especially to show the value of a government that cannot defend its citizens.

In the conditions of occupation, he who is stronger has the upper hand, but this state of affairs will not continue forever and I do not think that it will last long. It seems that this past weekend the occupation of offices continued. Today we hear once more about encroachements on the publishing house and printing works of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee.

Once again a good sign was the statement by writer Borovik yesterday on television. He said that dialogue directly with the republics should take place. We can do this. It is easy for us to talk to our neighbors in the north, we have a lot of support in the southern republics, in the Ukraine and Moldavia, in Belorussia, too—this government has territorial claims against Lithuania, but we have support there from the National Front. This saves the honor of the Belorussian people. [passage omitted]

Many people in the West have no doubt that the U.S. Congress resolution will be adopted. [passage omitted] It will have its political influence on our difficult situation.

In conclusion I would like once again to state my confidence in our solidarity in these especially difficult times for us, in the possibility for us to continue to work here in a constructive manner, complete the formation of the government, and make other important appointments which have already been mentioned. [passage omitted]

Lithuanian Council Approves Protection Unit

LD0304002790 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] The Lithuanian Supreme Council Presidium adopted a resolution instituting a protection unit, to protect the most important government offices and the republic leadership. It was resolved to institute an independent unit to protect vital government offices and the republic's leadership. It will be comprised of militia workers with the appropriation of necessary material and technical resources from the Lithuanian Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Jonas Gervinis, a militia captain, has been designated chief of the protection unit. He will be responsible to the Supreme Council Presidium and comes under the jurisdiction [pavaldus] of the chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council. In the latter's absence, he answers to Deputy Chairman Kazimieras Motieka.

Beriozovas Addresses 2 Apr Council Session

LD0204182990 Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian 1423 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Speech by Deputy Beriozovas, secretary of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party, at the Lithuanian Supreme Council Plenary session in Vilnius on 2 April; Beriozovas speaks in Lithuanian with superimposed Russian translation—live]

[Excerpts] Esteemed deputies, we must objectively and without panic assess the current political situation in Lithuania, and it is difficult. The creation of a parallel power structure has been started in Lithuania with the seizure of the Lithuanian Communist Party property with the help of military force. Arguments that the seizure of the Lithuanian Communist Party building is an interparty matter does not quite correspond to the real situation, although here, too, there are also interparty issues. But that was only the cause. In actual fact the guiding thing here is the position that was recently set out by the leader of the Soviet Government, in pointing out that the resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] contradicted the USSR Constitution. What can be said on this question? The resolution adopted on 11 March on restoring

the Lithuanian state corresponds to, and does not contradict, the provisions of the USSR Constitution on our right to self-determination. [passage omitted]

Such actions by the Soviet authorities as the creation of a parallel procuracy are unjustified. There is already talk that they want to seize the organs of internal affairs, to appoint their own staff at transportation and communication enterprises, and to hand power over to the platform of the CPSU, which has obviously already started forming its own government. What should be done today, and what does the Lithuanian Communist Party, the deputies from the Communist Party, propose that one should do in this critical situation? First of all, we must not lose our heads and begin a considerably active policy with relation to Moscow simply in the expectation of conceding one structure of power after another—that is a defeatist attitude. Today glasnost alone is not enough, although it is a very important factor and it is essential to maintain it; appeals to the public of the world [words indistinct]. The West, whose priority currently is the success of Gorbachev's reforms, will not take decisive steps to recognize the Lithuanian Republic. On the other hand, although this is perhaps a controversial theory, commercial circles in the West are interested in Lithuania, to the extent that it will be opened to the West, and may become their [word indistinct] of the Eastern market. So we have not only to settle relations with the Soviet Union; their quality is also important. [passage omitted]

It must be understood what the reasons are that prevent Moscow from sitting down at the negotiating table. Surely it is not simply imperial ambitions, although they do exist. But the main thing is not this. First, there is the condition under which President Gorbachev is responsible for the unity of the territory of the USSR. Second, there is the internal political situation, its instability, and the fear of the president of the secession of one of the republics. [passage indistinct] We must be ready for compromise and indulgence, for allowances, and for concessions. As Motieka said today, concessions are possible on all issues apart from the issue of independence; there are no politics without compromise. This does not mean that we should turn back. We must define the limits of the concessions, and bear in mind [words indistinct]. The basic and fundamental limit is the independence of the republic, and the way that it can be attained and strengthened under contemporary conditions. This can be the topic of negotiations. [passage omitted]

During the preliminary negotiations it is necessary to clarify the strategic military interests of the USSR in Lithuania: not only the call-up of young men, but also transit arrangements and other questions. [passage omitted] We must bear in mind that we are dealing with a very strong opponent, and we must know him [words indistinct], and although public opinion appears to be on our side, our weapons are flexibility, constructive activity, and the aspiration to agree and not to set in opposition the interests of the two countries—and so for all this work greater efforts on the part of deputies and the government must be made. [passage omitted with indistinct portions]

Council Message Denounces 1940 Annexation

AU0304072290 Paris AFP in English 0319 GMT 3 Apr 90

[By Sylvie Lanteaume]

[Excerpts] Moscow April 3 (AFP)—Lithuanian leaders said Monday they would refuse to supply conscripts to the Soviet military and rejected another demand by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that they retract their declaration of independence. Reiterating a call for negotiations, Lithuanian leader Vytautas Landsbergis rebuffed the Soviet president's warning Saturday of "serious consequences" if the Baltic republic did not rescind its March 11 declaration of independence.

In a message, a copy of which was obtained by Agence France- Press, Mr. Landsbergis denounced the 1940 annnexation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, calling it the "last major crime of Stalin."

The Lithuanian parliament press office said meanwhile that the question of continuing to send Lithuanians to the Red Army was debated by the legislative body in the capital Vilnius on Monday. Responding to the start on April 1 of the Soviet Union's twice- yearly military call-up, Vice President Kazimieras Motieka said "it would be absurd to think the Lithuanian authorities would, of their own free will, send their youth to serve in the army of another state." Mr. Motieka said the question would be raised by three envoys of the Lithuanian parliament who will be in Moscow on Tuesday to try to open a dialogue with the Soviet authorities. The envoys hope to meet Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov to discuss the issue of Lithuanians serving in the Soviet Armed Forces as well as the fate of deserters, said Vice Premier Romualdas Ozolas, a member of the delegation.

One representative, Egidius Pitchkauskas, arrived in Moscow on Sunday and the others were to leave Vilnius for the Soviet capital Monday night.

Several deputies took the floor to demand that the parliament "accept its responsibility and defend young Lithuanians" called on to serve in the Red Army.

Meanwhile, over 400 people demonstrated in Vilnius on Monday in support of the republic's top legal official, who was dismissed by the Kremlin on Friday. Witnesses said the crowd dispersed quietly after sacked prosecutor Arunas Paulauskas came out of his office building and appealed for calm. The building has been occupied by Soviet Interior Ministry troops since Moscow dismissed Mr. Paulauskas, and appointee of the Lithuanian parliament. [passage ommitted]

In his message to Moscow, Mr. Landsbergis, the Lithuanian leader, said "the people of Lithuania and its government again call on the Soviet Union to accept discussions with Lithuanian representatives on the broad problems confronted by the Lithuanian and Soviet people." "Be assured that Lithuanian representatives are ready to open at your convenience negotiations and discussions at any level with the Soviet Government and its representatives," he said. [passage omitted]

General Interviewed on Army Activity

LD0304124990 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Activities of Soviet Army servicemen in Lithuania are an object of close attention by the media, which often interpret the real facts in a wrong way. This is the view of Chief of Staff of the Baltic Military Region Lieutenant Genral (Petr Chauv). Our correspondent talked to the general.

[Gen. (Chauv)] There is no doubt that all our service and work today are influenced to a certain extent by the developments in Lithuania, says Gen. (Chauv). We are forced to devote a lot of effort to finding the Army servicemen of Lithuanian nationality who have deserted from their units.

[Correspondent] Does this mean the so-called massive seizing of men, as the Lithuanian leadership claims and accuses the military of?

[Gen. (Chauv)] We think this is a false picture. First of all, there is no such massive seizing, replied Gen. (Chauv). There are cases when we do detain the servicemen who have deserted and are under the protection of Sajudis officials or of other unofficial organizations so that the men cannot return to their units independently. Thirty-five men have been detained so far. Claims of a massive seizing in the streets and in homes are absurd. Besides that, 13 servicemen have returned to their Army units at their parents urging. By the way, some parents appeal to the commanding officers of Army units and to their region's headquarters with a request to wait and they will take their sons to the places of service later. So, if strong moral pressure is put on them today they cannot return [sentence as heard]. We think, added Gen. (Chauv), that many men will return soon. Those who do so independently will be given all the necessary papers.

Asked to comment on the reports that the military is building up tension in Lithuania, Gen. (Chauv) said an image is being created of the Soviet Army servicemen in Lithuania as enemies of the Lithuanian people, and that is a very unpleasant fact. It is this image that worsens tension in the republic. Such an attitude to the men who for long years have been ensuring the security along the northwestern borders of the USSR is simply unfair. Unlike the Sajudis leaders, continued Gen. (Chauv), we are now doing extensive work in the units to prevent the creation of an enemy image out of the servicemen of Lithuanian nationality. Most of these men are conscientiously performing their military duty.

[Correspondent] What military operations are planned by the Baltic Military Region headquarters on the territory of Lithuania, and are the buildings and people to be seized?

[Gen. (Chauv)] We have no plans for seizing or attacking anyone. Troops of the region are performing missions set for them by the minister of defence. They are on combat guard and are engaged in military and political training. There is no truth to the rumors of any concentration of troops, of their being moved to Lithuania, of forming strike groupings. The General Staff has informed us that not a single Army unit will appear in that republic in the near future and so far not a single unit stationed in the republic is to be pulled out.

Landsbergis Cables Assurance to Gorbachev

LD0204175290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 2 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A TASS report from Vilnius: Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania, has sent a telegram to the president of the USSR in which he assures him that that the republic does not intend to inflict harm upon the Soviet Union or the policy of perestroyka. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania, the message says, draws attention to the readiness of the USSR Government to begin discussion of the legality of acts and decisions of Lithuania with regard to the Soviet Constitution [as heard]. Representatives of Lithuania are also prepared to open a dialogue, talks, and discussions at any level with the USSR Government or with its representatives, and to discuss the question of the legal status of Lithuania.

Speaking at the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania session today, Landsbergis came out in favor of the need for a reply to the appeal of the president of the USSR, not only on the part of the Supreme Soviet but also the inhabitants of the republic. The Lithuanian leader proposed that the deputies discuss the draft of the answer to the president at today's and tomorrow's session. He also noted that the legal act of independence proclaimed by the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania does not denote the immediate restoration of independence on the republic's territory. At the same time, he said, the impression of some abroad have formed that the parliament is ready to renounce independence is devoid of substance.

Lithuanian Reaction to Gorbachev Address Reviewed

LD0204163390 Moscow TASS in English 1612 GMT 2 Apr 90

[By TASS special correspondent]

[Text] Vilnius April 2 TASS—The address of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to the Lithuanian people

and the Supreme Soviet of this Soviet Baltic republic, broadcast last Saturday, are being widely discussed at Lithuanian enterprises, state and collective farms, higher educational establishments, and other institutions. The main question now is whether Lithuania, with a population of more than 3 million people, will remain within the Soviet Union.

"The Soviet president calls on our leaders to be sober-minded and far-sighted in making their decisions," the Lithuanian Communist Party Veteran O. Barisajte from the town of Alitus said. "It's a pity that the current Lithuanian parliament is lacking exactly these qualities."

Secretary of the Sialcinskij Regional Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the platform of the CPSU) Vysotskiy said that the Soviet president's address to the Lithuanian people was reserved and friendly, and was designed to resolve problems concerning not only Lithuania but the whole country. "Many working people in our region, including Lithuanians, Poles, Belorussians and Russians, welcome Gorbachev's address and believe that he gives another opportunity to the political leaders at the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet to weigh everything and cancel their unjustified decisions contradicting the Soviet Constitution," he said.

However, some Lithuanian residents reacted differently to the address. Worker of the Zalgiris machine-tool making plant in Vilnius and chairman of the regional branch of the Sajudis orghanization B. Zala, said that Lithuanian residents "do not need any addresses from Moscow".

And yet, many Lithuanians share the opinion of worker A. Andreyev from Vilnius. "The problem of Lithuania's independence concerns not only the Russian-speaking population, but also Lithuanians themselves. Many of them do not want to secede from the Soviet Union, do not want unemployment and do not want to serve bourgeois owners. They call for a referendum on this matter." Andreyev said that the USSR draft law on "Resolving Issues of Secession of a Union Republic from the Soviet Federation" should by all means stipulate conditions for those who do not want to be deprived of the Soviet citizenship.

Council To Discuss Gorbachev Statement, Troops

LD0204103390

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0900 GMT on 2 April carries a report on the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius, presented by correspondent Guoda Salciute. Salciute says that the plenary sitting of the Lithuanian Supreme Council will begin at 1200 GMT today (2 April) and will be carried live on Lithuanian Radio's first program. Correspondent Jurate Valanciute then reports on the work of the Supreme Council's morning session.

Valanciute reports: "At the moment sittings of the permanent commissions are in progress and any interference would not be welcomed. I was simply lucky to meet Algimantas Cekuolis in the foyer of the Supreme Council. I would say that nowadays people are discussing and drawing their own conclusions about the president's appeal to the Supreme Council and the people of Lithuania."

A. Cekuolis asks: "Which president?"

Valanciute answers: "The president of the neighboring country. All these issues will probably be discussed at the Supreme Council this afternoon at three o'clock. Now, at this moment, what is your personal point of view?"

Cekuolis responds: "Mr. Gorbachev is trying to intimidate us. What is creating tension? We did not sent troops into Moscow, he did sent troops here. Some of the airborne troops uniforms were changed. A special task batallion of militia, which is subbordinated to Moscow, is now pretending to be the militia of Lithuania. Every night armored military vehicles move around. With all this we are accused of raising tension."

Cekuolis says that having seen the main news program "Vremya" on Soviet TV, people in the Ukraine and the Transcaucasus republics are trying to find out what is really going on in Lithuania. They do not believe the Central TV reports. He claims that it is not true that Lithuania has been isolated from the world and that no one will ever find out what in fact is happening here.

Cekuolis continues: "It is enough if one telephone line remains open. It is enough if one amateur radio transmitter is in operation. The world will know the truth about us. If people believe that gaining independence is an easy task, that it will come on a platter, now they realize how difficult this is."

He believes that what Lithuania needs now is for no one to attack anyone or anything.

Deputy Aleskandras Abisalas talks briefly about the agenda of the plenary session.

"The agenda has already been set up. We will discuss Gorbachev's statement and the issues concerning soldiers."

Lithuanians Send Telegram Appeals to Gorbachev

AU0204101290 Paris AFP in English 0943 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 2 (AFP)—Thousands of Lithuanians have sent telegrams to Mikhail Gorbachev in support of independence, defying a weekend appeal by the Soviet leader for an end to the breakaway, Lithuanian sources said Monday.

The move came as Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis accepted an offer from Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel to host talks between the Soviet and Lithuanian authorities, the CTK news agency reported in Prague Monday.

The telegrams were sent Sunday at Mr. Landsbergis' request after Mr. Gorbachev renewed an appeal Saturday to Lithuanian leaders to repeal their independence proclamation or face unspecified "serious consequences."

Mr. Landsbergis described Mr. Gorbachev's appeal as "extremely surprising" and said that it contained threats to the safety of the Lithuanian nation.

The Lithuanian parliament, which proclaimed the republic's independence on March 11, was meeting Monday to formulate a response to Mr. Gorbachev's demand.

An envoy of the Lithuanian president, Yegidius Pichkauskas, has arrived in Moscow for a fresh attempt to begin talks with the Soviet authorities, the parliament's press office in the Lithuanian capital Vilnius said.

Two more envoys are due to join him Monday.

CTK reported from Prague that Mr. Landsbergis had accepted Mr. Havel's offer made last Thursday "with joy and great thanks" in a message sent Saturday to the Czechoslovak president.

The Lithuanian leader stressed the importance of Mr. Havel's "efforts for Lithuanian freedom", highlighting that it was the first such offer.

Mr. Havel's proposal was also sent to Mr. Gorbachev, but no official response had been made in Prague by early Monday.

The diplomatic moves came after a weekend marked by the passing of a column of armoured vehicles overnight Sunday through the centre of Vilnius.

A total of 18 armoured vehicles and four or five armoured personnel carriers crossed Vilnius, passing in front of the parliament, shortly after midnight on their way to barracks in the northern suburbs, witnesses said.

Tension had risen sharply the previous weekend in Vilnius when Soviet military convoys rolled through the city in an apparent bid to intimidate the Lithuanians.

The Baltic state was annexed by Moscow in 1940 after enjoying independence between the two world wars.

Landsbergis on Efforts To Improve Ties

LD0204103490 Moscow World Service in Russian 0930 GMT 2 Apr 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program; report attributed to INTERFAX]

[Text] Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, stated that the Lithuanian leadership will spare no effort to settle its relations with the USSR: I do not regard the present situation as hopeless, he said in an interview with an INTERFAX correspondent. Working toward repealing our parliament's decision on the restoration of independence, Moscow demands of us the impossible both in juridicial and in moral terms.

Checkpoints Set Up on Lithuanian Border

LD0304084290 Moscow TASS in English 0831 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Kaliningrad April 3 TASS—By TASS correspondent Valeriy Biryukov:

Reinforced militia checkpoints have appeared on the roads leading from Lithuania to Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation.

A post was set up near a town of Kybartai bordering on Chernyshevskoye in Kaliningrad region at eight in the morning on Friday. It was set up according to a decision by Vilkaviskis district authorities of Lithuania on March 28. Local authorities followed the March 21 instructions of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers.

Checkpoints should prevent consumer goods, cattle, raw materials and other material values from being carried out of the district by cars, the decision reads. A person can carry out or send by post foodstuffs and industrial goods worth up to R80. Another paragraph of the decision enables local cooperative trade organisations to price, receive and sell goods confiscated after the attempts to take them out of the district.

Lieutenant Liudvigas Jasinskas and militiaman Vitalius Paplauskas, on duty at the checkpoint, told journalists they would only fulfill their usual duties.

"The decision was taken by people wishing to set us against our old and good neighbours," Jasinskas said. "How can I examine their cars, how can I determine if people carry out goods from our district, from Kaunas or from Belorussia?"

Not a single car was stopped during their duty, neither going to Lithuania or to Kaliningrad region.

A similar checkpoint is to be opened near a bridge over the Newman river connecting Sovewtsk (former Tilsit) with Panemune. A cabin with an inscription "checkpoint" was put there on Thursday, but overnight it disappeared.

Correspondent Reports on Supreme Council Session

LD0204194290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 2 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; passages within quotation marks recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] We have just received a report from Vilnius by our special correspondents:

[Orlov identified by caption] The Supreme Soviet of Lithuania resumed work today following the weekend, and Vytautas Landsbergis read the deputies the draft response to the appeal by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania. I have to say that, compared to the first reaction, the text in the proposed draft has changed somewhat. First, it has undoubtedly become more democratic. There are no words about a threat.

[Unidentified man] "We are beginning, it seems, to seek an intelligent understanding, and I believe that the most important thing is that this is a beginning. That is how I think for the moment. If only this was a beginning, how people would breathe a sigh of relief."

[Orlov] Deputies, and many of them occupy a more extreme stance, still need to adopt the final text of this document. But perhaps the time has already passed for uncompromising political (?blitzes)?

[Unidentified correspondent] An interdepartmental press center opened today in Vilnius at the provisional Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU platform. Its second secretary, Vladislav Shved, reported to journalists that the party's leadership evaluates the appeal by the USSR president to the people and parliament of the republic as altogether restrained and providing an opportunity for the beginning of a constructive bilateral dialogue.

[Shved] "But for this, it is of course necessary to recognize one reality, that Lithuania is a part of the Soviet Union, and that the USSR Constitution operates upon the territory of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]. These questions cannot be solved unilaterally or by way of ultimatum, no matter what the desire by which the Supreme Soviet is guided. And in this respect we share fully the position of the USSR president."

[Orlov] Representatives of the Soviet Army and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs who were present at the press conference answered journalists' questions. The address given by Colonel Petrushenko, USSR people's deputy, who has come to Lithuania, was received with interest:

[Petrushenko] Our deputies' group, which was set up with the objective of countering separatism and nationalism, and which comes out in favor of preserving the Federation—let me stress, the renewed Federation of the USSR—the deputies' group union, which today brings together more than 300 deputies, intends to represent and defend the interests of Soviet citizens in Lithuania."

[Correspondent Dvinin, identified by caption] What is the reason for the tense situation that has come about in the republic? Here is the opinion of Profeassor (Konstantinas Surblis), a Lithuanian historian.

[(Surblis)] The Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR had adopted 80 legislative acts over a short period of time. If we read all these documents carefully, we will see an attempt on the part of the legislators of the Lithuanian parliament essentially to deprive us of the gains made during the years of Soviet power. I have in mind the social protection, first and foremost, and this of course disturbs the working people of our republic. But I wanted to observe that the declaration of these documents of full independence, say, has not added one iota to our independence. No, independence is not an act of just one day; it is a lengthy process, it is the in-born right of every people, and in determining the further fate, therefore, it is not just individual parties and public movements that must take part, but first and foremost the main participant in this movement must be the people. The people must decide their own destiny."

USSR Troops Occupy Party Buildings

LD0204194890 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1900 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] Today at 2000 [1600 GMT] USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] guards arrived in two cars at the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Press Buildings on Maironis Street and occupied it. The process took 40 minutes. Armed guards in Lithuanian MVD uniforms are posted at the door.

The following press staff members relayed this information by telephone: Vilnius [word indistinct] student Aidas Laurikonis, Osauskas [word indistinct] from the journal [word indistinct] Editorial Office.

Changes at Vilnius Publishing House Announced

LD0204205590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1950 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] Let's return to events in Lithuania: At the center of attention is the printing house [dom pechati]. As reported by our correspondent, this publishing house is the property of the CPSU, but both Sajudis's newspapers and independent publications are also printed inside it. Today it is reported that the publishing house has also been obliged to print the SOVETSKAYA LITVA newspaper in three languages instead of four other publications, SOGLASIYE [Consent], RESPUBLIKA, and others. We'll tell you tomorrow how events will develop.

And another thing: The Lithuanian leadership has given orders to stop the broadcasting of a Leningrad program and will replace it with a Polish Television program.

'Sajudis' Printing Ban Imposed at Party Building

LD0304105590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1000 GMT 3 Apr 90

[By TASS commentator Yuriy Sizov]

[Text] Moscow, 3 Apr (TASS)—Four republican newspapers which express the interests of the Lithuanian

nationalist movement "Sajudis" and which have until now been printed at the Publishing House of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee have been banned from further use of this printing base.

"We are talking about RESPUBLICA, SOGLASIYE, ATGIMIMAS, and GIMTASIS KRASTIS," Juozas Juolelis, secretary of the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania (on the CPSU platform) told the TASS correspondent in a telephone interview today. He added that the question of stopping publication of TIESA and EKHO LITVY, the newspapers of the republic's Supreme Council, is also under consideration.

Explaining the motives behind the decision, Kuolelis emphasized that is a matter of protecting CPSU property on Lithuanian territory and putting the activities of the Lithuanian and publishing house which belongs to the CPSU Central Committee in order. He recalled that the republic's authorities have already tried to hand over some party buildings to certain cooperatives and public organizations, including the Social Democratic Party of Lithuania. Kuolelis reported that it is intended to publish SOVETSKAYA LITVA, the newspaper of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania (on the CPSU platform) at the publishing house in Lithuanian, Russian, and Polish and KOMMUNIST magazine in Lithuanian and Russian.

Observers note that the euphoria over the republic's "independence" declared by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet has still not passed. For too long the papers and television have been persuading the republic's population that with the coming to power of Sajudis, an unprecedented flourishing of democracy and of the economy will begin. The leaders of that organization have come to power. But instead of democracy and pluralism, what is being very persistently imposed is uniformity of thinking "along Sajudis lines." For example, on Sunday evening relaying of Leningrad television, which enjoyed popularity among the people, was ended. Calls are to be heard for ending television broadcasts from Moscow—they "are not to the liking" of the parliamentarians from Sajudis, who during the election campaign swore fidelity to democracy and pluralism and to freedom of speech, but are now acting against their own promises.

True, Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, yesterday sent USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev a cable assuring him that the republic "does not intend to harm the Soviet Union in the policy of perestroyka." The Presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, the message says, has taken note of "the readiness of the USSR Government to begin discussion of the legality of the acts and resolutions of Lithuania with regard to the Soviet Constitution." Representatives of Lithuania are also prepared to start a dialogue at any level with the USSR Government or its representatives and to discuss the question of Lithuania s legal status.

Speaking at the session on Monday, Vytautas Landsbergis proposed that the deputies discuss a draft reply to the message from the USSR president. He also noted that the act of independence adopted by Lithuania's parliament does not mean its immediate establishment on the republic's territory. At the same time, he said, the impression that some people have formed abroad that the parliament is prepared to abandon independence is without any foundation.

Landsbergis Interviewed by East German Paper

LD0304101190 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0138 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Lithuania is not interested in any further exacerbation of the situation. This was said by Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis in an interview published today by JUNGE WEIT. Landsbergis points above all to economic reasons. "As far as we are concerned, we are strictly fulfilling our supply contracts. That is not the case on the USSR side, because in the past months up to 40 percent less ores, coal and oil has come than agreed." This has led to economic difficulties in Lithuania.

Landsbergis said Lithuania regards itself as occupied and annexed. After the USSR Supreme Soviet had in 1989 described the division of Eastern Europe between Hitler and Stalin as criminal and invalid there has been no referendum on the secession of Lithuania from the Soviet Union, as the country had never officially joined it. Perestroyka itself had created the preconditions for such steps. In the opinion of the Lithuanian president, there are still many forces in Moscow which oppose such movements as Sajudis. Nevertheless, he does not believe Gorbachev is one of them, because he himself a few weeks ago proposed appointing a Lithuanian ambassador for Moscow.

Paper Lists Winners in Lithuanian Run-Off

90UN1239B Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 7 Mar 90 p 1

["List of Deputies Elected to the Supreme Soviet, 12th Convocation, of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic on 4 March 1990"]

[Text] Niyole **Ambrazaytite**—soloist at the Lithuanian Theater of Opera and Ballet (Vilnius, Panyaryayskiy Electoral District No. 14).

Irena **Andrukaytene**—teacher at Anikshchyay High School imeni Y. Bilyunas (Anikshchyay, Anikshchyay Electoral District No. 100).

Zbignev **Baltsevich**—editor of the newspaper KURYER VILENSKI (Vilnius, Pavilnisskiy Electoral District No. 20).

Medard **Chobot**—deputy director of the Vilnius Scientific Research Institute of Experimental and Clinical Medicine (Vilnius, Zheleznodorozhnyy Electoral District No. 19).

Eugeniyus **Gentvilas**—junior research assistant at the Mathematics and Cybernetics Institute of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences (Klaypeda, Nauyakemskiy Electoral District No. 42).

Pyatras **Ginetas**—driver-compressor operator at Klaypeda Mechanization Administration No. 5 (Klaypeda, Zhardininkskiy Electoral District No. 43).

Vidmante **Yasukaytite**—writer (Vilnius, Vilkavishkskiy Electoral District No. 134).

Stasis **Kashauskas**—writer (Vilnius, Uzhvyantskiy Electoral District No. 83).

Vitautas **Kolesnikovas**—chairman of the Alitus Arts Society "Garmoniya" (Alitus, Vidzgirskiy Electoral District No. 61).

Arvidas-Kostas **Leshchinskas**—dean of the Faculty of Production and Management Economics of Vilnius University (Vilnius, Radvilishkskiy Electoral District No. 89).

Iokubas **Minkyavichyus**—academician, secretary of the Social Sciences Department of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences (Vilnius, Kurshenskiy Electoral District No. 92).

Donatas **Morkunas**—second secretary of Shyaulyayskiy Gorkom [city party committee], Lithuanian Communist Party (Shyaulyay, Zhemaytskiy Electoral District No. 47).

Cheslav **Okinchits**—lawyer at Vilnius Legal Advice Office No. 1 (Vilnius, Syanamestskiy Electoral District No. 18).

Saulyus **Pechelyunas**—senior engineer at the Lithuanian Institute of Urban Construction Design (Vilnius, First Alitus Electoral District No. 59).

Eugeniyus **Petrovas**—engineer at the "Gelikon" experimental plant of the Institute of Semiconductor Physics of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences (Vilnius, Taurasskiy Electoral District No. 12).

Kazimera-Danute **Prunskiene**—deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic (Vilnius, Vyarkvayskiy Electoral District No. 5).

Antanas **Rachas**—teacher at Kdme High School No. 2 (Kelme, Kelmeskiy Electoral District No. 82).

Gintaras **Ramonas**—chairman of "Daukshyay" kolkhoz [collective farm], Ionishkskiy Rayon (Ionishkis, Ionishkskiy Electoral District No. 93).

Lyudvikas-Nartsizas **Rasimavichyus**—lawyer at the Klaypeda Legal Advice Office (Palanga, Kurshskiy Electoral District No. 39).

Lyudvikas-Saulyus **Razma**—rector of Vilnius Teachers College (Vilnius, Zhirmunskiy Electoral District No. 3).

Algirdas **Razhauskas**—chairman of "Zhvirblonyay" kolkhoz, Pakruoyskiy Rayon (Pakruoyskiy Rayon, Pakruoyskiy Electoral District No. 94).

Vladas **Terlyatskas**—senior lecturer at Vilnius University (Vilnius, Pilisskiy Electoral District No. 1).

Prantsishkus **Tupikas**—director of Vilnius High School No. 47 (Vilnius, Karolinishkskiy Electoral District No. 16).

Algimantas-Vintsas **Ulba**—director of the "Prekule" poultry sovkhoz [state farm], Klaypedskiy Rayon (Gargzhday, Prekulskiy Electoral District No. 65).

Pyatras **Vaytekunas**—research assistant at the Physics Institute of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences (Vilnius, Fabiyonishkskiy Electoral District No. 11).

Alfonsas **Zhalis**—ispolkom [executive committee] chairman of the Klaypeda City Soviet of People's Deputies (Klaypeda, Payurskiy Electoral District No. 45).

Communist Deputies Hold Post-Election Meeting

90UN1239C Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 7 Mar 90 p 1

[Lithuanian Telegraph Agency Report: "Meeting of Deputies"]

[Text] On 6 March in Vilnius, a meeting took place of a group of Lithuanian Communist Party members elected as deputies of the republic Supreme Soviet. Opening the meeting, Algirdas Brazauskas, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party, congratulated those assembled, who had emerged victorious following a difficult preelection campaign, and wished them success in their activity in the parliament.

During the course of the meeting, there was an exchange of views concerning the terms of convocation and work procedures of the first session of the new Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], and proposals were presented regarding nominations to the post of chairman of the Supreme Soviet. Those who made presentations argued against partitioning deputies into opposing camps, and against the diktat of one group or another. They expressed a readiness to work constructively in the Supreme Soviet for the good of Lithuania.

Algirdas Brazauskas informed those assembled of his official meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow Monday in the Kremlin, where he was invited as chairman of the Presidium of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet. The meeting laid out the point of view of the USSR leadership on certain aspects of relations with Lithuania which might arise in the near future.

Sajudis Organizes Pro-Independence Meeting

LD0304011690 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] The Lithuanian restructuring movement, Sajudis, is organizing at meeting at Kalnai Park in Vilnius on Wednesday [4 April] night.

Vilniusites and all Lithuanian people are invited to express their will for Lithuania's self-determination in the path it has chosen to follow.

Commentary Discusses Public, Sajudis Relations

LD0204181990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Igor Zorin commentary]

[text] [Announcer] It is no exaggeration to say that the attention of the whole world is fixed on the events in Lithuania, and I now propose that you view them through the eyes of an eyewitness. In the studio is commentator Igor Zorin, who has just returned from Lithuania. Please, over to you.

[Zorin] Good evening; good evening [last two words rendered as "labas vakaras" in Lithuanian] my dear amber land, as Lithuania has long been called. It is very difficult to evaluate the situation in Lithuania uniformly; very difficult. Externally, everything seems to be calm. If one takes a close look, then opponents and champions of the secession of Lithuania from the USSR interpret even simple facts in completely opposing ways. Hence, in my opinion, the tension, too. For instance, Sajudists, that is those who consider themselves to be members of the Sajudis [Lithuanian Movement for Restructuring] society, say that the military have seized such-and-such an installation. While there rivals say they are posted on guard. But practically in every case there is the point of view that there should not be lack of circumspection in secession from the USSR, and namely such a course—and I want to stress this—is stubbornly being adhered to today by the leadership of Lithuania.

So, well, alternative opinions on this account are adamantly opposed. When you explain that you and your central government are in favor of the self-determination of any people, including of the Lithuanian people, but that in order to be independent one needs to make use of civilized means, humanely, good-neighbourly, in a good way, objections seem to slacken. Why does the view of the process of acquiring independence of many inhabitants of the indigenous seem one-sided? Alas, the republican mass media, taken under the control of Sajudis—in my opinion, fully—has done a great deal here. The point of view of Sajudis on the course of events is overwhelmingly dominant. In any event, I did not see any other position portrayed in the central republican press, apart from in the restored SOVIET LITHUANIA [SOVETSKAYA LITVA], which, I think, is still published outside Lithuania, and also in the Army newspaper FOR THE HOMELAND [ZA RODINU] and in a number of small information leaflets, published by the Unity [Yedinstvo] socialist movement.

And where is the pluralism of opinions, dear colleagues? It is so fashionable now in the West and in our country. Where is the ability to respect each other, to respect another point of view? For instance, a group of journalists wanted to record an interview in the Kaunas branch of Sajudis. Well, two Sajudists refused to give it, stating that they can only talk to the press—just listen to this—when there are three of them. Well, how's that for you?

Local eye-witnesses say that bureacracy, and mainly political bureaucracy, have been perfected in Sajudis. The following example is given. When the minister of foreign affairs of the republic was being appointed, the candidate simply mixed up his facts and answered incorrectly questions touching on, let's say, Lithuanian-Russian-Polish-Belorussian relations. Then the main argument for his becoming a minister was the characteristic that he was a reliable supporter of Sajudis. I also recall that in modern history, not so long ago, there was such a thing, when, let's say, a sailor was appointed director of a bank.

Reports by television journalists of the "Vremya" program are given a very unhealthy reception in Lithuania. As soon as a CPSU platform person is seen in an interview, the question is raised immediately: Why is that being broadcast. It is a lie! It is not true. The facts show, no that is true.

Many Lithuanians, and not only Lithuanians, are for the preservation of all, including political links, with the USSR. All must be listened to in order to choose the correct path without tears. I recall how a woman, a Belorussian, an elderly woman, came up to me and cried. No, not cried, wept tears. It took me 15 minutes to calm her down. (?She wanted me) to report to Gorbachev in Moscow how she is being treated. A young Russian woman also came up to me—it's true that she refused to give an interview because, as she said, it would mean her death—telling me how she has been told to get out of Lithuania.

And so, my beloved amber land, Lithuania. May you have a straight, honest, and confrontation-free path. And, God forbid, without conflicts.

Polish TV Finds Enthusiastic Audience in Vilnius

LD0304091190 Warsaw PAP in English 0814 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Vilnius, April 3—It seems that never before and nowhere has the Polish Television programme aroused such enthusiasm as last Sunday in Vilnius. Starting from 6 p.m. April 1 the residents of Vilnius and its vicinity are able to receive the Warsaw programme.

The reception is perfect and the number of viewers beats all records, and that not only among 120,000 Poles living in Vilnius.

The Polish Channel One is broadcast on the hitherto Leningrad channel, so that Lithuania has presently four TV programmes, namely Lithuanian, Polish, and two Soviet ones.

Commentary Urges Patience on Secession Issue

LD0204124190 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Boris Markovnikov commentary]

[Text] On Monday or Tuesday Lithuania's Supreme Soivet is to consider Mikhail Gorbachev's address in which the Soviet president urges the republic's parliament to revoke without delay the unlawful legislation on the restoration of Lithuanian independence, and calls on all Lithuanian residents to listen to the voice of reason. Radio Moscow's Boris Makrovnikoy comments, and this is what he writes.

The decision to restore Lithuanian independence and proclaim the USSR Constitution ineffective on Lithuanian territory was taken by the republic's Supreme Soviet overnight and without a referendum which would clarify the attitude to it of the whole of the republic's population, which includes more than ethnic Lithuanians alone.

Poles, for example, consider themselves as indigenous people in Lithuania as anybody else and they too are cherishing the idea of proclaiming their own autonomy. There are also Belorussians, Russians, Ukrainians, and Jews who have lived in Lithuania long enough to be unwilling to find themselves outside the Soviet Union. Anyway, what the Lithuanian parliament has achieved so far is largely a growth of differences among the public forces in the republic, and this is only a minor share of the various problems brought to life by that parliamentary decision which looked like an ultimatum advanced by parts of the Soviet state against the whole of it.

People in other republics too have been seriously concerned over the largest Lithuanian developments, since the break up by that republic of the system of economic relations that has taken shape over the past five decades is very harmful to them too inasmuch as it impedes exchanges of raw materials, readymade goods, and food products. In a word, there is a whole package of problems to which mutually acceptable solutions must be found before proclaiming independence.

The Lithuanian leadership has preferred a different line of action, that of challenging and insulting the whole union, the presidential message says. No one is against Lithuania becoming independent. On the contrary, the Lithuanian leadership has taken its unilateral step at a time when the country has been introducing laws to guarantee the genuine independence of republics. A law establishing a mechanism of the republics' secession from the Union will be passed shortly. The president sugests that the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania should reverse its unlawful acts. He says that such a step would pave the way to discussing the whole range of problems on the sole acceptable basis, that of the USSR Constitution.

I don't know how the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania will react to this appeal, let's wait and see. However already now it is clear that many people in the republic, including Lithuanians, have supported Mikhail Gorbachev's call to heed the voice of reason.

Radio Moscow's correspondent in Vilnius has interviewed people's writer of Lithuania Juozas Baltusis. This is what he said:

[Begin Baltusis recording in Russian fading into English translation] I believe that my people, Lithuanians and I personally, are living through decisive days. We have approached a point where we must decide who we should join and where we should go. I am very much alarmed by the hasty decisions by Lithuania's Supreme Soviet. It wasn't considered properly, not to mention the fact that the decision runs counter to the Constitution, that it leads our people toward a stalemate, toward misfortune. For that reason, all those I have been able to talk to, and I myself, welcome President Gorbachev's appeal. Only the friendship of peoples and the Federation, only joint efforts will be able to bring about the independence of each republic and each people. [end recording]

Lithuania's 'Unity' Chairman Interviewed

LD0204195990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 2 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Just as before, we are awaiting news from Lithuania with particular feeling. What happened in the republic today? What is most worrying its inhabitants at the present time? A little bit later we will broadcast another report by our special correspondents from Vilnius, but for the moment we have an interview by our correspondent with Valeriy Vasiliyevich Ivanov, cochairman of the Unity [Yedinstvo] movement for perestroyka in Lithuania.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent] Valeriy Vasiliyevich, we know it is difficult for you at the present time. You are a minority, but nevertheless, is your movement really convinced that you can convince, win over, attract to your side, the majority of the population in Lithuania?

[Ivanov] You understand; it is good that you talked about convincing. We think we can. Represented in our movement are Russians, Poles, Belorussians, Jews, and other nationalities. There are quite a few of us. I would like to say, using the television channel of Central Television—unfortunately in the republic we do not

have the opportunity to address the republic's public on Lithuanian television—I would like to say, let's think about it, all together, both Yedinstvo and Sajudis [Lithuanian Movement for Restructuring], and the CPSU and the Lithuanian Communist Party—let's all get together and plan what to do. The situation is not a simple one. Therefore reason must prevail over emotions.

[Correspondent] How does your movement imagine a democratic mechanism, a way out of this situation, out of this crisis?

[Ivanov] Well, first one must probably stop adopting unilateral laws. The fact is that at the moment parliament has not even been fully elected. Secondly, the separatist moods still prevail in parliament. They do not completely reflect the situation in the republic. One must evidently pay attention and think about it, must listen to the voices of those who think differently. Our movement thinks differently. This is no secret for the inhabitants of the republic. But it is precisely the democratic process that provides for everyone coming to a decision together. Both forces should seek for a compromise. This compromise will be to the benefit of everyone. I think this is how it should be, precisely some kind of meeting, some kind of conference, but first of all there must be a halt, because the adoption of those laws which are in process at the moment is not improving the situation. It is making this situation more tense. [end recording]

Moscow Residents Interviewed on Lithuanian Issue

PM0204212590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 1

[G. Alimov and V. Litovkin "Express Interview" outside the IZVESTIYA editorial office, No. 5 Pushkin Square, with passersby: "The Future of Lithuania: Prudence Is Required"; first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] No. 5, Pushkin Square—The USSR president's appeal to the Lithuanian people and the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet left no one indifferent, either in the republic or in the other cities and regions of the country. People have voiced highly varied opinions, but extreme concern and perplexity at what is happening in the republic predominate. They are demanding that constitutional order be defended in the USSR.

This was illustrated by the brief interviews which our correspondents had with Moscow residents and visitors to the city 2 April right outside the IZVESTIYA editorial office on Pushkin Square.

R. Yermolov, senior research institute engineer, Leningrad:
I am very concerned by some extremist statements in the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. How can all the good that our peoples have done in the 50 years, that they have lived and worked together, be effaced at a stroke?! I also want to reproach the central authorities for their indecisiveness. We have had enough of appeals and admonitions. It is necessary to adopt a provision on how a republic should pull out of the Union, invite a Lithuanian delegation to Moscow, and begin a constructive, thorough dialogue on all economic, political, and social questions.

A. Kostava, medic:
Every people must have the right to live as they wish. The Lithuanian people want to live for themselves, live a peaceful, free life. No one should prevent them from doing so.

A. Lomanka, expert:
I am very troubled. There we were living quietly, and suddenly we find that we are the baddies and they are the good guys. We were one family and now everything is being vivsected. I do not think that this is the best way.

Captain Second Rank I. Vasilyev, staff officer:
I believe that we have once again taken too long in adopting decisions on the Lithuanian SSR. Our indecisiveness and even opposition to granting the republics genuine economic independence have provoked a fierce reaction from those extreme forces which are leading the country toward a split. That is why we need to be particularly well considered and prudent when settling questions of self-determination.

All peoples have the undisputed right to leave the USSR. But this is too serious a question to settle in a hurry under severe pressure. No state in the world can allow itself that "luxury." After all, we must not only think about the interests of Sajudis' leaders but also about the whole population of Lithuania, including the Russian-speaking population, and do everything we can to prevent a renewed outbreak of violence.

K. Chekheyan, all-union research institute scientific staffer:
I hold an unambiguous viewpoint: They are right but they have been hasty. Such serious matters should not be done in a hurry.

D. Uskov, ministry worker:
As far as I am aware, the West, in particular the United States, has no intention of giving them any of the openhanded assistance on which some people in Lithuania are probably counting. The 1 April edition of MOSKOSVKIY KOMSOMOLETS printed a humorous poem about the clearance sheet that we cannot sign for Lithuania. I do not, incidentally, think that this is just a joke.

L. Rozanova, medic:
Everything that is happening in Lithuania puzzles me. The republic's Supreme Soviet is not complying with elementary norms of behavior. We must, for example, take one another into consideration. It is undoubtedly their right to decide whether to break away or not. I personally do not like the way this is being done, for one

thing, or the way the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet is behaving provocatively toward other Union republics.

D. Turovtsev, war and labor veteran:
Why was this blood shed?—that is the first question. I do not think that we should allow them to break away from us. After all, we have applied so much effort and invested so much money in developing that republic's economy. Lithuania is our ally and it must be within the Union. The republic, certainly, does have a constitutional right to self-determination. But why is this question being settled by a narrow group of people within the Supreme Soviet? Why are they reluctant to hold a referendum; why do they not ask the people?

V. Chelyshev, student:
For God's sake, let them go it alone. I do not see a problem here. But I am afraid that events may develop to the detriment of both Lithuania and the Union.

G. Shakhova, scientific worker:
To be brief, I can understand them, but I am convinced that a referendum must be held all the same. You cannot get by without consulting the people on such matters.

S. Korovin, theater administrator.
I think that the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet's actions are somewhat premature. I have the impression that it is not the Lithuanian people but the politicians that are making this choice. It is important to know the whole people's opinion and it is important to conduct dialogue with Moscow, but not by means of such ultimatums. I consider the response given by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet chairman to Gorbachev's appeal strange and incomprehensible...

A. Sergeyev, worker.
Lithuanian Supreme Soviet deputies have assumed tremendous responsibility for their people's future. You can take whatever decisions you like—paper will wear anything. But it is foolhardy to fail to take life's harsh realities into consideration. For some reason they have not been considered. The present situation cannot go on long, after all. Sooner or later we will have to come to the same table and discuss all the issues. But we must consider one another's interests in order for this to happen. That is the most important thing. If the experience of world history can teach us anything, it is that you cannot achieve prosperity for yourself without taking your neighbors' interests into consideration. After all, we live next to one another and our common future depends on the first steps that are taken now.

Lithuanian Komsomol Appeals for Presidential Rule

LD0304094490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] The Lithuanian Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], which has more than 35,000 members, has addressed a statement to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, president of the USSR. It says:

The events of the past few weeks in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] have shown quite clearly that the path chosen by the leaders of Sajudis, who have obtained the real power in the republic, is leading to confrontation and to the most dangerous, unforeseeable tension. A few dozen people belonging to the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania, by a single decision have turned upside down the destiny of hundreds of thousands of people. What has happened in Lithuania is the natural result of the events of the past few years, but it is also a most serious warning to all republics, a striking example of how the most progressive transformations can be brought to have negative consequences, threatening the existence of the Soviet Federation.

The Supreme Soviet of Lithuania completely ignored the decision of the Third Congress of People's Deputies and the decree of the president of the USSR. The Supreme Soviet of Lithuania has published a draft law according to which we, members of the Leninist Komsomol, members of the CPSU, and all people in disagreement with the policy of the current membership of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania, can be brought legally to account.

On the basis of the above, we put the following proposal to the president of the USSR:

In order for the laws of the USSR to be fulfilled in the territory of Lithuania, to introduce direct presidential rule to the Lithuanian SSR.

We request that this appeal by the Lithuanian Komsomol should be transmitted through all the mass media, radio and television.

Landsbergis, Others Give Press Conference

90UN1342K Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 14 Mar 90 p 2

[ELTA report on press conference with Lithuanian parliament on 12 March 1990: "Meeting With Journalists" published under the rubric: "First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic of the First Convocation"]

[Text] The parliament of the Lithuanian Republic has been working continuously. Therefore, on 12 March republic and foreign journalists had to wait for a press conference until 8.30 p.m. when the members of parliament took a break before the next meeting.

Having begun the press conference with an introductory word, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic, Vytautas Landsbergis; and Deputy Chairmen Bronislovas Kuzmitskas, Kazimeras Moteka, and Cheslovas Stankyavichyus; the secretary of the Supreme Soviet, Lyudvikas Sabutis; and the temporary acting chairman of the republic Council of Ministers, Kazimera Prunskiene, answered numerous questions from workers of the press, television, and radio and the public from the republic and foreign countries. Most questions were asked of the chairman of the Supreme

Soviet, V. Landsbergis. He noted that the parliament of the Lithuanian Republic is now engaged in very important and responsible work. Documents of great significance were adopted today. While answering questions he also noted that they intend to clarify the position of the U.S. Government with respect to the Lithuanian state.

Speaking of the fate of Lithuanians living in Belorussia, Kaliningrad Oblast, and other places, V. Landsbergis emphasized that first of all it is necessary to show the proper concern for the interests of national communities living in Lithuania. And then opportunities will be found for assisting our compatriots living in foreign lands. The Lithuanian Republic will protect each of its citizens and it is taking steps to protect those who are serving in the Soviet Army where a harsh atmosphere prevails. And we hope that they will not be taken hostage there.

"Our counts are in favor of Lithuania," K. Prunskiene noted when answering questions about regulation of bilateral economic relations and a possible economic blockade from the neighboring country and other such actions. We are almost ready for negotiations on "dividing up" property and establishing normal relations. Understandably, as long as there is mutual mistrust certain attempts can be made to rearrange our economic activity. The main thing is to do our work well and, as K. Moteka said, there is no need to get excited about threats.

The conference was led by the representative of the republic government for information, Deputy Cheslovas Yurshenas.

Estonian President Appeals for Swedish Support

LD0304102590 Stockholm International Service in Swedish 0930 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] The president of Estonia, in an article in today's DAGENS NYHETER, appeals for support from the Swedish Government. Ruutel writes that he presumes that the Swedish Government supports the Estonian people's right to national self-determination, and the restoration of the republic of Estonia. The Estonian president also wants support for the Estonians' efforts to constitute an economic and political bridge between East and West, and goes on to propose that the Swedish Tele-X satellite be used for telecommunications links between the Baltic and Nordic countries.

Estonian Supreme Sovict 2 Apr Session Reported

LD0304092690 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1700 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Excerpts] Today's session of the Supreme Soviet on Toompea [in Tallinn] started at [word indistinct] and came to an end at 1821, with the voting on a string of chairmen for Supreme Soviet commissions only half complete. [indistinct passage omitted]

Ulo Nugis, head of the Supreme Soviet, read out a statement of the USSR people's deputies elected from Estonia, to USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev, which stresses that the 1939 and 1940 political events in Estonia took place against the will of the people and for this reason the people's deputies elected from Estonia cannot participate in the discussion of any USSR laws as this could be interpreted as recognition of Estonia being within the composition of the Soviet Union. The relationship between Estonia and the USSR must be [word indistinct] on the basis of talks. The Estonian Supreme Soviet supported this statement with 68 votes in favor, 16 against, and (?20) people's deputies abstaining. [passage omitted]

Estonian Deputies To Visit Moscow as Observers

LD0204192190 Moscow TASS in English 1853 GMT 2 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Albert Maloveryan]

[Text] Tallinn, Estonia, April 2—Estonia's newly-elected parliament adopted temporary regulations for its work at its morning sitting today. This is the first normative act adopted by the legislature since it opened its session three days ago.

Deputy Vladimir Malkovskiy says the adoption of the regulations will make it possible to streamline the parliament's work and to endorse the session's agenda and the procedure for considering proposals.

At the afternoon sitting, deputies formed a number of standing commissions of the Supreme Soviet.

They also took into consideration a statement by a group of USSR people's deputies from Estonia that they will participate in the discussion of a federal law on secession from the USSR in Moscow only as observers.

Estonia Not to Participate in Soviet Parliament

LD0204160590 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1500 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] Estonian deputies have resolved not to participate any more in parliamentary work in Moscow. Thus Estonia is following Lithuania in deciding that the Soviet parliament is a foreign representative body, in which it is not worthwhile for representatives of an occupied territory to take part. Jarmo Koponen reports:

[Koponen] [words indistinct] The presidium of the Estonian Supreme Soviet was (?confronted by) a demonstration held by the inter-movement. A hundred or so demonstrators, gathered [word indistinct] in front of the parliament, demanded with their posters that Estonia remain in the Soviet Union. The slogan (?of one poster) declared that Estonia is, was, and shall be Soviet Estonia.

[words indistinct] the work of the Estonian Supreme Soviet this mroning as it was last week. The parliament, however, concluded its discussion of the first topics on the agenda. Changes were also made in a bill that had undergone several readings. The Supreme Soviet sharply

[word indistinct] the formulation of the Lithuanian declaration: the Lithuanian people have the full support of Estonia, which recognizes its total right to secede. As soon as possible (?there will be prepared) a new law on military service as well. The Supreme Soviet of Estonia is unanimous in its attitude to the republic's independence.

There are differences, however. According to deputies who have been (?promoting) the rapid independence process, there is no longer any hurry. In the view of [name indistinct], a deputy representing the [word indistinct] union, negotiations with Moscow should be held in some third country, such as in Helsinki. The Estonian parliamentary group is still striving for a referendum to be held on the independence issue. [name indistinct] emphasized (?this) disappointment about independence, but believes that the Estonian Supreme Soviet cannot make such a decision. Estonia's representatives in Moscow believe that independence can be achieved by demanding negotiations from Moscow on this issue.

According to Indrek Toome, the former Estonian premier, a member of the [word indistinct], it is, however, very unlikely that Moscow will begin negotiations with the Estonians. Toome believes that Moscow might be prepared for (?one) meeting which might be called a roundtable discussion.

Estonian deputies required only 20 minutes to approve a joint letter in which the Estonian deputies refused to take part in legislative work in Moscow. The deputies' statement says that the most important thing is to work in their own parliament; only a couple of observers will be sent to Moscow.

Latvian CP Central Committee Plenum Held

LD0204163390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1340 GMT 2 Apr 90

["Plenum of the Central Committee of the Latvian Communist Party"—TASS headline. Moscow TASS International Service in Russian at 1415 GMT on 2 April transmits a service message killing this item.]

[Text] Riga, 2 Apr (TASS)—Participants in the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum today discussed documents to be presented at the Latvian Communist Party Congress, scheduled to open on 6 April.

The drafts of the documents—the political report, the fundamentals of the program and rules of the Communist Party of Latvia—were published in good time in the republican party newspapers and evoked critical remarks, both from supporters of the independent Communist Party of Latvia, as well as from those who do not wish to lose organizational unity with the CPSU.

It is evident that with the present polarization of opinions, it will be complicated to find compromise solutions. Will the documents submitted to the congress become the basis for mutual agreement?

Latvian Church Cables Gorbachev on Lithuania

LD0204142590 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1730 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Excerpt] Archbishop of the Latvian Evangelical-Lutheran Church Karlis Gailitis and the Consistory have sent a telegram to USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev. The telegram expressed a profound regret and contempt in connection with the beginning of the president's activity as part of a recurrence [recidivs] of USSR imperialist and militarist policy in independent Lithuania. Information about the text of the telegram has been also sent to Gunnar Stalsett, secretary of the Lutheran World Federation, in Geneva and to Keston College in London.

The Consistory of the Latvian Evangelical-Lutheran Church has decided the question of the Latvian Evangelical-Lutheran Church leaving the Christian Peace Conference. This decision has been adopted taking into consideration the great workload of Church workers in the processes of renewal of the Church and the people, an intensive participation in other ecumenical organizations and in international contacts among churches, and also because of the one- sided political trend of the Christian Peace Conference.

The Consistory has supported a proposal by Professor Roberts Feldmanis on starting Lutheran divine services in Russian. This will take place at the churches of Mezaparks and Olaine, where founding of Russian Lutheran congregations is also possible. [passage omitted]

Latvian KGB Chairman on Current Activities

LD0204121490 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1730 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The most unexpected question examined at yesterday's [Jurmala's soviet of people's deputies] session was on further activities of the Jurmala branch of the State Security Committee. Deputies demanded that the head of this branch give an account of their activities. After not having seen in it what is most needed by the city, they presented demands to the Jurmala branch of the State Security Committtee that either it begin without delay to act realistically to improve the legal situation in Jurmala, e.g., by actively combating organized crime, or its activities in the territory of Jurmala will be discontinued.

The newly-appointed chairman of the Latvian State Security Committee, Edmunds Johansons, in turn, gave a long interview yesterday to Latvian television. He asserted that in the State Security Committee now an entirely different generation of workers is found which negatively assesses this organization's past. During the present period, the security committee is fulfilling only the functions specific to it, i.e., guarding the border, protecting state secrets, etc. An entirely new function of the security committee is to protect commercial secrets. Edmunds Johansons asserted that at the present moment

the institution of hired agents or informers does not exist in the security committee. Edmunds Johansons asserted that their establishment is not engaged either in listening in on telephone conversations or in opening and inspecting correspondence.

Edmunds Johansons also said that Valdis Steins, chairman of the Social Democratic Workers' Party of Latvia, appealed to him to release party member Leo Hirssons, who was arrested for illegally keeping weapons, until court proceedings are instituted. However, this matter is not under the competence of the State Security Committee. It is being investigated by the republic's procuracy.

RSFSR

Moscow City Deputy Discusses Economic Reforms

PM0304082190 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 13, 1 Apr 90 (Signed to Press 27 Mar 90) p 7

[Interview with Gavriil Popov, USSR people's deputy, Moscow City Soviet people's deputy, and member of the "Democratic Russia" Bloc Coordinating Council, by Dmitriy Mikhnev; no place or date of interview given: "Moscow's Duma"; first paragraph is an introduction]

[Text] Representatives of the "Democratic Russia" bloc are now in the majority in Moscow City Soviet. Gavriil Popov, USSR people's deputy, Moscow City Soviet people's deputy, and member of the bloc's Coordination Council, replied to MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI correspondent's questions.

[MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI] In your view, what will be the first actions to be undertaken by the new Moscow City Soviet?

[Popov] I believe that one of the most immediate measures is to supply the capital's residents with food. There is a gigantic gap between the food stocks Moscow receives and the empty shelves in its stores. It is necessary to put an end to all varieties of food distribution (by orders, by ration, and so on) and to release everything into the general trade network. In this context, we are coming up against the question of guaranteeing the rights of Moscow's so-called indigenous population. But I do not believe that the presentation of passports or residence certificates as a form of restriction is an efficient system.

[MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI] But what about refugees?

[Popov] They should be located in Moscow in compliance with the all-Union legislation on refugees' status. But Moscow, being the capital, should hardly be overloaded with refugees, except for the provision of medical assistance. Of course, if the Supreme Soviet decides to locate them in Moscow, this will be done, but in such an event we ought to accept only a quota. It is not right to send two-thirds of all refugees to Moscow.

[MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI] In your view, is there a danger of the Moscow City Soviet's work being directly sabotaged by the apparatus?

[Popov] Certainly. And a considerable danger at that. But Moscow is a gigantic organism. Old officials know how this mechanism works and they should not be rejected out of hand. Everyone should be given a chance. This idea was voiced in 1985 by our president, but it has not been properly applied. Everyone ought to be asked how he envisages the solution of problems. If someone assumes that everything that had to be done has actually been done, we must part company with him.

We have the bitter experience of penal battalions—you have committed a crime, now is your chance to atone for your sins. We must assign the city's most difficult sectors to apparatchiks who are still in the Moscow City Soviet. If they cope with the work, they will be rehabilitated. But we must not allow a recurrence of the 1917 option—all-out war against the entire previous system.

[MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI] What, from your point of view, could be the principles of the new Moscow City Soviet's work?

[Popov] The Moscow City Soviet's structure must reflect the blocs of deputies existing within it. Neither the principle of democratic centralism nor the principle of open monopoly of power is suitable. It is necessary to elaborate democratic forms for the organization of work. Each of the Moscow City Soviet's commissions must give each faction a number of seats in proportion with the number of its representatives. Deputies representing all population groups must sit on the commissions.

It is necessary to avoid any exacerbation of confrontation in the Soviet, and not to forget the voters' mandates. It is necessary to find the middle road and embark on productive actions as soon as possible. The development of the country as a whole will depend on the way work will be organized in the new Moscow and Leningrad Soviets, where democratic blocs gained victory. We must prove what democratic power means, and that democrats are capable of working. And all this must be done bearing in mind that local soviets have only limited opportunities...

Serious trials lie ahead of the democrats!

Moscow City Soviet Scheduled To Meet 16 Apr

LD0204171190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] The first session of the Moscow City Soviet is to take place on 16 April. It should be said that preparations for its work began the day after the elections, which brought victory to the majority of candidates from the Democratic Russia bloc. At a general assembly, the 464 people's deputies of the Moscow Soviet elected an organizing committee for the first session. This is made up by means of direct representation of the deputies' groups

which have already been formed. Bakirov, professor of one of Moscow's higher education institutions, was elected chairman of the organizing committee.

Corruption Alleged in Moscow Electoral District

PM2203161290 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 11, 18 Mar 90 p 9

[N. Sergeyeva and A. Parfenov report: "Shady Candidate"]

[Text] The election campaign for people's deputy of the Russian Federation from the Kuntsevskiy Territorial Constituency No. 26 of Moscow proceeded in a rather peculiar manner. Four out of five candidates - ecology Professor N. Vorontsov, Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Nature, G. Litvinova, D.Sc (history), Director of Sovetskaya Rossiya Publishers V. Novikov and chairman of the amateur motorists' club V. Osipov patiently waited for the general election poster of all candidates to appear. It appeared three or four days before the elections. But by that time all the doors, underground passages, bus stops, shop doors and house entrances had been plastered with mass-produced leaflets bearing the portrait and programme of yet another candidate - Lieutenant-General of the Militia P. Bogdanov, Head of the Chief Administration of Internal Affairs of Moscow, USSR Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs. Who did all this work in support of this one candidate? How did P. Bogdanov manage (for the R50 allotted each candidate by the district election commission) to print so many leaflets? True, on March 7 Radio Liberty reported that in the Kuntsevskiy District 60 militiamen were recruited to paste the leaflets with the general's portrait all over the place.

The director of Sovetskaya Rossiya Publishers and the chairman of the USSR State Committee for Nature could easily have published leaflets in their own support, but they didn't do it...What's General Bogdanov's attitude? He and Prof. N. Vorontsov made it into the second round of elections.

Trade Union Leader Talks With Ministry Official

LD0204221690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1325 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 2 April. (TASS)—Igor Klochkov, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Federation of Independent Trades Unions [FITU], today gave Aleksandr Vlasov, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, the documents of the founding Congress of Trade Unions of the Russian Federation which recently ended in Moscow.

During a conversation which followed, the attention of the head of government of the RSFSR was drawn to the decision of the trade union congress in relation to an appeal by delegates from Bryansk, Kaluga, Orel, and Tula oblasts. The appeal expressed serious concern at the unfavorable situation which has come about in those territories that suffered radioactive contamination as a result of the accident at Chernobyl nuclear electric power station. The participants in the congress demanded that the RSFSR government declare this region a national disaster zone.

The FITU chairman also expressed the trade unions' ideas on the draft concept for the RSFSR's economic sovereignty. He noted that it is essential to make efforts to ensure that laws which really alleviate the situation of the working people will be elaborated and brought into operation at the very first stage of that concept's implementation.

It was noted during the conversation that it is very important right from the outset to adjust the machinery for cooperation between the commissions of FITU and the republic's governmental organs and to do everything to ensure that the voice of the working people, their hopes and aspirations, should be constantly taken account of while plans for the RSFSR's socio-economic development are being drawn up. In this connection the need was stressed to embark on drawing up a draft agreement between the government and the RSFSR trade union center for 1991, a king of "social contract" which would entail a package of measures providing effective guarantees for working people in connection with the transition to market mechanisms in the economy.

Leningrad Joint Plenum Delegates' Speeches

90UN1262A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Feb 90 p 2

[Report on speeches at 22 February 1990 joint plenum of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee and Soviet Executive Committee: "For Consolidation and Unity of Party Ranks"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] N.N. Korablev, first secretary of the CPSU Vasilyostrovskiy Rayon Party Committee [raykom]:

Today much is being written and said about the CPSU Central Committee plenum, and we have already heard many correct words at the plenum itself. I was present and I must say that I was expecting somewhat more from it. I expected that those who today have been entrusted with the fate of the party would this time be very open and offer a correct political assessment of the processes in the socialist countries, interethnic wars, the economic instability, and finally, of the processes that are taking place within the party and around it. To my great chagrin I did not hear such assessments. Neither did I hear the names of those who are directly to blame for the fact that the country has been brought to economic and political chaos. Even the platform does not contain these assessments.

We observed with alarm how the members of the politburo shifted the blame for the existing situation from one to the other like naughty schoolboys. Not one of them

admitted his own personal mistakes, but when things became heated not one of them was slow to shield his own colleagues.

It is difficult to believe that the party leaders do not know about the state of affairs. It is even more difficult to understand why they have not implemented radical measures, but have retreated from their positions step by step. Was it not to justify these kinds of actions that the latest "image of the enemy" was created in the person of the apparatchik, by which we now mean not only the workers who have been freed but also the party aktiv? The final accord of this campaign will obviously be the public dishonoring of all communists. Was it not for this that thousands of people who are devoted to the party were subjected to abuse in order to deflect blame from those directly responsible for creating the situation in the country, from those party and state leaders who made irresponsible decisions, and indeed are still doing so? Was this not why in the first version the draft platform seemed like a cradle song against the background of the 200,000-strong roaring crowd on Manezhnaya Square?

But what can be done; the event is concluded. The draft platform has been published and adopted and our task is to justify its shortcomings. Today, therefore, I believe that we should all affirm our capacity to make radical changes in the situation that has taken shape. In this connection, in my opinion the main task for today's plenum is to adopt decisions that are not cosmetic but radical, dismantling in nature, and aimed at breaking the administrative- command system first and foremost in the party itself. Only these kinds of decisions are capable of carrying over to the active, well- considered process of real transformations throughout the entire party. Only these kinds of decisions can raise the revolution above a well-organized one, and this means bloodless, in the direct meaning of the word. We cannot expect more, the more so since the party leadership and today's central committee do not see the decisions that could stabilize the situation in the party and the country.

I believe that, without waiting for the congress, it is necessary to delegate all rights to the primary party organizations. They themselves should determine their own structure and budget and handle admissions to the party. It is precisely the primary party organizations that should decide what the party committee, the party rayon committee, and the city committee and their apparatuses should be, what party workers' wages should be, and finally, what assets should be deducted to the higher organs, which should be obliged regularly to give an account of their spending. The time has also come to resolve questions pertaining to the creation of a unified Leningrad party committee and its apparatus, whose structure must be radically changed. It should insure the coordination of actions and the function of party organizations rather than be led by them.

All of these issues should be examined at a Leningrad oblast accountability-and-election conference no later than the first half of April, and decisions on them must be reached.

Today's plenum should also state very clearly its position on the creation of a Russian communist party. I believe that the decision should be positive and that the Leningrad party organization is in a position to take over the preparations for a constituent congress that should take place on the eve of the 28th CPSU Congress. The accountability-and-election campaign in the party should be developed after the congress, based on the new rules and platform that will be adopted.

Comrades, I must also speak on the subject of the "Democratic Platform." Today attempts are being made to present this movement as a schismatic movement that will lead to the breakup of the party. I agree that there are people in the movement who do want to eliminate the party and are openly saying so. But many of the planks in this platform have been formulated in our documents and in the platform of Leningrad's communists. I therefore believe that simply to reject this movement will be a political mistake that may have serious consequences. It is time for us to be more flexible and learn to listen to the opinion of each communist and, in this case, of many party organizations. And finally, the city has been alarmed by all possible kinds of provocative actions by the so-called "democratic forces" in which one can find no trace of democracy. Calls for destabilization and the very explosive situation may lead to unpredictable consequences. Leningraders want to know the names of those who thirst for blood and open riot. So let us name them. [passage omitted]

Zh.I. Alferov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Physical-Technical Institute imeni A.F. Yoffe:

Comrade communists, today we have been discussing the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee February (1990) Plenum, which adopted the draft platform for the 28th CPSU Congress. I regard this plenum as a most important event in the life of the party. Although I received my invitation to participate in the work of the plenum only two days before it opened, while on a business trip in the United States that I had to urgently interrupt, I have no complaints.

The draft platform was subjected to fierce criticism at the plenum from various sides. The published text took account of the many criticisms, although I know that, as previously, it by no means satisfies everyone. However, given all its shortcomings, it does reflect the basic demands of the times that are determining the transition from a party of a society of totalitarian dictatorship to a party of a society of popular democracy. It is first and foremost a rejection of the oversimplified class approach and the contrasting of national and "all-human" values; a rejection of Article Six of the Constitution on the

leading role of the party; and a rejection of the CPSU's monopoly of power, which opens the door to a multi-party system.

Unfortunately, as has happened on more than one occasion, the decisions were reached late. In this case little enough can be said: If they had been reached at the plenum in December of last year we would have had a quite different Second Congress of Soviets and possibly a different atmosphere in the country.

With reference to the criticism of the draft at the plenum, I would say that the most clearly stated criticism from the right was contained in the statements made by Anufriyev, second secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee, and by Ambassador to Poland Brovikov. When Comrade Anufriyev accuses our leadership of violating "our buffer zone" in East Europe, he insults not only the national dignity of the peoples of those countries but also the soldiers of the Red Army who gave their lives for the liberation of the peoples of Europe from the fascist dictatorship and for freedom and independence from totalitarian regimes.

Comrade Bronikov's statement was very effective in form and had a "bold" personal thrust. But when he proclaimed that "discipline without democracy will carry through" and that during these years our country "has been transformed from a power that was admired throughout the world into a state with a mistaken past, an unhappy present, and an indeterminate future," I could hear nothing but nostalgia for the age of terror. We still have what is truly deserving of admiration. And there is, unfortunately, still an abundance of those who love to "cook up porridge from the products of perestroyka," and the more so given the shortages of the products.

They say that when the great German physicist Max Planck graduated from the gymnasium and chose his specialty he was very attracted to economics. Here we had an expert in technical chemistry who headed the Leningrad Obkom and considered himself adequately qualified to resolve the question of who should publish a literary journal. He decided to resolve the struggle against party privileges by setting an all-union record for the speed with which he expelled his predecessor in the obkom from the party, the meritorious retiree and veteran of the Great Patriotic War, Yuriy Filippovich Solovyev—who, incidentally, was by no means the worst leader of the Leningrad party organization—because he purchased a foreign automobile in a commission store, jumping the queue.

Returning to the Central Committee plenum, I must say that in the speeches, according to Yeltsin's classification, the "conservatives" and "radicals" clearly voiced criticism of the draft for its lack of formula for the socialism we are building. Without laying claim to being the final arbiter of truth—for I have not forgotten that I am an expert in physics and electronics—I would like to remark that renewal of these kinds of debates begin by recalling the dogma- permeated Stalinist oversimplifications of the debates in the late Twenties. For us the real social gains of the workers are rather more important, and here we can only state with regret that they are much better in say Sweden. When one of my Swedish friends, Professor Grimayss, was my guest in Leningrad in 1985, he called Sweden a socialist country and I was very surprised, but after I had visited Sweden I saw that he had solid grounds for saying that.

It is equally important for us to recognize that the current scientific and technical revolution, first and foremost the development of microelectronics, is fundamentally altering the social structure of society in the developed countries. Thus, in the United States less than 15 percent of the working population is employed in industry, and less than five percent in agriculture, but more than 50 percent of them are "white-collar" workers—specialists working in the sphere of information gathering, processing, and use. The rest work in the services sphere. It is not without reason that they say the next century will the century of information science. Just as the physics of Bohr and Einstein did not replace the classical physics of Newton and Maxwell, so none of us is about to replace Marx and Engels. But today's realities require the development and review of socioeconomic theories.

In conclusion a few words about our plenum's draft resolutions on the elections to the primary and rayon organizations. I believe that it would be advisable to hold an oblast party conference before the congress, because this will help reveal new active cadres who deserve promotion. It is of no small importance that by holding them later we risk not having the secretaries of raykoms and large primary party organizations in the new obkom.

On the subject of an Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Communist Party, I talked about this at the Central Committee plenum and I consider it my duty to repeat it here. The importance of the RSFSR party organization for the entire CPSU is so great that it would be advisable before the congress to hold a conference of representatives of RSFSR party organizations made up of those elected at the 28th CPSU Congress of RSFSR delegates, and to work out at that conference proposals on the status of the RSFSR Communist Party, and after confirmation by the CPSU congress, to settle this problem once and for all. It seems to me that we do not need excessive haste here. The leading role in perestroyka is achieved by real work, not by all kinds of new undertakings.

Provisional Bureau Formed in Bashkir Oblast

90UN1018D Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Zinovyev, Ufa: "A Provisional Bureau Has Been Formed"]

[Text] An extraordinary plenum of the Bashkir CPSU Obkom [oblast party committee] has been held.

IZVESTIYA (No 39) has already reported on the reasons for its convocation. I will recall that everything began with the plenum of the Ufa City CPSU Committee, held a week earlier, which gave a vote of no confidence to the bureau of the party obkom headed by First Secretary R. Khabibulin. This decision was supported by the meetings of communists of many labor collectives and the party committees of Ufa and other cities and rayons of the autonomous republics.

The plenum accepted a collective resignation of the obkom bureau. A provisional bureau was formed which will hold office until the oblast party conference which is scheduled for April. I. Gorbunov, first secretary of the Ordzhonikidzevskiy Rayon Committee of the city of Ufa, was elected chairman of the provisional obkom bureau.

The composition of the current provisional bureau is quite unusual. It even includes two informals, the leaders of the Tatar and Bashkir national centers.

Chairman of the bureau I. Gorbunov appealed on TV to the communists and all citizens of the autonomous republic, calling for cooperation and consolidation.

Bashkir Ballot-Rigging Case Under Investigation

PM0304141390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Own correspondent A. Zinovyev report: "To Declare Null and Void..."]

[Text] Ufa— That is the decision taken by the Bashkir ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] Central Electoral Commission for Novo-Baltachevskiy No. 269 Electoral Okrug in connection with the crude violations of the Law on Elections of Bashkir ASSR Peoples' Deputies brought to light here.

A statement was submitted to the autonomous republic's Central Electoral Commission by R. Zakharov, Bashkir ASSR candidate deputy and a village teacher by profession. Rif Porfiryevich was protesting the actions of the precinct electoral commission.

Two commission representatives (Bashkir ASSR Justice Minister R. Gibadatov and K. Zinatullin, a State Inspectorate for Technical Oversight inspector) arrived for an on-the-spot check. In their presence, members of the okrug and precinct electoral commissions unsealed the envelope containing the ballot papers. And, as was said in the indictment drawn up subsequently, "130 voting papers with clear signs of erasure were revelaed." Yes, even with the naked eye it was easily visible that on all these voting papers someone's hand had erased with india rubber the pencil line from the name of one of the candidates, and had painstakingly, this time with a fountain pen, crossed out the name of another candidate.

Of course, it is the job of an investigation to establish who was the instigator and perpetrator of the ballot-paper erasures uncovered by the check organized by the Bashkir ASSR Central Electoral Commission. But even now the following facts cannot help but suggest certain ideas. The precinct electoral commission where all this took place handed over its package of ballot papers to its okrug electoral commission without the package bearing the relevant marking, with no data indicated on it about the results of the vote in the precinct or about the number of spoilt or used ballot papers, and so forth. Precinct Commission Chairman I. Khannanov was drunk, both on the day of the runoff vote (17 March) and at the moment the representatives of the Bashkir ASSR Central Electoral Commission arrived. Precinct Commission Secretary F. Musina is married to A. Musin, chairman of the okrug electoral commission; the latter heads the "Mayak" Kolkhoz [collective farm]. That same kolkhoz which nominated Rayispolkom [rayon soviet executive committee] Chairman Mustafin as Bashkir ASSR candidate deputy and afforded him every possible assistance in the election campaign. For some reason, the number of ballot papers with erasures turned out to be precisely the number of papers which were needed.... for Mustafin's victory, when the results of the vote in the other precincts were totaled up. That means that someone very much wanted to tip the scales in the rayispolkom chairman's favor. So much so that this "someone" did not stop even before the law. But this loyal zeal, as it turned out, "torpedoed" the chairman's chances. The Bashkir ASSR Central Electoral Commission has decided to forward the materials on the precinct electoral commission's violations of the election law to the Bashkir ASSR Prosecutor's Office.

Candidate Manayenkov Visits Lipetsk Oblast

LD0203053990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Y.A. Manayenkov, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and a Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic people's deputy candidate for National-Territorial Constituency No. 53, was in Lipetsk oblast for four days.

He met with the metallurgists' collective of the Novolipetsk metallurgical combine, the tractor builders, and the workers of the "Stroyindustriya" production association and acquainted the voters with his election platform.

Comrade Manayenkov addressed the participants of an assembly of the oblast party-economic aktiv. He also had a meeting with the first secretaries of the CPSU gorkoms [city park committee] and raykoms [rayon party committee].

Tambov Plenum Appeals to Lithuanian 'Comrades'

PM0304090990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 30 Mar 90 Second Edition p 1

[Appeal from participants in Fifth Tambov Obkom Plenum: "To Party Comrades"]

[Text] Dear Lithuanian comrades! The communists and all inhabitants of Tambov Oblast are following with concern the political processes taking place in the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]. They deeply perturb the communists and all working people of our oblast. We associate ourselves to the voice of those who denounce the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet decision to restore the Lithuanian state's independence as having no legal power and as violating the rights of Soviet citizens and the sovereignty of the Soviet Union.

We express full support for all progressive forces of the Lithuanian SSR and the activity of the communists standing on the CPSU platform aimed at preserving the unity of the CPSU and the Soviet Federation.

On behalf of the oblast's communists we state our solidarity with your struggle against the separatists' attempts to dismantle the socialist system and to divide the peoples of our country. We are sure that the Lithuanian communists standing on the CPSU platform will be able to unite the true champions of perestroyka and to ensure the defense of the rights and interests of Soviet citizens of all nationalities.
[Signed] Participants in fifth Tambov CPSU Oblast Committee Plenum, Tambov, 29 March 1990.

Western Republics

Rally Held Supporting Lithuania Despite Ban

PM0204214590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Sergey Tsikora report under the rubric "Direct Line. IZVESTIYA Own Correspondents at the Teleprinter": "Nevertheless, There Was a Rally..."]

[Text] Kiev—An unauthorized rally in support of Lithuanian independence was held on Saturday 31 March in Kiev, on the square in front of the republic stadium.

The question of whether this rally should or should not take place was the prevailing topic of conversation among the city's 3 million inhabitants for almost a week. "Rukh" [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka] put forward the idea of holding the rally. This organization's secretariat petitioned Kiev's Moskovskiy Rayispolkom [Rayon Soviet Executive Committee] 20 March, asking for permission to hold a rally to "discuss the political situation in connection with events in Lithuania." A week later the rayispolkom gave its answer: "The 'Rukh' Secretariat is denied its request to hold a rally since it may inflict serious damage on the political efforts to settle the situation in connection with events in the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]."

The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee and the republic's Council of Ministers expressed their hostility 27 March to "Rukh's" plan to hold rallies supporting the Lithuanian Republic in the cities of the Ukraine.

The rally took place nevertheless. Several thousand people gathered on the square by the republic stadium 31 March. Yellow and blue flags were hoisted, along with new Lithuanian flags. Several red and black "Banderite" banners were also blowing about.

The rally lasted two hours. Representatives of informal associations who had come to Kiev from various parts of the Ukraine delivered speeches. A resolution of support was adopted, reiterating the statement issued by the rally's organizers: " 'Rukh' categorically opposes the use of force and flagrant interference in the independent republic's internal affairs and disregard of the Lithuanian people's right to self-determination."

Another unauthorized rally was held in Kiev the following day. There members of the so-called Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth spoke out against Ukrainian draftees serving on other republics' territory. Rallies were organized opposite of the Kiev military commandant's office; several hundred young people tried to raise the yellow and blue flag on the town hall flagpole by the Kiev City Soviet building but they were forced back by the militia...

Rally Sends Appeal to Gorbachev

LD3103213390 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 2000 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Text] A demonstration in support of independent Lithuania in which many thousands of people took part was held in Kiev. It was a peaceful demonstration. An open letter containing an appeal to stop the military intervention was sent to Mikhail Gorbachev. The chairman of the Ukrainian Rukh [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka] organization said that the Ukrainian nation is prepared to defend Lithuania's independence.

A rally in suport of Lithuania was also held in Moscow today.

Rally Held in Donetsk To Support Lithuania

LD0204120390 Moscow World Service in Russian 0930 GMT 2 Apr 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program; report attributed to INTERFAX]

[Text] On 31 March a rally was held in Donetsk in support of an independent Lithuania. Despite the local authorities not sanctioning this action and the procurator's many warnings to the population about responsibility, several hundred people, including people's deputies, took part in the two-hour rally. An INTERFAX correspondent reports that representatives of the law enforcement bodies insistently demanded that the demonstrators disperse. Dossiers have been prepared on each speaker.

Ukraine Declares Chernobyl Tragedy Day

LD0304083790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0500 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] The Presidium of the Ukraine Supreme Soviet has declared 26 April as Chernobyl tragedy day. In addition to the official ceremony and the lowering of the flag, there is also a plan by social organizations. They have come forward with the proposal to organize on this day the picketing of the nuclear power station and the establishments and organizations at fault in the ecological tragedy. All-Ukrainian public prayers and a minute of national mourning will take place in Kiev on the square in front of the Sophia Cathedral during the evening of the same day.

Ukrainians Attend Liberal Democratic Congress

LD0204222890 Kiev International Service in English 1800 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] Representatives of the Ukraine took part in the constituent congress of the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union which was held in Moscow. Two hundred and fifteen delegates from several Union republics elected the Central Committee of the party, adopted a statute and a program of this political organization. The main aim of the Liberal Democratic Party is building a society with legal institutions void of ideological concepts. In foreign policy, this party comes out for proclaiming the neutrality of the Soviet Union against the country's participation in any military alliances.

Belorussia Asks West for Chernobyl Aid

90UN1185C Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russia No 11, 14 Mar 90 p 2

[Article by A. Kozlovich, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent for the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic: "Chernobyl Is Not Sobering"]

[Text]**The Belorussian press is circulating news from across the ocean—Lev Maksimov, permanent representative of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] to the United Nations, held a press conference in New York.**

An announcement was made of the Appeal of the Republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Council of Ministers to the parliaments, governments, international organizations, and fellow-countrymen abroad for assistance and help in eliminating the aftereffects of the Chernobyl catastrophe. The republic will need R17 billion for this purpose.

In an interview with a TASS correspondent, L. Maksimov reported that public committees have been established in the United States to collect money for Belorussia, and that they have tens of thousands of dollars. However, emigres are refraining from transferring the collected money, fearing that it will not reach those who need it. Our diplomat announced further that he is trying to dispel these fears, and that the coordination council "Children of Chernobyl," which has 11 representatives from public organizations, including the Belorussian People's Front [BNF], operates under the Belorussian Children's Fund.

He did not say "including" idly, having the Belorussian People's Front in mind. By the way, this is not the first official admission of an indisputable fact: You see, the Front has existed in the republic for more than a year, but... it is not registered. So, I want to explain the reason for the emigres' fears in not wanting to send the collected money to the Belorussian SSR.

The newspaper GRUNWALD (No.1 for 1990, city of Tallinn) carries a facsimile of a letter from Anton Shukelayt, chairman of the Belorussian-American Unity. It is dated 8 November 1989. I will quote an excerpt: "Belorussian-American Unity supports the appeal of the BNF's constituent congress to all the people of the world and to Belorussian emigres requesting assistance with medical equipment and medical supplies and money for the treatment of those who are ill from Chernobyl radiation. The Belorussians of America are ready to give this kind of assistance, but they declare that they will send it for delivery to the BNF, and only on condition that the subsequent distribution of aid will be conducted with the participation of the BNF."

A. Shukelayt asks for the address of the BNF and its bank account number. But there is no address, no account and, in fact, there is no BNF. Official authorities of the republic "are not aware of" a People's Front. Even the Chernobyl misfortune does not prompt them to compromise.

Belorussian Official on Chernobyl Aftereffects

LD0703233990 Moscow TASS in English 2143 GMT 7 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Yuriy Kozlov]

[Text] Vienna March 8 TASS—The Chernobyl disaster had consequences for much larger areas than was initially thought. Belorussia accounts for about 70 per cent of territories affected by the nuclear disaster. As many as 27 cities and 2,697 villages with a total population of 2.2 million are situated in the zone of radioactive contamination. The life and health of more than one- fifth of the number of the republic's population are jeopardized.

Aleksandr Kichkailo, deputy chairman of Belorussia's Council of Ministers and chairman of Belorussia's commission for the clean-up of the aftermaths of the Chernobyl accident [name and title as received], told this at a news conference here on Wednesday.

He heads a delegation staying here. On behalf of Belorussia, the delegation conducted negotiations with heads of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) about aid to Belorussia in solving ecological and social problems caused by the nuclear accident.

Kichkailo told TASS that the accident's consequences cannot be fully liquidated for at least a hundred years, and will still be felt many years afterwards.

What is meant now is just a complex of urgent measures to limit the scope of the tragedy.

In the five years ahead, more than 118,000 people should be evacuated from 526 populated localities to clean areas. Jobs should be provided for them.

Considerable work is under way for reorientation of agricultural production, the construction of agricultural towns and the setting up of medium and small enterprises in them.

Belorussia now experiences considerable difficulties in the supply of medicines. There is an acute shortage of disposable syringes and needles, medical diagnostical equipment and instruments of radiation and dosimetric control.

"We cannot solve these questions relying only on our own resources. Therefore Belorussia pins hopes on assistance of competent international organisations and the world community," Kichkailo said.

Moldavian Rally Supports Lithuanian Statehood

LD0204123390 Moscow World Service in Russian 0930 GMT 2 Apr 90

[From the "Soviet chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program; report attributed to INTERFAX]

[Text] The Moldavian People's Front has organized a rally and demonstration in Kishinev in support of the decisions of the new Lithuanian government on the restoration of Lithuanian statehood. In the opinion of Vladimir Solonar, a representative of the Yedinsvo [Unity] interfront, these events will give rise to even greater anti-Russian sentiments in the republic.

Today a group of people's deputies of Moldavia sent a telegram to Snegur, chairman of the Moldavian Supreme Soviet Presidium. It says that the forthcoming session of the new Supreme Soviet of the republic may be foiled by the People's Front, unless order is ensured in Kishinev. The session is to open on 17 April.

TASS Reports Kishinev Hunger Strike Continues

LD0204124390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1112 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] Kishinev, 2 Apr (TASS)—The hunger strike in the Moldavian capital, Kishinev, begun on 19 March in protest against unfounded and illegal actions by the local and republican organs of state power, continues.

The republican press has published the decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] on the results of the work of the commission set up to consider the hunger-strike and heard all the hunger-strikers who wished to meet members of the commission and put their demands to them. In the course of the investigation a number of documents and civil cases previously examined by various judicial departments were obtained on demand and received. As a result of study and legal assessment of the demands of the participants in the hunger strike, the commission estabished that many of them are justified and should be resolved. At the same time its documents note that some of the participants in the hunger strike have put forward demands which are without legitimate justification.

The decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Moldavian SSR puts forward a number of specific measures to meet all the legitimate demands of the hunger-strikers. Action is to be taken against officials guilty of infringing their civil rights.

Yet despite all this, about half of the hunger strikers—nine persons—have refused to end it. Some of those still on the benches in the shade of the monument to Shtefan the Great disagree with the commissions' conclusions, while others have decided not to leave the spot until firm guarantees are given that all their demands will be met.

Belorussians Demand Verification of Commission

90UN1185A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 27 Feb 90 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Sajudis Information Agency Reports"]

[Text]BELORUSSIA. The Belorussian People's Front (BNF) held a meeting on 25 February in Minsk. The demand was made to verify the activity of the Central Election Commission, and a demand was made concerning the resignation of the leaders of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and of the Belorussian Communist Party. It was also demanded that the current Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet give up its powers before the prescribed time. It was announced that the Central Election Commission is not registering candidates for deputy Viktor Ivashkevich and Georg Mikhin, who were nominated according to their place of residence by the Union of Workers of Belorussia.

A meeting was held on 25 February in Khoyniki, at which dissatisfaction was expressed with the total lack of concern on the part of the leaders of Belorussia and the USSR over the elimination of the aftereffects of the Chernobyl accident.

Caucasus

Azerbaijan's Appeal to Gorbachev Detailed

NC0304142390 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 3 Apr 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The participants of the recent Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee plenum adopted an

appeal to President Gorbachev, who is also CPSU Central Committee general secretary. The appeal recalled that Armenian extremists have been committing terrorist activities against the peaceful residents of Azerbaijan's rayons that border the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR], since 27 March. It said the following:

Obviously, the resumption of open aggression against the Azerbaijan SSR violates the Union agreement, on which the Soviet Federation is based. This not only challanges our republic, but also the (?Constitution of the Soviet Union), which includes provisions for safeguarding Azerbaijan's security, constitutional rights, territorial integrity, and immunity. It also challanges the [word indistinct] presidential system.

The participants of the plenum are convinced that the measures taken by the (?central authorities) [words indistinct] are insufficient.

Esteemed comrade president, in view of this, we demand that immediate measures be taken to protect Azerbaijan SSR's constitutional rights. We also demand that the Armenian SSR aggression against our republic's territorial integrity and sovereignty be stopped.

End of Strike in Nagorno-Karabakh Reported

NC0304094790 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] had an unseasonably cold day on 2 April. However, the weather could not wreck the happier than usual mood of the people of Stepanakert. The taxis and buses which appeared in the streets of the city early in the morning raised hopes that the people would return to work after more than two months of a work stoppage which was the result of the presence in Stepanakert of representatives of the Azerbaijani leadership. In fact, that is what happened. The workers at the electrical goods factory, the silk and other manufacturing combines, the footwear, knitwear, and rubber factories, and construction organizations returned to work on Monday. Industrial shops, cultural establishments, municipal services, and food shops opened their doors to customers. Thus, as was predicted, the call by the latest session of the oblast soviet for restoring the work rhythm was heeded by the people.

Does this mean that the civil disobedience campaign against the Azerbaijani leadership has ceased? Not at all, said Arkadiy Pogosyan, director of the affairs of the apparatus of the oblast party organization. It is simply that we now have our own administration in the form of the recently restored NKAO soviet of people's deputies, whose decisions must be obeyed by the entire oblast. As regards the Baku comrades who are in Stepanakert, the local authorities have virtually no contact with them. That is understandable: no artificial structure to run the autonomous oblast could replace the free expression of the will of the NKAO's Armenian population which aspires to real self-determination. This is a truth confirmed by life itself. That is why we consider the NKAO problem (?open). But all this does not mean that we must be on a permanent strike. The civil disobedience campaign could also be expressed in another form. Therefore, if anyone really thinks that the return to work means reconciliation with the present situation he is deeply mistaken; only the people are not mistaken.

The operational situation in the NKAO is relatively calm. Freight cars carrying various goods for the national economy are being received at the railway station.

Azerbaijan Minister on 'Extremist Forces'

NC0204090590 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 31 Mar 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] Orudzhev, justice minister of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, has been in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] for some time in accordance with the instructions of the republic's government. How can the the situation be assessed? What can be done to remove tension in the NKAO? Orudzhev replies to these and other questions in KOMMUNIST and BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY. He said:

The recent incidents indicate that the extremist forces, which were quelled and evicted from the NKAO as a result of the measures taken to normalize the situation in that oblast, are returning to deal new blows, create pockets of tension along the entire border with Azerbaijan, and obstruct the NKAO Organization Committee's successful achievements. This state of affairs will continue as long as these criminal groups exist. Problems can be resolved only through fully upholding the supremacy of law.

Armed Armenians Attack Kazakhskiy Rayon

NC0304141790 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] (?Armenian bandits continued attacking towns in Kazakhskiy Rayon from 31 March to 1 April). Additional USSR Internal Ministry troops and militia units have been sent there, repulsing the bandits after lengthy clashes.

The bandits also attacked Yukari Eskipara town and stole a number of cattle. Barkhudarly town and the [name indistinct] railway station were fired on continuously.

The residents of Baganis Ayrum town, who were forced to leave their homes because of the Armenian attacks a few days ago, are unable to return because the extremists may resume their attacks. The bandits set fire to a number of houses and killed a number of people in the town.

Shamil Allakhberdiyev, chairman of the Kazakhskiy Rayon Soviet Executive Committee, told an AZERINFORM correspondent: The situation in the rayon, particularly in 12 border towns that armed Armenians recently attacked, continues to be tense. Internal troops and militia groups have been sent to these areas from other rayons in the republic. The employees of the republic's Committee for State Security rushed to our aid. The rayon's party, soviet, and economic organs are taking all necessary measures to provide bread, provisions, and other needed goods to the people. The industrial establishments are working normally.

Movement on Shusha-Agdam Highway Resumes

NC0204091190 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 30 Mar 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] An AZERINFORM report in today's newspapers notes that the establishments, organizations, and administrations of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] are being brought under the jurisdiction of the pertinent ministries and main administrations of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] since the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted a decision on the measures needed to normalize the situation in the NKAO and since the Azerbaijan SSR's NKAO Organization Committee began its work.

Movement on the Shusha-Agdam highway has resumed after a long interruption. Movement on the highway had been halted when one of the bridges near Stepanakert was damaged by Armenian extremists in December 1989.

Arrival of Trains From Azerbaijan Reported

NC0304104490 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] The press center of the Yerevan branch of the Transcaucasus railways has reported that eight trains with a total of 374 freight cars arrived from Azerbaijan through Idzhevan station between 30 and 31 March. One train with 50 freight cars arrived on 1 April. The freight included 173 tanks of fuel oil, various cars of manufactured goods and construction materials, and 12 freight cars of cereal.

Trains are still not arriving through Norashen station.

Twenty-eight trains with a total of 790 freight cars arrived over three days through the Transcaucasus railway. The republic received 237 freight cars of construction materials and cement, 16 tanks of benzene, 14 of fuel oil, and two of aircraft fuel, as well as 104 freight cars of cereal and 19 freight cars of foodstuffs.

Situation in Shamshadinskiy Rayon Reviewed

NC0204122990 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Report by Tsola Grigoryan—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Grigoryan] The situation has recently become extremely tense along Shamshadinskiy Rayon's 160-km-long border. The Azerbaijanis are firing from hideouts close to and some distance from the border. They are using long-range battle weapons and are amazed when the Armenians respond with their hunting rifles. They are not only amazed but also enraged and try to portray themselves as the underdog and appeal to the central authorities for protection from the Armenians. Without conducting an investigation, the center often hastily sends in troops to punish those who are protecting their homes and land. This is sad but true. Yesterday morning a group of raiders entered the rayon from Tauzskiy Rayon, hijacked a passenger bus and a large passenger vehicle, and took the people to an unknown location. What is most galling and strange is that the Interior Ministry troops guarding the road at the border did not attempt to prevent the hijacking of men and vehicles. Unruliness and impunity have a limit; apparently that limit is set by our patience. They have concluded that they can do anything against the Armenians and escape punishment. Expressing the indignation of his colleagues, Eduard Simonyan, a driver at the Nerkin-Karmir-Agbur village near the border, said:

[Simonyan] As regards the developments of the last few days, I would like to say that I do not have good feelings toward our brotherly Russian army. It is enforcing a unilateral disarmament. That is, it is diasarming the people of Shamshadinskiy Rayon and I do not know where this will lead. [passage omitted]

[Grigoryan] Indignation over this discriminatory attitude has created a tense situation in the region. Norayr Mirzoyan, first secretary of the rayon party committee, is also indignant:

[Mirzoyan] Shamshadinskiy Rayon borders the three Azerbaijani Rayons of Kazakhskiy, (?Tauzskiy), and Kedabekskiy. Its border runs for almost 160 km. For reasons known to us all, tension between the two peoples has continued for the past two years. The leadership of the rayon as well as all its inhabitants and workers have always tried to normalize relations and keep the peace. Nevertheless, developments continued and culminated in an exchange of fire. What is the reason for this? I blame the Union government for allowing terrorism against this peaceful and industrious people who are unable to sleep at night and must keep guard holding their children's hands. Normal work rhythm has been disrupted.

Another problem is that the troops deployed on the Azerbaijani side suddenly enter the rayon, round up people, and spirit them away like wolves without keeping

the leadership of the rayon informed. The troops suddenly enter our territory. The leadership of the rayon tries to approach them to learn their intentions and negotiate but they warn us not to come closer than 100 meters or they might shoot. For how long can this continue? Who is going to lead the people? Who will provide some concrete information to help calm the people?

'Difficult' Georgia Trends, Politics Noted

LD0204165990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Video report by correspondent N. Gongadze, identified by caption, in Georgia on 2 March; from the "Vremya" newscast—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] And now our correspondents in Georgia report. Difficult processes of their own are under way in this republic, too. [video shows street scenes; people reading newspapers and talking; a large demonstration outside an official building with Georgian national flags being held aloft]

[Gongadze] Never before has such political activity been observed in Georgia. Every day brings something new. And today, too, there is interest in a report from the 18th plenum of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, at which it was decided by a majority of votes to convene a congress of the communists of the republic on 15 May, halving the number of party representatives and delegates.

It must be acknowledged that now that a most acute power struggle has begun, the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee has found itself in a fairly complex situation. As early as the beginning of March at an extraordinary session, the republic's Supreme Soviet declared the Union Workers' and Peasant's Treaty between Georgia and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic of 21 May 1921, and the Union Treaty on the Formation of a Federation of the Transcaucasian republics of 12 March 1922, unlawful and invalid. The Treaty on the Formation of the USSR has also been deemed unawful with regard to Georgia.

Proceeding from this, the irreconcilable opposition in the shape of the National forum now asserts that the parliament of the republic that is currently functioning is also unlawful, and inasmuch as elections to the Georgian Supreme Soviet have not been held along the lines of introducing a multiparty system, it is proposing its own version of opposition leadership: a national congress elected by universal suffrage and secret voting.

In the current struggle for power, the Social Democrats regard it to be more reasonable to carry out the registration of the Georgian political parties operating within the framework of the Constitution and, starting talks with the official authorities, to create a transitional coalition government involving representatives of the opposition and public associations in the Georgian Council of Ministers [video shows correspondent interviewing G. Dolidze—identified by caption—secretary of the party committee of the 'Elektrovozostraitel, Electric Locomotive Builder, Production Assistant]

[Gongadze] How are the communists acting? Are there any who do not want to be in the party today?

[Dolidze] There is...[changes thoughts] Well, over this period, starting on 9 April, I would say, about 60 communists have handed in their party cards. Well, I would say that this trend is still continuing.

[Gongadze] And where do you think the answer lies?

[Dolidze] Without fail, a new party has to be created—this will be a Georgian Communist Party with its own rules, its own program—and all work directed towards this. And this has to be done without delay.

I have always thought that there has to be a multiparty system, but the other parties should also go through an administrative registration process.

Boycott Threat Postpones Georgian Election

PM2203155190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 22 Mar 90 p1

[Own correspondent N. Mikeladze report: "Choice Before Elections"]

[Text] The elections to the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet planned for 25 March will not be going ahead.

This decision was taken by an extraordinary session of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet. Elections to the supreme body and to local soviets have been put back to October-November 1990.

The official reason given for this decision is the need to conduct the elections on a multiparty basis. True, there are also other circumstances. Informal parties with a radical slant have been active throughout the election campaign. They have urged the population to boycott the elections to the Supreme Soviet, because "it does not reflect the will of the people and is an element of the illegally founded structure of statehood."

Opinions have been divided. The People's Front and some other social organizations have been taking a very active part in nominating candidates for deputy. So that no one has any doubts: These formations, which want to cooperate with the authorities, also consider the Supreme Soviet to be "an illegal body." But, as N. Natadze, chairman of the Georgian People's Front, said: "The Supreme Soviet is the only body currently empowered to represent Georgia's expression of will before the whole world. Non-participation in the election struggle must be regarded as a 'crime against the nation.'" These words are taken from an interview given by N. Natadze to the newspaper ZARYA VOSTOKA, published after the extraordinary conference of the Georgian national

movement, where the stand taken by the People's Front and other sociopolitical organizations involved in the election battle was strongly criticized.

One way or another, public opinion—which political organizations are using their own resources to register—shows that a boycott of the forthcoming elections is a fairly real prospect. "Letters and appeals," I cite an extract from a resolution passed by the republic Supreme Soviet session, "express the opinion that it would not be advisable to hold the elections on the date set." This means that the powers of Supreme Soviet deputies from the previous convocation will be extended.

More on Election Delay

LD3103220990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 31 Mar 90

[Text] Why did the elections to the Georgia Supreme Soviet planned for 25 March not take place? Our correspondent Nana Gongadze reports:

[Gongadze] The main event of the last month—the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the republic planned for the 25th—did not take place. Yet which the time arrived for registering candidates, there were 2,500 of them for 300 seats. But when the Congress of People's Deputies introduced amendments to Articles 6 and 7 of the USSR Constitution, the candidates started to make public declarations that they would not stand.

It must be noted that extremist-minded political and social organizations of Georgia did not take part in the election campaign. At the extraordinary conference which took place in Tbilisi on 13-15 March, they elected an opposition body—the National Forum. And when calls were heard to postpone the elections and to hold them later on a multiparty basis, the National Forum stuck with its old position; to boycott the elections, until such time as the current parliament should dissolve itself.

Without intending to do so, the extraordinary session of the republic Supreme Soviet gave them a clear pretext for this position, in-so-far as this session declared as illegal and inoperative the Union Workers and Peasants' Treaty of 12 March 1922 on the formation of the Federation of Soviet Socialist Republics of Transcaucasia. The treaty of 30 December 1922 on the formation of the USSR was also declared illegal with regard to Georgia. The session adopted a decision to start talks on restoring the independence of the Georgian people. Basing itself on this, the diehard opposition in the shape of the National Forum asserts that the currently existing parliament is also illegal.

There was an extraordinary session of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet on 20 March which, in order to introduce a multiparty system, postponed the elections to October-November this year. At the same time the mandates of the deputies were extended. The same session adopted a law to amend Articles 6,7, and 49 of the Constitution.

In general, it must be admitted that a new, open stage is starting of the struggle for power. Evidently it will be a fierce one, because the opposition has split into diehards and those who have decided to aim for the independence of Georgia by the parliamentary path.

In this new stage of political life, the Communist Party of the Republic has found itself in a very complex situation. In any case a lot depends on the upcoming Congress of the Communists of Georgia. According to a decision by the plenum of the Central Committee held on 22 March, the congress will start work on 15 May this year. The commissions formed by the plenum to prepare proposals on the status of the Communist Party, and to work out theses of the program and a draft charter, are already at work.

In conclusion, a few words about one of the items published in a March edition of the paper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. Allegedly quite authentic instances of vandalism that occurred on Lenin Square in Tbilisi were cited by the correspondent. Let me hasten to tell those who read the article and naturally believed it, that the monument to the leader of the world proletariat stands safe and sound in Lenin Square in Tbilisi. But one thing is surprising: Why and who needed to publish this false information in such haste?

Reasons for Delay Reviewed

90US0745A Moscow TRUD in Russian 28 Mar 90 p 4

[Article by O. Chikhladze, Tbilisi: "Georgia: Day After Day"]

[Text] The first and most important of the events of last week was the fact that the elections to the Supreme Soviet, scheduled for Sunday 25 March, did not take place. The election campaign started off in a most active fashion. Only the most partisan political and social organizations did not participate—they created the National Forum at their special conference on 13-15 March, an organ of implacable opposition. At the time of registration there were about 2,500 candidates for 300 positions. It seemed that nothing pointed to an abrupt halt.

Soon after the USSR Congress of People's Deputies introduced changes to Articles 6 and 7 of the country's Constitution, the candidates for deputy began one after another publicly to refuse to run. Then calls were heard from all sides to postpone the elections and to conduct them "on a multiparty basis" in the future. The National Forum maintained its own position: to boycott any elections until the republic's current parliament dissolved itself. The parliament itself, although ostensibly not wanting to, gave excellent grounds for such a position. A special session of the republic's Supreme Soviet that took place on 9 March declared "illegal and invalid

the 21 May 1921 Union worker-peasant treaty between the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], and the 12 March 1922 Union Treaty on the Formation of a Federated Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the Transcaucasus." The 30 December 1922 Treaty on the Formation of the USSR was also declared illegal in relation to Georgia, and the decision was made to "begin negotiations on reestablishing an independent Georgian state." Taking its lead from these actions, the implacable opposition in the form of the National Forum now insists that the republic's existing republic is illegal—with all consequences that follow.

On Tuesday 20 March another special session of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet "on reasons for introducing a multiparty system" postponed the elections to October or November of this year and extended the term of the deputies appropriately. A law on changes to Articles 6, 7, and 49 of the Constitution was also adopted at this session.

So one must, in all probability, acknowledge that a new, open stage in the contest for power is beginning. It will be a heated one if only because the opposition has split itself into the "irreconcilables" (having united under the flag of the National Forum and not acknowledging the legality of the Soviet structure), and those who have decided to work for Georgian independence by parliamentary means. The former intend to further "destabilize the political situation, and to develop and intensify destructive processes inside the state" (we quote one of the speeches at the special conference). The latter recognize as moral only constitutional means of fighting for the creation of a democratic parliament.

One cannot doubt the seriousness of the intentions of the forces belonging to the National Forum if only because they have absorbed the most active, even if not the largest, of the dozens of political and social formations that exist today in Georgia. A number of movements, including the Republican Party, the Political Club, the Chavchavadze Society, the Association of Progressive Democrats, the regional organizations of the People's Front, and others have declared that if the National Forum takes upon itself the functions of the government, "it will result in the most extreme destabilization of circumstances" and "put the historical prospects of the Georgian people in doubt"...

The "irreconcilables" have put into circulation such concepts as "legal heritage" and "persona non grata," and there has been talk at meetings of a ban on mixed marriages... The outburst of political activity will, perhaps, bring many more surprises. But no matter whom you talk to on this subject, everyone expresses confidence that the ability to listen to others that is historically characteristic of the Georgian people will nonetheless help them to overcome similar "costs" of pluralism. It seems to me that all this "terminology" more likely has a tactical component which, apparently, the authors have summoned up with the intention of "rocking the boat" still more.

The Communist Party finds itself in a difficult position in this new stage of political life. Varied evaluations may be heard these days. Some believe that the party has been treading the path of an informal movement lately, making one concession after another, and that it has now reached the point of confusion. According to the suggestions of other people, it has not been able to get off the starting line in the new sociopolitical situation. Many also believe that the communists have not yet lost their strength and that they will yet recover themselves. That may still happen if, as many believe, they manage to overcome a case of "the bends," whereby the world is perceived completely differently because of an abrupt decrease in pressure. In any event, much depends on the upcoming congress of the communists. By decision of the Central Committee plenum which took place on Thursday 22 March the congress is designated for 15 May of this year. A commission which was formed by the plenum has begun work to prepare proposals on the status of the Communist Party, and to develop the themes of the program and a draft charter.

Two or three other events from the chronicle of the last week. The press center of the Communist Party Central Committee distributed a report about a meeting of the republic's leaders with the leaders of the KGB, the procuracy, the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], and the Ministry of Justice. The situation, it states, is becoming very strained. A certain power vacuum has formed in which many of the provisions of existing laws and the Constitution are not being implemented, and state, labor, and social discipline are waning. Some of the people have a feeling of social and civil vulnerability and of uncertainty concerning the future and the authorities' ability to maintain order and anticipate the unlawful and unconstitutional actions of individual groups of citizens who are consciously trying to destabilize the situation. Strengthening law and order was discussed at the meeting.

The speech by G. Gumbaridze, chairman of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and first secretary of the party's Central Committee, on republic television on Friday essentially followed this same line of thinking. He noted especially that no one has the right to encourage processes that threaten the fate of the people, civil peace, and harmony. He expressed confidence that, having mobilized intellectual forces and enjoying broad democratic opportunities, a constructive dialog, political pluralism, cooperation and mutual respect, all the conditions have been created in the republic not only for mapping out the true reference points for Georgia's political, economic, social, and spiritual development but also for realistically guaranteeing the realization of the vital interests and goals of the whole people.

Central Asia

Municipal Militia Planned for Dushanbe

LD1003121990 Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 10 Mar 90

[Text] According to the independent news agency INTERFAX, law and order in Dushanbe, the capital of the Tajik Republic in Soviet Central Asia, will soon be maintained by a new 500-men-strong municipal militia. Citizens commanding trust and respect in the districts are being enrolled in the force which will be maintained at the expense of the local councils. The city's industries have donated 2 million rubles to fund a municipal militia. The idea of such a municipal force was prompted during the recent disturbances in Dushanbe when citizens' self defense groups opposed extremist actions.

Russian-Speaking Tajiks Request Protection

WA0903203590 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Feb 90 p 2

[Article by A. Kruzhilin, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA special correspondent, Dushanbe: "Hear Us!"]

[Text] These days, hundreds of Russians are leaving the Tajik capital—forever.

The following document has already been transmitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet and merits quoting:

"Dear comrades, mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters!"

"The Russian-speaking population of the capital of Tajikistan, the city of Dushanbe, appeals to you!"

"...For many of us Tajikistan is our Motherland. We were born and raised in the united family of the fraternal peoples of our republic. It is a bitter thing to acknowledge that what is most precious has been trampled upon—peace, love, and friendship in people's hearts."

"Hear us!"

"We appeal to the people's deputies of the Soviet of Nationalities and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and request emergency assistance—we ask that a commission of the Congress examine in extraordinary session the question of the security of more than 300,000 people, the Russian-speaking population of the city of Dushanbe (of which 190,000 are Russian)."

What can be added to this? The figures, perhaps. I had occasion to see three copies of this appeal. One had 300 signatures. The second—about 1,500, and the third—650.

There will be no rail containers in Dushanbe until October. In two city hospitals, 260 Russian doctors submitted applications to leave (they are not being allowed to go because of pressing considerations of the moment—"no need to exacerbate the situation...."). What do they mean—"exacerbate"? The overwhelming majority of those injured during the days of terror were Russians; all of those assaulted were Russian; 82 percent of those who have left Tajikistan since the beginning of the year are Russian.

I do not wish to thrust my opinion on people. But it seems to me it would not be superfluous to listen to the request of thousands of our countrymen from Dushanbe and not drag out what is causing us so much grief—what an unpleasant and bitter word "refugee" is.

Tajiks Apologize for Armenian Mistreatment

90US0605A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 8, 24 Feb 90 p 2

[Letter to the editor of SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, followed by editorial reply and report by correspondent Leonid Makhkamov: "In the Name of Our People"]

[Text] To the Presidium of the Armenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, the Armenian people, and all USSR people's deputies from Armenia.

Attempts are being made by anti-popular forces to use the tragic events taking place in Dushanbe to sow dissension between the Armenian and Tajik peoples, to arouse interethnic strife.

We bitterly regret that a small segment of the population with minimal consciousness has for a brief time given in to provocation. We apologize to the fraternal Armenian people for the fact that, in the state of emergency which has come about, worn and tired refugees from suffering Armenia have had to be sent back. This forced and temporary measure was taken exclusively out of humane considerations, out of a desire to avoid violence and bloodshed.

From time immemorial Tajiks have been distinguished by the most generous cordiality and hospitality—as this is observed in the East. Tolerance and friendliness are showered upon emigrants from other lands. Tajiks always reserve the best place in the home for their guest, who presents no burden and is ever accorded true affability. We have always related with great love and respect to the ancient and wise Armenian people, related to us by historical destiny, hundreds and thousands of whom live side by side with us in Tajikistan.

We resolutely declare that the tension existing today in Dushanbe has in no way been caused by anti-Armenian sentiment. The true causes of unrest are rooted in contradictions which have accumulated over decades, primarily of a socio-economic and political nature.

We earnestly request that our declaration be published, and we stress once again that our people do not nurture, and cannot nurture any enmity towards the Armenian people.

[signed] M. Shukurov, academician of Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences, member of the USSR Writers' Union; A. Tursunov, corresponding member of the Tajik

SSR Academy of Sciences; S. Ulug-Zade, people's writer of Tajikistan; and others—500 signatures in all.

From the editor: This letter is an example of how the intelligentsia should react to such tragic events. They should not search for guilty parties among those who come from other lands, should not seek to inflame passions, but rather should show compassion and the ability to accept part of the blame for those who only disgrace an age-old culture and the morality of a people.

We will be able to normalize life in our common home if each nation struggles against manifestations of nationalism, chauvinism, and extremism, especially in its own ethnic environment.

Confirmation of this thesis can be seen in the latest report of our staff correspondent, Leonid Makhkamov:

"The appeal of the Central Committee of the Tajik Communist Party, Presidium of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet, and Tajik SSR Council of Ministers to all workers in the republic, published by the mass media, contains an analysis and evaluation of the tragic events and a plea to avoid inciting passions, to avoid giving in to all sorts of rumors, wily subterfuge, and the insidiousness of instigators. It states specifically: 'Everyone must overcome the sicknesses of self-adoration, egoism, and regional bias. We must all, as one, seek ways of healing the ills of the people. We must travel the road of brotherhood and unity, secure prosperity and tranquility for our native Tajikistan.'

Signatures of 120 Dushanbe families appear below a petition which states: 'We would like to know—in the name of which people are demands being put forth at rallies, demands which, incidentally, change with every day? If these are representatives of the people, then why have we seen destruction of the people's property as a result? Why do we see the destruction of material assets created by the hands of labor?'

Also as yet unanswered are matters which arose unexpectedly during the course of the 17th extraordinary Plenum of the Central Committee of the Tajik Communist Party, where at the last moment I. Khayeyev, chairman of the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers, attested to the unconstitutional conduct of certain members of the government during the days of the events. What was going on here? Assessment of the February events depends on the response to this question. The plenum instructed the bureau of the Central Committee to investigate all the circumstances of this matter."

Dzhizak Oblast Party Committee Elects Leader

LD0903221190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 9 Mar 90

[Text] A plenum of the Dzhizak Oblast Party Committee, examined an organizational matter, took place today. Comrade Tursunov, who had worked as chairman of Uzbekistan's State Committee for Water Resources and Land Reclamation, was elected first secretary of the oblast committee.

Karimov, first secretary of the Central Committee of the republic's Communist Party, spoke at the plenum.

MVD Official Views Violence in Tashkent

LD1003110490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1830 GMT 9 Mar 90

[Presented by V.A. Yanchenko, head of the Department for Cooperation with the Mass Media of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs—identified by caption]

[Text] [Yanchenko] Good evening, comrades. Last week was marked by a major social and political event in the life of our country, as you know: the local Soviet elections. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs' operation reports, the day went fairly calmly, without excesses and the elections were well-organized. No serious offenses were committed. All the same, the past week has been clouded by negative events and disorders which took place in the town of Parkentiy in Uzbekistan's Tashkent Oblast.

The pretext for the disorder was a conflict between the local population of Uzbeks and Meshketian Turks. The local population demanded the immediate resettlement of the Meskhetian Turks were evacuated comparatively recently from Bukinskiy Rayon. Soon, however, the slogans took on quite a different character. The crowd of many thousands of people, egged on by extremists, demanded the immediate removal from work of the leaders of party, local soviets, and law and order bodies. In spite of admonishments and attempts to calm the crowd down, nothing proved successful. Stones and pieces of piping were thrown at the militia and the armed forces, meaning the internal troops. People were wounded.

In this situation, the militia and internal troops were obliged to adopt appropriate measures to put a stop to those disorders. As a result of these events, four people died and 92 received injuries of varying severity. Of course, more than half were staff of militia bodies.

This is true. In this connection, an interview given to an AP correspondent by one Sharif, a member of an Uzbek informal organization, is incomprehensible. In the interview, he said that the demonstration had what he called a profoundly peaceful character, and yet there were around 30 dead. The question rightly arises: for what interests and in whose names did a representative of an Uzbek informal organization engage in blatent deception, juggling the facts and out-and-out falsehood? No doubt in order to make the situation even worse and give rise to a more widespread conflict. If that is the case, and that is objectively what emerges, such actions should entail serious consequences in answering for these deeds.

Muslim Official Comments on Navruz Holiday

90US0720A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 12, 21 Mar 90 p 2

[Interview of Sheikh Yusufkhan Shakir, deputy chairman of the Spiritual Administration of Moslems of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, by correspondent M. Mukhammad-Dost: "Navruz Reborn"]

[Text] On the eve of Navruz, celebrated 21 March as the spring holiday of many peoples of the East, our correspondent conducted an interview with the deputy chairman of the Spiritual Administration of Moslems of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, Sheikh Yusufkhan Shakir.

"This holiday of Navruz is special for us," the sheikh said, "because we are observing it after a compulsory pause related to the 'struggle with religious vestiges.' But, glory to Allah Most High, different times have arrived which have given the people the opportunity not only to observe, but also to regenerate their holiday, with all its attributes, worldly and religious. Navruz (literally—"new day") has existed with us since as long ago as pre-Islamic times, marking the renewal of nature and the beginning of spring efforts. Islam never repudiated it, but rather adopted it in the same way that the peoples who observe Navruz adopted Islam.

Navruz is a happy holiday. It brings people together. People forget about old grievances on this beautiful day and forgive one another. The day comes to our land to remind people of their true calling—to devote themselves to peace and virtue.

We live in a complex time and in the hopes of achieving a better future. Things are equally difficult for all of us. It is a great happiness not to yield to the power of evil incited by the accursed Iblis. For those who have now fallen into despondency, I would like to recall the words of the friend of Allah, the Prophet Mohammed: 'They will tell you "Tomorrow is the Day of Judgment!" but you go and plant a tree!...'

On behalf of our Spiritual Administration, I sincerely congratulate all Muslims and all the good people of our country on the occasion of Navruz, and I pray to the Great Allah to send down peace, serenity, and swift prosperity."

Kirghiz Official on Frunze Rallies

90US0663B Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 17 Feb 90 p 1

[Interview with Kirghiz SSR First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs F.Sh. Kulov by an unnamed SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA correspondent; date and place not specified: "Democracy Means Order"]

[Text] Idle talk, rumors, and fabrications and the alarm caused by all of this became the reason for a conversation between our correspondent and Feliks Sharshenbayevich Kulov, first deputy minister of internal affairs of the republic, candidate Kirghiz SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] people's deputy

[SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA] In Frunze and the adjacent areas, all kinds of rumors have been flying. What is the reason for them?

[Kulov] As has already been reported, on 25 and 26 January unauthorized rallies were held in the central square of the capital city. Alas, abridged information did not facilitate clarity and the stabilization of the situation. I was present at all the rallies in the line of duty. Quite a few justified demands of a social and economic nature were made there. In particular, it was said that the assistance promised to [private individual] developers is not being rendered or is being rendered poorly, or is being delayed. As came out later, in the course of meetings of the republic leadership with the young people, informals, and workers of enterprises, such work is being done. However, the lack of information once again created grounds for rebukes.

It is also known that the first rally was incited by rumors about the supposedly high number of refugees coming to Kirghizia. Such "information" was easily refuted, to be sure, with delay, at the rallies themselves.

I also consider the overall complex situation in the country to be a factor. The events in Transcaucasia, and now also the pogroms in Dushanbe, have been received with alarm by millions of people and have given rise to uncertainty and concern. Given this background, any imprudent expression, action, or a mundane misunderstanding to which we would have previously paid no attention at all cause a markedly negative response and disturb the peace. Incidentally, this is how common crime is perceived as well.

[SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA] Can we refer to the presence of a crime-causing background in this instance?

[Kulov] The experience of foreign countries and our, domestic experience shows unequivocally that destabilization provides the most favorable environment for criminal elements in which they abruptly step up their activities. It is advantageous for them from every point of view. Here is proof: Individuals with valuables looted in Azerbaijan during the pogroms are being apprehended in various cities of our country.

On the whole, we have brought down the rate of increase in crime in our republic, albeit a little bit, through a lot of effort. Still, the crime-causing situation gives us no solace. Homicides, serious bodily injuries, and bandit assaults on, for example, drivers are frequent. Alas, humanitarian approaches are to blame in part.

[SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA] Some people maintain that nationalist appeals were made at the rallies. There

was no such thing in speeches at the rallies. Isolated pronouncements in the crowd were not given any support. Do you have other information?

[Kulov] We do not have such information. I did not get to hear them at the rally either. Possibly, the assertions to which you are referring are based on the demand to curtail the migration of the populace to our republic. However, even this appeal did not amount to an infringement of the interests of the Russian-speaking nationalities residing in Kirghizia.

On the other hand, an inaccuracy in the press could have played a role. In a note on the attempt to hold a rally on 10 February, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA wrote: "Nationalist appeals began to be aired." The correspondent of this newspaper K. Bayalinov produced on his initiative a copy of the text filed from which this phrase was absent.

[SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA] So, it looks like they "made an addition" in the editorial office.

[Kulov] You know "the backstage" of newspapers better than I do. I give the facts. I will say one more thing. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA also overstated it before, when it reported increased purchases of weapons by the populace of Kirghizia. Here are the facts: Last year, 2,000 fewer hunting guns were sold than in 1988. The same amount was confiscated or voluntarily surrendered. The case with a machine gun did happen, but in 1962.

The incomprehensible speed with which rumors spread has long been known. The rumors are eagerly received by the people even if they are incredibly wild and fantastic. We resolutely put an end to the rumors and appeal to the press for help. For example, to this end a statement of the Procuracy and the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of our republic was published yesterday.

Now I would like to respond to the question which the citizens are asking on the MVD telephones: What is the likelihood of a random, mundane skirmish escalating into an extensive conflict? I believe that there will be no mass disturbances. Look at the history, customs, and traditions of the Kirghiz people and the peoples residing together with them. I am Kirghiz myself, and I know that violence, wild pogroms, mad rampage, and bandit attacks are alien to my people. A negligibly small segment of the young people, like in the younger generation of other nationalities, may have such leanings.

[SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA] Ultimately, common sense always prevails though, on occasion, with delay. Perhaps, the MVD is also relying on something else on top of this.

[Kulov] Indeed, the use of force at the unauthorized rally on 5 February and in front of the Ala-Too cinema on 10 February was fully justified. However, when I went into the crowd myself and talked to them I became convinced that the sidewalks and approaches could be cleared in a more peaceful manner.

However, those who mistake our restraint for weakness are wrong. This is absolutely out of the question. Our actions are regulated by law, and we are going to comply with it under any circumstances.

As a professional, a lawyer, I know the psychology of an agitated crowd firsthand. In an agitated state, the crowd gives in to extremism very easily, turns people into animals, and brings out dark instincts. It is prone to be uncontrollable even if the ringleaders want to assume control and restrain passions. In this sense, the organizers of rallies should think a thousand times before assuming this extremely heavy responsibility when they are not certain two or three times over that the outcome will be peaceful. You cannot touch a hot pan in order to make sure how hot it is like a child who just cannot believe it when told.

Incidentally, militia employees wrote up reports on a number of participants in the three unauthorized rallies in strict compliance with the law and referred them to the courts for consideration of the issue of administrative penalties. According to verified data, on 10 February 41 people were detained. I would call them excessively temperamental. When the possible consequences of unlawful actions were explained to them, many regretted their participation and said that they did not even expect this turn of events. Incidentally, they are common, regular guys.

[SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA] Is there a guarantee that such a turn will not come about?

[Kulov] This guarantee is also found in reality. As a rule, mass disturbances are steered by certain forces, a certain organization. We do not have anti-Soviet, nationalist, reactionary, religious, and other anti-constitutional groupings and organizations; this is confirmed by our analysis of real-time data [received] through various channels.

One more thing. We proceed from our actual potential for localizing the outbreaks of any kind. I am now stating firmly that the forces and resources are sufficient. We will not allow anyone to disturb public order and the peace of citizens. We are determined to prevent violations of the law, and we are going to act within the law ourselves.

[SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA] What would your advice be to the residents of the city and the republic?

[Kulov] As the rallies held have shown and as our practice convinces us, unauthorized events are mostly facilitated, apart from the activists, by the citizens themselves and their natural curiosity. In this instance, the MVD organs request earnestly that the residents and

guests of the republic refrain from this unwitting support. Do not trust the rumors, do not give in to provocations. At present, we need a businesslike and quiet situation as never before. Party and soviet functionaries are conducting explanatory work vigorously in educational establishments, dormitories, and workers' collectives. Even economic managers have become noticeably politicized.

Not only the employees of the internal affairs organs but also the citizens themselves should show restraint in their mutual relations. Let us not create new shortages, those of good will, tolerance, cordiality, and an elementary civilized approach. Let us keep in mind the fact that the crises give anti-perestroyka forces the most powerful arguments against democracy.

Democracy means order, and all of us are to reinforce it.

Frunze Official on Leadership, Rallies

90US0663C Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 24 Feb 90 p 2

[Report on an interview with A.M. Muraliyev, candidate people's deputy of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, chairman of the Frunze Gorispolkom, by SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA correspondent V. Derbishev, in Muraliyev's office in Frunze, date not specified: "Problems Will Not Be Solved in the Absence of Friendship"]

[Text] I will admit that I prepared a lot of questions on the problems of the capital city's economy and the prospects for its development before going to my meeting with A. Muraliyev, candidate people's deputy of the Kirghiz SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, chairman of the Frunze Gorispolkom [City Soviet Executive Committee]. However, I changed the topic of our conversation when I entered his office after waiting in an impressive line. This happened when the hands of my watch showed 21:30 hours.

[Derbishev] Previously, the common people associated being a leader with an official car and a refrigerator stocked with delicacies from a special cafeteria... How does this image appear at present?

[Muraliyev] At present, he is a convenient target for critical arrows, beginning with arrows from those nearest to him and going to arrows from those who were undeservedly wronged in the years of stagnation.

However, as I see it, such vulnerability is a normal phenomenon. It should serve as an incentive of sorts for the leader's self-improvement. To be sure, this vulnerability has a negative aspect which is strictly personal—prematurely gray hair, heart medicine in the pocket of one's jacket, getting up at an ungodly hour, pulling all-nighters, and so on.

In general, discussing a new type of leader is all we have been doing since the beginning of perestroyka. The old, unpopular image of a leadership figure surrounded by special eateries and special services has been almost destroyed by now. You would agree that the elimination of the Fourth Main Administration at the republic Ministry of Health speaks for itself. In a word, the elimination of unlawful privileges may be viewed as an irreversible process. However, we should note that we have spent a long time approaching these urgent demands of democratic life. We should acknowledge that this protracted process of realization has done us a disservice—the authority of the leadership at almost all levels has been undermined. However, the situation is improving. Incidentally, at present you can frequently see the leaders of the highest ranks dining in regular canteens, using mass transit, and purchasing merchandise in the stores... Please understand that they are doing this in earnest...

It is very difficult to paint the ideal image of a person delegated by the people to exercise power. To my mind, he should be not only democratic but also businesslike in the best meaning of the word because the well-being of thousands of ordinary citizens will depend on his practicality and competence. Of course, he must be a refined psychologist who has mastered the art of carrying on a dialogue. In this matter, we lag behind badly.

[Derbishev] Amangeldy Mursadykovich, you are a mayor elected in the years of perestroyka; however, some of the gorispolkom apparatus dates back to the period of stagnation. Do you experience management difficulties due to this?

[Muraliyev] My relationship with the apparatus is normal. However, not everything is that simple. There is friction. However, this is not to say that I should apply the principle of "a new broom." The main point is to fully reveal the potential of every staffer. It is not that important whether he came along during the period of stagnation or not.

At present, I am dissatisfied with the fact that the function of control and resolving the issues to their logical end has been weakened in the gorispolkom...

[Derbishev] Pardon me for interrupting, but I have a question which has a direct bearing on this problem of yours, the problem of executive discipline. Recently, T. Kariyev, a reserve officer who has fought in Afghanistan, approached the editorial office. Judging by his letter, he had an appointment with you following which you issued an assignment to allocate at least temporary housing to his family of five...

[Muraliyev] I must warn you: There are many appeals of this kind. I understand how difficult it is for these people. Believe me, there are people in the city who find shelter in condemned houses, dugouts, basements, and barracks. However, we are trying to do everything possible in order to speed up construction. Thus, we have now increased the capacity of the housing construction combine. Incidentally, because of this 48,000 more square meters of housing were commissioned last year than in 1988. This is not the limit at present. However,

the rate of construction leaves a lot to be desired. As far as Comrade Kariyev is concerned, I will definitely look into his case. In general, I will be even more strict in all cases of red tape.

We somehow strayed from the question. So, the second cause of the differences we have is in the fact that some employees of the apparatus cannot and do not want to use the economic methods of management. I will admit frankly that this is the most painful issue, all the more so now that the capital city of the republic has embarked on an experiment in self-financing and self-management.

[Derbishev] I would be interested to know your opinion, the opinion of a leader, on the youth rallies which have been held.

[Muraliyev] I am certain that every citizen of Frunze, regardless of his ethnicity, experienced a feeling of alarm during those days. Besides, the tragic events unfolding in Transcaucasia and Dushanbe, so to say, poured oil on the fire. Rumors spread around the city to the effect that the young people of the indigenous nationality were preparing for a pogrom. These rumors were picked up and had cock-and-bull stories added to them. However, there was no foundation whatever for believing this idle talk.

I was present at these rallies, and this is why I can say with confidence that the guys did not air extremist slogans, all the more so because there were many representatives of European nationalities in the square and nearby who had left movies, concert halls, and restaurants, and some came to the rally on purpose in order to support the demands of its participants. It appears to me that it is advantageous for someone to sow hostility between the nations. Someone definitely wishes to set the people against each other in order to subsequently get political mileage out of the woes of the people. Such provocateurs should be rebuffed immediately. After all, they may belong to any collective.

Finally, I would like to quote one of the items from my pre-election platform:

"We will not be able to solve any of our problems unless we reinforce the friendship of representatives of all nationalities and ethnic groups residing in our republic and in our city."



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Daily Report

Annex

Soviet Union

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Soviet Union
ANNEX

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Karelian People's Front Awaits Election Results

90UN1184A Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 6 Mar 90 p 22—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by Jukka Rislakki: "After Two Years in Operation, Karelian People's Front Finally Registered; 'Horse Trades' With Finns Anger Sulo Nokelainen"]

[Text] Petrozavodsk (HS)—The Karelian People's Front is eagerly awaiting the results of the Russian election. The organization was finally registered last Friday, and Sunday's elections were the first it had an opportunity to influence.

At a People's Front Council meeting in Petrozavodsk before the elections, the leader of the front, Sulo Nokelainen, deliberated along with the others as to whom the people would be urged to vote for and whom not.

The People's Front launched its activities as early as 1988, but it was not registered in the days of Karelia's former leaders. "President Filatov said it would be registered only over his dead body. Well, now he's a political corpse," Nokelainen said.

After the transfer of power, too, several weeks went by before the officials registered—after a few changes in the rules—this "independent sociopolitical organization."

One drawback that the front has pointed out is that the big production plants do not belong to Soviet Karelia, but to Moscow. Products and profits are sent elsewhere. The nuclear power plant that is planned for here will also power this industry. The People's Front has organized demonstrations and collected signatures to protest the power plant.

Angered by Collaboration With Finland

The Enso venture is well known, and Nokelainen rattled off exact figures off the top of his head on how Finns cut timber in Soviet Karelia and then let Karelia buy cellulose.

"Collaboration with Enso is of no benefit to us. There is no full equality, and the Finns retain the right to the deciding vote. The agreement was dictated by Moscow, and I've kept this in the foreground in my election campaign."

"The People's Front is angered by these secret, behind-the-scenes horse trades."

"The danger exists that we will be a producer of raw materials and that the condition of our environment will get worse than it is. There's a lot of support here for the idea that Karelia should be allowed to revert to the status of a Soviet republic, which would bring us sovereignty. Unfortunately, however, the idea is not a realistic one."

Nokelainen is an economist by education and training. He resigned from his last position when he got into trouble with the leaders because of his People's Front activities. The front's other coordinator, Engineer Yuriy Dmitriyev, is at present unemployed because of the same activities.

Nokelainen has served as secretary to a member of parliament and was himself a candidate for the Russian Supreme Soviet in Sunday's elections. Onega Tractor Plant workers, among others, nominated him for the post.

Nokelainen ran against 15 other candidates in the Karelian election district. All that is known about the results is that no one was elected in this round of voting.

Radicals Have Their Own Bloc

Composed of tens of reform-minded candidates, the "Bloc" published an expose in its newspaper just before the elections to the effect that the spouses and children of any of the party and administration bigwigs could bypass the waiting list with a special permit to purchase a car.

The force that launched this "Bloc" and also the People's Front is a young people's representative, Sergey Belozertsev. He was the most popular speaker at the mass meetings organized in Petrozavodsk.

The "Bloc" is demanding "power for the soviets," elimination of the Communist Party's special status, the establishment of a Karelian Soviet Republic, and cultural autonomy for all peoples.

The People's Front Provisional Council consists of 27 members, who primarily represent the intelligentsia. The number of members the front has has not yet been disclosed, but, according to Nokelainen, "we have a very large, active group—at least 1,000, as well as members of the community."

"Of paramount importance is genuine democracy, that the people can make the decisions and that they cannot be dictated from above," he declared.

In Karelia people have differing opinions on whether the People's Front is needed and whether it has achieved anything other than its metal campaign button. In the opinion of some, the front does not offer a clear-cut alternative, and its goals are vague.

"Nothing that's happened here recently is thanks to the People's Front," a well-known cultivated person said in Petrozavodsk.

Lithuanians Appeal to Thatcher for UK Support

PM3003133090 London THE GUARDIAN in English 30 Mar 90 p 10—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Michael Simmons report under the general rubric: "Lithuanian Deserters Get Amnesty"]

[Text] A message from Mr. Landsbergis, appealing for British Government support for his country's independence, was handed in at 10 Downing Street yesterday.

It was delivered by Laima Andrikriene, who is secretary to the Lithuanian Prime Minister. She had flown in especially hoping to be received by Mrs. Thatcher, but was received only by an official from the Soviet desk of the Foreign Office.

In his message, Mr. Landsbergis said the Lithuanian people had taken great hope and courage from the fact that Britain had repeatedly refused to recognize the annexation and occupation of the republic by the Soviet Union in 1940.

"Today," he wrote, "with increasing freedoms and liberties a reality for most Lithuanians, the people are hoping for your nation's support."

Similar letters have been delivered this week to the prime minister of Norway and to the president of Iceland. One was also delivered in Copenhagen yesterday, where a Lithuanian team was received by the Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen.

Ms. Andrikriene, who is reluctantly travelling on a Soviet passport, said last night that she had met the Norwegian foreign minister during her stop-over in Oslo from Moscow. Today she is flying to Stockholm, where she expects to meet the Swedish foreign minister.

She made it plain that she understood why Mrs. Thatcher had not recieved her personally, but said she had epxected a more positive reaction. "Of course we would like the British parliament to recognise our independence," she added.

Earlier in the day, a letter to Mrs. Thatcher was also delivered from Lithuanians living in Britain, expressing concern at the lack of positive support for Lithuanian people, it said, were being intimidated in a "crude and barbaric" attempt to force them to rescind their independence.

'Shield' Leader Interviewed on Lithuania Situation

OW2803001790 Tokyo TOKYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 26 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 1—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[By correspondent Furumoto]

[Text] Moscow, 25 Mar—The Kremlin is threatening to use force on the Lithuanian Republic which has unilaterally declared secession from the Soviet Union. Mr. Vitaliy Vladiytsev, a cochairman of the "Shchit" ("Shield") and a deputy to the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies, recently granted an interview to this newspaper. He noted that demands for tougher actions against Lithuania are arising among hawkish generals of the Soviet Ministry of Defense and the Staff Command. The "Shchit" is a national Soviet trade union of armed service members which is said to be rapidly expanding its influence within the Soviet Armed Forces.

At the same time, he affirmed the firm opposition of the "Shchit" to the use of force against the republic. In view of the fact that the "Shchit" has the extensive support of democratic forces—including reformists within the Supreme Soviet—his remarks apparently suggest the possibility of a rift occurring within the military over actions dealing with Lithuania.

He also revealed that the "Shchit" is currently studying the possibility of forming a socialist-democracy-based political party, as the Soviet Union is moving toward adoption of a multiparty system.

Mr. Vladiytsev, a retired lieutenant colonel, voiced his support for Lithuania's demands for independence, saying: "The struggles of the three Baltic nations to free themselves from the totalitarianism and the imperialist rule of Moscow are completely rational. As long as the nations want it, they should be allowed to fully exercise the right to secede from the Union as stated in the Constitution."

Pointing out the danger of hawkish generals stepping up their calls for tougher actions against Lithuania, he said: "The military is trying to find any excuse to intervene. They are watching the situation of the Baltic nations carefully and are reporting collected information to President Gorbachev."

Concerning the presidential decree that the Gorbachev government issued to Lithuania on 21 March, his view was that there was pressure from the military behind this action. He said that "this proves that the forces made up of those who want to create a 'martial law' situation over the whole nation are becoming strong."

Asserting that a series of ethnic disturbances in the Caucasus and elsewhere have created socio-psychological apathy on the part of Soviet people concerning a "state of martial law," he stressed that the danger of tough action like declaring a state of emergency against Lithuania exists as a matter of fact.

The "Shchit" was formed last May to seek democracy for the Armed Forces and welfare for retired officers and men. Because the top military leadership does not recognize the "Shchit," there are only 3,000 registered members. However, according to Vladiytsev, the number of officers secretly joining the organization is rapidly increasing. The organization has particular support from military units in local areas, and there are also generals who are sympathetic to it. Lieutenant General Shaposhnikov is honorary chairman of the body. It has the strong backing of the reformist organization "Interregional Group" (MRP), which includes Supreme Soviet member Yeltsin.

Estonia Supports 'Flexible' Independence Line

PM3003133290 London THE GUARDIAN in English 30 Mar 90 p 24—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Dispatch from John Rettie in Tallin and Jonathan Steele in Moscow: "Crowds Urge Estonia to Independence"]

[Excerpts] Estonia's newly elected parliament found itself being swept towards independence at its first session yesterday, in the wake of Lithuania's breakneck rush.

Several hundred people waving blue, black, and white Estonian flags gathered outside the parliament building to cheer the new deputies—or at least the two-thirds who favour independence. They waved banners demanding "an end to occupation" and "a free and sovereign Estonia."

The new session is expected to vote to suspend the Soviet Constitution and replace it with Estonian laws. [passage omitted]

The Supreme Soviet's opening session had barely started when deputies broke off to wave to the demonstrators, who stood with their backs to the Orthodox Russian Cathedral built on the Tsar's orders at the turn of the century to show his unruly Estonian colony who was boss.

The president, Arnold Ruutel, assured delighted listeners of his intention to restore Estonia's independent statehood.

Recognition of neighbouring Lithuania as an independent state is expected to be the first item on the Supreme Soviet's agenda today. "We have to support them," said Viktor Palm, a leading nationalist who is also a member of the all-union Supreme Soviet in Moscow.

The Estonians are however, far from happy at the Lithuanians' approach. Professor Palm said no action should have been taken without complete co-ordination between Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Georgia—the Caucasian republic which is also heading towards a confrontation over independence.

Mr. Ruutel, who was re-elected today as president of the parliament, told THE GUARDIAN that Estonia's was "a soft, flexible position" in comparison with Lithuania's, but parliament would move firmly and calmly towards its goal.

He hoped to persuade Estonia's big Russian minority and their friends in Moscow, but if not, "we won't wait."

Mr. Ruutel said that when the Estonian Supreme Soviet declared its incorporation into the Soviet Union illegal last November, he feared a return to Stalinist tactics, but now he believed the Soviet Union's movement towards democracy had made a full return to the past impossible.

The Popular Front, which has 45 of the 105 seats in the new parliament, is expected to propose the declaration today on the official status of Estonia. Representatives of the mainly Russian minority, who have 27 deputies, strongly opposed its inclusion on the agenda.

The declaration denounces the "occupation of the Estonian republic" on June 17, 1940 and its "annexation" on August 6. The Supreme Soviet declares itself separated from the system of Soviet state power and dependent only on the will of the people who elected it.

If passed, as expected, the declaration will be like a red rag to a bull in Moscow. But many Estonians have high confidence in Mr. Ruutel as a skilled politican capable of steering Estonia through the rocks of Soviet wrath.

'Civic Action' Movement Urges Social Justice

WA0204201590 Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 8, Feb 90 (signed to press 13 Feb 90) p 5—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Declaration of 'Civic Action' Movement]

[Text] The crisis that has affected our social system is assuming an increasingly dangerous nature. Centers of tension in the economy, social sphere, and interethnic relations, which have already announced themselves in outbursts of violence and bloodshed, are multiplying.

The past year was not fruitless. But while paying tribute to the first steps along the path of democratizing the legislative authority and to the successes of our foreign policy, and evaluating highly the counterflow of rapid fundamental transformations in the East European countries, we are obliged to ask ourselves: Why are we now beginning to lag behind them, why did we find ourselves unprepared for the trials that descended on us in the past year and with which, undoubtedly, the present year will be fraught to an even greater extent?

The answer is obvious. The public mandate for fundamental transformations of the political structures and a halt to the country's slide into the abyss is obvious. The efforts of a number of USSR people's deputies, the rapidly growing public movements, and the "informal" organizations are being paralyzed essentially by the unchanging mechanism of the adoption and realization of political decisions and by the retrograde property relations.

Forces rejecting basic values common to all mankind are uniting. A bloc of neo-Stalinists with the Black Hundred and the corrupt bureaucracy—with the increasingly impudent criminal world—is taking shape. We consider the demand coming from the heart of the people for social justice and order to be perfectly justified. Forces aspiring to a return of dictatorship and equality in poverty are, however, playing on these cherished hopes.

We are worried particularly by the fate of Russia. Self-seeking, unscrupulous people aspiring to fence off the country's future from the tried-and-tested paths of world civilization and to sow discord between the Russian and other peoples are attempting to speak on behalf of the Russian people, on behalf of Russia. These people refuse to recognize that Russia may only become truly sovereign and prosperous by accommodating and cooperating with the strivings of all peoples of the USSR for national revival.

Russia's breakthrough toward a better future is realistic. As the German and Japanese miracles occurred after the war, as they are currently being repeated by the Asian countries, so could there be a Russian economic miracle.

At the same time, increasingly less time remains for preventing the development of events along the lines of the Chinese or Romanian model. No one knows when it will run out. For this reason the cohesion of all democratic forces prepared to organize their actions in a common civic movement is now essential. The citizens must be responsible for their future and must create it themselves.

Those who have signed this declaration proclaim the formation of a Civic Action Movement.

We appeal for participation in the movement to all opponents of totalitarianism: citizens, public unions, people's fronts, voter clubs and associations, worker and strike committees, and parties. United in the struggle for a civilized civil society, we are capable together of preventing a fatal reactionary change in the fate of the peoples, ensuring the country's peaceful way out of the crisis, and a normal, dignified life for all.

Civic Action seeks as priority steps:

1. The conclusion of a new union treaty providing for the free association of sovereign states and peoples.

2. An end to any, primarily state, monopoly of the means of production and a transition to a modern market economy based on the competition of various forms of ownership and an effective system of social protection.

3. The granting of land to the hereditary possession or ownership of those who wish to work on it.

4. Equalization of the rights of the CPSU and other political organizations.

5. A diversity of the forms of spiritual and social life.

6. Democratic reform of the Army.

7. Deprivation of the KGB functions of secret political police.

Civic Action is inspired by the ideas of our contemporary, the great citizen of the world A.D. Sakharov.

Citizens and organizations that join Civic Action will formulate and implement civic initiatives aimed at realizing the movement's goals:

will jointly participate in elections of the organs of power and actively aid supporters of radical reforms;

will organize civic opposition to reactionary steps and decisions by collecting signatures, holding mass meetings, marches, and demonstrations and, in extreme cases, by organizing political strikes, civil disobedience campaigns, and other nonviolent measures.

The organizations that join Civic Action will preserve their independence and autonomy. The movement's activity will be directed by coordinating centers formed from representatives of the citizens and organizations that are a part of it. The program for the movement's development and its organizational structure will be specified at a constituent conference.

Citizens, groups and citizen associations!

Join the Civic Action Movement!
S.S. Averintsev, Yu.N. Afanasyev, L.M. Batkin, S.V. Belozertsev, L.I. Bogoraz, V.V. Vasilyev, M.V. Volkenshteyn, Ye.A. Gayer, S.S. Dzarasov, I.I. Zaslavskiy, V.I. Kirillov, S.A. Kovalev, Ye.S. Maksimova, A.N. Murashov, B.Sh. Okudzhava, G.Kh. Popov, E.A. Ryazanov, R.Z. Sagdeyev, A.Ye. Sebentsov, V.S. Smirnov, A.A. Sobchak, V.I. Selyunin, S.S. Sulakshin, S.B. Stankevich, P.P. Falk, R.K. Shchedrin, Yu.P. Shchekochikhin, Gleb Yakunin, A.V. Yablokov.

Issuing Mechanism of Documents Queried

90UN1235B Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 8, Feb 90 [signed to press 13 Feb 90] p 6—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Letter from O. Kobyakov, member of the CPSU and head of the Taganrog Komsomol Ideology Department]

[Text] Taganrog—I wish to bring up a problem that is at first sight immaterial. Various letters, statements, documents and so forth signed "CPSU Central Committee" appear from time to time. For example, the CPSU Central Committee statement on the situation in the Soviet Baltic republics.

These documents are of dissimilar content, and many aspects of them evoke various opinions among the communists. And, I believe, not only among the rank and file but also among members of the Central Committee.

But the mechanism of their appearance and adoption is not yet understood. As is known, many of these official papers have not been approved at plenums. Are signatures simply collected in that case among Central Committee members?

The communist rank and file and all citizens would like to know how many Central Committee members have approved this statement or the other and how many have not (by name, preferably). And whether in the past four years a statement prepared in advance has been rejected by a majority of Central Committee members.

It would also be good to know the names of the members of the group of authors preparing this document or the other.

The publication of such information would create a number of important precedents.

First of all, the whole country would be better informed as to who in the Central Committee adheres to what positions, and it would be impossible to hide behind the impersonal "CPSU Central Committee" signature.

Second, it could be learned from the list of the group of authors which people, specialists, political scientists, and party functionaries were engaged at the time of preparation of a party decision and state bills.

And, third, the publication of such information would not allow officials of the lower components: oblast, city, and rayon party committees, to hide behind similar impersonal appellations.

Zaslavskaya Predicts 'Decisive Year' for USSR

PM1203164090 London THE INDEPENDENT in English 10 Mar 90 p 31—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Report on interview with Soviet People's Deputy and sociologist Tatyana Zaslavskaya, by Isabel Hilton; no date given: "A Reformer Scared of Saboteurs"]

[Text] Tatyana Zaslavskaya was in Britain last week or the publication of her book The Second Soviet Revolution (IB Tauris, 19.95 pounds.) She was already suffering in the flesh the ill-effects of the overwhelming curiosity and interest the Gorbachev revolution has generated—the exhaustion of the effort of communicating across barriers of language, culture, and history.

Her book is intended to bridge that gap. Writing for foreign readers, she seeks to explain perestroyka from the perspective of an active supporter who has worked with Mikhail Gorbachev. Her starting point is that perestroyka offers the opportunity to put the Soviet Union back on a path towards socialism. Her finishing point is that the Communist Party will not be a suitable vehicle for the rest of the journey.

Tatyana Zaslavskaya was born in 1929 into an intellectual family. She studied first physics and social sciences, making her name as an agrarian economist. Her fieldwork in the Soviet countryside brought her up against the shocking realities of rural destitution, setting her on a path of critical analysis of the failures of the Soviet system. She eventually became an academician, in spite of the career handicap of an independent mind and, from 1982 was one of the senior social scientists invited to advise Gorbachev.

She has chosen to pursue a radical critique of the Soviet system from within rather than as a dissident. Her own fate is thus closely tied up with the success or failure of the present reforms.

"This will be the decisive year," she says. "I believe that the democratic forces in the Soviet Union are stronger than the conservative or reactionary. But strength is not enough to guarantee success. There is an obvious contradiction between privatisation of the means of production and the passages in Marx, Lenin and Engels that say that socialism is a form of society without market relations and private property. But the new social scientists in the Soviet Union think that our task is not to appeal to the classics but to live more comfortable, peaceful, democratic lives. The main criteria should be the happiness of the people and not theoretical aims put forward many years ago and never carried out in practice."

The market, she argues, has proved to be the most efficient economic instrument so the Soviet Union should move towards it. As for socialism, she believes that the Soviet Union has so far misunderstood what it should be. Her own description, as she agrees, sounds more like Sweden or West Germany: "Socialism," she says, "is not a special kind of society but a set of social relations which can be developed equally well in a market-capitalist economy as in a centrally planned economy. We now argue that common human values are more important than class relations." From there it also follows, she says, that there is a potential convergence between the Soviet and Western systems, an idea that was, not long ago, heretical in both Washington and Moscow.

Amongst the Soviet Communist Party's 20 million members, she says, perhaps half continue to subscribe to traditional Marxist theory while the other half are social democrats. The most reactionary part of Soviet society is the Party apparatus, those functionaries who oppose and sabotage perestroika.

Their resistance can only be overcome, she believes, if perestroyka, which began as a revolution from above, become a real revolution from below. "When Gorbachev used the phrase 'a new socialist revolution' two years ago," she said, "people thought it was a metaphor. But in fact it is the only way forward. Without a second revolution, we will have very limited reforms which will produce no results."

The dangers to the process come from hostile bureaucrats and the Soviet Union's explosive ethnic conflicts, which, she believes, may also have been encouraged by people bent, for their own reasons, on the sabotage of Mikhail Gorbachev.

In spite of the problems, according to a recent poll conducted by the All- Union Centre for Public Opinion Studies, of which she is director, President Gorbachev retains the support of 75 per cent of the population. "I like to be optimistic," she said, "because it is my nature. But the supporter of democracy in the Soviet Union need to prove organising ability, sophistication, they need to listen to each other—all these qualities are in question. I don't know if we will be able to do it."

Medvedev: Party Leaders' Qualities Change

90UN1114A Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN in Russian No 4, Feb 90 (signed to press 6 Feb 90) pp 19-22—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by USSR People's Deputy R. Medvedev; first two paragraphs are PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN introduction: "Lines Added to the Portrait of the Party Leader"]

[Text] The authority of the party leader is today determined more than ever by his personal attributes: endeavor to be constantly with the people, and not to tower above them, live their interests and needs, sacredly preserve the ties of party comradeship and set an example of high morality and personal modesty. These are not pious wishes, but objective demands associated with the process of the revolutionary restructuring of our society and the renewal of the party itself.

The commentator and historian R. Medvedev, people's deputy of the USSR, has offered the editorial office an article in which history echoes contemporaneity, as it were. We are convinced that many of the demands made on the party leader are of truly permanent significance.

The question of the character of the proletarian leader and of the "chief" and the people's masses has always occupied an important place in Marxism. Many interesting and important evaluations and descriptions of almost all the leaders of the workers movement contemporary with them, descriptions sometimes full of profound respect, but frequently scornful or devastatingly negative even, may be found in various works of Marx and, particularly, in his correspondence with Engels. However, neither Marx nor Engels ever attempted to provide a discursive answer to the question of the character of the leader of the working class. This is understandable for in Marx's lifetime the workers movement in Europe negotiated several stages, changing appreciably both the character of the European proletariat itself and the quality of its leaders. There was an enrichment of the experience and in many respects a broadening of the views of Marx himself.

Different capabilities have at different times proven extremely valuable for the proletarian leader. An outstanding propagandist could have proven not all that capable a leader at the time of the revolution or under the conditions of the civil war. An excellent "revolutionary fighter" might not have found things to do given the absence of a revolutionary situation. A skilled conspirator of a sec society was lost under conditions of democratic legality. The experienced leader of a legal party could have proven impotent upon transition to an illegal situation.

Demanding a historical approach to the solution of social problems, Marx extended the principle of historical method to the question of the character of the proletarian leader also. However, there were qualities of a workers' leader on which he always insisted: selfless devotion to the interests of the working class and the ideas and aims of communism, an endeavor to be with the masses, not tower above them, study of the regularities of social development and the scientific substantiation of the strategy and tactics of the workers movement and also unconditional personal honesty.

Of course, the question of qualities of the proletarian leader was never a purely theoretical question for Marx. Having recognized the historic mission of the working class, Marx took its part in the struggle, giving it his love, his willpower, his intellect and his pen. In 1844-1845 even Marx and Engels were proletarian revolutionaries and remained such throughout their lives. At this time the workers movement was a notable factor in the political life of West Europe. There was the Chartist Party in England. In France there were many secret alliances based on the proletariat. There were various worker societies in Germany. German emigre workers had formed the secret "League of the Just."

Each of these organizations had its own leaders. K. Marx quickly and intensively familiarized himself with the figures of the workers movement contemporary with him and their views. In Britain he became close to D. Garmi and E. Johnson. In France he made the acquaintance of A. Blanqui, Louis Blanc and P.J. Proudhon. Marx had particularly strong ties to the German revolutionaries: W. Weitling, W. Wolf, K. Schapper, I. Wedemeier, and many others.

K. Marx was at this time a welcome guest in the workers' organizations, and many of them would have liked to have seen him become a member. However, Marx was satisfied neither by the ideological nor organizational principles of all these secret and legal alliances. Marx and Engels not only criticized them but also embarked on the formulation of a new system of views and the creation of their own teaching. Even then Marx and Engels had the idea of forming an international workers' party. The accomplishment of this task was facilitated by convergence with the "League of the Just," which culminated in Marx and Engels joining this "League" and its reorganization into the "League of Communists." It was Marx and Engels who were entrusted with the elaboration of the program documents of the renewed "League," the result of which was their celebrated "Communist Party Manifesto."

Marx and Engels also participated actively in the preparation of the charter of the "League of Communists," which also formulated the demands which Marx deemed it possible to make both of ordinary figures and of the leaders of the workers movement. The charter said: "...The conditions of membership are: a) a way of life and activity in keeping with this goal (that is, ouster of the power of the bourgeoisie and the founding of a classless society—R.M.); b) revolutionary energy and zeal in propaganda; c) recognition of communism; d) refusal to participate in any anticommunist—political or national—society; e) subordination to the resolutions of the League; f) secrecy of all League affairs.... All members of the League are equal, they are brothers and, as

such, are duty bound in all instances to help one another" (K. Marx and F. Engels, Second Edition, Vol. 4, p 524).

Marx's assumption of the leadership of the "League of Communists" was accompanied by a break with W. Weithling, one of the founders of the "League of the Just." Marx acknowledged Weithling's contributions, but could not agree with his affected teaching and authoritarian approach. Marx saw clearly that the movement of the proletariat would bring forward not only chiefs aspiring to the creation of a society in which "...the free development of each is the condition of the free development of all" (Vol. 4, p 447) but also chiefs who preached a society of "barracks communism" crudely and unjustly equalizing all people. Unfortunately, the principal motive of some revolutionaries was malice and vengeance, they were prepared to employ all means and, aspiring to destruction, gave little thought to the creative tasks of the proletariat. Essentially, these were ideologues not so much of the proletariat as the lumpen-proletariat.

Marx and Engels opposed "ascetic, severe, spartan communism prohibiting any delight in life" (Vol. 19, p 191). They were also emphatically opposed to any cult of personality and joined the "League of Communists" "on the indispensable condition that all that contributed to the superstitious worship of authorities be thrown out of the charter" (Vol. 34, p 241).

This struggle against the cult of leaders and barracks communism was a principal struggle in Marx's activity in a later period also. It is well known that by the mid-19th century Marx had still not formulated his main ideas in the sphere of political economy and that Marxism had not at that time gained significant prevalence in the working class. Even the First International, which had been formed with Marx's creative participation, was not founded on a recognition of Marxism as the official ideology, although it did contribute to its more extensive spread.

While channeling his main efforts into the development of the theory of scientific socialism, Marx devoted much time also in this period to the education of proletarian revolutionaries. This work produced substantial results. Worker parties came to be formed at the end of the 1860's and in the 1870's in West Europe, and it was Marxism which exerted the greatest influence on the program documents of these parties. Many of the leaders of these parties—W. Liebknecht, A. Bebel, K. Kautsky, F. Mehring, F. Sorge, P. Lafargue, J. Guesde, A. Labriola and others—were students and followers of Marx.

K. Marx kept a close watch on the formation of these proletarian leaders, frequently criticizing them for their political mistakes. He engaged here in sharp argument with the revolutionaries who attempted to impose on the proletariat primitive-communist and anarchist ideas or who were proponents of bourgeois and petty bourgeois influence on the working class. Instructive in this respect was not only Marx's polemic with F. Lassalle but also M. Bakunin. This does not at all mean that Marx maintained friendly and creative relations only with his supporters and students. He treated with sincere respect many figures of the workers movement who were not Marxists: the Chartists, the Blanquists, the Russian populists and the participants in national liberation movements. But was cutting and coarse even with those who were not loyal in polemics, who ascribed to themselves nonexistent merits and made themselves out to be prophets and who put their personal interests above the interests of the movement, that is, with morally impure people wallowing in mutual rivalry, intriguers and those who dreamed of "...the onset of a deathly silence, wherein their voice would be heard the more loudly and the level of social consciousness would be so low that even people of their caliber would be significant entities" (Vol. 8, p 335).

There is no doubt that Marx advocated observance of party discipline and the principle which subsequently came to be called "democratic centralism." But he was opposed to blind, "Jesuitical" discipline, which could be a guarantee only of "impersonality for each member" (vol 18, p 241). Even less may theoretical work be bound by an iron frame. Marx never conceived of an "index of banned books" for party members. Not only centralism but also the opportunity for party members to monitor the activity of their leaders were important for Marx. Marx considered a principal form of such supervision the maximum possible observance of glasnost. He never idealized the leaders of the working class known to him. Back in 1850 he had written: "It would be highly desirable were the people at the head of a party of the movement... to be, finally, portrayed in severe Rembrandt colors in all their vital truth. In all existing descriptions these persons are never portrayed in their actual, merely in official, form, with buskins on their legs and with a halo above their heads. In these exultantly transformed Raphaelian portraits the entire truthfulness of the portrayal is lost" (Vol. 7, p 280).

These words could be applied to Marx himself. He has no need either of buskins or a halo. Neither was Marx always a model of reasonable tolerance nor did he always respond opportunely and adequately to a change in reality. But Stalin's definition, for example, of party leaders as the "command staff" of the proletariat, as "a kind of order of sword-bearers within the Soviet state directing the organs of the latter and inspiring their activity," has nothing in common with Marxism. Such a comparison would never have occurred to Marx, who had called religious orders "crusade scum."

Both Marx and Engels understood that revolution is frequently a brutal struggle which does not preclude violence and that the leaders of the working class should be prepared for this. Enemies of Marxism frequently quote the words of Marx and Engels on revolutionary terror. There is no reason to gloss over these statements. But, portraying them in a historical context, we need to acknowledge as just also other words of Marx, who

wrote: "That dust is kicked up in a storm, that at the time of revolution there is no savor of attar of roses and that from time to time some people even find themselves spattered with dirt is beyond question. Either, or. However, if account is taken of the immense efforts made by the entire official world... to destroy us... if account is taken of the dirty slander of the "democracy of the absurd," which cannot forgive the fact that our party has more intelligence and character than it itself; if one knows the history of all other parties **of that same period**... one concludes that in this 19th century our party stands out by its purity" (Vol. 30, pp 402- 403).

Unfortunately, far from all party leaders have subsequently been able with sufficient grounds to repeat these words of Marx's. But this is no reason to cast aside Marxism and socialism, merely a reason to intensify the struggle for the purity of communist teaching and socialist practice and also the behavior and political activity of the leaders of the present-day working class.

Moiseyev Cited on Perestroyka in Armed Forces

AU3003060090 VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, 12 March 1990 (signed to press 1 February 1990) pp 3-10—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Interview with Army General Mikhail Alekseyevich Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, by Major General V.I. Filatov, editor in chief of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL: "The Armed Forces: Perestroyka, Problems, Plans"]

[Text] **At readers' conferences and in letters to the editorial board, requests are often espressed for more detailed accounts of the USSR's defensive military doctrine, prospects for military organizational development, perestroyka of the Armed Forces at a new qualitative level, and the tasks of the General Staff at the present stage.**

On the eve of the 72d anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy, Major General V.I. Filatov, editor in chief of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, met with General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and asked him to answer questions which interest our readers.

[Filatov] Mikhail Alekseyevich, on 18 October 1989, M.S. Gorbachev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, pointed out at the Main Military Council that the main directions for the implementation of the USSR's defensive military doctrine have already taken shape in the Ministry of Defense. What are the initial political tenets of the doctrine and the new approaches to its implementation?

[Moiseyev] The organizational development of our defense is being conducted and implemented on the basis of decisions taken by the party and the government. Today, its content and orientation are determined by the ideas of the new political thinking, by the development of the international and internal situation, by the country's socioeconomic potential, and by the requirements of military doctrine. As is well known, our doctrine is based not on preparation for war but on its prevention, on the preservation of peace, reliable defense of the USSR and its allies, maintenance of the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces at a level sufficient to guarantee the repulsion, in cooperation with our allied armies, of armed aggression. In other words, the doctrine bears an exclusively defensive character. I believe that its initial political aims and the new approaches for their realization are as follows: to use the Armed Forces only in response to aggression started from outside; not to be the first to start war, unless we ourselves or our allies have become the object of aggression; not to be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances; to base the actions of the Armed Forces at the beginning of war on the conduct of defensive operations.

The practical fulfillment of these aims confirms the Soviet state's peaceable foreign policy and is a powerful counterbalance to the myth of the Soviet military threat.

The military technical aspect of the doctrine is closely connected with the political one. It determines first and foremost what kind of Armed Forces are needed now, their composition, numerical strength, groupings, level of equipment, and the direction of the preparation character of preparation, training, and indoctrination of personnel.

Proceeding from the priorities of the new political thinking, the main thing is not the escalation of arms, but rather their reduction to a level of reasonable sufficiency for defense. In this connection, it is possible to maintain smaller Armed Forces in peacetime and in so doing to save strength and resources.

Soviet military doctrine is being implemented in the following main directions. **First**, the Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Medium- and Shorter-Range Missiles is being implemented consistently. As of 31 December 1989, the Soviet Union has eliminated 1,498 medium- and shorter-range missiles (81.1 percent of their initial quantity) and 555 launchers for such missiles (67.2 percent). The United States have eliminated 451 missiles (53.3 percent) and 92 launchers (31.8 percent). In addition, in 1989 both sides completed the elimination of their shorter-range missiles and launchers. The first step toward practical nuclear disarmament has been made.

Second, the unilateral reduction of the Armed Forces is under way and its first stage has been completed. The numerical strength of the troops has now been reduced by more than 260,000 men, and the total reduction is to be one of 500,000 men. In addition to this, more than 173,000 students have been discharged from military service in accordance with a resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The Central Asian and Urals military districts and the command of one army have been disbanded, and the process of disbanding two more

armies is nearing completion. The quantity of command and control elements of the central apparatus and of the directorates of military districts has beed reduced by 20-40 percent. This process continues.

Third, the withdrawal of our combined units and units from groups of forces and from the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic which was planned for 1989 has been completed. More than 50,000 men, 3,200 tanks, and large quantities of weapons and military hardware have already been withdrawn. Three out of the six tank divisions intended for withdrawal, have already been withdrawn. The rest will be withdrawn this year. All six divisions are being disbanded. Simultaneously, tactical nuclear systems, assault-attack, and assault river-crossing combined units and units are being withdrawn in full from the groups of forces.

Fourth, more than 50 combined units, units, and subunits of the Rocket Forces, Ground Forces, Air Defense Forces, and Air Forces on the territory of our country have been disbanded. About 7,000 tanks, large quantities of artillery guns and assault river-crossing equipment have been eliminated from the effective strength of the Ground Forces, about 600 combat aircraft from the Air Forces, and 12 submarines and 28 surface ships from the Navy.

Fifth, a considerable part of the military hardware being reduced is being re-equipped and transferred to the country's national economy. It is sufficient to say that several thousand tanks are now ready for dismantling, some of them have been re-equipped as auxilliary hardware, and more than 7,000 motor vehicles have been transferred to the national economy.

Unilateral reduction is a materialization of our fundamentally revised military doctrine. It has now been assigned a strictly defensive character. Such a profound perestroyka of our Armed Forces is determined by the general logic of the new political thinking. It is closely linked with some of our other unilateral initiatives. I will remind you of only some of them: For one and one-half years we have observed a moratorium on nuclear tests; last year we carried out the withdrawal of 500 tactical nuclear warheads from the territories of allied countries; we have stopped the production of chemical weapons and started to destroy their stocks; we are discontinuing the production of highly enriched uranium for military purposes. In 1990, we are closing down an industrial reactor for the production of weapons-grade plutonium without replacing it with new capacity. Another reactor of this kind was closed down two years ago and yet another one in 1989.

During the next two years our military budget will be reduced by 14.27 percent (R10 billion), and in 1990 it will be reduced by more than 8 percent. By as early as 1995, we are going to reduce sharply—by a factor of one and one-half to two—the share of our national income spent on defense. Of course, we will only be able to do so if the international situation permits it.

We are planning to complete all the reduction measures by the beginning of 1991. As a result, the Armed Forces will acquire a distinctly defensive orientation. At present, work is being conducted by the General Staff on the prospects for their development with a view to their possible further reduction if agreements are reached during disarmament negotiations. This is a complicated problem which requires a balanced and comprehensively considered approach.

[Filatov] What is the reaction of the US and NATO leadership to our country's peaceable initiatives?

[Moiseyev] The peace-seeking efforts of the Soviet Union have not yet found due response or understanding on the part of the US and NATO leadership. An objective confirmation of this is the approach of the U.S. Administration to the formation of long-term policy with regard to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact states. The United States continues to believe that, notwithstanding the complex of perestroyka changes, the ideological contradictions between the two world systems still remain and will continue to exist in the future. In view of this and also of the level of Soviet military and economic power and of a number of other factors, the Soviet Union remains and will indefinitely remain the main and potential enemy of the United States in both the ideological and the military respect.

G. Bush's administration does not intend to give up its policy of continuous pressure when conducting negotiations or the "nuclear deterrence" strategy and does not altogether rule out the possibility of returning, under certain circumstances, to a state of direct confrontation between the Armed Forces. It exercises caution in assessing prospects for the development of the U.S. Armed Forces. At the same time, one can see a definite readiness for cooperation in general, although this does not go beyond the framework of U.S. interests.

A leading position is assigned to reaching agreements with the USSR on arms reduction, but with a selective approach which is directed mainly at violating the strategic parity between the USSR and the USA to the latter's advantage. The Americans believe that one of the main factors guaranteeing the implementation of these long-term goals is the attainment of extremely rapid growth rates in industrial production and the development of new models of armaments and military hardware based on advanced technology.

They continue intensive work on guaranteeing their superiority in high-precision weapons, combat aircraft, and naval forces, and on implementing the SDI program in its various modifications.

These actions are paraded as a measure which is necessary to prevent American interests in central Europe from being vulnerable to the USSR's military power, which allegedly exceeds U.S. military power. At the same time, the declaration of the Soviet side about the change in USSR military doctrine and strategy is presented as "Soviet rhetoric."

The scope of the exercises being conducted by the United States and NATO does not decrease and their orientation is invariable. Almost continuously, around the entire perimeter of land and sea maritime borders of the USSR and its allies in Europe and Asia, large-scale exercises of the U.S. and NATO Armed Forces are being conducted for the purpose of working out realistic plans for preparing and conducting military actions against the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community.

The strategic offensive forces are regarded by the Bush administration as the principal guarantor of national security and are assigned top priority in U.S. military organizational development.

At the same time, the United States strives to maintain its naval forces as a means of defending American interests in various regions of the world and does not envisage conducting negotiations with the USSR on the reduction of naval armaments.

On the whole, the regular session of the Council of the West European Union at the level of foreign and defense ministers, which was held in Brussels on 13-14 November 1989, approved these approaches of the U.S. Administration, supported the idea of the creation of a "strong and united Europe," and emphasized the necessity of following more attentively the processes which are under way in Europe. This must not be left out of account.

[Filatov] Today, much is being said and written about the prospects for military organizational development and the perestroyka of the Armed Forces at a new qualitative level. What is being done with regard to this, and what are the tasks which the General Staff is facing?

[Moiseyev] All the processes of perestroyka which our country is experiencing find reflection in the Army and the Navy. Within the Armed Forces, they are proceeding in the following principal directions: **First and foremost**, the requirements of Soviet military doctrine and of its defensive character are being implemented in practice; **second**, a transition is being made in military organizational development to mainly qualitative parameters with regard to technology, military science, and the composition of the Armed Forces; questions of the development of the Armed Forces are being revised proceeding from the principles of reasonable sufficiency for defense and with the provision for the reduction of military expenditure without detriment to the country's security; **third**, the quality of training of the Armed Forces is improving; **fourth**, definite changes for the better have started being seen in the state of military discipline, in the elimination of accidents and crimes, and in the establishment of an observance of regulations in the life of our troops.

Fifth, and finally, the level and the effectiveness of party-political work in the Army and the Navy are rising as is the personal example set by Army and Navy communists, and the party line is being more actively implemented in the Armed Forces.

I consider it necessary to analyze our work on implementing the above trends of perestroyka in greater detail, to pinpoint those problems which require particular attention, and to specify the tasks of main directorates in resolving them.

We are now reducing the Armed Forces. This is a command of time. It is now necessary to revise the character of the training of the troops, our military technical policy, the organizational development of the Armed Forces, and the procedures for manpower acquisition and training of cadres.

There is not a single area in which we would not carry out work to implement the up-to-date tenets of defensive military doctrine. Simultaneously, we have carried out a critical reappraisal of the structure of the Armed Forces. We have analyzed their possible courses of action in repulsing aggression and have determined the expedient composition of forces and equipment on theaters of operations and on sectors.

Work on the timely training of personnel for the defense of the country has been organized, taking into account changed views on the art of warfare. Much has been done and is being done.

Our possibilities are restricted in connection with the fact that fulfillment of tasks is considerably complicated by the reduction of the Armed Forces, yet our responsibility remains the same. The problem may be resolved by improving the organization of the troops and the naval forces, by providing them with an optimal structure, by defining more precisely the various aspects of their development, their level of equipment, and the force ratios between the branches of service of the Armed Forces and its combat arms. However, this does not exhaust the existing difficulties. For example, one of the problems is how to maintain arms and combat hardware with a minimal quantity of personnel, where to get the personnel to service this hardware, and so forth.

Nor do we forget that more attention must be paid to the personal training of leading personnel and headquarters staff on questions of combat readiness, command and control of troops, and the strengthening of military discipline. We are raising the demands made with regard to the quality of the operational and combat readiness of headquarters and troops.

The collectives of the General Staff's leading directorates have done great and useful work but, in approaching its assessment from the standpoint of perestroyka, we have no right to rest content, the more so because many unresolved problems still remain. Today, it is still too early to speak of the completion of the processes of perestroyka. An analysis of the work of some directorates shows that by no means have all reserves and potential been activated. The inertia of the old approaches has not yet been completely overcome and formalism in work is

being eliminated too slowly. Some generals and officers are still living from day to day. We will strive to learn and demand that they learn how to combine to the best advantage the resolution of current and long-terms tasks in our work, to concentrate efforts on what is most important, and to have a clear perspective.

It is necessary to considerably improve organizational activities on the manpower acquisition of our Armed Forces and on preparing young people for military service, taking into account the problems which exist in interethnic relations. Particular attention must be given to the ethnic characteristics of the conscript contingent and to the creation of well-balanced collectives of mixed nationalities which are capable of fulfilling the tasks facing the troops.

The enlistment into the services of military reservists, for various special training courses connected with gathering the harvest, eliminating the consequences of natural disasters and major accidents, and also to serve terms exceeding the norms stipulated by the Law on Universal Military Service Obligation is an acute question. The resolution of this problem must be accelerated with the aim of giving it the force of law.

Over the past two years, the General Staff has implemented a number of measures on the organizational perestroyka of the central apparatus, headquarters, and troops. It must be said that against the background of an overall reduction of the central apparatus we have strengthened important areas of work in headquarters. However, this has given rise to questions of strengthening directorates (sections) of combat training, and others. This question needs to be further elaborated. Haste is inadmissible in solving tasks of this kind. It is also clear that the existing structure of the Armed Forces does not yet fully conform to the defensive policy we have adopted and needs to be improved. We have very serious work ahead of us here. I would especially like to emphasize the practicability aspect of the approach to resolving such tasks. Wishful thinking is dangerous, especially in the General Staff.

Timely and reliable information on a potential adversary plays a great role in validating the prospects for the development of the Soviet Armed Forces.

On the whole, officers of the General Staff are today expected not simply to verify facts and tendencies which have been revealed concerning the adversary but, together with officers of the other services of the Armed Forces, to provide a thorough and critical analysis of them and the most timely and rapid identification possible of those trends in the military strategic and military technical efforts of potential adversaries which are the most dangerous for us. It must not be forgotten that in many areas of contemporary science discoveries may be made whose implementation may fundamentally alter the character of the means of warfare and the ways in which they are employed. This is why we must be insured against any elements of surprise.

In particular, we must point out the necessity of focusing the attention of General Staff officers on an analysis of the military political and military technical aspects of the US stand with regard to arms reduction and disarmament. The timely acquisition of such information will enable us to form our position at negotiations and international conferences of various levels in a more valid and qualitative manner.

Demands for increased efficiency in the command and control of the Armed Forces are growing sharply. Much work is being done in this direction. The structure and the system of communications are being made more precise. Complicated and important tasks face the apparatus of the Armed Forces Chief of Signals Service; their resolution will require the implementation of a whole number of organizational technical measures onn the scale of the Armed Forces and of the country as a whole.

The perestroyka of international relations in accordance with the new political thinking places fundamentally new demands on military cooperation with foreign countries.

Military cooperation continues to constitute an essential part of the Soviet Union's interrelations with friendly states and has a determining influence on our position in various regions. Today, the situation in the world is such that military cooperation will continue. The main role in increasing its effectiveness belongs to the General Staff.

In my opinion, the main direction in accomplishing perestroyka of military cooperation must be guaranteeing its close coordination with the foreign policy course of the Soviet Union and with the tasks of the fundamental reform of the foreign economic activity of the USSR. It must be based on our long-term political, economic, and military interests.

In the area of military cooperation we must evidently shift more toward advisory activity. We must conduct cooperation in close interaction with the directorates of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense, services of the Armed Forces and combat arms jointly with the Foreign Ministry, the USSR Council of Ministers State Committee for Questions of Military Industry, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, and other ministries and departments.

In our practical work we must learn due lessons from the past. All the tasks which are emerging must be tackled in depth, taking into account long-term prospects and foreseeing problems which the USSR Armed Forces may encounter. We must learn **to skillfully combine current and long-term tasks in our work**.

In these conditions **the role of military science increases**. It must help us to resolve problems not only without serious errors but also in their optimum variant, especially when we are dealing with prospects for the future.

At present, many military-theoretical tenets are being revised, new trends are emerging in military science, and

questions of strategy, operational skills, and tactics are undergoing radical changes. However, there are problems here, too.

The transition of scientific research institutions to economic accountability and self-financing has advanced a number of other problems which may significantly influence our military technical policy. Today, it is important not to allow lagging in the elaboration of promising types of weapons and hardware. The narrow departmental approach is inadmissible here.

However, it should be kept in mind that everybody must devote attention to military science. Unfortunately, so far we mostly do no more than talk about it. All the directorates of the General Staff must actively join in work on fundamental and applied problems and must better analyze and take account of progressive methods. Only given this condition, will practical work at the General Staff be based on the conclusions and recommendations of science. This is why ensuring a closer combination of scientific and practical activity must constitute one of the trends of perestroyka in our work.

I want to emphasize a specific feature in the present-day work of the General Staff, **its increasing role in resolving international problems**. This follows naturally from the situation in which we are living.

We must improve our work on guaranteeing the negotiating process, convincingly defend our positions, show flexibility, and seek compromise solutions. We must exercise greater foresight in appraising different variants of possible solutions, seek correct responses to the actions of a potential adversary, defend our interests, and find compromises.

[Filatov] Mikhail Alekseyevich, in resolving the very complicated problems which face the General Staff it is evidently necessary to improve or perhaps even change the style and methods of its work. What are your thoughts on this matter?

[Moiseyev] It must be pointed out that the majority of the officers of the General Staff work well, with great effort and diligence and that they cannot be accused of inactivity or irresponsibility. However, alongside the high quality of work, some officers oversimplify their approach to resolving important questions and sometimes resolve them in a routine manner. Here, I would put the blame first and foremost on superiors who do not work sufficiently with their subordinates and do not teach them how to resolve problems in such a way as to meet the requirements of the General Staff. Hence the task of radically improving work with officers and of **raising their professional training**.

New demands have compelled us to define more precisely the structure of the General Staff and to bring it into line with the character of the tasks being tackled today. We believe that the perestroyka which is under way will make it possible to increase the effectiveness of work, to eliminate parallelism, and to increase peoples' responsibility for fulfilling the tasks with which they are entrusted. However, no reorganization in itself resolves anything. Success has always depended on people, and we must give special attention to this aspect. We must not forget the fact that everything is decided by people.

It is necessary to conduct the most resolute struggle **to eliminate bureaucracy from our directorates**. We must put an end to their unjustified preoccupation with organizational questions [zaorganizovannost] and attempts to take upon themselves the functions of subordinate organs, reject their petty and excessive supervision, the multitude of reports, various kinds of unnecessary or formal information, accounts, dispatches, and so on.

The habit of looking to one's "superiors" and trying to guess what their opinions might be is one of the bad features. It engenders weak will, inertia, and sometimes indifference and a striving to "deflect" any task or to hide behind a sheet of paper which is addressed to a neighbor. As a result, tens and hundreds of questions, most of which can and must be resolved on the spot, keep wandering from one office to another or even from one directorate to another and contribute to the stream of paperwork which literally overwhelms us. We must abandon this defective practice.

In this connection, we must also approach **the organization of interaction** in everyday work between all structural subdivisions of the General Staff in a new way and enhance the personal role in this matter of the chiefs of main and independent directorates, who must resolve more questions by way of personal contacts and thus, whenever possible, eliminate the carousel of paperwork.

Now a few words on another trend of perestroyka which may be referred to as **the strengthening of military discipline**.

It is very important for us to understand that a radical breakthrough in discipline depends not only on a fundamental improvement in the work of the political command personnel and headquarters directly within the troops and the fleets, but also on the perestroyka of the work of the central apparatus in this respect, including the General Staff. It is necessary to shift our efforts to a more stringent organization of the fulfillment of orders, directives, and all our instructions. So far, not everything is in order in this matter.

[Filatov] In the CPSU we see the bearer of perestroyka's policy goals, a unifying and consolidating force. What would you like to see in the work of the General Staff's party organizations under conditions of perestroyka?

[Moiseyev] First and foremost, I want to point out that perestroyka in the Army and the Navy is impossible today without the solidarity and unity of all Communists and without their vanguard role. This has been confirmed by the course and results of the work of the second Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the December (1989) CPSU Central Committee plenum.

The General Staff's collective consists entirely of communists. The role which party organizations are expected to play in the perestroyka of its activity is perfectly clear. The main point here is **work with every communist and the close coordination of all measures taken by the party, on the one hand, with the specific tasks being tackled by the directorates, on the other.**

It is necessary to make a better study of people, to improve their education, and to eradicate manifestations of formalism in this matter. Party organizations must proceed more actively to specific issues and demand from communists a high level of responsibility for the implementation of resolutions of the party and the Soviet Government on questions of defense.

Chiefs of directorates and secretaries of party organizations must react more efficiently to the proposals and critical remarks of communists and perceive them not as a formality but rather as their official and direct party duty.

In educational work with communists we must take into account the fact that the character of the activity of the General Staff differs significantly from that of other management organs. The officers are required to show the highest performance, self-dicipline, honesty, stringent diligence, and exactingness. In the General Staff, as in no other place, it is essential for senior officers to develop a respectful attitude toward their subordinates and their opinions and proposals, and a feeling of mutual help and mutual understanding.

Communists of the General Staff are obliged to show an example of **efficient organizational work within the troops**. Unfortunately, there are many shortcomings here. The efficiency of our officers when working outside the center is not high. We do not always notice fundamental shortcomings or reveal their genuine causes. Greater emphasis must be placed on rendering **professional assistance** to the troops and the fleets. It is necessary to work in such a way that officers of the General Staff would be welcome in the troops, and that commanders would be able to openly exchange opinions about their problems with representatives of the General Staff and be confident that they would be understood correctly, that the leadership would be notified, and that measures would be taken.

We have undoubtedly done much over the past two years. However, some of the problems have not really been dealt with and we are only just approaching other problems. This is particularly tangible when dealing with the implementation of qualitative parameters in the organizational development of the Armed Forces, and it can be understood. More than one generation of General Staffers have been brought up on quantitative parameters. However, the time is now such that all of us must learn how to think and work in a new way, must look to the future with greater confidence, and must seek unconventional solutions. In short, we must restructure more actively, become more involved in the practical implementation of matters locally, make greater efforts to ultimately overcome the elements of stagnation, and to accomplish the tasks facing the Armed Forces more efficiently. It is necessary to decisively fight departmentalism, to look for and make fuller use of our inner reserves and potential. In these questions, we must demand more from the headquarters of the services and of the Armed Forces, from the main and central directorates of the Ministry of Defense, from senior officers of combat arms and services, from the commanders and headquarters of military districts, and from groups of forces and fleets.

I find it essential to emphasize once again that perestroyka in the Armed Forces is not a matter of one day. In order to enable the General Staff to really function properly, we must intensify and improve our work constantly, from day to day. We must be constantly learning how to resolve our problems in the national interest.

The most responsible stage of preparation for the 28th Party Congress is ahead of us. All of us must clearly determine our positions and act in such a way that every day will be a step forward, however small, and will produce concrete practical results.

CSSR Foreign Minister Dienstbier Interviewed

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[Report on interview with CSSR Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier, by Vitaliy Yaroshevskiy; date and place not specified: "With the Musketeer From the Czernin Palace"]

[Text] This happened on 10 December last year. It was a Sunday, and Jiri Dienstbier was preparing to set off for the night shift in the boiler house where he had been working for almost six years. However, the authorities had to find a replacement for him: The stoker had been appointed foreign minister in Czechoslovakia's coalition government. He threw off his working clothes and hastily headed for Prazsky Hrad, where the new cabinet was swearing the oath of allegiance to the president of the republic. Vitaliy Yaroshevskiy, our correspondent in Prague, outpaced his colleagues and was the first Soviet journalist to whom Minister Jiri Dienstbier kindly consented to grant an interview.

The 52-year-old Jiri Dienstbier worked as a stoker against his will, of course. In the 1960's he had been one of the best-known foreign correspondents of Czechoslovak radio and was a winner of the Julius Fucik Prize. Following the purge of the mass news media of "antisocialist elements" in 1970, he was dismissed. The only place where he was given permission to work was the boiler house. But despite the conditions, which were little suited to creativity, Dienstbier's pen did not rust over. Two of his books were published by Prague's

Albatros Publishers under the woman's pseudonym of Zelmira Zivna. From 1979 through 1982, he was imprisoned for participating in the activity of the Committee in Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted. His friends call Dienstbier a "musketeer." Not only, we have to assume, for his outward appearance but, rather, for his honesty, courage, and loyalty.

[Yaroshevskiy] From a stoker to a minister! A dizzying progress, to put it bluntly. Who offered you this high office? Were there other candidates? What did you feel when you walked into your office in the Czernin Palace? How were you able all these years to keep up to the mark and maintain your intellectual condition in order to be able to plunge immediately into affairs of state?

[Dienstbier] When I was 10 years old, perhaps, 11, I purchased a three-volume "History of Diplomacy." It had been written by Soviet authors, and it was published in our country after the war. In the 1960's I was a foreign policy commentator and then correspondent in countries of the Far East and in the United States. As of 1969, I changed professions, but in no way lost my interest in diplomacy. To be honest, I do not know how many candidates for the ministerial office there were. The revolution developed very quickly. I was chosen, obviously, because at the given moment I was available....

To keep up to the mark I daily listened to the radio and read foreign journals, newspapers, and books. Getting hold of them was difficult. As a representative of the citizens' opposition, Charter 77, for example, or as chairman of the editorial council of the independent LIDOVE NOVYNY newspaper, say, I met over a period of several years with politicians, deputies, and ministers who visited Czechoslovakia. I had meetings with President Mitterrand and many American senators, political scientists, and journalists. In a word, I, as a stoker, had enough work.

[Yaroshevskiy] You once called the former Czechoslovakia an "iceberg in Europe" and not very long ago wrote in the newspaper LIDOVE NOVINY that "the iceberg has already melted, but parts of it remain." Could you not clarify what you meant? What is the essence of the "iceberg period" in Czechoslovak foreign policy and what still remains of it?

[Dienstbier] Having seized power and held onto it for more than 20 years as a result of the military intervention of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries on 21 August 1968, the former political leadership of Czechoslovakia supported with great reluctance and only in words the idea of building a common European home. The former Czechoslovak leaders failed to fulfill the principles of the Helsinki process, made a mockery of human rights, sent police armed with nightsticks against peaceful demonstrators, threw behind bars anyone who dared even to hint that he disagreed with the postulates of Brezhnevian ideology and followed with undisguised hostility the democratic changes in Poland and Hungary. In fact, the former leadership was absolutely purposeful in sabotaging Mikhail Gorbachev's foreign policy efforts. The situation which had taken shape in Czechoslovakia inevitably had to have caused misgivings about to the new European policy also. Czechoslovakia's former policy not only failed to introduce anything new and original to the European process but, in addition, the very state of Czechoslovakia was slowing down the integration of Europe and the building of the common European home.

[Yaroshevskiy] To look to the future, what do you see as the basis of Czechoslovak-Soviet relations?

[Dienstbier] I believe that the strength of Czechoslovak-Soviet contacts will depend directly on their voluntary nature. Ultimately this is the fundamental principle of relations between states. We aspire to the most mutually profitable economic relations possible. We will fulfill and stand by all commitments ensuing from the accords between our states. At the same time it is essential to review many of them and bring them into line with the fundamentally new international situation. In order for our relations to be built on mutual trust and for their past to not even be burdened by unexplained circumstances, we must investigate the consequences of the military invasion of Czechoslovakia of 21 August 1968 and, for example, the invalid treaty on the temporary stationing of Soviet forces on Czechoslovak territory. At the same time I believe that today Czechoslovak and Soviet policy are closer than at any time in the past 20 years.

[Yaroshevskiy] As far as I know, you are an active supporter of the disbanding of the military blocs....

[Dienstbier] Not only I but Mr. President Vaclav Havel has declared repeatedly that Czechoslovak policy is geared to the removal of both military groupings in Europe. Nonetheless, all partial actions and any unilateral attempt to leave the Warsaw Pact would not promote the achievement of stability in Europe. Czechoslovakia does not intend to leave the Warsaw Pact. It wants to participate together with all European countries in the building of a Europe in which there is no basis for the existence of military blocs at all.

[Yaroshevskiy] Are manifestations of unfriendly sentiments in respect of the Soviet Union possible in Czechoslovakia, in your view?

[Dienstbier] I believe that your question is irrelevant in respect of Czechoslovakia. You know our country, you have studied here, you speak Czech fluently and you have a lot of friends here. You therefore surely know that the anti-Soviet mood in Czechoslovakia was closely linked with the Stalin-Brezhnev policy. Gorbachev, however, was cordially received in Prague. Czechs and Slovaks are following closely the new domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union. They know that Mikhail Gorbachev's new policy served to support the democratic changes in the East European countries, Czechoslovakia included. In addition, you could see for

yourself that our "autumn revolution," as we call it, consistently adheres to the principles of truth and nonviolence. Our peoples have understood that democracy can only be achieved democratically, under peaceful conditions, and this means maintaining friendly relations with the peoples of other countries.

[Yaroshevskiy] You wrote in an article in the newspaper LIDOVE NOVINY that the Czechoslovak people had accomplished the present revolution themselves. The propitious international situation had nothing to do with it in this case, apparently. If I have understood you correctly, neither the perestroyka in the USSR nor U.S. policy in East Europe ultimately exerted any appreciable influence on the development of events in Czechoslovakia?

[Dienstbier] I said at a press conference that the Soviet Union had recognized as mistaken its decision of 21 August 1968 only after we had liberated ourselves from totalitarian authority. Had such an acknowledgment been made earlier, we also would have been able to remove earlier the discredited neo-Stalinist regime, and our peoples would as a result have had a more affectionate attitude toward the Soviet Union. But this confluence of circumstances was, as I have already said, of a positive nature also. No one presented our new freedom and democracy to us as a gift. This is of very considerable significance for the self-awareness of our peoples. Answering the preceding question, I have already emphasized that the new Soviet policy, detente in the world, and the changes in neighboring countries contributed to our revolution being swift, disciplined, and nonviolent. The parallel nature of the democratic processes in our two countries is a guarantee of the successful and propitious development of Czechoslovak-Soviet relations.

[Yaroshevskiy] Tell me how your working day takes shape. How do you spend your free time, if you have such, of course? Your amusements? And, excuse my forwardness, how much do you make? Do you enjoy any benefits and privileges?

[Dienstbier] I have no free time, nor can I speak of any amusements as yet. My wage is approximately four times that of a stoker. I have an official car and driver. But I like to drive the car myself and therefore sometimes send the driver home and take the wheel. I travel the world not only free of charge but even receive money for this. However, overseas I see only airports and statesmen's offices. But I like my work. Complaining would be unseemly since I have taken it on. I have what I wanted. [interview ends]

...When the conversation with the minister was over and I had left the Czernin Palace, I thought about the unhappy event which had occurred in this building.

Jan Masaryk, son of Tomas Masaryk, president of bourgeois Czechoslovakia, and foreign minister in the Klement Gottwald government, died here in 1948. The official version at that time was that the minister had resolved to do away with himself by throwing himself out of the window. True, all these past years there had been very little credence put in this version in Czechoslovakia. Was this "suicide" or murder? The arguments are still going on. Coming to head the Foreign Minister, Jiri Dienstbier resolved to convert the apartment of his predecessor in the Czernin Palace, which had been preserved in its original form, into a museum. This will be done in the spring, on the anniversary of Jan Masaryk's tragic death.

Defense, State Security Committee Viewed

AU1503230090 Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 1, January 1990 (signed to press 15 December 89) pp 79-85—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by G. Sturua, sector chief at the USSR Academy of Sciences World Economics and Internal Relations Institute, MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA accredited observer at the USSR Supreme Soviet: "The Committee on Questions of Defense and State Security: The First Months of Work"]

[Text] There has never been a committee of this kind within the structure of the USSR Supreme Soviet in its entire history. It is very symptomatic that in the old wording of the Basic Law, the extremely scant list of powers of the USSR Supreme Soviet made no mention of the competence of the supreme organ of state power with regard to foreign policy and defense. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the activity of our state in the sphere of defense and state security has, in point of fact, turned not simply into a gigantic "zone above criticism" but into an enigmatic "terra incognita" for the whole of society. The excessive secrecy, the practice of taking account of predominantly departmental interests, the limited circle of people involved in working out even fundamental decisions, and accountability to just a few leading figures offered wide scope for active participation in the arms race, the squandering of national resources, ill-considered actions on the international arena, and repressions within the country.

The corresponding activity of the supreme echelon of the party and state bureaucracy was assigned a kind of sacral character, one which did not tolerate interference by the unordained.

The perestroyka which is under way and which presupposes the dismantling of the administrative command system and the formation of a law-governed state has directly posed the question of effecting a radical transformation—on the basis of the principle of the sovereignty of the people—of the mechanism by which decisions are made in the sphere of defense and state security. This would seem to be one of the most important among those practical measures for guaranteeing the irreversibility and stability of democratic reforms. Deputy A.A. Alekseyev, chairman of the Committee on Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order

has noted with absolute justification that one of the main functions of a parliamentary organ dealing with defense and security matters must lie in coordinating decisions in this sphere with the observance of human rights.

The amendments to the Constitution which came into force at the end of 1988 were evidence of the emergence of a new approach in the spirit of perestroyka: In particular, Article 113, Paragraph 13 states that the USSR Supreme Soviet determines basic measures in the sphere of defense and state security.

However, as we have all had occasion to be persuaded of the fact that the absence of a mechanism for implementing even a correct constitutional provision renders that provision no more than an empty declaration. The creation of a special organ of the USSR Supreme Soviet to examine the problems involved in guaranteeing external and internal security was a serious step in establishing such a mechanism.

The conception of a new structural subdivison of the USSR Supreme Soviet was probably being developed in its most general form in 1988. Articles began to appear in the periodic press in which authors proposed the organization of a parliamentary commission on the Armed Forces, analogous to those which exist in the legislative assemblies of foreign countries. The authors of Soviet legislative reform concluded that the new parliamentary organ should be assigned a somewhat different character and endowed with a broader range of powers. Proceeding from the fact that the tasks of guaranteeing the country's defense capability and state security are closely bound to one another and that the Constitution links them in a single complex, it was considered expedient to transfer the curatorship of both areas to the competence of the future organ. It is evident that considerations of secrecy might also play a certain role—the aspiration to limit the circle of people admitted to strictly guarded state secrets to the members of this parliamentary subdivision alone.

The specific character of the examination of problems of defense and security and, first and foremost, the novelty of the organizational aspect of the matter all indicate that, at the initial stage, the transfer of both areas to one organ is an absolutely expedient move. At the same time, the volume of work generated by each of these areas may be so significant and, moreover, with the passing of time must be so significant that if we are really building a law-governed state it will be difficult and irrational for purely technical reasons to combine the examination of these two types of state activity under one "roof."

The idea of separating these two areas is also supported by some deputies, albeit for diverse reasons. For example, I.I. Gryazin, doctor of juridical sciences considers that since the concept of "state security" does not fit into a purely military and political framework it should be the concern, alongside the working organ on defense, of other committees of the Supreme Soviet, in particular of the Committee on Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order and the Committee on Glasnost and the Rights and Appeals of Citizens. It may well be expedient to create a separate Supreme Soviet committee on state security.

Marshal V.G. Kulikov arrives at the same conclusion from a quite different angle. In his opinion, the level of secrecy in the sphere of state security is much higher than that in the sphere of defense and it is therefore undesirable, as has already occurred, to increase the number of deputies who might be occupied with problems of guaranteeing state security in their entirety.

It is also not ruled out that with the passing of time life will cause us to think of rejecting the formation of a USSR Supreme Soviet committee and of creating corresponding committees of its chambers. Such a possibility is contained in the USSR Constitution. Proceeding from Article 116, which fixes the competence of each of the chambers, it may be concluded that since the Council of the Union examines questions of defense and state security it should have organized a commission empowered to study them. At the same time it follows from Article 166, which establishes that each chamber may examine any questions relating to the conduct of the USSR Supreme Soviet, that in case of necessity, the Council of Nationalities may in theory also form a temporary or permanent commission engaged on the analysis of defense and security securities. As we can see from the course of perestroyka at the present stage of its development, the process of guaranteeing national equality and the interests of nations and nationalities, which relates primarily to the competence of the Council of Nationalities may, in principle, also affect the military and political sphere.

The provisions of the Constitution, our experience, and worldwide practice serve as a starting point for clarifying which specific tasks may already be included in the powers of the committee today.

Article 121, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution says that the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet presents reports to the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and to the Supreme Soviet, including reports on guaranteeing the defense capability and security of the country. It must evidently be assumed that the chairman will present a report in his capacity as head of the USSR Defense Council. The first report of this kind will be a major event in our internal and, indeed, our international life, and will raise the open discussion of questions of defense and security to a previously unprecedented level. The inclusion of legislative power on an equal basis in dialogue on these questions presupposes that, in the USSR Supreme Soviet, deep and competent positions will crystallize on military-political problems. A corresponding committee could also make its contribution to this process by studying the report presented and passing judgement on it.

The task of finding the optimum size of military expenditure is also closely bound up with this possible function. Thus the Committee on Questions of Defense and State Security, working jointly with other committees and commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, could present recommendations on the draft USSR State Budget and offer judgement as to whether its articles correspond to fundamental principles and planned measures in the sphere of defense and security. Strictly speaking, this should become the committee's most important task as a working organ of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Like any other committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Committee on Questions of Defense and State Security should, according to Article 123 of the USSR Constitution, participate in work on draft legislation and have the right of legislative initiative. For example, the committee's competence would evidently include the examination of draft laws on the state border, military service and the performance of military service, state and military crimes, and regulation of the activity of executive organs of state power in the sphere of defense and state security. It may be assumed that the committee would carry out a large quantity of work in connection with the elaboration of plans for the conversion of the defense industry in our country.

A further function of the new committee which would reflect the nature of the soviets as executive organs of power might be that of promoting the implementationn of laws and other decisions adopted by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet and the implementation of surveillance and control over the activity of state organs and organizations. According to Article 123, the recommendations of the committee would be subject to obligatory examination by corresponding state organs and social organizations (the Ministry of Defense, the KGB, the Voluntary Society for Collaboration with the Army, Air Force, and Navy, and others). According to the Constitution, a report must be made on the results of such an examination and measures taken within periods of time established by the committee. By way of an example, the committee could examine the state of affairs in the defense industry, questions of using its capacity for the production of consumer goods, questions of pre-draft training and the development of a system of military education, and cases of violations of the normative regulations governing the internal daily routine in the Army and relations between military servicemen.

In accordance with Article 123, the committee is obliged to pass judgements on candidatures for the post of minister of defense and chairman of the KGB. It would also be reasonable to allow the USSR Supreme Soviet, when appointing the supreme command of the USSR Armed Forces, to turn to the committee for judgements on the proposed candidatures for these posts.

The committee might examine questions of declaring mobilization and a state of war in those cases where circumstances permit this and when it is considered necessary by the USSR Supreme Soviet, whose sphere of competence embraces these questions (Article 113, Paragraph 13). With regard to the use of contingents of the USSR Armed Forces within the framework of their fulfillment of treaty obligations it should probably be stipulated that this problem, as a rule, be subject to preliminary study at sessions of the committee. Provision should also be made for a procedure according to which the Committee on Questions of Defense and State Security would also study treaties imposing such obligations upon us.

Treaties of another type which could be discussed in this committee and on which it would pass judgement are treaties on disarmament. The question may arise as to whether or not separate discussions will be necessary in the Defense Committee if a similar discussion is to be conducted in the Committee on International Affairs. As progress is made toward disarmament the treaties being concluded will acquire an increasingly complicated character, a fact already confirmed by the INF Treaty. Evidently, there is no particular sense in overburdening the Committee on International Affairs with obligations which do not form part of its direct functions by compelling it to give a skilled analysis of military-technical aspects of disarmament treaties and their conformity with the military and strategic interests of the country. The other committee would be quite capable of dealing with this, a committee which, by the nature of its activity, is more suited to making such an evaluation of the disarmament obligations being undertaken.

The Comittee on Questions of Defense and State Security was formed at the start of the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in the summer of 1989. Before recounting how the new committee set about its work, I would like to say a few words about foreign experience.

The U.S. Congress with its two Armed Services Committees is of prime interest here. These committees have to concern themselves with a military machine comparable in size to the one in our country. Implementing control, far from always approving the requests of military departments, and frequently adhering to positions which do not coincide in principle with those held by the executive they are the partners of that power in resolving the supreme task—that of increasing the return from every dollar spent on the needs of national security.

Much in the activity of our "Defense" Committee will inevitably differ from the activity of the congressional committees but there are three parameters on which they must be comparable—parameters which determine the efficiency with which such parliamentary formations work: the degree of access to information enjoyed by the executive power, the level of detail in which the defense budget is examined, and the quality of independent analytical backup. The time is not yet ripe for such a comparison—the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee is only just finding its feet. Therefore I will limit myself, due to lack of space among other things, just to selective

"food for thought" about one of the armed forces committees of the American Congress—the Armed Forces Committee of the House of Representatives. I will note that it is not a chance selection. This House of Representatives committee has established good, businesslike relations with our own committee. An American delegation headed by committee Chairman L. Aspin was received in the Soviet Union by the Committee on Questions of Defense and State Security and had the opportunity to share its experiences. As far as I am aware, the members of our committee gave it their fixed attention.

The House of Representatives Armed Services Committee has existed in its present form since 1947, but since as far back as 1822 it had contained two committees engaged in the separate study of military and naval questions. The committee examines various draft laws and programs relating to defense, military aspects of the use of nuclear power, civil defense, intelligence, and arms limitation. The committee's potential for influencing how defense policy is worked out grew when the powers of Congress were extended with regard to the day-to-day allocation of resources to various items of the military budget. The range of these powers increased comparatively recently, in spite of what accepted opinion suggests. As late as in 1963, for example, Congress obtained the right to confirm allocations to all scientific research and experimental design work of the Ministry of Defense.

The 52 members of the committee work in seven subcommittees, as follows: Research and Development, Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials, Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems, Readiness, Military Installations and Facilities, Personnel, and Investigations. In view of the fact that the Senate Armed Services Committee has its own specializations I will also enumerate its six subcommittees: Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence, Conventional Forces and Allied Defense, Projection Forces and Regional Defense, Defense Industry and Technology, Personnel, and Readiness, Sustainability, and Support. Working groups on individual problems have also been formed in both committees and their subcommittees.

Figures for 1987 offer an example of the intensity of the committee's work. There were 230 sessions and briefings of which 16 were sessions of the entire committee, that is to say that the bulk of the work was conducted in subcommittees and working groups. In March 1987, the working group on defense policy organized a series of hearings to elucidate the political and strategic context in which the military budget would be determined. The hearings were intended to produce answers to the following questions: What are the goals of the national security policy of the United States? What forces are necessary to attain them? Does the United States have such forces? If not, what does it lack? What is being undertaken to eliminate these shortcomings in the current budget and what is planned for the next five years? Other themes such as drug addiction among military servicemen and the hiring of women in the Armed Forces did not escape the committee's attention either. They examined the reasons behind the destruction of the frigate "Stark" in the Persian Gulf.

Hearings in the committee and the subcommittees are open to the public and the press, with the exception of those cases in which it is decided by a vote that they should be closed in order to protect national security should not be harmed. The results of nominal voting in the committee and the subcommittees are open to the public. Those who are invited to speak in the committee must submit the text of their report 48 hours in advance (24 hours if it contains secret information) and must expound only its basic theses in oral form. A further aspect of procedure which might be singled out is the fact that every member of the committee has the right to attach his or her own particular opinion on one question or another to the final report.

The work of the committee is backed up by about 50 experts and some 30 technical workers, and this does not take account of the fact that every member of the House of Representatives has his own staff of between seven and 20 people. The system of gathering information makes provision for sending delegations of committee members to various countries (in 1987, five delegations visited 15 countries) and for receiving foreign delegations (a total of nine in 1987).

Even the few facts cited confirm that the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee is a well tuned, lavishly financed, deeply informed, and authoritative legislative and control organ.

When the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet was determining the composition of its committees and commissions it emerged that the greatest number of applications was submitted for membership of the Committee on Questions of Defense and State Security. It ultimately comprised 43 members, including 21 members of the USSR Supreme Soviet and deputies from 11 republics (mostly from the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic [RSFSR]—a total of 25, counting nine deputies from social organizations resident on its territory; Armenia, Georgia, Kirgizia, and Turkmenia do not have a single representative on the committee) and from seven social organizations (13 deputies, of whom six are members of the CPSU). The members of the committee include first secretaries of oblast party committees [obkoms], chairmen of republican KGB organizations, general designers, general directors, metal workers, academicians, and a writer. There are seven strictly military figures on the committee. It is only to be regretted that no place was found for a single economist or jurist.

V.I. Lapygin, general designer and director of a scientific production association, was elected chairman of the committee. V.N. Ochirov, a people's deputy and commander of an airforce regiment, became his deputy. The committee has three subcommittees, as follows: The subcommittee on the Armed Forces, headed by Ye.P.

Velikhov, vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences; the Subcommittee on the Defense Industry, headed by M.P. Simonov, people's deputy and general designer at the P.O. Sukhoy machine-building plant; and the Subcommittee on State Security, headed by G.P. Kharchenko, first secretary of the Zaporozhye obkom of the Communist Party of the Ukraine.

Inside and outside the walls of the USSR Supreme Soviet the opinion has been voiced that the committee is dominated by representatives of the "Soviet military-industrial complex." Given the very conventional character of this term as applied to our realities there are, undoubtedly, formal grounds for this conclusion. It is not difficult to calculate that up to 90 percent of the committee's members are professionally connected, in one way or another, with the "Soviet military-industrial complex." Is there a conflict of interests here? To what extent may this affect the committee's abilities to fulfill its obligations efficiently, as the critics suggest?

In answering these questions V.I. Shabanov, member of the committee and deputy minister of defense responsible for armaments, shared his thoughts with us. Inasmuch as the committee needs feedback from the organs of executive power in charge of defense and state security, their representation on the committee is justified. We must take account of the full complexity of the questions which constitute the committee's sphere of competence and their importance for the vital functioning of the state. Even given its present composition it is evident that many members will need time to become familiar with the problems involved. The opinion is current that the military are supposedly interested in a large military budget for their own mercenary ends. This is an error. The most important thing for us is to provide reliable defense, remembering as we do so the errors which have been made in the past and remaining soberly aware of the fact that, in the same way as before, we are confronted with impressive military power.

Two positions—where is the truth? It can hardly be found in a purely speculative fashion. In the future, the results of the work of the "Defense" Committee will bring us to an optimal formula for selecting its composition. For the time being, the committee's greatest difficulty perhaps lies in the fact that its members, who hold responsible posts, are also so burdened by work over and above their obligations as deputies. It must also be stressed that the imposing figure of 90 percent was produced purely mechanically and that it should not be used to judge the qualitative characteristics of the committee. The political face of people's deputies is in no way determined by their profession or their post, but rather by their civic stance in the era of perestroyka. In this sense it is very indicative that some military members of the committee make up an interregional group which adheres to radical views.

We must be realists: A parliamentary committee which has just obtained accesss to the "holy of holies" of executive power for the first time could not have any other composition today. I believe that in this case it is the fact of access itself which is remarkable. Departments which have expended a great deal of energy and resources on maintaining a dense curtain of secrecy around their activity cannot liberate themselves from entrenched stereotypes and habits in a matter of a moment. This will be facilitated by the establishment of trust toward their "opposites" in the Supreme Soviet. I am prepared to express what may be a contentious thought, namely that the presence of a certain amount of healthy conservatism is a guarantee that the "Defense" Committee will function successfully in the structure of state power.

Finally, we must not fail to mention the particularities of the external situation in which the committee will work. The Soviet Union is already involved in the process of unilaterally eliminating the "excesses" of military power and it is evident that, in the near future, it will conclude agreements on even deeper bilateral reductions. In short, bold and far-reaching decisions have been made in the military sphere—unlike the economic one—and they are being implemented.

At the first stage of the committee's existence, the military sector was given priority. At a series of briefings Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the general staff, Marshal S.F. Akhromeyev, advisor to the chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and leaders of the Ministry of Defense made speeches which familiarized the members of the committee with official evaluations of the military-strategic situation and with the views of the Soviet command on ways of developing the Armed Forces. One would like to hope that in the future, alongside the regularly conducted closed briefings of military leaders, we will also open reports full of information on a daily basis, as is the case, in particular, in the United States and the other countries of NATO. As far as I am aware, the members of the committee also expect the same from the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff.

During three weeks of October 1989, the committee's working groups undertook a clause by clause analysis of the apportionments [postateynyye raskladki] of the draft Soviet defense budget. It must be admitted that very little time was available for such a serious matter. However, other committees and commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet had a good deal of time at their disposal when discussing the draft state budget proposed by the government. (By way of information: Examination of the federal budget by the U.S. Congress sometimes drags on for a period of up to 10 months). The study of the size of military expenditure and of budget priorities has been of a general nature, a factor facilitated by the lack of detail in available figures. Members of the committee are suggesting quite reasonably that they must be in a position equal to that of foreign parliamentarians, not only confirming allocations as a whole, for military purchases for example, but for each armaments program in isolation.

In the existing circumstances, when elaborating recommendations on the budget, the committee has devoted the greatest attention not to military but to social problems. (The committee's program has assigned prominence to the problem of the social protection of military servicemen). As V.L. Lapygin, the chairman of the committee, noted, the standard of living of military servicemen "is approaching the poverty line." Indeed, an intolerable situation has developed in which people who are in control of threatening weapons may, together with their families, inhabit a hostel for years and earn less than the driver of a trolleybus. it is precisely shortsighted social policy, and by no means the critical statements of the press, of which there are not that many on the whole, which have led to a decline in the prestige of the military profession. Having approved a military budget of R70.9 billion, the committee recommended that within that amount an additional R1.2 billion should be found for improving the material living conditions of officers, first and foremost of those who are poorly paid. This proposal met with approval in the Ministry of Defense.

The committee's ideology, which is now taking shape, shows a clear understanding of the need to organize open hearings. Hearings conducted on two themes at the time of preparing this article —the second half of October—deserve an encouraging evaluation: These were hearings on plans for the conversion of the defense industry (this was reported by V.I. Smyslov, deputy chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee) and on the USSR KGB Border Troops (accounts were given by V.A. Kryuchkov, chairman of the KGB, and Lieutenant General V.A. Matrosov, commander in chief of the Border Troops). They were quite informative.

However, it is evident that the committee is only just beginning to discover the potential of an instrument such as hearings in general and open hearings in particular. The place where they are held makes its mark on them: A diplomatic foyer, the oblong hall decorated with unexpressive landscapes in the Great Kremlin Palace. It seems that a more businesslike location would also have created a somewhat different psychological atmosphere, not to mention the fact that it might have been more suited to the use of audiovisual technology. At the same time, open hearings are not completely open: Neither representatives of the foreign press nor, more importantly, ordinary voters may attend, and for the latter the sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet are also closed. It is probable that these limitations, which are to a certain extent compulsory, are now promoting fuller "self-determination" in the work of the committee. Other justifying factors can also be found. At the same time, there are no trifles in parliamentary procedures—even small things influence the essence of the matter. In the future we must consider how these limitations might be removed without this being detrimental to our work. For the sake of fairness it must be added in spite of all the difficulties involved in the process of gearing up the voting process in our parliament, the committee plans to start publishing the proceedings of the hearings.

Maximum openness in the work of the committee is not a case of paying tribute to fashion or of curtseying to the Soviet and foreign public. It creates yet another guarantee of the irreversibility of the movement toward a law-governed state. Openness will arm the committee with the necessary authority and compel powerful departments to take account of its opinion, departments whose extreme and utterly groundless secrecy removes them de facto from effective control. What really constitutes a state secret and how far the regime of secrecy should extend are issues of principle and it seems that their rapid study should be included on the agenda of the "Defense" Committee.

Other aspects of the procedure for conducting hearings are also being refined. So far they have been reminiscent of a lecture with questions and answers, and not of a thorough examination of a problem in accordance with previously agreed strategy and tactics. There is an explanation of a general nature for this, one which the members of the Supreme Soviet have spoken of themselves on more than one occasion—they are only just ridding themselves of the role of supplicant with regard to executive power. The informational and analytical backup available is inadequate for the tasks faced by the committee and this is an obstacle to in-depth examination of the theme under discussion at open hearings and , indeed, in the course of closed ones.

In putting forward their programs, drafts, and legislative initiatives departments enlist the services of a large number of excellent specialists, who draw upon genuinely limitless sources of information. Critical evaluation of the activity of departments does not require such a vast army of experts but there is a need for quite a large group of associates—tens of people—preparing material for the committee and providing its members with all the information they need. Departments usually avoid alternatives in their elaborations; the associates of the committee should therefore present the deputies with an analysis of diverse variants for accomplishing a task and express these variants in terms of cost. (I liked the idea of V.L. Lapygin, the chairman of the committee, who proposed calculating the economic efficiency of the way in which state security is guaranteed). For example, the use of border troops to protect coastal economic zones is of great benefit to the national economy.

For the immediate future the committee can count upon the assistance of less than 10 associates, that is to say that the committee will be served by as many specialists as are attached to one member of the House of Representatives in the United States. What is more, the committee is in a special situation in comparison with other parliamentary committees and commissions, since the character of security problems limits the circle of people who might be approached for assistance on a nonpermanent staff basis.

The committee's computer equipment also leaves something to be desired. A single computer and, besides, one which is not connected to various data bases, will not

change things. Today, letters from voters are being stored in its memory, and I have been told that they contain businesslike proposals.

Reality is such that the Committee on Questions of Defense and State Security must overcome many organizational difficulties before it will have the freedom to operate on a broad scale. Meanwhile, the committee has far-reaching plans. Deputy Ye. P. Velikhov believes that the committee must get to grips with doctrinal questions, and determine what kind of armed forces we need and what kind of allocations are required to maintain them in a state of combat readiness. Defense expenditure is to decrease very shortly to R60 billion [figure as published], and for that reason we must determine precisely where the cuts are to be made. One of the most active members of the Committee, deputy V.S. Podziruk, sees potential for reduction in the elimination of those elements of the Armed Forces which do not guarantee their combat readiness (intermediate command and control echelons, for example division headquarters in some combat arms, political organs, sporting companies [sportroty], and so forth). Deputy V.M. Shabanov feels that a reduction in the number of specific types of arms [tipazhnost vooruzheniy] will also produce great economy of resources. From the point of view of Deputy N.D. Tutov, it will be expedient in connection with this to correct the present situation in which several design bureaus, sometimes as many as six, are engaged on the creation of one type of combat hardware.

Increasing the pace of its work is a more complicated matter for the Committee on Questions of Defense and State Security than it is for other working organs of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The success of its activity depends upon democratization and upon the political climate in the country to a greater extent that perhaps it does with regard to any other committee. Bearing all of this in mind I would like to conclude this review of the "Defense" Committee's first steps by saying that they instill a feeling of cautious optimism.

Kirichenko Notes Importance of Statistics

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[Article by Vadim Nikitovich Kirichenko, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Statistics, doctor of economic sciences: "Returning Credibility to Statistics"]

[Text] The growth of social activity and the insistent search for a way out of unfavorable crisis situations are also manifested in an increased interest in statistical information and in the growing torrent of criticism directed toward it. In these conditions, the most foolish course of action which people involved in the state statistical service can adopt is that of trying to save the "honor of their uniform" by trying to show that, in spite of individual shortcomings, which are being dealt with, the overall picture is not so bad. Society will not believe such assertions anyway, and not without reason: They do not correspond to reality.

After all, the practice of demonstrating successes and advantages and of hushing up difficulties and negative phenomena in the development of the country and its regions has predominated for decades. Statistics, like theory, have been forced to assume a distorted ideological function, a function which lies in creating an illusion of well-being and of the infallibility of the actions of the administrative command system. This type of "whitewashing" approach was also reflected in the very methodology of forming indices (of the rate of social production, the dynamics of prices, the level of consumption of foodstuffs, efficiency and losses) and in tendentious reviews, closed to society, of the methodology of forming data. There was no guarantee of their comparability with the standards, indices, and methods of formation accepted in the statistical practice of the developed countries and of international economic organizations. Distorted data about the rates, levels, and proportions of the country's socioeconomic development did not constitute a reliable basis on which to make the most important socioeconomic decisions.

Of course, many of the shortcomings of our statistical information are connected with the over reporting of performance and overt deception. The struggle against these phenomena demands unremitting attention. Nevertheless, the major damage inflicted upon the credibility of statistical data has come from the incomplete (or tendentious) nature of the methodology used to calculate them, and from the practice of adjusting them to serve current political tasks. Here are a few examples.

Not in ancient times but as recently as in the years of perestroyka, when assessing and publishing data for the years 1985 to 1987 on gross national product, gross social product, national income, and the real income of the population, adjustments were made to eliminate the influence on the dynamics of these indices of the reduction in the production and sale of alcoholic drinks. As a result, the growth rate of national income for 1985 and 1986 was hiked by a factor of approximately two. In fact, the national income produced in 1985 grew not by 3.5 percent but only by 1.6 percent, and in 1986 not by 4.1 percent but by 2.3 percent. It is not difficult to understand the extent to which such data are conducive to analyzing the situation and making well-grounded decisions. The USSR State Committee for Statistics [Goskomstat] has now eliminated these shortcomings. The following step was taken when evaluating the results for 1989. They have been given on the basis of calculating general indices not in the so-called constant prices [neizmennyye tseny] of 1983 but in current prices, with the exception of the influence of the actual rise in prices. Last year, national income increased by 2.4 percent, and gross national product by three percent.

Retail trade turnover must reflect the volume of commodities sold to the population in exchange for its

monetary income. However, according to existing methodology, it also includes the volume of nonfoodstuffs sold to organizations, institutions, enterprises, and collective farms [kolkhozes] for their current economic needs and the volume of foodstuffs sold to organizations in the sociocultural sphere (small-scale wholesale commodity trade). It includes the entire proceeds from sales of nonfoodstuffs on a commission basis, whereas it would be justified to count only that part of the commodity turnover of second-hand shops which is connected to (ready) cash circulation. There are elements of repeat calculation, first and foremost in the calculation of the volume of paid services. These include not only services rendered to the population but also those rendered to enterprises and organizations. The overall volume of repeat calculation and non-cash operations amounts to one-fifth of the net increase in retail trade turnover and paid services. Among the reasons for the net increase in retail trade turnover, recent Goskomstat publications single out the sale of alcoholic drinks, a rise in average group prices [srednegruppovyye tseny], and a growth of small-scale wholesale commodity trade. In 1989, for example, by comparison with the preceding year, the physical mass of foodstuffs and nonfoodstuff goods for sale to the population grew by 4.5 percent given an increase in the overall volume of trade turnover of 10.2 percent.

The unjustified inclusion of lard and its subproducts in the population's consumption of meat was dictated by a desire to embellish the real state of affairs. When such methods of calculation are rejected, the index for the average consumption of meat per head in 1988 falls to eight kilograms. The volume of grain reserves in our country has also been hiked (by a total of 12-15 million tonnes annually). After all, it was calculated together with water and unusable admixtures. Henceforth, we shall cite data which are in accordance with what is generally accepted in world practice, namely data on its weight after processing (that is to say not with the permissible rather than the actual level of moisture and contamination).

It is a comparatively simple matter to put an end to such evident absurdities and tendentious devices which make it possible to "improve" an index. It is far more complicated to overcome the schism which has been developing for decades between worldwide statistical culture and statistics in our country, and to bring our system of information into line with those approaches and standards which are accepted in international practice.

The main path leading to the accomplishment of this task is clear. We must learn to use the most important elements of the national accounting system in macroeconomic calculations and to integrate them with the system of balancing the national economy. However, this is much more easily said than done. After all, it will be necessary to fundamenatlly restructure the entire system of bookkeeping at enterprises. However complicated the task facing us may be, we have to accomplish it. Such an approach is in accordance with a developed system of commodity-monetary relations and finance and credit instruments, that is to say with those relations and institutions toward which we are also proceeding by developing and extending radical economic reform.

The first step in this direction was the introduction into USSR statistical practice of an index of gross national product which is constructed in accordance with the principles of the system of national accounting used by the United Nations. It characterizes the overall volume of economic activity in the country, uniformly embracing the spheres of material production, social and personal services, all types of incomes, and amortization. Today, a system of tables has already been elaborated which guarantee a transition from the balance of the national economy toward indices of a system of national accounting. We do not consider the fact that we recruited foreign experts and specialists in accounting to elaborate them to be shameful in any way. It is precisely the chance to rely on rich international experience which will make it possible for us to accomplish the most complicated tasks of the perestroyka of statistics with greater success.

Of course, we must approach the methodology of international comparisons of the most important indices of economic development in a fundamentally different way. The statistical service of the United Nations Organization is conducting such work in the interests of the entire international community. The first step toward the full inclusion of the USSR in this process will be bilateral comparison with the FRG and Austria. This will make it possible to refine our methodology and to create an internationally recognized basis for comparisons with other countries.

Accountability, and especially periodical accountability, is fearfully overburdened by operational production-technological information. The question of substantially reducing it has never been so urgent. After all, information is not a gift from nature but a product, on whose preparation vital and justified labor is expended. So, if we take only the processing of annual returns on capital construction in the computer centers of the organizations of Goskomstat, the cost is about R1 million, and simultaneous selective research into the incomes of the families of workers, white collar workers, and collective farm workers costs several hundred thousand rubles.

The correlation of demands for information with financial and labor potential and computer capacity is as necessary as it is in normal types of production activity, especially since these resources are limited. For example, the budget assigns R2,000 annually to the entire system of state statistics—including allocations to departmental science and the retraining of cadres. In 1989, the United States assigned about $2,000 billion to large- scale statistical programs alone. Of course, such direct comparisons cannot serve as a guide for budget planning but they must be taken into account when considering the means and scale of financing information activity in the country, and in particular statistical activity.

The final result of statistical work is characterized not only and even not so much by the determination of a "figure" but by the analytical conclusion which may be drawn from the data obtained. Analysis makes it possible to reveal the causes of phenomena, to show the influence and interaction of various factors, to evaluate the efficiency of the administrative measures being undertaken, and the possible economic and social consequences of the situation which is emerging. Unfortunately, it is precisely comprehensive and multiple analysis which remains the weak link in statistics in our country.

Of course, the prevailing emphasis on obtaining an index as such, the fragmented nature of statistical data, and the uncoordinated nature of the methodology of calculating conjugate parameters also make their mark. Nevertheless, I believe the main reason to be the break in the natural ties between statistics and economic science. From my experience in scientific work I am well acquainted with the way in which, in the course of decades, economic scientists have literally been kept on starvation rations where information is concerned.

For example, what kind of serious financial analysis can we speak of if the economic community has known little about the genuine condition of the state budget and the volume of state debt? After all, official publications have invariably reported that state income exceeds expenditure. At the same time, financial disproportions have deepened and become more and more dangerous. There has been a reduction in the most important types of income.

In 1987 and 1988, the payments of state enterprises and organizations from profit (income) fell by R10 billion but the profit which remained at the disposal of enterprises and organizations rose by almost R50 billion. Income from foreign economic activity fell in comparison with 1985 by R8.5 billion. Expenditures have substantially increased from year to year (by R33.7 billion on the national economy, R25.7 billion on sociocultural measures, and a further R11 billion on financing foreign economic activity). Subsidies from the budget on making up differences in the prices of individual types of output have also increased (by R20 billion) and as a share of the budget this expenditure has risen to 19 percent (from seven and one-half percent in 1970). This has been conditioned mainly by increased purchase prices for agricultural output and the introduction of increments to these prices. The gap between income and expenditure has been covered by drawing part of the state-wide loan fund into the budget. In 1989 alone, Goskomstat published figures characterizing the growth of such borrowings in the years of the 12th five-year plan period: They increased from R18 billion in 1985 to R90 billion in 1988. The public finally became aware of the fact that the share of resources taken from the state loan fund to cover budget expenditure had risen to almost 20 percent compared to two percent in 1970 and five percent in 1985, that many burning questions, including social questions, were being resolved on credit, at the expense of future earnings, and that there had been a significant increase in the country's national and foreign debt.

Of course, it is now possible to reproach economists to the effect that they did not immediately notice our troubles and sounded the alarm too late. However, it is strange to demand a precise diagnosis and efficient cure from a doctor while refusing to tell him what is the matter with the sick person.

Today, statistical workers themselves need the active involvement of science in the practical resolution of the tasks of improving methodology and deepening analytical work. Many problems must be researched, problems which still remain "blank spaces," do not have a scientific solution, and have not been assimilated by our statistics.

So, both in science and in practice, we have come up against the inadequate nature of traditional cost methods of determining the dynamics of economic growth in conditions of deep qualitative changes and structural shifts in production, the appearance of principally new types of goods and services, and an unprecedented growth in the role of intellectual forms of activity. The natural [naturalno-veshchestvennyye] aspects of the theory of the balanced nature of economic growth still prevail—it examines flows of output and factors of production. What is necessary today is an analysis in terms of market balance or imbalance, an analysis which makes it possible to take account of the purchasing power of the population and enterprises, the movement of prices, the supply of commodities and services, and the interaction of demand and prices. Only on this basis can we achieve unity of evaluation of material and financial-cost aspects of reproduction. We need a theoretical and analytical foundation in order to work out methods and indices for the statistical observation of inflationary processes. The list of insufficiently elaborated theoretical problems may be continued. One thing is clear: Cooperation between statistical organs and science may be objective and productive. An important condition for this is a radical extension of the glasnost of statistical information and of the methodology of its formation.

Recently, we have managed to expand the number of statistical publications and to reduce the list of information classified as secret. In accomplishing this task, we sometimes encounter objections which are strikingly original. For example, people say that the publication of detailed information on foreign economic policy, the scale of indebtedness, and expenditure on servicing it may have a negative influence on our relations with foreign banks, yet it is surely clear that this information is fully accessible to them anyway? Our existing vagueness with regard to the size of our reserves of currency and gold is the very thing which creditors like least of all. On the whole, in order to bring the level of openness of

our statistical information into line with universally accepted international norms, there is still a great deal of difficult work to be done.

Any item of statistics says little in itself if the methods used to calculate it remain secret. As methods are reviewed, a process which is now proceeding very intensively, Goskomstat intends to publish them. This will create favorable conditions for the provision of alternative calculations of indices by researchers and organizations not connected with state statistics.

As is well known, the practice of alternative calculations presupposes the observance of certain conditions which guarantee the interests and protect the rights both of state statistics and of those who plan to carry out an alternative calculation. First and foremost, this is ensured by unity of the initial statistical basis, openness and correctness of methodology of calculations, and the necessary competence on the part of those people who are elaborating the alternative evaluations. Unfortunately, against a background of justified mistrust of official information people frequently forget the significance of these manifest limitations. Genuinely fantastic figures are put into circulation.

Thus, a popular weekly journal cited "alternative calculations" of the share of national income represented by wages; these calculations had been made by one of its readers and confirmed by the editorial board. Forgetting that there are 12 months in a year, they divided the **monthly wage fund** by the **annual volume** of national income and concluded that the share represented by wages in our country is 10 times less than abroad. Hence a stupendous norm of exploitation. An arithmetical error turns into what is by no means harmless disinformation. In fact, the wages of workers in material production as a share of the national income produced by them (in actual prices) amounted to 46.9 percent in 1985 and to 48.3 percent in 1988. If we take the final breakdown of the national income (as a result of processes of redistribution), the share represented by the population's income grew over this period from 61.4 percent to 62.4 percent and the content of the nonproduction sphere and the accumulation within it from 23.8 to 24.7 percent. In all cases, the trend is toward an increase in the share of the population and the nonproduction sphere. Also characteristic is a commentary in the journal on data with regard to the volume of social consumption funds (R175 billion in 1988): They are said to be "used 100 percent by our elite." Well, we must know at least the composition of social funds. They are spent on the free services of education, health care, and physical culture, on maintenance of the housing fund (R81.5 billion) and on monetary allowances (about R94 billion). The latter include pensions, benefits paid in case of temporary incapacity for work, to mothers with many children, single mothers, and children in underprivileged families, and the payment of aanual leave for workers. Not only the so-called elite gets ill, goes on paid leave, is in the position of a single mother, and sends its children to creches and kindergartens, schools and pioneer camps. Receipts from social consumption funds in families with an average income per head of up to R75 amount to 29 percent of total income, and in families with an average income of R75-100—21.8 percent. This share is almost two to three times lower (10.6 percent) in families with an income of over R200.

It is possible and necessary to discuss the scale of social funds and each of their elements, to criticize the specific mechanism of distribution and the selection of priorities. However, why distort evident facts? After all, even if a lie is used not to glorify something but to overturn it, it nevertheless remains a lie.

Today, the calculation of price indexes is the main link in the entire chain of problems connected with the credibility of socioeconomic information, and the basis of the realistic evaluation of the dynamics of the most important general economic indices. Attention to price changes on the consumer market is particularly intense. For many years, statistics confirmed a virtual absence of price rises on the consumer market. Their own experience has convinced millions of people of the reverse. In such a situation society is prepared to believe almost any figure characterizing the rates of price increases if that figure is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, the trustworthy calculation of price indexes and the cost of living is a complicated and very labor intensive statistical operation. In the United States, for example, approximately $65 million is allocated for this purpose. For this very reason, I view with a certain distrust specialists who make ready use of their own evaluations of rates of inflation without detailed discussion of the question of the sources of the data and methods of working with them.

According to calculations made in 1989 by Goskomstat, between 1971 and 1988 the index of average prices, taking account of the kolkhoz market, grew by more than 40 percent. Between 1986 and 1988 the net increase in average prices of the purchases made in state trade, consumer cooperation, and the kolkhoz market (without taking account of changes in prices for goods produced by cooperatives and individual labor activity) amounted to 7.2 percent, of which 11.7 percent were foodstuffs and 3.2 percent were nonfoodstuffs. Price changes did not occur evenly. In some groups of commodities their growth was very noticeable, and this was felt acutely by the population. The most substantial average growth was in prices for sausage products (18.5 percent), meat conserves (13.9 percent), potatoes (22.8 percent), vegetables (11.6 percent), bread and bakery products (22.3 percent), and alcoholic drinks (46.5 percent). Among nonfoodstuff commodities, the most rapid price increases were on clothing and underwear (13.8 percent), refrigerators and freezers (10 percent), televisions (7.8 percent), wool cloth (8.7 percent), and automobiles (7.2 percent).

The share of the overall volume of commodity turnover in 1988 represented by commodities whose average price rose amounted to 54.4 percent in terms of the prices which actually emerged. The influence of this group of

commodities on the average index of prices is weakened by the dynamics of prices for other commodities.

Commodities whose prices remained virtually unchanged between 1986 and 1988 (the indexes of prices were within the limits of 99.5 to 100.5 percent) amounted to 25.3 percent of the overall volume of sale of output in 1988. In particular, these commodities include: Fish, butter and vegetable oil, margarine, milk products, cheese, eggs, sugar, washing machines, electric floor polishers, and synthetic washing agents.

During this period there was a fall in the level of average prices for confectionery products, herrings, fish conserves, leather and rubber footwear, cotton, silk, and linen fabrics, carpets and rugs, tape recorders, cameras, and so forth. Output for which prices fell amounted to 19.4 percent of commodity turnover.

Otherwise, under priviliged families were worst affected by the price shifts indicated: Where the average per capita income was less than R75, the price increases affected almost two-thirds of the commodities they purchased.

It is not difficult to notice that the list of commodities whose prices increased contains a predominance of objects of everyday use, and this was felt particularly painfully. It is hardly necessary to prove that an increase in the price of bread and potatoes cannot compensate for a decrease in the price of cameras.

Determining the index of prices makes it possible to approach the characteristics of inflation (the process of the devaluation of money). However, at least two questions arise here: Is it correct to take data on the average costs of the purchase of commodities as the basis for our calculations and, in our conditions, is the growth of prices a faithful reflection of inflation?

The index of list prices, which ruled our statistics for many years, only takes account of price changes which are being implemented legislatively. It does not reflect the increase in prices of new commodities and the influence of many other forms of hidden price increases. At the same time, it must be recognized that the index of average prices, whose dynamics I was speaking of above, is influenced by the natural process of the change in technological and economic parameters and in the quality of the output being produced. As is well known, price changes in accordance with shifts in the quality of commodities are not a factor of inflation.

In 1989, in order to determine more objectively the real increase in prices which characterizes the increase or decrease in customer expenditure calculated per unit of consumer value, Goskomstat organized the registration of prices on a selection of representative commodities. A total of 650 representative commodities were taken from a selective network of state trading outlets in all 150 oblast, kray, and republican centers.

This method makes it possible to calculate the dynamics of list prices for comparable output, the appearance of new types of products, and the influence of contractual and temporary prices. It reflects the change in consumer expenditure on one unit of consumer value of a particular quality of commodity, and excludes the influence of shifts in assortment and structure. The summary index of prices of the representative commodities being registered takes account of the influence of prices and of the volume of output sold in state trade, consumer cooperation, and on the kolkhoz market, and also of the influence of cooperatives and individual labor activity. It is precisely these merits which explain its extensive use in world practice to calculate inflation on the consumer market.

When a significant part of prices is established by directive, visible price inflation is also accompanied by another specific form of inflation—suppressed inflation. The mechanism of its formation lies in forestalling a growth of incomes by comparison with the increase of commodity resources. This has been particularly noticeable in recent years. In 1989, monetary incomes rose by 12.9 percent, but the population's expenditure on goods and services rose by only 9.1 percent. The result is an accumulation of unsatisfied solvent demand [platezhesposobnyy spros] (in the form of a net increase of surplus savings in the Savings Bank and in the population's hands). In conditions of free price formation, consumer prices might rise to the size of the unsatisfied solvent demand.

According to the research carried out (registration of prices for goods and tariffs for services) the growth of consumer prices amounted to two percent in 1989. This is the price component of inflation. Its hidden part, conditioned by an increase in suspended [otlozhennyy] solvent demand, attained a level of five and one- half percent. Thus, according to initial evaluations, the overall rise in inflation in the consumer sector totalled seven and one-half percent. In particular, this means that the growth of prices conditioned approximately one-quarter, and the exacerbation of the deficit three-quarters of the overall scope of inflationary processes.

According to Goskomstat, the entire accumulated unsatisfied demand of the population for goods and services has increased to R165 billion. If we were to try to eliminate it by way of free price formation according to the laws of the market, prices for consumer commodities would have to rise immediately by a minimum of 40 percent. This would lead to extremely undesirable and acute social consequences. Such is the worth in the contemporary situation of proposals to make a "radical" and immediate transition to free market relations on the consumer market.

Statistical analysis of the structure of inflation reveals the major areas in which we struggle against it. First of all, we must concentrate on overcoming suppressed inflation, since it is particularly destructive both on the economic and the social plane. This involves increasing

the production of goods and services, extending the range of benefits liable to market realization and the sphere of paid services, and introducing genuinely commercial principles in the organization of trade. Rigid tax regulation of income will also be required. Incomes can and must grow, but only in line with the end results of production. Otherwise, an increase in the population's monetary income loses meaning from the point of view of a real improvement in peoples' material situation in the observance of real social justice in our society. Measures must be taken to immobilize the monetary savings of the population and of enterprises. There is no need to invent mechanisms for carrying out such a policy, they are already well known. These are loans, the formation of obligatory financial reserves of enterprises, and a flexible interest rate policy stimulating long-term forms of investment for free financial resources.

The successful implementation of a complex of anti-inflationary measures creates natural prerequisites for restraining the growth of prices. After all, on a balanced market, in conditions of competing producers, income is easily spent. What is complicated is obtaining it.

In point of fact, attempts to deal with inflation by freezing prices, in spite of their apparent radicality, only change the correlation of the forms which inflationary processes take. Life will not improve if the entire power of these processes manifests itself in a further exacerbation of the deficit and an increasing disintegration of the market. As a category of commodity-monetary relations, inflation must also be extinguished by market methods with the help of financial and monetary regulation.

Calculating indexes of prices and tariffs for services allows us to adopt a new approach toward analyzing the dynamics of the population's standard of living by social and income groups and toward working out measures to intensify social protection. Study of the standard of living of underpriviliged strata of the population requires particular attention.

First and foremost, let us consider the quantative characteristics of the problem. Although the share of the population with low incomes has fallen in recent years, it still remains significant (in 1980, 68.6 million people, or 25.8 percent of the population, had an average joint income per head of up to R75, and in 1988 the corresponding figure was 36 million people or 12.6 percent).

In underpriviliged families, more than one-half of their income is spent on food (the average for the population as a whole is one-third). At the same time this expenditure, calculated per family member, is lower than the average expenditure for all families by a factor of almost two, and on the purchase of non-food commodities it is lower by a factor of almost three.

One-half of the underpriviliged come from families with many children. According to the results of selective research on the incomes of 310,000 families for March 1989, the average joint income per head of all the families amounted to R124; for families with two children this figure was R108, and for families with three or more children—R66 (R71 for workers and office workers and R53 for kolkhoz workers). Pensioners make up one-fifth of the underpriviliged population and single mothers account for the same proportion.

More than one-half of those who have an average per capita income of R75 per month are inhabitants of the republics of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan, 26 percent live in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], 12 percent in the Ukraine, four percent in Georgia and Armenia, three percent in Belorussia and Moldavia, and one percent in the Baltic republics.

The lot of underpriviliged families is frequently exacerbated by difficult housing conditions. Twenty-two percent of urban families of workers and office workers with an average joint income per head of R75 have less than five square meters of living space per head.

The task of overcoming underprivilege requires active policy, reinforced by the allocation of very substantial financial and material resources. Success is guaranteed here if the policy being implemented rests on a deep statistical analysis of the content and structure of the problem. Only this will make it possible to elaborate measures which take account of the demographic type of underpriviliged families and specific regional features.

Any large-scale socioeconomic decision affects a whole complex of interconnected processes. We cannot rid ourselves of the problem without revealing these processes and making provision for compensating measures. For example, the increase in the minimal size of pensions as of 1 October 1989 will lead to a significant decrease (although not to the complete disappearance) in low income groups of pensioners. Their number will fall by a factor of two. The growth of pensioners' incomes will involve increased demand for foodstuffs, cheap clothing and footwear, and medicines. In 1990, the net increase in monetary income resulting from the rise in the minimum size of pensions will amount to approximately R6.5 billion. According to an evaluation made by Goskomstat specialists, about 45 percent of this sum will be used to purchase foodstuffs, one-fifth to acquire nonfoodstuff commodities, and approximately one-tenth to pay for services. Knowing the structure of the consumption of underpriviliged groups of pensioners, it may be assumed that satisfaction of the newly emerged demand will required the additional production of approximately 470,000 tonnes of meat products, 2.2 tonnes of milk products, 2 billion eggs, and 1.4 million tonnes of potatoes, vegetables, and gourds. If we do not guarantee an increase in resources which corresponds to the structure of consumer demand, a rise in monetary income will not produce the desired social result.

If measures to overcome underprivilege are to be effective they must have the clearest possible direction, and must work to satisfy a specific requirement on the part of a particular group of the population. For example, a reduction in the cost of medicines, communal services,

and travel on public transport for elderly people and invalids. The same must apply to additional, advantageously priced food for pregnant women, mothers who are breast feeding, and young children in underpriviliged families, and subsidies on the purchase of childrens' clothing and footwear.

Underprivilege is usually connected with a need to extend the social assistance rendered by the state or by enterprises. However, there is one further important reserve which has so far remained untapped—an increase of the share of the working population in republics with a high proportion of underprivileged families.

The 1989 census showed a significant share of the population of working age who are not participating in social production and not studying—about 6 million people (not counting those occupied on individual smallholdings). The populations with the highest proportion of unemployed are those of Azerbaijan and the republics of Central Asia.

Unfortunately, we still have a clearly inadequate amount of information at our disposal for a detailed analysis of the causes of unemployment and of the proportion of it which is involuntary (unemployment in the strict sense). In order to assemble the data necessary for implementing a policy of rational and full employment we must resolve a number of difficult methodological and organizational problems.

Questions of interrepublican economic ties have recently been acquiring a particularly acute character. In view of the complexity and the economic and, indeed, even political significance of the problem there is a need to pay particular attention to improving the statistical methods of its study—interregional interbranch balances and statistics on deliveries.

Almost one-quarter of the gross social product is involved in commodity turnover between the union republics. As a rule, the smaller the republic, the greater the share of exports in its production and of imports in its consumption. The greatest proportion of consumption accounted for by imports (27-29 percent) is characteristic of the Georgian, Moldavian, Kirgkhiz, Tajik, amd Armenian Soviet Socialist Republics [SSR] and for the Baltic republics. In 1988, five republics (the RSFSR, the Belorussian SSR, the Azerbaijan SSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Georgian SSR) showed a positive balance in interrepublican exchange of output (exports in excess of imports).

Research into the foreign economic ties of the republics (their exports and imports) has shown that there are only three republics (the RSFSR, the Uzbek SSR, and the Tajik SSR) in which the volume of exports exceeds the volume of imports. In all the other republics, currency receipts from exports were insufficient to cover those allocated to their share of import deliveries. For example, in intraunion prices actual imports in 1987 exceeded the amount of possible imports (conditioned by foreign currency receipts from republican exports) by a factor of 3.8 in Moldavia, 4.3 in Turkmenia, and 14 in Armenia. It is true that the absolute quantities of imports were not large. The excess for the Baltic republics taken together amounted to a factor of slightly more than two.

Let us note that the disproportions being examined reflect the consequences of the division of labor which has taken shape in the national economy over many decades, regardless of the will of the republics themselves. Furthermore, the existing economic mechanism in no way links the income of a republic's workers to the economic efficiency of the production situated in their territory. Finally, the incomes of enterprises situated on the territory of one republic or another (and belonging, for the most part, to union departments) are by no means the same thing as the incomes of republican and local budgets which are used for the benefit of the local population. That is why, however impressive the figures above may be, it is incorrect to use them to substantiate the "injustice" of interrepublican exchange. It is even less permissible, proceeding on the basis of these figures, to accuse the population of any of the republics of living at the expense of others. Such calculations are necessary and useful for scientific and practical purposes to analyze a rational all-Union division of labor. However, they cannot in any way emerge as incontrovertible arguments in the defense of direct political conclusions.

The economic results of the exchange of output between republics are influenced by the incomplete correlation of prices for raw material resources and ready output, and the irrational mechanism for implementing turnover tax and paying subsidies on meat, milk, and other types of output. The reform of pricing must eliminate many such imperfections. However, we can avoid them in our calculations if the flows of output being exchanged are evaluated in world prices. There is much talk and much argument today about who wins and who loses in this case, frequently on the basis of incidental and unreliable data.

Goskomstat carried out an analysis of interregional flows in world prices. In this case, as was to be expected, the situation of those republics which export fuel is improving (the balance of imports and exports) and that of the republics where light industrial goods make up a significant share of exports is growing worse. That is why in all union republics (apart from the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Turkmen SSR) the overall balance of imports and exports of output in world prices is worse than the balance in internal prices. To take 1988 as an example, for the Baltic republics, the Moldavian SSR, and the Georgian SSR, the deterioration in the above balance measured in world prices by comparison with the balance measured in internal prices was equivalent to a loss of approximately one-tenth of national income.

So, using world prices, the Moldavian SSR would have to pay more for the import of oil products, metal, machines, and equipment. It would receive 2.7 times less for exports

of the output of its food industry because world prices are 1.9 times lower for wine products, 4.2 times less for fruit and vegetables, four times loess for tobacco, and 3.1 times less for meat and meat products. The republic would gain on imports of chemical products and light industrial goods, but this would not compensate for the losses sustained on other import and export items.

However, the main task of improving regional statistics does not of course in any way lie in calculating who "owes" what to whom. This question cannot be answered unless the internal market functions normally. Calculations in world market prices represent quite a useful analytical device but its significance should not be overrated. As long as internal prices remain separate from world prices too many conditional assumptions have to be made. What is far more important than busying ourselves with fruitless arguments about redividing the social pie is developing balanced statistics at the regional level, including elaboration of the balance of the social product, the balance of basic funds, the largest sectors of the summary financial balance and of all the most important summary indices of socioeconomic development—national income, the net output of enterprises in the material production sphere, gross national product, the total volume of consumption of material goods and services, and generalizing indices of the efficiency of social production. Only in this way is it possible to place the development of regional self-management and self-financing on a solid informational base.

Our statistics, whose development is closely connected with the Zemstvo system [elective local councils at guberniya and uyezd level, composed of members of the gentry, with other classes usually less represented due to differential electoral rights] enjoyed well-deserved authority for its honesty and professionalism. Zemstvo statistics were used by the Bolsheviks and the Cadets to substantiate fundamentally different positions. However, on the whole we may rely on their credibility. Strictly, only in such a situation is it possible to have a normal public discussion on economic and political problems, the healthy deveopment of economic theory.

The politicization of statistics and its transformation into a servant of power structures has inflicted a severe blow to its prestige. I think that the most important task of statistical organs today is that of providing credible data and, on this basis, regaining the trust of the Soviet and international public. The country can no longer seek the correct path via the "kingdom of crooked mirrors."